UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. vs SHRI RAVI KUMAR

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE

Present:

The Hon’ble Justice Madhuresh Prasad
And
The Hon’ble Justice Prasenjit Biswas

F.M.A. 904/2025
with
CAN 2 of 2023

Union Of India and Others
-Versus-
Shri Ravi Kumar

For the Appellant/ U.O.I. : Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Trivedi Ld. ASGI,
Mr. Arijit Majumdar,
Ms. Swapna Jha,
Ms. Shreyashi Sarkar.


For the Respondent : Mr. Masud Karim,
Mr. Asif Riaz Ansary.


Hearing Concluded On : 27.07.2026

Judgment On : 31.08.2026

Prasenjit Biswas, J:-
1. The writ petitioner, while serving as a Constable in the Central
Industrial Security Force, was posted at the Tunnel Gate of IISCO
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Steel Plant, Burnpur, West Bengal, on 4 October 2013 during the

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‘B’ shift, i.e. from 13:00 hours to 21:00 hours, under the
administrative control of ‘A’ Company. It was alleged that at about
21:00 hours on that day, the petitioner permitted a red-coloured
Tata Sumo vehicle to enter the plant premises without conducting
the requisite security checks. The vehicle was subsequently noticed
in suspicious circumstances, parked in front of the storage yard of
M/s Anupam Industries situated within the plant area, with six
persons standing behind it. Upon being challenged, the said persons
attempted to flee; three of them succeeded in escaping, while the
remaining three were apprehended and found in possession of two
Hexa Blades. In connection with the said occurrence, a First
Information Report was lodged at Hirapur Police Station.
2. Following the incident, the Assistant Commandant placed the
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petitioner under suspension by an order dated 7 October 2013.
Thereafter, the Commandant, CISF Unit, ISP, Burnpur, issued a
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memorandum of charge on 15 October 2013 alleging dereliction of
duty and serious misconduct. The petitioner submitted his written
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explanation on 25 October 2013, specifically denying all the
allegations levelled against him.
3. A departmental enquiry was thereafter initiated and conducted
against the petitioner. Upon completion of the enquiry, a copy of the
enquiry report was supplied to him, and he was afforded an
opportunity to submit his representation against the findings
recorded therein, which he duly submitted.

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4. Subsequently, by a memorandum dated 28 February 2014, the
disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of removal from service
upon the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner
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preferred a statutory appeal on 22 March 2014; however, the
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appellate authority rejected the appeal by an order dated 7 May
2014. The petitioner thereafter invoked the revisional jurisdiction of
the competent authority, but the revision petition also came to be
dismissed on 21.01.2015.
5. Challenging the entire disciplinary process, the petitioner instituted a
writ petition seeking quashing of the charge memorandum, the
enquiry report, the order of removal from service, the appellate
order, and the revisional order. The learned Single Judge, upon
consideration of the materials on record, allowed the writ petition
and set aside the impugned disciplinary actions. The correctness and
legality of the said judgment and order passed by the learned Single
Judge are the subject matter of challenge in the present intra-court
appeal.
6. Learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants
said that the writ petition itself was liable to be dismissed on the
ground of gross delay and laches, inasmuch as the petitioner
approached the writ court after a lapse of more than two years from
the date of the impugned disciplinary action. According to the
learned A.S.G., despite such inordinate delay, the petitioner did not
furnish any plausible or satisfactory explanation for not approaching
the Court within a reasonable period. It is, therefore, submitted that

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the learned Single Judge ought to have declined to exercise the
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in
favour of a litigant who remained indolent and failed to explain the
cause for such prolonged delay. Learned A.S.G placed reliance upon
the decision passed by the Apex Court in case of Chennai
Metrpolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others vs.
T.T. MuraliBabu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 ( paragraphs 16
and 17 ).
7. It is further submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General
that the allegations levelled against the petitioner were of a grave
and serious nature, striking at the very core of the duties entrusted
to a member of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The
CISF is entrusted with the responsibility of protecting vital industrial
installations and preventing unauthorized entry into sensitive plant
premises. Any lapse in the discharge of such duties, particularly at
an entry gate, has serious security implications.
8. The learned A.S.G. contended that the petitioner cannot take shelter
under the plea of inexperience. The records disclose that he had
joined the CISF in the year 2010, whereas the incident occurred on
04.10.2013. By that time, he had already completed nearly three
years of service and had received adequate training and practical
exposure regarding the standard operating procedures governing
security checks at sensitive industrial establishments.
9. Attention has also been drawn to the defence statement submitted
by the petitioner during the departmental proceeding, wherein he

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admitted that his duty at the Tunnel Gate had been properly briefed
by ASI/Exe. Md. Alim and HC/GD R.N. Upadhaya. According to the
appellants, this admission clearly establishes that the petitioner was
fully aware of the procedure for checking vehicles and persons
entering the plant premises, and therefore his subsequent plea of
inadequate instruction is wholly untenable.
10. The learned A.S.G. further submitted that the departmental
evidence clearly established that the vehicle was allowed to enter
the plant premises without proper security checking. It was pointed
out that barely 10 seconds were consumed in permitting the vehicle
to pass through the gate, during which neither the gate pass was
properly examined nor any effective physical verification of the
vehicle or its occupants was carried out. Such conduct, according to
the appellants, amounted to a serious dereliction of duty and a clear
breach of the prescribed security protocol.
11. Referring to the findings of the Enquiry Officer, it was contended
that the substance of the charge was that the petitioner permitted
the concerned Tata Sumo vehicle to enter the protected premises
without proper checking. The discrepancy regarding the registration
number, whether recorded as WB-30H-9084 or WB-40H-9084, was
argued to be merely clerical in nature and not a material infirmity
affecting the core allegation of negligent gate-checking.
12. Reliance was also placed on the testimony of S.I./Exe. Dharamveer
Kardam, who had monitored the CCTV footage of the relevant period
and stated that a four-wheeler was seen entering the plant premises

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while the sentry on duty opened the gate and allowed its entry. The
learned A.S.G. submitted that this electronic evidence corroborated
the allegation that the vehicle was permitted entry while the
petitioner was performing gate duty.
13. It was argued that the suspicious vehicle remained inside the plant
premises for a considerable period and was intercepted only during
subsequent patrolling by CT/GD Ram Nath and other CISF
personnel, who found six persons present in suspicious
circumstances near Anupam Industries, of whom three managed to
flee. According to the appellants, this sequence of events clearly
demonstrates the seriousness of the security lapse committed at the
Tunnel Gate and establishes a direct nexus between the negligent
gate-checking and the unauthorized presence of suspicious persons
within the plant premises.
14. Lastly, the learned Additional Solicitor General contended that the
learned Single Judge exceeded the permissible scope of judicial
review by reappreciating the evidence adduced in the departmental
proceeding and substituting the Court’s own assessment in place of
the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority. It was submitted
that the writ court does not exercise appellate jurisdiction over
disciplinary findings and cannot examine the sufficiency or adequacy
of evidence when the enquiry has been conducted in accordance
with law and the findings are supported by some relevant material
on record.

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15. According to the learned A.S.G., the petitioner was afforded full
opportunity to defend himself, no violation of the principles of
natural justice was established, and the findings of the Enquiry
Officer were based upon relevant materials, including oral evidence
and CCTV footage. Reliance was placed upon the decisions of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Others v. P.
Gunasekaran , reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 , B.C. Chaturvedi v.
Union of India & Others , reported in (1995) 6 SCC 749 , as well
as the decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Union of
India v. R. Kasivelu passed in M.A.T. 2290 of 2004 . It was
submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions, interference with
the findings of the Enquiry Officer by undertaking an independent
appreciation of evidence is wholly impermissible.
16. The learned A.S.G. further submitted, relying upon the judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Om Kumar & Others v. Union of
India reported in (2021) 2 SCC 386 (particularly paragraphs 24,
26 and 39), that the question of quantum of punishment primarily
falls within the domain of the disciplinary authority. The power of
judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
confined to examining whether the decision suffers from the vice of
arbitrariness, irrationality, or any other infirmity applying the well-
settled Wednesbury principles.
17. It was emphasized that the CISF is a disciplined armed force
entrusted with the protection of critical industrial installations, where
a high degree of vigilance, integrity, and devotion to duty is

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indispensable. Any lapse in security checking at the entry point of
such a sensitive establishment cannot be viewed lightly, as it may
endanger valuable property and public safety. It was, therefore,
submitted that the misconduct proved against the petitioner
constituted a serious breach of duty and the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority was neither disproportionate nor liable to
interference by the writ court.
18. Per contra, learned Advocate appearing for the writ petitioner
supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Single
Judge and contended that the findings recorded in the disciplinary
proceeding are wholly unsustainable, being founded on conjectures
and surmises rather than on legally admissible evidence.
19. It was emphatically submitted that the charge against the writ
petitioner was not established by any cogent or reliable material.
According to the learned Advocate, there was a complete absence of
corroborative evidence connecting the petitioner with the alleged
unauthorized entry of the vehicle in question into the plant
premises. Referring specifically to the testimony of Dharamveer
Kardam, it was contended that even from his statement it did not
emerge that the vehicle had entered the premises through the
Tunnel Gate or that it was the writ petitioner who had permitted
such entry without verifying the requisite gate pass. The witness,
according to the learned Advocate, did not depose any fact
whatsoever, capable of implicating the petitioner in the alleged
misconduct. In the absence of any statement of witness,

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documentary evidence, CCTV footage identifying either the vehicle
or the petitioner, or any independent witness supporting the
allegation, the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer was
wholly unsupported by the evidence on record.
20. The learned Advocate further argued that the disciplinary proceeding
stood vitiated on account of a fundamental violation of the principles
of natural justice. It was submitted that an Enquiry Officer
conducting a domestic enquiry is under an obligation to act fairly,
objectively and with an open and unbiased mind. In the present
case, however, the manner in which the enquiry was conducted
clearly demonstrated that the Enquiry Officer had proceeded with a
predetermined approach and was intent on holding the charges
proved irrespective of the evidentiary deficiencies. Such a course, it
was urged, destroys the very foundation of a fair domestic enquiry
and renders the entire proceeding null and void.
21. In support of the aforesaid contention, reliance was placed upon the
decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kuldeep Singh v.
Commissioner of Police & Others , reported in (1999) 2 SCC 10 ,
wherein the Apex Court held that a finding in a disciplinary
proceeding which is based on no evidence, or which is such that no
reasonable person could have arrived at on the basis of the material
available on record, is liable to be interfered with in exercise of
judicial review. The learned Advocate submitted that the present
case squarely falls within the said principle, as the finding of guilt is
not supported by any evidence and is therefore perverse in law.

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22. It was further contended that where the record itself discloses
perversity in the decision-making process or a patent error apparent
on the face of the record, the High Court would be fully justified in
exercising its writ jurisdiction to quash the disciplinary action. In this
regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel , reported in AIR 1964 SC
364 , wherein it was held that although the High Court does not sit
as an appellate authority over disciplinary findings, it can interfere
where the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority is
unsupported by any evidence and is therefore legally unsustainable.
23. On the strength of the aforesaid submissions, the learned Advocate
urged that the learned Single Judge had rightly appreciated the
glaring absence of evidence and the procedural infirmities vitiating
the enquiry. According to him, no error of law or jurisdiction has
been demonstrated in the judgment under appeal warranting
interference by this Court in exercise of its intra-court appellate
jurisdiction. It was, therefore, prayed that the instant intra-court
appeal be dismissed outright with affirmation of the order passed by
the learned Single Judge
24. We have given our anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and has carefully
examined the materials placed on record.
25. Learned counsel for the appellants sought to contend that the writ
petition ought not to have been entertained on account of delay and
laches in view of decision passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply (supra). In the said
case, the Apex Court was dealing with a situation where the
employee had approached the Court after an inordinate delay of
about four years. The Supreme Court observed that it is the duty of
the Court to carefully scrutinize whether such enormous delay
deserves to be ignored in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation, and that a litigant who remains indolent for a prolonged
period cannot, as a matter of course, invoke the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court.
26. The factual matrix of the present case, however, stands on a
materially different footing. Here, the petitioner had promptly
pursued the statutory remedies available to him by filing both the
appeal and the revision within the prescribed framework. The writ
petition was instituted only after the revisional authority had
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rejected his challenge on 21 January 2015. Although there was a
lapse of approximately two years before the writ petition was filed,
the delay cannot be viewed in isolation or treated as indicative of
negligence or abandonment of rights. The records disclose that the
petitioner had been continuously contesting the disciplinary action
and had exhausted all departmental avenues before approaching the
writ court.
27. Upon an overall appreciation of the materials on record, it cannot be
said that the petitioner had adopted a lackadaisical or indifferent
attitude towards the assertion of his legal rights. The delay, viewed
in the context of the sequence of departmental proceedings and the

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nature of the challenge raised, does not amount to such inordinate
or unexplained laches as would disentitle him from seeking judicial
review. Consequently, the ratio laid down in T.T. Murali Babu
(supra), which turned on a substantially longer and unjustified
delay, does not advance the case of the appellants in the facts and
circumstances of the present matter. We are, therefore, unable to
accept the contention that the writ petition was liable to be
dismissed solely on the ground of delay and laches.
28. In view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.
Gunasekaran , after considering the earlier decision in case of B.C.
Chaturvedi particularly paragraph 12 thereof, the scope of judicial
review in disciplinary matters is extremely limited. The High Court,
while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution,
does not sit as an appellate authority over the findings recorded by
the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority. It cannot undertake
a fresh appreciation or re-evaluation of the evidence as if it were
hearing a regular appeal against the departmental decision.
29. The Apex Court has categorically held that the High Court cannot
reassess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the sufficiency of the
evidence, or substitute its own conclusions for those reached by the
disciplinary authority. The Court can only examine whether the
decision-making process suffers from any of the infirmities
enumerated in paragraph 12 of P. Gunasekaran . Accordingly, the
High Court may look into the evidence adduced in the disciplinary
proceeding only for the limited purpose of ascertaining:

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(e) whether the conclusion is so arbitrary or capricious
that no reasonable person could have arrived at it;
(g) whether inadmissible evidence was relied upon to
influence the finding; and
(h) whether the finding is based on no evidence at
all.
30. Thus, the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court is between “re-
appreciation of evidence”, which is impermissible, and “examining
whether there exists some legally acceptable evidence to support
the finding”, which is permissible. If there is some evidence on
record which reasonably supports the conclusion of guilt, the High
Court normally should not interfere merely because another view is
possible or because the evidence may appear insufficient in its
opinion.
31. However, where the record discloses that the finding has been
recorded without any supporting evidence, or that the evidence
relied upon is wholly irrelevant, inadmissible, or incapable of
establishing the charge, the High Court would be justified in
interfering, not by re-evaluating the evidence, but by holding that
the finding is vitiated by perversity and falls within clauses (e), (g)
and (h) of paragraph 12 of P. Gunasekaran .
32. In the present context, the Court was not required to reassess the
evidence as an appellate forum. Its scrutiny is confined to
determining whether the disciplinary authorities acted within the

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bounds of law, observed the principles of natural justice, and
recorded findings supported by some admissible and relevant
evidence. Only when the findings are demonstrably arbitrary,
perverse, or based on no evidence can interference in writ
jurisdiction be warranted in terms of the principles authoritatively
laid down in P. Gunasekaran (supra).
33. In the present case, the entire edifice of the departmental
proceeding substantially rests upon the evidence of Dharamveer
Kardam, who was treated as the principal witness for the appellants.
His evidence assumes considerable importance because, according
to the respondents, he was the person who was monitoring the
security checking at the tunnel gate on the relevant date and time. A
scrutiny of his deposition reveals that he merely stated that at about
18:58 hours one vehicle entered the plant premises and that a
sentry opened and thereafter closed the gate. Significantly, he
categorically stated that from the CCTV footage neither the
registration number nor the colour of the vehicle could be clearly
ascertained.
34. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the appellants
attempted to contend that the petitioner was standing in the shadow
area of the CCTV camera and, therefore, had deliberately concealed
himself so that he could not be recognized. He submitted that there
is no dispute that he was posted at the gate. Therefore there is no
iota of doubt that the sentry in the CCTV footage was none other
than the petitioner. Such an inference, in our considered view, is

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wholly speculative and unsupported by any cogent material.
Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof,
particularly in a disciplinary proceeding where findings must be
founded on some legally acceptable and reliable evidence. The mere
circumstance that a portion of the area covered by the CCTV camera
was shadowed cannot lead to an irresistible conclusion that the
petitioner intentionally hid himself to avoid identification.
Dharamveer Kardam did not depose that he had personally seen the
petitioner opening the gate or permitting the vehicle to enter. His
statement was confined to the fact that “one sentry” opened and
closed the gate.
35. Despite the aforesaid factual position emerging from the evidence on
record, the Presenting Officer proceeded on the premise that it stood
conclusively established that the petitioner had allowed a vehicle
bearing Registration No. WB-40H-9084 to enter the plant premises
through the tunnel gate. Such a conclusion, in our considered view,
is wholly unsustainable and is clearly inconsistent with the evidence
adduced during the enquiry proceeding.
36. The principal witness relied upon by the appellants, namely
Dharamveer Kardam, categorically stated that at about 18:58 hours
a vehicle entered the plant premises and that a sentry opened and
thereafter closed the gate. However, he further stated in
unequivocal terms that from the CCTV footage neither the
registration number of the vehicle nor its colour could be properly
ascertained. Therefore, the very evidence on which the appellants

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sought to place reliance failed to establish two essential and
foundational facts: first, that the vehicle in question was red in
colour; and that the vehicle was bearing Registration No. WB-40H-
9084. The statement also does not say that the petitioner was the
person/ sentry who permitted its entry into the premises.
37. In a departmental proceeding, though the strict rules of the Indian
Evidence Act may not apply, the findings must nevertheless rest
upon some legally acceptable and reliable material. A charge cannot
be held to be proved merely because it appears probable or because
suspicion arises against the delinquent employee. The authority
conducting the proceeding is required to arrive at its conclusion on
the basis of evidence which has a rational nexus with the finding
recorded. Where the evidence itself is uncertain, incomplete, or
incapable of establishing the foundational facts, any conclusion
drawn in excess of such evidence would necessarily be arbitrary.
38. The CCTV footage constituted the primary objective material in the
present case. Once the witness monitoring the footage admitted that
the registration number could not be discerned and that the
petitioner was not visible or identifiable therein, the Presenting
Officer could not legitimately assert that the petitioner had allowed
vehicle No. WB-40H-9084 to enter the plant premises. There was no
corroborative evidence produced to bridge this evidentiary gap. No
witness claimed to have personally seen the petitioner permitting
the entry of the said vehicle, nor was any contemporaneous record

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produced establishing that the vehicle intercepted later was the
same vehicle that had entered through the tunnel gate.
39. The conclusion reached by the Presenting Officer, therefore, was not
a reasonable inference based on any evidence whatsoever. A
reasonable inference must be founded upon established
circumstances from which the conclusion naturally and logically
flows. In the present case, the conclusion was reached despite the
absence of proof regarding the identity of the vehicle and the
identity of the person who allegedly permitted its entry. Such
reasoning amounts to substituting conjecture for evidence and
assumption for proof.
40. Accordingly, the finding that the petitioner had allowed vehicle No.
WB-40H-9084 to enter the plant premises was not supported by any
substantive evidence available in the enquiry. The conclusion was
based on conjectural assumptions unsupported by the materials on
record and, therefore, could not constitute a valid foundation either
for the enquiry report or for the consequential order of punishment.
41. The matter becomes even more serious when one examines the
findings of the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer recorded that the
petitioner had permitted the vehicle to gain entry into the plant
premises and further observed that this fact had been admitted by
the petitioner. We have carefully gone through the records of the
enquiry and we do not find any statement, written or oral,
amounting to an admission by the petitioner that he had allowed the
vehicle to enter through the tunnel gate. The petitioner consistently

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denied the allegation. In the absence of any such admission, the
Enquiry Officer could not have treated the same as an admitted fact.
Recording a finding on the basis of a non-existent admission strikes
at the very root of fairness in a quasi-judicial proceeding. Such
findings manifestly perverse.
42. It is a settled principle of law that a disciplinary authority, while
exercising powers under service jurisprudence, acts as a quasi-
judicial authority. Consequently, its conclusions must be based on
some evidence which a reasonable person could accept as
supporting the charge. The authority cannot proceed on
assumptions, surmises, or conjectures, nor can it attribute
admissions to a delinquent employee when no such admission exists
on record. Equally, an Enquiry Officer cannot supply missing links in
the evidence by drawing speculative inferences adverse to the
employee.
43. In the present case, the essential ingredients of the charge were
required to be proved by reliable evidence, namely: (i) that a
particular vehicle bearing Registration No. WB-40H-9084 entered
through the tunnel gate; (ii) that the petitioner was the sentry who
opened the gate and permitted the entry; and (iii) that such entry
was allowed without proper checking. None of these foundational
facts has been established by acceptable evidence. The CCTV
footage did not identify the vehicle or the petitioner; the principal
witness did not identify the petitioner; the alleged admission of the

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petitioner is demonstrably non-existent; and the testimony of the
remaining witnesses suffers from material contradictions.
44. In such circumstances, the enquiry report cannot be said to rest
upon any substantive evidence. The findings recorded therein are
clearly perverse, being based partly on conjectures and partly on
facts not borne out from the record. Since the order of punishment
is founded upon such defective findings, it cannot be sustained in
law. The learned Single Judge, upon an appraisal of the materials,
rightly concluded that the findings suffered from perversity and that
the punishment order was vitiated for want of evidence.
45. Having independently examined the entire matter, we find no
infirmity, illegality, or perversity in the reasoning or conclusions
recorded by the learned Single Judge warranting interference in
appellate jurisdiction.
46. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed .
47. The learned Single Judge had directed the respondents to reinstate
the writ petitioner with full back wages within a period of four weeks
from the date of the order. It is evident that the said period has
already expired and the direction has not yet been complied with.
48. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, and having regard to the fact
that the time granted by the learned Single Judge has elapsed, the
respondents are hereby directed to comply with the directions
contained in the order passed by the learned Single Judge, including
reinstatement of the petitioner with full back wages, within a further
period of six weeks from the date of this order.

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49. Accordingly, connected application being no. CAN 2 of 2023 is also
dismissed.
50. There will be no order as to costs.
51. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be
supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.
I agree.


(Madhuresh Prasad, J)
(Prasenjit Biswas, J.)