Gurbhej Singh Alias Mehka vs State Of Punjab

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CRM-M-62197- 2026 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
244
CRM-M-62197- 2026 (O&M)
Date of decision : 11.11.2026
Date of uploading:11.11.2026
Gurbhej Singh Alias Mehka ………….Petitioner
Versus
State of Punjab …….Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUMEET GOEL
Present: Mr. Robhinder Singh, Advocate for
Mr. Amrinder Singh Dhillon, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Anup Singh, AAG, Punjab.
---
SUMEET GOEL, J. (ORAL)
nd
1. Present 2 petition has been filed under Section 483 of
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail to the
petitioner in case bearing FIR No.89 dated 12.07.2025, registered for the
offences punishable under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘NDPS Act’) at Police
Station Sadar Moga, District Moga.
2. The gravamen of the FIR in question pertains to the recovery of
4.147 grams of Etizolam.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
in custody since 12.07.2025. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further
submitted that the mandatory provisions of the NDPS Act have not been
complied with, and thus, the prosecution case suffers from inherent
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CRM-M-62197- 2026 (O&M)
defects. Learned counsel for the petitioner has iterated that the trial is
delayed and the liability thereof cannot be fastened upon the petitioner.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner was
granted interim regular bail on account of non-presentation of the FSL
report on 20.08.2025, which concession was never misused by the
petitioner. The petitioner, on his own volition, appeared before the
concerned trial Court on 29.11.2025, whereupon he was taken into
custody upon presentation of the FSL report. Learned counsel for the
petitioner has further urged that the conduct of the petitioner does not
reflect any proclivity towards the commission of crime. Learned counsel
has further iterated that the petitioner has suffered incarceration for more
than 1 year. Thus, regular bail is prayed for.
4. Learned State counsel has opposed the present petition by
arguing that the allegations raised against the petitioner are serious in
nature and, thus, he does not deserve the concession of the regular bail.
Learned State counsel has further submitted that the instant bail plea is
restricted by the rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and thus, the same
ought to be dismissed. Learned State counsel seeks to place on record
custody certificate dated 10.11.2026 in Court, which is taken on record.
5. I have heard counsel for the rival parties and have gone through
the available records of the case.
6. The petitioner was arrested on 12.07.2025, whereinafter,
investigation was carried out and the challan was presented on
29.11.2025. Total 10 prosecution witnesses have been cited, but 02 have
been partly examined and 05 have been given up till date. The rival
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CRM-M-62197- 2026 (O&M)
contentions raised at Bar give rise to debatable issues shall be ratiocinated
upon during the course of trial. This Court does not deem it appropriate to
delve deep into these rival contentions, at this stage, lest it may prejudice
the trial. Nothing tangible has been brought forward to indicate the
likelihood of the petitioner absconding from the process of justice or
interfering with the prosecution evidence.
6.1. As per custody certificate dated 10.11.2026 filed by the learned
State counsel, the petitioner has already suffered incarceration for a period
of 1 year and 20 days & is not involved in any other case.
6.2. This Court in a judgment titled as Kulwinder versus State of
Punjab passed in CRM-M-64074-2024 (2025:PHHC:002695); after
relying upon the ratio decidendi of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Hussainara Khatoon vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar (1980) 1
SCC 81; Abdul Rehman Antulay vs R.S. Nayak (1992) 1 SCC 225; Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh vs. State of Maharashtra and another, 2024(3) RCR
(Criminal) 494; Mohd Muslim @ Hussain vs. State (NCT of Delhi)
reported as 2023 INSC 311; Criminal Appeal No.245/2020 dated
07.02.2020 titled as “Chitta Biswas Alias Subhas vs. The State of West
Bengal”; “Nitish Adhikary @ Bapan vs. The State of West Bengal”,
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.5530-2022 dated 22.08.2022 titled as
“Mohammad Salman Hanif Shaikh vs. The State of Gujarat”; Criminal
Appeal No.1169 of 2022 dated 05.08.2022 titled as Gopal Krishna Patra
@ Gopalrusma vs. Union of India, and Ankur Chaudhary vs. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2024(4) RCR (Criminal) 172; has held, thus:
“ 7.8. The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is not only a vital
safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration; to mitigate
anxiety and concern accompanying the accusation as well as to curtail
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any impairment in the ability of an accused to defend himself, but there
is an overarching societal interest paving way for a speedy trial. This
right has been repeatedly actuated in the recent past and the ratio
decidendi of the above-referred to Supreme Court’s judgments have
laid down a series of decisions opening up new vistas of fundamental
rights. The concept of speedy trial is amalgamated into the Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty,
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The right to speedy
trial begins with the actual restraint imposed at the time of the arrest of
the accused and consequent incarceration which continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result due to
impermissible and avoidable delay since the time of the commission of
the offence till the criminal proceedings consummate into a finality,
could be averted. The speedy trial, early hearing and quick disposal
are sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence. The overcrowded Court-
dockets, the heavy volume of work and the resultant pressure on the
prosecution and the Police, indubitably keeps the entire criminal
jurisprudential mechanism under stress and strain. However, this
cannot be an excuse for keeping the sword of Damocles hanging on the
accused for an indefinite period of time. It does not serve any credit to
the criminal justice system, rather it makes for a sad state of affairs.
The guarantee of a speedy trial is intended to avoid oppression and
prevent delay by imposing on the Court and the prosecution an
obligation to proceed with the trial with a reasonable dispatch. The
guarantee serves a threefold purpose. Firstly, it protects the accused
against oppressive pre-trial imprisonment; secondly, it relieves the
accused of the anxiety and public suspicion due to unresolved criminal
charges and lastly, it protects against the risk that evidence will be lost
or memories dimmed by the passage of time, thus, impairing the ability
of the accused to defend himself. It goes without saying that the
consequences of pre-trial detention are grave. Accused, presumed
innocent, till proven otherwise, are subjected to psychological and
physical deprivations of jail-life, usually under onerous conditions.
Equally important, the burden of detention of such an accused
frequently falls heavily on the innocent members of his family.
There is yet another aspect of the matter which deserves
consideration at this stage. The allegations in the present case relate to
accused being involved in an FIR relating to commercial quantity of
contraband under the NDPS Act, 1985. While considering a bail
petition in a case involving commercial quantity, the Court has to keep
in mind the rigours enumerated under Section 37 of NDPS Act, 1985
which mandates that Courts can grant bail to an accused only after
hearing the public prosecutor and after having satisfied itself of twin
conditions which are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused
is not guilty of the offence charged/alleged and that, he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The stringent rigours of Section 37
of the NDPS Act, 1985 must be meticulously scrutinized against the
backdrop of accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The right to
life and personal liberty cannot be rendered nugatory by unwarranted
delays in the judicial process, particularly where such delay(s) is
neither attributable to the accused nor justified at the end of the
prosecution by cogent reasons. An individual cannot be kept behind
bars for an inordinate period of time by taking refuge in rigours laid
down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. The legislature in its
wisdom, in order to ensure speedy and timely disposal of the cases
under the Act, has provided for the constitution of special Courts under
Section 36-A of the Act. However, this Court cannot turn Nelson’s eye
to the protracted delays and systematic inefficiency that frustrate this
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legislative purpose. A Court of law is duty-bound to ensure that it does
not become complicit in violation of an individual’s fundamental rights,
notwithstanding anything contained in a statute. While dealing with
bail petition in a case governed by the rigours of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985, the Court must strike a judicious balance between the
legislative intent to curb the menace of drugs and the sacrosanct right
of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. Prolonged incarceration,
without justifiable cause, risks transforming pre-trial detention into
punitive imprisonment, an outcome antithetical to the principle of
justice and equity.
Ergo, the unequivocal inference is that where the trial has
failed to conclude within a reasonable time, resulting in prolonged
incarceration, it militates against the precious fundamental rights of
life and liberty granted under the law and, as such, conditional liberty
overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37 of the
NDPS Act, 1985 ought to be considered as per facts of a given case. In
other words, grant of bail in a case pertaining to commercial quantity,
on the ground of undue delay in trial, cannot be said to be fettered by
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985. ”
In this view of the matter, the rigor imposed under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act stands diluted in light of the Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
6.3 Indubitably, the present petition is the 2nd attempt by the
petitioner to secure regular bail. The last bail plea preferred by the
petitioner was dismissed as withdrawn on 18.09.2026 by this Court in
CRM-M-40385-2026. Keeping in view the entirety of the factual milieu
of the case in hand, especially the prolonged incarceration of the
petitioner and the glacial pace of the trial, this Court is inclined to
favourably consider the instant plea for bail, this Court is inclined to
favourably consider the instant plea for bail. A profitable reference, in this
regard, can be made to a judgment of this Court passed in CRA-S-2332-
2023 titled as Rafiq Khan versus State of Haryana and another ;
relevant whereof reads as under:
“ 10. As an epilogue to the above discussion, the
following principles emerge:
I. Second/successive regular bail petition(s) filed is
maintainable in law & hence such petition ought not to be
rejected solely on the ground of maintainability thereof.
II. Such second/successive regular bail petition(s) is
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maintainable whether earlier petition was dismissed as
withdrawn/dismissed as not pressed/dismissed for non-
prosecution or earlier petition was dismissed on merits.
III. For the second/successive regular bail petition(s) to
succeed, the petitioner/applicant shall be essentially/pertinently
required to show substantial change in circumstances and
showing of a mere superficial or ostensible change would not
suffice. The metaphoric expression of seeking second/successive
bail plea(s) ought not be abstracted into literal iterations of
petition(s) without substantial, effective and consequential
change in circumstances.
IV. No exhaustive guidelines can possibly be laid down as to
what would constitute substantial change in circumstances as
every case has its own unique facts/circumstance. Making such
an attempt is nothing but an utopian endeavour. Ergo, this
issue is best left to the judicial wisdom and discretion of the
Court dealing with such second/successive regular bail
petition(s).
V. In case a Court chooses to grant second/successive regular
bail petition(s), cogent and lucid reasons are pertinently
required to be recorded for granting such plea despite such a
plea being second/successive petition(s). In other words, the
cause for a Court having successfully countenanced/entertained
such second/successive petition(s) ought to be readily and
clearly decipherable from the said order passed. ”
6.4 More recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment titled
as Sri Sujit Das and others Vs. Union of India [SLP (Crl.) No. 12451-
12453 of 2026] decided on 05.11.2026 has held thus:
"48. We also find that the High Court in its impugned judgment has
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Sukhwinder Singh @
Gora. By way of the aforesaid decision this Court had set aside the
bail granted by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to the accused
for an offence punishable under Sections 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS
Act. While doing so, this Court found that the High Court did not
record any satisfaction that the twin conditions under Section 37 of
the NDPS Act were satisfied and held that without recording such
satisfaction, bail could not have been granted.
48.1. In the course of the deliberation, this Court observed that the
right to speedy trial rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution is
undoubtedly a precious constitutional right. However, the Bench
proceeded to further observe that in matters governed by special
enactments such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is
of commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be
exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed
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into service solely on the ground of delay to override Section 37.
The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provisions
of law under Section 37 of the NDPS Act are to be read
harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other.
49. We have our reservation on the aforesaid observations made by
the Bench. First and foremost, the rights conferred by Article 21 of
the Constitution of India are not only constitutional rights. These are
fundamental rights. Right to life and liberty as enshrined in Article
21 are at the core of our constitutional jurisprudence. These
fundamental rights cannot be tinkered with so lightly, not even under
the special statutes. Such observations run counter to numerous
judgments of this Court which reiterate the proposition that when
there is a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, the rigor of
Section 37 of the NDPS Act or similar such provisions under the
special statutes would have to give way. [Please see Union of India
Vs. K.A. Najeeb16, Satender Kumar (2021) 3 SCC 713 Antil Vs.
CBI17, Mohd. Muslim Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 18, Ankur Chadha
Vs. State of Madya Pradesh19, Vijay Singh Vs. Union of India20
wherein this Court clearly held that Article 21 of the Constitution of
India over-rides Section 37 of the NDPS Act, Syed Iftikhar Andrabi
Vs. National Investigation Agency21 and Jaskaran Jeet Singh Deol
Vs. State of Punjab22]. In fact, it could be urged that such an
observation by the two-Judge Bench in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gola
may be hit by the principle of per incuriam as K.A.
Najeeb is a judgment by a three-Judge Bench. However, we would
not comment beyond this point since Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora is
also by a coordinate Bench. That apart, from the facts of that case,
it appears that the accused was in custody from 10.01.2024 and bail
was granted to him by the High Court on 18.02.2026. At that stage, 2
out of the 24 prosecution witnesses were examined. It is a debatable
issue as to whether a view could have been taken by the High Court
that right to speedy trial of the accused was being jeopardized.
Moreover, clause (2) (2022) 10 SCC 51 (2023) 18 SCC 166 (2024)
SCC Online SC 2730 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881 2026
SCC OnLine SC 1939 of Article 22 was not an issue before the
Bench in Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora. Therefore, this decision also
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cannot come to the aid of the respondent."
Suffice to say, further detention of the petitioner as an undertrial
is not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
7. In view of above, the present petition is . Petitioner is
allowed
ordered to be released on regular bail on his furnishing bail/surety bonds
to the satisfaction of the Ld. concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate.
However, in addition to conditions that may be imposed by the concerned
trial Court/Duty Magistrate, the petitioner shall remain bound by the
following conditions:
(i) The petitioner shall not mis-use the liberty granted.
(ii) The petitioner shall not tamper with any evidence, oral
or documentary, during the trial.
(iii) The petitioner shall not absent himself on any date
before the trial.
(iv) The petitioner shall not commit any offence while on
bail.
(v) The petitioner shall deposit his passport, if any, with
the trial Court.
(vi) The petitioner shall give his cellphone number to the
Investigating Officer/SHO of concerned Police Station
and shall not change his cell-phone number without
prior permission of the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate.
(vii) The petitioner shall not in any manner try to delay the
trial.
(viii) The petitioner shall submit, on the first working day of
every month, an affidavit, before the concerned trial
Court, to the effect that he has not been involved in
commission of any offence after being released on
bail. In case the petitioner is found to be involved in
any offence after his being enlarged on bail in the
present FIR, on the basis of his affidavit or otherwise,
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the State is mandated to move, forthwith, for
cancellation of his bail which plea, but of course, shall
be ratiocinated upon merits thereof.
8. In case of breach of any of the aforesaid conditions and those
which may be imposed by concerned trial Court/Duty Magistrate as
directed hereinabove or upon showing any other sufficient cause, the
State/complainant shall be at liberty to move for cancellation of bail of the
petitioner.
9. Ordered accordingly.
10. Nothing said hereinabove shall be construed as an expression of
opinion on the merits of the case.
11. Since the main case has been decided, pending miscellaneous
application, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(SUMEET GOEL)
JUDGE
11.11.2026
ja 

Whether speaking/reasoned: Yes/No
Whether reportable: Yes/No
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