UTTAM CHAND vs THE DR.Y.S.P.U.

2026:HHC:48189
High Court of H.P.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.19286 of 2025
Date of Decision: 2.11.2026
_____________________________________________________________________
Uttam Chand
……...Petitioner
Versus
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni.
…....Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.

For the Petitioner: Mr. Vipin Pandit Advocate.

For the Respondent: Mr. Ramesh Chand Sharma, Advocate.
__________________________________________________________________________

Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)
Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 23.09.2025
passed by learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla Division Shimla, Camp
at Solan in Revenue Appeal No. 126/2025 titled Uttam Chand v. Dr. Y.S.
Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry, Nauni, Solan , thereby
rejecting application filed by the petitioner for condonation of delay in filing
the appeal, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying therein to set
aside the aforesaid order.
2. Precisely the grouse of the petitioner as has been highlighted in
petition and further canvassed by Mr. Vipin Pandit, learned counsel
representing the petitioner is that learned Divisional Commissioner,
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Shimla, while passing impugned order, failed to take note of the fact that
limitation to file appeal against the order passed under the Himachal
Pradesh Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1971
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') shall commence from the date of
publication of such order, not from the date of announcement of the order.
He states that since order dated 10.11.2023 passed by learned Sub
Divisional Collector, Solan, in Case No. 5/13-A of 2019 never came to be
published, delay, if any, in filing the appeal against the aforesaid order,
which otherwise stood explained, ought to have been condoned.
3. To the contrary, Mr. Ramesh Chand Sharma, learned counsel
representing the respondent-University states that as per averments
contained in the application filed by the petitioner, there was a delay of
more than 148 days coupled with the fact that there was no plausible
explanation rendered qua the aforesaid delay and as such, no illegality can
be said to have been committed by learned Divisional Commissioner while
passing the impugned order.
4. Having heard learned counsel representing the parties and
perused material available on record, this Court finds that eviction
proceedings were initiated against the petitioner under the Act for his
having failed to pay arrears of rent. Learned Sub Divisional Collector,
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Solan, in the case detailed hereinabove, vide order dated 10.11.2023,
ordered eviction.
5. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid order of
eviction, petitioner preferred an appeal in the Court of learned District
Judge, Solan, but since same was not maintainable before the aforesaid
Court, petitioner, after having withdrawn the appeal from the aforesaid
Court, filed the same before learned Divisional Commissioner. Since there
was a delay in maintaining the appeal, an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act also came to be filed. Since no plausible explanation was
rendered for the delay in filing the accompanying appeal, learned Divisional
Commissioner, vide impugned order dated 23.09.2025, proceeded to
dismiss the appeal. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached
this Court in the instant proceedings.
6. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 9 of the
Act, which reads as under:
9. Appeals.- (1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the Collector
made in respect of any public premises under section 5 or section 7
to the Commissioner.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred-
(a) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5,
within thirty days from the date of publication of the order
under subsection (1) of that section; and
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(b) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 7,
within thirty days from the date on which the order is
communicated to the appellant:
Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal
after the expiry of the period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in
time.
(3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the Collector, the
commissioner may stay the enforcement of that order for such period
and on such conditions as he deems fit.
[(4) Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by the
Commissioner within a period of three months.]
(5) The costs of any appeal under this section shall be in the
discretion of the Commissioner.”
Careful perusal of Section 9(2) clearly provides that appeal under sub
section (1) can be filed within a period of thirty days from the date of
publication of the order under sub section (1).
7. Having perused the aforesaid provision of law, this Court finds
force in the submission of learned counsel representing the petitioner that
period of limitation, if any, can be counted from the date of publication.
However, in the instant case, order of eviction passed under Section 9(1)
appears to have not been published, which fact has been otherwise
admitted by both the parties. Even otherwise, careful perusal of order dated
10.11.2023 passed by learned Sub Divisional Collector, Solan, which came
to be challenged by way of appeal, nowhere suggests that the same was
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ordered to be published and as such, this Court otherwise has a reason to
presume and believe that order dated 10.11.2023 was never published.
8. True, it is that as per averments contained in the application
filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act along with appeal, there was
delay of more than 148 days, but once date for the purpose of counting
limitation is not ascertainable on account of non-publication of eviction
order passed in terms of Section 9(1), prayer made on behalf of the
petitioner for condonation of delay ought not have been rejected by the
learned Divisional Commissioner, rather he ought to have proceeded to
decide the application on its own merits.
9. Moreover, this Court finds that prior to filing the appeal in the
Court of learned Divisional Commissioner, petitioner, on the incorrect
advice of counsel representing him, filed appeal before learned District
Judge at first instance, as a result thereof, further delay was caused in
approaching the appropriate court of law, i.e. Divisional Commissioner.
10. Reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in case titled Sarwan Kumar etc. v. Union of India etc. , AIR
1975 SC 1737, wherein paragraphs 5 and 6 read as under:
"(5.) Sec. 9 of the Act provides for appeals. An appeal lies against an
order under Sec. 5. In respect of an appeal from an order under Sec.
5, Sec. 9(2) provides a period of fifteen days "from the date of
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publication of the order under Sub -section (1) of that section" It is
apparent that the starting point of the period of limitation is the date
on which the order under Sec. 5(1) of the Act is published. Now
publication implies communication to the general public or to a Sec.
thereof but not communication to an individual in his personal
capacity, that is to say, in a capacity other than as a member of the
public. The word "publication" has been defined in Webster's Third
New International Dictionary to mean "Communication (as of news or
information) to the public: public announcement: the act or process
of issuing copies (as of a book, photograph, or music score) for
general distribution to the public". Where copies are given by way of
private communication it cannot be said that there is any
publication. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, sets out a number of
illustrative cases from which it is clear that publication must
necessary imply communication to the general public. Publication
may be accomplished in a variety of ways according to the subject
matter. While a book or other literary matter is published by being
surrendered by its author for public use, its circulation amongst
friends gratuitously or to pupils by lectures is not publication, nor is
circulation amongst subscribers for their private use. A newspaper or
periodical is published whenever and wherever it is offered to the
public by the proprietor. A sculpture or bust is published when it is
publicly exhibited.
(6.) The rules of limitation are technical rules of procedure and it is
now settled law that they must be so construed. If the rule prescribes
that limitation shall commence from a specified date, it cannot be
construed as referring to any other date. Sec. 9(2) declares that the
limitation for filing an appeal under Sec. 9(1) of the Act shall
commence from the date of publication of the order under Sec. 5(1) of
the Act. Publication of such order is effected when the copy of the
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order is affixed on the outer door or some other conspicuous part of
the public premises. It is not effected when notice of the order is
served personally on the individual found to be in unauthorised
occupation of the public premises. The Appellate Officer has taken
an erroneous view of the law in computing the period of limitation
from the date of such service. The appellate order in each case is
liable to be quashed."
11. Be that as it may, once it is not in dispute that order passed by
learned Sub Divisional Collector, Solan was never published and there was
no date notified for the purpose of counting limitation for filing appeal, this
Court is persuaded to accept the prayer made in the instant petition, but
while doing so, this Court in the interest of justice deems it fit to direct the
petitioner to deposit arrears of rent from September 2017 till 20.02.2026,
when possession of the shop in question was taken by the respondent
University on account of non grant of stay against the order dated
10.11.2023. As per own calculations of the petitioner, sum of Rs.
7,75,710/- is payable for the aforesaid period.
12. Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is allowed
and impugned order dated 23.09.2025 passed by learned Divisional
Commissioner (Annexure P-9) is set aside with the direction to the Court of
learned Divisional Commissioner, Shimla to decide Revenue Appeal No.
106/2025 on its own merits, subject to deposit of the aforesaid amount
within a period of two weeks.
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13. Needless to say, as and when the aforesaid amount is paid
within a period of two weeks, possession of the shop in question shall be
given back to the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal, merely to
pursue his occupation. It is also made clear that petitioner further shall
keep on paying rent on regular basis, failing which the respondent
University shall be entitled to charge penal rent.
In the aforesaid terms, present petition is disposed of along
with pending applications, if any.

November 02, 2026 (Sandeep Sharma),
(manjit) Judge
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