The State Of Madhya Pradesh vs Sudhir Upahdyay

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR
th
ON THE 7 OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 29011 of 2018
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Versus
SUDHIR UPAHDYAY
Appearance:
Shri Abhinav Shrivastava - Advocate for applicant.
Shri Aryan Tiwari - Advocate for respondent/State.
ORDER
Heard on I.A No.12402/2018, an application for condonation of
delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
2 . The Special Police Establishment, State of M.P has preferred an
appeal feeling aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal dated 31.08.2017
passed in Special Case (Lokayukta) No.1300003/2014 passed by the Special
Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Damoh, District Damoh whereby the
respondent has been acquitted of the charges punishable under Section 7 r/w
Section 13 (1)(d) and Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
Since, the application for grant of leave was filed beyond the prescribed
period of limitation of 90 days from the date of judgment of acquittal, the
appellant has submitted an application for condonation of delay.
3 . Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the application for
grant of leave to appeal is presented with delay of 233 days. The delay is
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explained in the application. The Special Prosecutor for the S.P.E Lokayukta

collected the certified copy and other relevant documents and forwarded the
same for opinion to the law department on 02.11.2017. The law department
instructed to file the appeal vide memo dated 16.11.2017. Thereafter, an
officer incharge was appointed for filing of appeal. The officer incharge was
transferred from Sagar to Bhopal. Therefore, another officer incharge was
appointed by the department in the month of April. The officer Incharge
received the file, collected the documents and after consulting the standing
counsel preferred the present appeal. The delay is attributable to the
functioning of the State Government requiring permission, deliberation at
various levels which consume time. The delay is unintentional, bonafide and
procedural and was beyond the control of the appellant. Therefore, the delay
of 233 days in filing of present appeal be condoned. Learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the Court may take judicial notice of the procedural
delay in functioning of public authorities. The delay is not intentional or
deliberate, therefore, the appeal deserves to be heard on merits as it involves
the grievous offence relating to the Prevention of Corruption Act. The
dismissal of appeal merely on delay may have adverse effect on the
administration of justice. Learned counsel referred to the judgment of
Supreme Court in case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO and Ors. reported
i n 2005 (3) SCC 752 to bolster his contentions regarding condonation of
delay in matters involving public machinery.
4 . Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
application and submits that reasonable explanation for delay has not been
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pleaded in the application. The reasons are vague and unsatisfactory. The

learned counsel. referring to the judgment of Supreme Court in the cases of
State of M.P vs. Bherulal reported in 2020 (10) SCC 654, Postmaster
General vs. Living Media India Ltd., reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563 and
Shivamma vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Ors. reported in 2025 INSC
1104, contends that the State authorities does not deserve any special
treatment in explaining the delay. The "sufficient cause" has to be
established for condonation of delay. The application is meritless.
5. Heard both the parties and perused the record.
6 . There is no controversy that application for grant of leave to
appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal is filed with delay of 233
days. The applicant has submitted the explanation that the delay in filing the
application is attributable to red-tape and the procedural delay involved in
the functioning of public authorities.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO
(supra) observed as under:
"13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in
charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be a
subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with
the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part
is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State
which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a
litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the
spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the
expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits
in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal.
Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was
remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of
hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra this Court had held that
the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the
application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was
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condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance
with law.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at
a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table
and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay intentional or
otherwise is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of
latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for
such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis
suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore,
be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The
factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the
governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the
matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate
standards to d determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant
could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at
appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any
legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require
adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give
appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, e
needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the
appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.
Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The
individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would
pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person
legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its
officers or servants.
16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani
and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma. It was noted that
adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract (sic) public
justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay
in the process of filing an appeal.
17. When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles
as noted above, the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved
condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the
delay is set aside."

8 . The Supreme Court in case of Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India,
reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531, on consideration of law laid down in
Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, G. Ramegowda v. LAO , (1988)
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2 SCC 142, State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132, Tehsildar

(LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634, State of Nagaland v. Lipok
Ao, (supra), State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408,
Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd., (supra), Esha Bhattacharjee
v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649, State of M.P. v.
Bherulal, (supra), University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 ,
observed as under-
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel
that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties
and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical
considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we
reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to
courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of
the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length
of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned
whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is
designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something.
It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to
point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his
fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an
"excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same
thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a
distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility
and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling
something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is
believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all
situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence
or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage,
we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are
more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest
from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious
claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.
40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur v. Koting Lamkang,
(2019) 10 SCC 408, cited by Mr Sen, where the same Bench of three Hon'ble
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Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi v. Union of India,
(2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State's
functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults
are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs
read as follows:

"7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to also
be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a
government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State
should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while
observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the
Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be
condoned.
8. Regard should be had in similar such circumstances to the impersonal
nature of the Government's functioning where individual officers may
fail to act responsibly. This in turn, would result in injustice to the
institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost
for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be
individually affected." (emphasis supplied)
39. According to Mr Sharma, University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13
SCC 745 is a decision by a larger Bench and, therefore, binding on us. This
Court, while deciding University of Delhi, was seized of a situation where even
if the delay were to be condoned, it would cause grave prejudice to the
respondent Delhi Metro Rail Corporation at the instance of the casual approach
of the appellant University. This Court, on the argument of non-availability of
the Vice Chancellor for granting approval to file the appeal, and other reasons
put forth in the matter, could not conclude that there was fulfilment of
sufficient cause for condonation of delay; hence, the refusal to condone the
delay. The decision really turns on the facts before this Court because of the
prejudice factor involved.
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that
the High Court's decision to condone the delay on account of the first
respondent's inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons
assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the
aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does,
at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where
certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at
work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the
prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce
upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure
unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand
scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic
view on balancing of the competing interests.
Thereafter, in the matter of DDA v. Tejpal, reported in (2024) 7 SCC
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433, it was held that-

C. Law on condonation of delay
22. Since the issue in this batch of appeals concerns the condonation of delay,
it would be worthwhile to briefly allude to the law of limitation. The Limitation
Act, 1963 ("the Limitation Act") is a statute of repose founded on
considerations of public policy and expediency. The dominant objective
underlying the law of limitation is that the title to property, and matters of
rights in general, cannot be kept in a state of constant uncertainty, doubt or
suspense. Public interest requires that finality should be put to litigation. The
Limitation Act, thus, prescribes the specific points of time from which the
period of limitation begins to run for the institution of actions. On expiry of
such period, no action can be initiated save and except where the court
condones the delay for a sufficient cause. A party who is insensible to the
value of civil remedies, and who does not assert his claim with promptitude is
denied the ability to enforce even an otherwise rightful claim. This position is
reflected in the Latin maxim, vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt
i.e the law aids the vigilant and not those who sleep on their rights.
23. The Bombay High Court in Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody
[Kumudini Ramdas Shah v. K.M. Mody, 1984 SCC OnLine Bom 302: AIR
1985 Bom 320, para 4] aptly exposited the philosophical pillars supporting the
concept of limitation: (i) the sword of prosecution ought not to be hanging over
an individual for an indeterminate period; (ii) those who have been lethargic in
safeguarding their interests should not expect the law to come to their rescue;
and (iii) a defendant ought not to suffer for lost evidence owing to the passage
of time.
24. Section 3 of the Limitation Act reflects this philosophy. Every suit or
appeal made after the period of limitation ought to be dismissed,
notwithstanding whether such ground had been raised by the opposite side.
However, this does not imply that the Limitation Act destroys the right itself.
Instead, it only extinguishes the ability to enforce the right, without either
creating or destroying the underlying cause of action or entitlement itself.
25. As is clear from a plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, there
are exceptions to this general rule. The statute allows for admitting an action
provided "sufficient cause" is shown. This vests courts with the discretion
to extend the period of limitation if the applicant can show that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or application within the
prescribed period. Section 5 requires analysis of two ingredients: first, an
examination of whether "sufficient cause" has been made out; and second,
whether such cause has been shown for not filing the appeal/application
"within the prescribed period".
26. As regards the first ingredient, the Limitation Act itself does not provide
more guidance on what its constituent elements ought to be. Instead, Section 5
leaves the task of determining appropriate reasons for seeking condonation of
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delay to judicial interpretation and exercise of discretion upon the facts and
individual circumstances of each case,
27. While there is no arithmetical formula, through decades of judicial
application, certain yardsticks for judging the sufficiency of cause for
condonation of delay have evolved. Mere good cause is not sufficient enough
to turn back the clock and allow resuscitation of a claim otherwise barred by
delay. The court ought to be cautious while undertaking such an exercise, being
circumspect against condoning delay which is attributable to the applicant.
[Basawaraj v. LAO, (2013) 14 SCC 81, paras 9-11] Although the actual period
of delay might be instructive, it is the explanation for the delay which would
be the decisive factor. [Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom v. Bhargavi Amma,
(2008) 8 SCC 321, para 13]
28. The court must also desist from throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
A justice-oriented approach must be prioritised over technicalities, [Raheem
Shah v. Govind Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 764: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 910, para 6]
as one motivation underlying such rules is to prevent parties from using
dilatory tactics or abusing the judicial process. Pragmatism over pedanticism is
therefore despite it appearing liberal or magnanimous. The sometimes
necessary expression "sufficient cause" should be given liberal construction so
as to advance substantial justice. [Lonand Grampanchayat v. Ramgiri Gosavi,
1967 SCC OnLine SC 105, para 4.]
29. In addition to "sufficient cause", Section 5 also requires that such cause
must be shown within the prescribed period. To satisfy the latter condition, the
applicant must show sufficient cause for not filing the appeal/application on
the last day of the prescribed period and explain the delay made thereafter.
[Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39, para 8] Causes
arising after the culmination of the limitation period, despite being sufficient in
substance, would not suffice for condonation given this second prong of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the applicant shall not be required to
prove each day's delay till the date of filing such appeal/application. [Ummer v.
Pottengal Subida, (2018) 15 SCC 127, para 14: (2019) 1 SCC (Civ) 113]
*
D. .Leeway to be granted to Government entities

48. The appellants have vehemently contended that the Government entities
ought to be allowed leeway for condonation of delay. For this, the
appellants placed reliance on Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and
G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142 which held that courts ought to be
generous while considering delay on the part of Government entities given
factors unique to them like the impersonal nature of their functioning, inherited
bureaucratic methodology, and procedural red-tapeism.
49. However, with time, the position of law held in these cases has been
diluted. In CWT v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 603, para 3, this
Court noted that while latitude can be granted to the Government, it has to
show its bona fides and diligence in filing the appeals. In case of bureaucratic
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indifference, delay cannot be condoned.
50. Subsequently, in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd., (2012) 3
SCC 563, this Court noted that the delay cannot be condoned mechanically
only because the appellant is a government entity. The Court explicitly negated
the earlier rationale of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology given modern improvements in technology. Lastly, the Court
held that Government entities must show bona fides and demonstrate diligence
in pursuing the matter.
51. This Court has again in State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654,
reiterated the reasoning of the Postmaster General and held that the Collector
(LA) could not be relied upon any longer as it was laid down in a different
bureaucratic and technological period. The proposition that Government
entities ought to be afforded greater latitude on issues of delay on account of
administrative exigencies, is no longer a precedent to be followed routinely.

54. It seems to us that acceding to the appellants' request on the aforesaid
account would also have undesirable consequences. If delay were to be
condoned merely on the basis of a broad general assertion of bureaucratic
indifference, without requiring demonstration of bona fides or an act of mala
fides on the part of specific individuals, it would create an artificial distinction
between the private parties and the Government entities vis-à-vis the law of
limitation. This would not be in conformity with the spirit of equality before
law as guaranteed under our Constitution. Allowing such latitude would further
distort incentives for the Government and encourage more laxity by the
bureaucracy in its general functioning, thereby undermining quality
governance.


9. Later, in the matter of Shivamma Vs. Karnataka Housing Board
and Ors. (supra), the Supreme Court, on consideration of precedents on the
subject, observed as under-
"210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where
the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant
shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State,
premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has
now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private
litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing
governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and
responsibility in the conduct of public litigation.
211. The earlier decisions of this Court, particularly in K.V. Ayisumma
(supra), Chandra Mani (supra), Lipok AO (supra) and Indian Oil Corpn (supra)
insofar as they favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its
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instrumentality in matters of condonation of delay, and showed indulgence in
condoning the same on ground of impersonal and slow-moving nature of these
entities, no longer reflects the correct position in law. No litigant, be it a private
party or a State or any of its functionaries, is entitled to a broader margin of
error, falling in the category of inaction, negligence or casualness, in matters of
limitation.
212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision of Postmaster General
(supra), is unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an
exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no less than private parties,
must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent
such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the
identity of the applicant.
213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj
Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra)
is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be
accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same
standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise
the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal
approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct
position of law. Secondly, that thehabitual reliance of Government departments
on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative
inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always,
invariably accepted as a "sufficient cause" for the purpose of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the
very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be
diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation.
214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster
General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy
cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be
circumstances where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic
procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such
instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State
acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts
to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the
discretion to condone the delay.
215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on
condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes.
The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross
negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, of a
defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the
explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An "explanation" on the other
hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, and
would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack

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of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no
formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of
delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its
own facts. of a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would
imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An
"explanation" on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and
reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence,
deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in
conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of
sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts.
218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is
sought to be given on account of bureaucratic lethargy and inherent
complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than
not would invariably always is an "excuse", as experience has shown us,
depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where the
decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks to convey
the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State or its
instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of delay in a
casual manner.
219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a
plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in
cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of
bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and
reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as
"sufficient cause". They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in
condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional instances, where the
explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and
promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction,
lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be
accepted.
231. Public interest, therefore, does not lie in condoning governmental
negligence, but in compelling efficiency, responsibility, and timely decision-
making. This Court has time and again emphasised that liberal condonation of
delay on behalf of the State, merely on the ground that refusal might cause the
dismissal of a potentially meritorious matter, is a misplaced proposition. Public
interest is not synonymous with the cause of the Government; it is, instead,
synonymous with the enforcement of rule of law, certainty in legal rights, and
an administrative machinery that functions with diligence and accountability.
232. It must, therefore, be underscored that the guiding principle is not the
protection of governmental indifference but the promotion of responsible
governance. The State is under a higher duty to act in time, for in every matter
it litigates, it does so not in its private capacity, but as the trustee of the people's
interest. Hence, repeated indulgence in condoning delays on grounds of

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bureaucratic inefficiency would amount to eroding the very object of limitation
statutes, which are enacted in every civilised jurisdiction for the sake of
finality, certainty, and public order.
233. Any other view, would invariably defeat the sound public policy
embodied in the Limitation Act and fail in enthusing efficiency in
administration, and bring a balance between accountability and autonomy of
action, It would result in giving immunity or carte blanche power to act as it
pleases with the public at whim or vagary and inevitably spell doom all over
the collective responsibility that the State and its instrumentalities are entrusted
with. Thus, we are of the considered opinion, that delay cannot be condoned,
merely because not doing so would result in non-suiting the State and thereby
run the ostensible risk of public interest suffering. Such by no stretch can be
the sole consideration for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as to
do so would be to ignore the provision of Section 3 and the overarching public
policy of giving quietus to lis, that forms the bedrock of the Limitation Act.

10. Thus, the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act cannot be claimed as a matter of right. No special concession can be
granted merely because the applicant is a State or a functionary of the State.
Despite the latitude conventionally shown to the functionaries of the State,
the applicant cannot get an automatic or presumptive benefit of condonation
on the ground of bureaucratic lethargy. The "sufficient cause" must be a
genuine bonafide explanation and not a formal excuse for a bureaucratic
formality. The explanation that merely narrates the file having moved
through official channels for approval from higher authorities, without
disclosing the genuine and bonafide impediments, may not amount to
sufficient cause. Such an explanation is not an explanation amounting to
"sufficient cause" but a lame excuse. An explanation reflecting only the
routine procedural movement of files between officials without particulars of
what caused the specific delay, who was responsible for it and why it could
not have been avoided, is a stereo-typed explanation that fails to meet the
threshold of "sufficient cause".
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRAMOD
KUSHWAHA
Signing time: 09-09-2026
3.02.14 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:69233
13 MCRC-29011-2018
[Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, 1994 Supp
(2) SCC 603; Pathapati Subba Reddy (Dead) by LRs v. The Special Deputy
Collector (LA) (2024) 12 SCC 336; State of Orissa v. Managing Committee
of Namatara Girls High School, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191 relied.]

1 1 . The material on record is examined in light of aforestated
propositions of law. It is pertinent to mention that the initial presumption of
innocence in favour of accused stands fortified by the impugned judgement
of acquittal after trial on merits. When the applicant/appellant seeks to assail
such a judgment after delay of more than four months beyond the prescribed
period of limitation, a substantial burden lies upon the applicant to
demonstrate "sufficient cause". Delay in preferring an appeal against an
acquittal cannot be viewed as a mere administrative oversight as it directly
impinges upon the accrued right of liberty enjoyed by the accused acquitted
after trial by a competent Court.
1 2 . Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the matter
involves grievous offences punishable under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, therefore, dismissal of appeal on the ground of delay may have adverse
effect on the administration of justice. If the applicant considered the matter
to be of such importance as to impact administration of justice, the officials
of the applicant organization were expected to be vigilant, careful, and
diligent in prosecuting it.
1 3 . The applicant/Special Police Establishment has attempted to
explain the delay on the ground of bureaucratic functioning and procedural
necessities. However, the period consumed in seeking the legal opinion,
preparing the appeal and filing the application for grant of leave to appeal, as
set out in the application, manifests bureaucratic lethargy, inaction, casual
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRAMOD
KUSHWAHA
Signing time: 09-09-2026
3.02.14 PM

NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2026:MPHC-JBP:69233
14 MCRC-29011-2018
indifference and lack of diligence on the part of the officials concerned. The

applicant cannot take refuge under administrative exigency and procedural
niceties. The delay attributable to the appointment of the Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) and the preparation of the appeal was avoidable, reflecting neither
bona fides nor diligence on the part of the officials of the applicant
organization. Every stage of the process, as stated in application, suffers
from laxity and laches. The applicant has failed to demonstrate that the
officials of the applicant organization acted with a reasonable diligence and
the delay occurred despite bonafide efforts to act within the period of
limitation. Consequently, the reasons proffered for the delay appear to be a
lame excuse rather than a cogent and satisfactory explanation.
1 4 . In view of above discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the applicant has failed to satisfactorily explain the delay of 233
days (more than twice the prescribed period of limitation) in filing the
application for grant of leave to appeal.
1 5 . Consequently, the application I.A. No.12402/2018 for
condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is
dismissed.
16. Consequently, the present M.Cr.C. is also dismissed.
(SANJEEV S KALGAONKAR)
JUDGE
PK

Signature Not Verified
Signed by: PRAMOD
KUSHWAHA
Signing time: 09-09-2026
3.02.14 PM