Sh.Moolchand Malhotra & Anr. vs Sh. Suresh Kumar Singhal Since Deceased Through His Wife Santosh Singhal

$~8
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27.10.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010414202025
+ RC.REV. 194/2025 & CM APPL. 39621/2025 (Stay)
SH. MOOLCHAND MALHOTRA & ANR. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Mansi Bajaj, Mr. Nitin
Prakash and Ms. Sweta
Chaudhary, Advocates.

versus

SH. SURESH KUMAR SINGHAL SINCE DECEASED
THROUGH HIS WIFE SANTOSH SINGHAL
.....Respondent
Through: None.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)

1. The present Revision Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ( “DRC Act” ), seeks to assail the
Order dated 24.03.2025 ( “Impugned Order” ), passed by the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi ( “ARC” ) in the Eviction Petition, being RC ARC No. 378/2019
( “Eviction Petition” ), titled “Shri Suresh Kumar Singhal (Since
deceased) through his wife Santosh Singhal vs. Sh. Moolchand
Malhotra” .
2. By way of the Impugned Order, the Application seeking Leave
to Defend, filed by the Petitioners herein came to be dismissed and,
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 1 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

consequently, an Eviction Order came to be passed in favour of the
Respondent herein in respect of tenanted premises being, a shop on
the ground floor admeasuring 25ft x 8ft situated in premises bearing
No. 2483, Gali No. 8, Beadon Pura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi -110005
( “Subject Premises” )
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, at the
outset, submits that the challenge to the Impugned Order is confined
to two grounds, namely, first , that the ground of bona fide requirement
forming the basis of the Eviction Petition ceased to subsist during the
pendency thereof and, secondly , that certain evidence having a
material bearing on the adjudication of the Application seeking Leave
to Defend could not be placed on record before the learned ARC,
despite the learned ARC granting the liberty to bring on record the
same at later stage of the proceedings.

4. Elaborating upon the first limb of the challenge, learned counsel
for the Petitioners contends that during the course of the eviction
proceedings, the Respondent, for whom the bona fide requirement was
espoused, passed on and, therefore the bona fide requirement, for
which eviction of the Petitioners was sought, ceased to exist.
5. Learned counsel for the Petitioners further submits that the
learned ARC erroneously held that the bona fide requirement in
respect of the Subject Premises sustained, even upon passing on of the
Respondent, since the bona fide requirement existed and was espoused
on behalf of the wife of the Respondent as well. Learned counsel
submits that the said finding is erroneous and not borne from the
record since no document was put before the learned ARC, in support
of the bona fide need of the wife of the Respondent, to substantiate
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 2 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

that the Subject Premises were required by her as well.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioners, therefore, submits that there
existed no bona fide requirement at the relevant time when the
Application seeking Leave to Defend was adjudicated and finally
decided by the learned ARC, which is an essential element of the
statutory requirement under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and,
therefore, the Eviction Order could not have been passed by the
learned ARC.
7. Turning to the second limb of the challenge, the learned counsel
for the Petitioners submits that certain material evidence, which would
have had a bearing on the adjudication of the Eviction Petition, could
not be placed on record before the learned ARC. In this regard,
reliance is placed upon the Order dated 02.12.2024, passed by the
learned ARC, whereby the Petitioners were permitted to withdraw
their Application under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, seeking admission denial of a recorded conversation and its
transcript between the son of the Petitioner with the deceased
Respondent and his wife, and in case of dispute for sending of voice
sample to FSL, with liberty to file a fresh Application at a later stage,
if so required.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that the period
between the passing of the aforesaid Order and the Impugned Order
was too short to enable the Petitioners to place the said documents on
record. It is, therefore, contended that the failure to consider the
material, which the Petitioners had been permitted to bring on record
at a subsequent stage, vitiates the adjudication of the Application
seeking Leave to Defend.
9. No other submissions were advanced by the learned counsel
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

appearing on behalf of the Petitioners.
ANALYSIS:
10. We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioners and, with her able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
11. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction, sought to be invoked by way
of the present Petition, vested in this Court under the proviso to
Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
12. The contours of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 25-B
of the DRC Act are well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla
1
Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum
2
Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-
3
Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has consistently held that the jurisdiction
exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be
equated with the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
13. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
4
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
5
Grover .
14. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against

1
(1998) 8 SCC 119
2
(2014) 9 SCC 78
3
(2022) 6 SCC 30
4
2024:DHC:9322
5
2025:DHC:11285
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 4 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

15. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra) , a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra) ,
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17. This Court, having regard to the limited scope of revisional
jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act, as discussed
hereinabove, deems it appropriate to first consider the second limb of
the challenge, which pertains to the Petitioners’ inability to place
certain evidence on record prior to the passing of the Impugned Order.
18. A perusal of the record reflects that, vide Order dated
02.12.2024, the Petitioners were, in fact, granted liberty to withdraw
their Application under Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872, with liberty to institute a fresh Application at a later stage,
if so required. The said liberty, however, did not dispense with the
requirement of taking appropriate steps to bring the alleged evidence
on record in accordance with law and, as is evident from the material
placed before this Court, no fresh Application seeking to place the
said evidence on record was filed before the learned ARC prior to the
passing of the Impugned Order.
19. In these circumstances, the Petitioners cannot fault the learned
ARC for not considering material which had not been placed before it
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 6 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

for consideration or cannot render the Impugned Order vitiated. The
submission that the period between the Order dated 02.12.2024 and
the Impugned Order dated 24.03.2025 was insufficient, by itself, does
not establish any procedural irregularity or infirmity in the decision-
making process. The Petitioners inability to put on record the material
in time, as had been permitted, cannot in any manner be canvassed to
be an error on the part of the learned ARC or an error meriting
interference in revisional jurisdiction.
20. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the absence of any
material demonstrating that the Petitioners were prevented from
availing themselves of the liberty granted, or that the learned ARC
otherwise failed to consider a request properly made before it, this
ground of challenge does not warrant interference by this Court in the
exercise of limited scope of revisional jurisdiction exercisable by this
Court. The second limb of the challenge, accordingly, fails.

21. Adverting now to the first limb of challenge, the essential
questions upon which adjudication thereof necessarily turns is whether
the bona fide requirement espoused by the Respondent for obtaining
the possession of the Subject Premises was restricted to that for the
Respondent himself or extended to include the Respondent’s wife as
well, and as how, in respect thereof, the aspect of bona fide
requirement has been dealt with by the learned ARC in the Impugned
Order.
22. To answer the aforesaid questions, it would be necessary to first
examine the case originally pleaded by the Respondent in their
Eviction Petition before the learned ARC. The relevant portions
thereof read as under:
“ 6. That the petitioner aged about 78 years old and is a senior
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

citizen and in occupation on the first floor of the property in
question residing with his wife aged 60 years and is a patient of
various ailments such as acute Arthritis, Hypertension, heart
disease etc.
7. That on the account coupled with old age, climbing of stairs is
very difficult for the petitioner as well as his wife. Considering the
various ailments of petitioner, the doctor advised the petitioner
against climbing of stairs. That the petitioner has received a major
heart attack and the doctors at Metro Hospital had applied stent in
the year 2013. The petitioner is under the continuous treatment and
is very difficult to use stairs in the property. Copies of medical
treatments are annexed as ANNEXURE-F (COLLY).
8. That petitioner wants to renovate the ground floor and desires to
convert the entire ground floor into residential accommodation for
the purpose of avoiding the climbing of stairs as advised by doctor
being having knee problems to climb the stairs. That on account of
the said reasons the petitioner number of times requested the
respondent to vacate and hand over the possession of the tenanted
shop peacefully so that the petitioner may convert the entire ground
floor into residential accommodations but the respondent on
hearing so threatened the petitioner and his wife to face dire
consequences. The threat as extended by the respondent is to such
an extent that the petitioner and his wife are living in the premises
under constant fear and threat of their lives and property.
9. That the petitioner having three daughters and were residing with
their respective matrimonial houses after their marriage outside of
Delhi. The family members of the married daughters frequent
visitors to the premise of the petitioner and used to stay for many
days and the petitioner and his wife face great difficulty to arrange
the space for their stay. The petitioner is facing great hardship due
to paucity of accommodation.
10. That neither the petitioner nor his wife have available any
alternative accommodation except the premises under occupation.
11. That there are three shops including the shop under inception of
respondent in the ground floor of the property and looking into the
old age and suffering from various ailments of petitioner as
mentioned above, the petitioner aged 78 years and his wife aged
about 60 years wants to use the entire ground floor for their
residential use, hence the present application.
12. That the petitioner requires the tenanted premises bonafidely
for himself and his family members. There is no alternate
reasonable residential accommodation available with the petitioner
to meet his bonafide requirements.”
(Emphasis supplied)

23. A perusal of the aforesaid portion of the Eviction Petition
makes it manifest that the original Petitioner i.e. , the Respondent
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

herein pleaded that he and his wife were residing on the first floor of
the Subject Premises; that owing to their age and the difficulty in
climbing stairs, they wished to convert the ground floor into
residential accommodation due to paucity of space for visiting
members of the family, including their daughters; and that neither of
them had any alternative accommodation available to meet their
requirement.
24. A plain reading of the aforesaid averments demonstrates that
the Eviction Petition refers to the difficulties faced by both spouses
and expressly states that the requirement pleaded was not confined to
the personal use of the Respondent alone, but expressly encompassed
the residential needs of his wife and his family members as well.
25. However, in view of the submission of the Petitioners that there
existed nothing before the ARC to substantiate the bona fide
requirement of the Respondent’s wife, the demise of the Respondent,
constituted a subsequent event which could have had a bearing on the
relief sought and, therefore, warranted consideration by the learned
ARC.
26. In this regard, it would therefore be apposite to examine as to
how the learned ARC dealt with the subsequent demise of the
Respondent and assessed the subsisting requirement of his wife. The
relevant observations in the Impugned Order read as under:
“ BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT
9) Moving forward, in order to succeed in his petition, petitioner is
required to establish his bonafide need. Petitioner has averred that
he requires the tenanted premises for the residence of himself, his
wife and for providing space/accommodation to the visiting
daughters. However, it is contended on behalf of the respondent
that the sole purpose of the present petition is to evict the
respondent and sell the property. But the Hon'ble Supreme court in
Baldev Singh Bajwa vs Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 has held
that whenever a landlord seeks eviction of the tenant for bonafide
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

need, the controller shall presume the need as genuine and bonfide.
Additionally, the burden to refute the said presumption squarely
lies on the tenant and mere assertion on the part of tenant is
insufficient. Hence, mere assertion of the respondent in this regard
does not amount to any triable issue. Further, in this regard, the
provision of Section 19 (2) of DRC Act is to be emphasized which
protects a tenant in case the landlord recovers possession of any
premises and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by
the person for whose benefit the premises are held within two
months of obtaining such possession or having obtained the
possession, the same are re-let to any other person within three
years from the date of obtaining the possession. Thus, the said
contention is also devoid of merits.
10) Secondly, it is contended that at the time of execution of rent
deed, father of the respondent had also paid pagri amount of Rs.
2.25 Lacs. However, the said contention is devoid of merits. In this
regard reliance is placed upon the case of Puran Chand Aggarwal
Vs. Lekh Raj RC Rev. No. 291/2012 decided by the Hon'ble High
Court of Delhi on 16.04.2014, the following was held:-
“31. As regards the argument of the petitioner that he has
spent 2,50,000/- in construction and has also paid
2,25,000/- to the petitioner's brother as per agreement, the
original agreement was not filed in the trial court. Even
otherwise, in case any amount is paid to the brother of the
respondent that has no relevance to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. Similar is the case of
spending money for construction. The petitioner is entitled
to recover the said amount, if recoverable in law. The said
plea taken by the petitioner does not help the case of the
petitioner and it is not a triable issue.
11) Thirdly, it is contended that the petitioner has become
infructuous since the petitioner has already expired. It is stated that
the present petition was filed for the bonafide need of the petitioner
since he was suffering from medical ailments and finding it
difficult to climb stairs. It is therefore stated that since he has
already expired, therefore, the need no longer exists. It is trite to
state that the matters are to be decided on the basis of
circumstances existing at the time of filing of petition and not on
the basis of subsequent events. However in “Atma S. Berar Vs.
Mukhtiyar Singh” AIR 2003 SC 624, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
of India observed that “the power of the Court to take note of
subsequent events is well settled and is accompanied by three
rider: Firstly, the event should be brought promptly to the notice of
Court; Secondly, it should be so brought to notice consistent with
the procedure and affording opposite party an opportunity of
meeting it; and Thirdly, the event must have material bearing on
right to relief of any party.” In the present matter, the factum of
death of the petitioner already stands brought to the notice of the
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 10 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

court promptly by way of application on the part of the respondent.
The said fact has also taken on record by way of order dated
02.12.2024. Therefore, the said fact cannot be ignored since it has
material bearing on the projected bonafide need.
12) However, at the same time, it is also pertinent to note that the
petitioner averred not only his personal need but also that of his
wife who is also a senior citizen. Additionally, the petitioner has
also mentioned that he requires space for visiting daughters who
are married out of Delhi. Reliance is placed upon the case of Dr.
Jitender Mohan Gulati Vs. Hira Lal Singh, 2019 (2015) DLT
489, it was held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi as under:-
“....... The fact that Hira Lal has mentioned two bonafide
requirements i.e. to start the business for himself and the
other for expansion of business of his son would not nullify
his bonafide requirement. There is no requirement in the
law that while filing an eviction petition under Section 14
(1) (e) of DRC Act, the landlord must restrict himself to

only one bonafide requirement”.
“......... Merely because the landlord has multiple
requirements of the tenanted premises, his eviction
petition cannot be dismissed on ground of vagueness or
that he is confused about the requirement. It will be for
the landlord to use the same for the more pressing
requirements and the Court cannot dictate the same.”
13) Therefore, it cannot be held that the present eviction petition
has become infructuous. The need of the petitioner may have been
been extinguished on his death but the need of of his wife still

survives.
14) It is contended that the medical documents filed of the
petitioner are false. However, as discussed above he has already
expired. Further, as far as the need of the wife of petitioner is
concerned, it is not in dispute between the parties that she is a
senior citizen. Therefore, independent of the medical documents,
judicial notice can be taken on fact that in old age, senior citizens
find it difficult to climb stairs due to various health issues as well
as knee ailments. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondent that
there is any lift in the subject premises, which would ease the need
of the wife of the petitioner to climb stairs. In this regard, reliance
is placed upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court in
Amit Khandelwal and Anr. vs. Hem Chand Aluria, RC. Rev.
380/2018 in which the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that:
“clearly, as tenant cannot dictate to a landlord as to how
the landlord is to use his premises. At the age of 69 years
(now 76 years), it would be too much to expect from the
respondent landlord, with his health condition to make
climb up and get down the stairs when he can have the

accommodation available on the ground floor.”
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

15) Lastly, it is contended that the respondent is carrying on
business from the tenanted premises and has no other place to do
business. It is pertinent to note here the judgment of the Hon'ble
Apex Court in Abid-ul-Islam Vs. Inder Sain Dua, (2022) 6 SCC
30 where it was stated by the Hon'ble court that requirement is the
existence of bona fide need, when there is no other “reasonably
suitable accommodation”. Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on
two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii)
the non-availability of a reasonably suitable accommodation. Such
reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the
perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. Therefore, the said
contention does not amount to any triable issue. Furthermore, in
view of the judgment of the Apex Court, in Satyawati Sharma Vs.
Union of India AIR 2008 SC 3148, the landlord is not precluded
from seeking eviction of the tenant from non-residential premises
on ground of his bonafide requirement u/s 14 (1) (e) of the DRC
Act. Hence, I find that the petitioner has been able to establish his
bonafide requirement for the tenanted premises. ”

(Emphasis supplied)

27. A perusal of the Impugned Order makes it abundantly clear that
the learned ARC duly took cognisance of the the subsequent death of
the Respondent, inasmuch as the learned ARC expressly
acknowledged that the death of the Respondent had a material bearing
on the projected requirement and proceeded to examine whether the
requirement pleaded in the Eviction Petition survived in respect of his
wife. Thus, the learned ARC did not disregard the subsequent event or
proceed on the assumption that the Respondent’s personal requirement
continued notwithstanding his demise.
28. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order further records that
the Respondent had pleaded a requirement for his wife, who was also
a senior citizen and resided with him on the first floor. The learned
ARC, considering these aspects, took judicial notice of the facts
regarding the age of the Respondent’s wife, difficulty in climbing
stairs and the absence of a lift in the Subject Premises. Consequently,
the learned ARC concluded that, although the Respondent’s personal
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

requirement may have ceased upon his demise, the requirement of his
wife continued to subsist.
29. The Petitioners’ contention, therefore, that no independent
material was placed before the learned ARC to substantiate the wife’s
requirement must be examined in the context of the pleadings and the
nature of the proceedings at the stage of consideration of an
Application seeking Leave to Defend. The question at that stage is
whether the affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the
landlord from obtaining an Eviction Order, or whether a triable issue
arises warranting leave to contest.
30. This Court, in view of the contents of the Eviction Petition and
the reasons in the Impugned Order, is of the considered view that the
requirement of the Respondent’s wife was not an assertion introduced
subsequently to overcome the effect of the Respondent’s demise. It
formed part of the original pleadings and was linked to the stated
difficulty faced by both spouses in accessing the first-floor
accommodation. The learned ARC rightly considered these averments
and the subsequent event of death before concluding that the
requirement survived in respect of the wife. The absence of separate
medical documents pertaining to the wife, therefore, in itself, does not
establish that this conclusion is perverse or that the learned ARC
failed to consider a material aspect of the case. The Petitioners had
also not placed anything on record before the learned ARC to dislodge
the bona fide need of the Respondent’s wife.
31. At this juncture, it bears reiteration that the jurisdiction
exercised by this Court is not appellate in nature. The Court is not
called upon to reassess the pleadings and material as if adjudicating
the Application seeking Leave to Defend in the first instance. In the
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Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56

absence of a demonstrable infirmity in the decision-making process,
the mere possibility of another view cannot furnish a sufficient basis
for disturbing the Impugned Order.
32. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is unable to
accept the Petitioners’ submission that the demise of the Respondent
necessarily rendered the Eviction Petition infructuous. The
requirement pleaded from the outset extended to the residential needs
of his wife, and the learned ARC expressly examined whether that
requirement survived the subsequent event. The Petitioners have not
demonstrated that the conclusion so reached suffers from a manifest
illegality, perversity, or an error apparent on the face of the record
warranting interference under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
DECISION:
33. In view thereof, neither of the two grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioners discloses any infirmity in the Impugned
Order warranting interference by this Court in the exercise of its
limited revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act.
34. Accordingly, the present Petition, being sans merit, stands
dismissed.
35. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of in aforementioned terms.

HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
OCTOBER 27, 2026/nd/DJ
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RC.REV. 194/2025 Page 14 of 14

Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:30.10.2026
15:16:56