Asomiya Pratidin And 2 Ors. vs Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma And 4 Ors
- Court
- Gauhati High Court
GAHC010037502026
2026:GAU-AS:6639
IN THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM & ARUNACHAL PRADESH )
FAO/14/2026
1. Asomiya Pratidin,
An Assamese language newspaper
having its office at
Pratidin Building, M.R.G. Road,
Chandmari, Guwahati, Kamrup
(M), Pin-781003, Assam
and represented by its Proprietor
Sri Jayanta Baruah
2. Jayanta Baruah,
Proprietor and Editor of Asomiya
Pratidin
Pratidin Building, M.R.G. Road,
Chandmari, Guwahati, Kamrup (M)
Pin-781003, Assam
3. Jatin Choudhury,
Printer and Publisher of Asomiya
Pratidin,
Pratidin Building, M.R.G. Road
Chandmari, Guwahati, Kamrup (M)
Pin-781003 Assam
…….. Appellants
-Versus-
1. Dr. Himanta Biswa Sarma,
S/O Late Kailash Nath Sarma,
FAO/14/2026 Page 1
Presently R/O Qr. No.- M-6,
Ministers Colony, Dispur, Guwahati,
Kamrup (M), Assam, Pin 781006
and
Permanent R/O H.No. 15, Uday Path,
R.G. Barua Road,
Guwahati, Kamrup (M),
Assam, Pin-781024
2. Gaurav Gogoi,
S/O Late Tarun Gogoi,
R/O 55- Ajanta Path Survey,
Beltola, Dispur, Guwahati,
District- Kamrup (M),
Assam, Pin-781028
3. Jitendra Singh,
S/O Pratap Singh,
R/O C-1/14, Lodi Garden,
New Delhi-110003
4. Bhupesh Baghel,
S/O Late Nand Kumar Baghel,
Permanent R/O Mansarovar Awasiya
Parisar, Bhilai,
District – Durg, Chhattisgarh,
Pin-490025
and
Official Correspondence Address In
E-1, Civil Lines, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh, Pin-492001
5. The Staff Reporter (Name Not Known)
Asomiya Pratidin,
Pratidin Building,
M.R.G. Road, Chandmari,
Guwahati, Kamrup (M),
Pin-781003, Assam
……Respondents
FAO/14/2026 Page 2
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MRIDUL KUMAR KALITA
Advocate for appellants : Mr. K. N. Choudhury, Sr. Advocate
Mr. N. Gautam, Advocate
Advocate for respondents : Mr. D. Saikia, Sr. Advocate
Mr. R. Borpujari, Advocate
Date on which judgment is
reserved
: N/A
Date of pronouncement of
judgment
: 13.05.2026
Whether the
pronouncement is of the
Operative part of the
judgment
:
N/A
Whether the full judgment
has been
Pronounced
: Yes
Judgment & Order
1. Heard Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. N. Gautam, the learned counsel for the appellants. Also heard
Mr. D. Saikia, the learned senior counsel assisted by
Mr. R. Borpujari, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1.
Though, notices on the other respondents were duly served,
however, none has appeared on their behalf, when the matter was
called on for hearing. Hence, this Court decided to proceed ex-parte
against them.
FAO/14/2026 Page 3
2. This appeal under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has
been filed by the appellants, namely, (1) Asomiya Pratidin, (2) Sri
Jayanta Baruah and (3) Sri Jatin Choudhury, impugning the order
dated 11.02.2026, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge
(Senior Division) No. 1, Kamrup (M) in Misc (J) Case No. 156/2026
in connection with the Title Suit No. 85/2026, whereby, ex-parte ad
interim injunction was granted in favour of the present respondent
No. 1 by injuncting the present appellants from making, publishing,
circulating or disseminating any further defamatory statements or
materials concerning the present respondent No. 1 with regard to
the news items published, on 05.02.2026, in the Assamese daily
newspaper, Asomiya Pratidin, which were captioned as “ RAAJYAT
NAAME-BENAAME SAMPATTI KROY – MUKHYA MANTRIR
PARIYAALOR 12 HEJAAR BIGHAA BHUMI”, and (ii) “ HIMANTA BISWA
KAARO NAHAY JAARE GHANISTHA HOICHE, TAREI PITHIT CHURI
BAHUAAICHE”.
3. The facts relevant for consideration of the instant appeal, in brief,
are that the present respondent No. 1, namely, Dr. Himanta Biswa
Sarma had filed a Title Suit bearing Title Suit No. 85/2026, before
the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Kamrup
(M) at Guwahati against the present appellants and three other
persons, namely, (1) Sri Gaurav Gogoi, (2) Sri Jitendra Singh and
(3) Sri Bhupesh Baghel (who are arrayed as respondent Nos. 2, 3 &
4 respectively in the instant appeal).
4. In the said suit, the present respondent No. 1 has prayed for a
declaration that the news items mentioned hereinbefore, which
were published in the newspaper Asomiya Pratidin on 05.02.2026
are defamatory and has harmed the name, fame, reputation,
FAO/14/2026 Page 4
goodwill and future prospects of the present respondent No. 1. The
present respondent No. 1 has also prayed for a compensation to the
tune of Rs. 5,00,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Hundred Crores) for the
damage done by the respondents to his reputation. The relief of
permanent prohibitory injunction has also been prayed for
restraining the present appellants and other defendants from
making any statement, printing, publishing, circulating or
disseminating any news items in furtherance of the above-
mentioned news items. The respondent No. 1 has also prayed for a
relief of permanent mandatory injunction by directing the present
appellants to publish clarification and apology in connection with the
aforesaid news items published in the Asomiya Pratidin Newspaper
on 05.02.2026.
5. It is also averred by the present respondent No.1, in the plaint filed
by him, before the Trial Court, in the Title Suit No. 85/2026, that on
th
14 February 2026, the present appellant published two news items
in the Asomiya Pratidin newspaper with the caption as already
indicated in paragraph No. 2 hereinabove. The said news items
were published on the basis of certain allegations made against the
present respondent No. 1 by the present respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4
in a press conference addressed by them jointly at Rajib Bhawan,
Guwahati on 04.02.2026.
6. It is also averred in the plaint, filed by the present respondent No.
1, before the Trial Court, that in the news items defamatory remarks
were made against the present respondent No. 1 and his wife. It
was alleged that the present respondent No. 2 accused the present
respondent No. 1 and his wife of occupying 12,000 Bighas of land in
FAO/14/2026 Page 5
the State. It was also alleged that the respondent No. 1 is “impolite
and arrogant Chief Minister”, land grabber, betrayer politician and
liar Chief Minister of all times.
7. Similarly, in the aforementioned news items, the present respondent
No. 4 has accused the present respondent No. 1 of being a “master
fraudster” and “that he has frauded all his intimates”, and that “a
gang including his wife has plundering in Assam”. Similarly, the
present respondent No. 3 has been quoted in the news items to
have said that “Himanta Biswa Sarma has sold Assam and his family
is doing business by selling Assam”. He was further quoted as
saying that the respondent No. 1 “stabbed a former Chief Minister
and has become Chief Minister through back door”. It was also
alleged that respondent No. 1 has imposed “HBS Tax” and has been
involved in Louis Berger, Sarda, PM Sampada, North Cachar Hills
scams.
8. In the aforesaid suit, the respondent No. 1 has also filed an
application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, praying for grant of temporary
injunction against the present appellants and other respondents.
The said application was registered as Misc. (J) Case No. 156/2026.
In the said Misc. Case a prayer has also been made for dispensing
with the notice to the opposite parties under Rule 3 of Order 39 of
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
9. Accordingly, by Order dated 11.02.2026, passed in Misc. (J) Case
No. 156/2026, the Trial Court granted ex-parte ad interim injunction
restraining the opposite parties (present appellants and present
respondent Nos. 2, 3, 4 & 5) from making, publishing, circulating or
FAO/14/2026 Page 6
disseminating any further defamatory statements or materials
concerning the present respondent No. 1 regarding the news items,
published on 05.02.2026, in Assamese newspaper “Asomiya
Pratidin” as already described in paragraph No. 2 of this judgment,
till the appearance of the opposite parties before the Trial Court.
The notices were issued to the appellants and other opposite parties
in the said Misc. Case fixing 09.03.2026 for appearance and service
report.
10. Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned senior counsel for the appellants
has submitted that the Trial Court has erred in the granting of ex-
parte ad interim injunction against journalistic pieces the present
appellants without arriving at a prima facie satisfaction that the
contents sought to be injuncted are prima facie malicious or
palpably false. He submits that granting ex-parte ad interim
injunction at a pre-trial stage in a cavalier manner results in stifling
of public debate. He submits that ex-parte ad interim injunction
against publication houses may be granted only in exceptional cases
or after a full-fledged trial. He submits that the Trial Court had failed
to take into consideration the aforementioned principles and without
coming to any prima facie finding regarding the falsehood or
maliciousness of the contents of the aforementioned news items ex-
parte ad interim injunction was granted against the present
appellants.
11. He further submits that even the three-fold test of establishing (i)
prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable
loss, for grant of ex-parte ad interim injunction was not consider by
the Trial Court. He submits that though the Trial Court has discussed
FAO/14/2026 Page 7
in the impugned judgment as to what constitute the three golden
principles for grant of temporary injunction, however, it has failed to
discuss the applicability of those principles to the facts of the instant
case. He submits that the power to grant discretionary relief of ex-
parte ad interim injunction was exercised arbitrarily and perversely
by the Trial Court.
12. The learned senior counsel for the appellants also submits that the
Trial Court failed to take into consideration that no evidence has
been produced by the respondent No. 1 before the Trial Court to
support his contention that the news items published on
05.02.2026, caused reputational harm to him. He further submits
that neither any discussion to that effect has been made in the
impugned order by the Trial Court.
13. The learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that this is a
fit case where the appellants may be given opportunity of being
heard before considering the question as to whether it is a fit case
for grant of temporary injunction as prayed for. He submits that the
impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside to the extent it
granted ex-parte ad interim injunction against the present
appellants. In support of his submission, the learned senior counsel
for the appellants has cited the following rulings –
i. “ Bloomberg Television Production Services India Private
Limited and Others Vs. Zee Entertainment Enterprises
Limited” reported in (2025) 1 SCC 741 .
ii. “Wander Ltd. and Another Vs. Antox India P. Ltd.” reported in
(1990) (Supp) SCC 727 .
FAO/14/2026 Page 8
14. On the other hand, Mr. D. Saikia, the learned senior counsel for the
respondent No. 1 has raised two preliminary points on the question
of maintainability of the instant appeal. Firstly, he submits that in
the cause title of the memo of appeal, the appellants have not
stated the exact provision of statute under which the appeal has
been filed as required under Rule 2 of Chapter 4 of Guwahati High
Court Rules. He submits that the appellants have only mentioned in
the cause title that this is an application under Order 43 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908, whereas, Order 43 Rule 1 of the said Code
contains Clause (a) to Clause (w), however, the appellants have not
specifically mentioned in the cause title of the memo of appeal as to
under which specific provision of Order 43 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the instant appeal has been filed, which has made
it difficult for the respondent No.1 to advance his defence against
the appeal pin pointedly. He submits that though this is a curable
defect, however, if the appellant refuses to rectify the same, the
appeal is liable to be rejected on that ground only.
15. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also
submitted that the memo of appeal is also bad in law for not having
any prayer in the same. He submits that the appellants have not
made any prayer in the memo of appeal. He submits that as apart
from present appellants, there were other defendants in the suit
filed by the respondent No. 1, and all of them were injuncted by the
impugned Order. He submits that in absence of a specific prayer in
the memo of appeal, it may not be clear for the Court to ascertain
as to whether the appellants are seeking any modification in the
FAO/14/2026 Page 9
impugned order or they are seeking the impugned order to be set
aside in toto.
16. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that if
a Court considers or grants a relief for which no prayer was made, it
deprives the respondent of an opportunity to oppose or resist such
a relief, and same would lead to miscarriage of justice. He submits
that though in Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it is
not specifically mentioned that the prayer shall have to be
mentioned in the memo of appeal, however, it is a settled
proposition of law that relief which is not prayed for may not be
granted. In support of his submission, he has cited a ruling of the
Apex Court in the case of “Akella Lalitha Vs. Konda Hanumantha Rao
and Another”, 2022 SCC Online, SC 928 .
reported in He submits that
though, this is a curable defect, however, if the appellant refuses to
rectify the same, the appeal is liable to be rejected on that ground
only.
17. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 has further
submitted that the Respondent No. 1 is a well-known politician of
India and was holding the post of Chief Minister of Assam at the
time when the defamatory news was published in the newspaper
against him. He also submits that the newspaper Asomiya Pratidin,
in which above-mentioned defamatory news were published, is the
highest circulating Assamese newspaper in the entire Northeast
India and the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have made imputations
against respondent No. 1 in the press conference organized by them
only with the sole purpose of damaging the reputation and image of
FAO/14/2026 Page 10
the respondent No.1 for gaining undue political mileage in the
elections which were to be held immediately thereafter.
18. He submits that the allegations levelled against him in the press
conference as well as in the news item are false, frivolous,
fabricated and concocted without any iota of truth and the same
has been denied on oath by the respondent No.1.
19. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 2 has submitted
that the respondent No. 2, being a public servant, is required to
submit all details of his property as well as the details of the
property of his family members to the Government, which he has
done. It is also submitted that even at the time of contesting
Assembly Elections, the details of his property are submitted in form
of affidavit before the Election Commission of India. He submits that
such details are also stated in the Income Tax Return submitted by
the respondent No. 1 before the Income Tax Department. He
submits that the aforementioned affidavits/details submitted by the
respondent No.1 before the relevant statutory authorities belies the
defamatory imputations made by the appellants and respondent
Nos. 2, 3 and 4 against the respondent No.1.
20. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that
before publishing the aforementioned defamatory news items, the
appellants did not take any care to verify the veracity of allegations
made against the present respondent No. 1. He submits that the
appellant should have verified the veracity of imputations made
against the respondent No. 1 before publishing the same in their
newspaper. However, as the sole purpose of publication of the news
was to damage the reputation of the respondent No. 2 so that the
FAO/14/2026 Page 11
political mileage is gained by his political adversaries, namely
respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4, the defamatory news items were
published against the respondent No.1 without any verification. He
submits that all the imputations made against the respondent No. 2
has been categorically denied by the appellant in the plaint which is
supported, in addition to a verification by an affidavit by the
respondent No. 2.
21. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 has also
submitted that these aspects were taken into consideration by the
Trial Court while granting ex parte ad interim injunction against the
present appellants. He submits that in the impugned order after
considering the materials on record, the Trial Court came to a prima
facie finding that the defamatory publications were made against
the Respondent No. 2 without any authentic documents or any basis
for the same. He submits that the Trial Court also took into
consideration that unless an ad interim ex parte injunction is
granted against the present appellants, it would have led to
multiplicity of suit as there would not have any restraint in
publishing successive news items on the subject by the appellants in
the event of not granting an ad interim ex parte injunction.
22. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No.1 also submits
that since the assembly elections were to be held very soon, the
sole purpose of the publication of the news item mentioned
hereinbefore was to defame the respondent No. 2 and damage his
reputation so as to get a political mileage in the ensuing Assembly
elections. He submits that since the timing of publication of
defamatory news item is crucial in this case, this case is a case of
FAO/14/2026 Page 12
exceptional nature where the news items published against the
present respondent No.1 were malicious and palpably false and
therefore, the Trial Court did no wrong in granting the ex parte ad
interim injunction, that too for a limited period till the appearance of
the other respondents and the appellants before the Trial Court. He
submits that the golden principles necessary for grant of ex parte ad
interim injunction were discussed by the Trial Court in Paragraph
No. 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment.
23. The learned senior counsel for the respondent No. 1 has also
submitted that the ex parte ad interim injunction was granted by
the Trial Court only for a limited period till the appearance of the
other opposite parties and the case was fixed on 09.03.2026. He
submits that it was open for the present appellants to appear before
the Trial Court on that date and plead their case by filing written
objection wherein they could have prayed for vacating the ex parte
ad interim injunction. However, on the next date no such prayer was
made. Rather, the present appellants did not file any objection
before the Trial Court and sought time for filing objection. He
submits that the ex parte ad interim injunction granted against the
opposite parties were extended by the Trial Court till next date i.e.,
on 29.04.2026 and thereafter, till 14.05.2026.
24. The learned senior counsel for the respondent further submits that
since the Trial Court has cited reasons for granting ex parte ad
interim injunction against the present appellant in the impugned
order, same cannot be regarded as arbitrary or perverse and
therefore, no interference in the impugned order is required by this
FAO/14/2026 Page 13
Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. He, therefore, prays for
dismissing the instant appeal.
25. In response to the plea of maintainability raised by the learned
senior counsel for the respondent No. 1, the learned senior counsel
for the appellants has submitted that as regards the plea of not
specifically mentioning the exact provision of Order 43 of the Code
of Civil Procedure 1908 in the cause title of the memo of appeal, he
submits that same is a curable defect and even if it is not rectified,
the Court can treat it as an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the
Code of Civil Procedure 1908. He submits that it is a well-settled
principle of law that where the authority making an order has power
conferred upon it by a statute to make an order made by it and the
order is made without indicating the provision under which it is
made, the order would be deemed to have been made under the
provision enabling the making of it and as such, even if exact
provision of law is not mentioned in the cause title of the memo of
appeal, this Court has power to treat the same as an appeal under
Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In support
of his submission, he has cited the ruling of the Apex Court in the
case of “Pournami Oil Mils and Others Vs. State of Kerela and
Another” reported in 1986 (SUPP.) SCC 728 .
26. As regards the contention that the memo of appeal does not
contain any prayer, the learned senior counsel for the appellants
submits that as regards what should be contained in the memo of
appeal has been specifically provided in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 that the memo of appeal shall set
forth concisely under distinct heads the grounds of objection to the
FAO/14/2026 Page 14
decree appealed from, there is no mention therein of mentioning
any specific prayer portion in the memo of appeal and as such, he
submits that even if no prayer has been made in the memo of
appeal, the said appeal is not liable to be dismissed or rejected on
that count.
27. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for
both sides and have gone through the materials available on record.
I have also gone through the rulings cited by the learned counsel
for both sides in support of their respective submissions.
28. As regards the contention of the learned senior counsel for the
respondent regarding mentioning of specific provision in the cause
title of the memo of appeal under which the said appeal has been
filed, the Rule 2 of Chapter IV of the Gauhati High Court Rules
provides that in every application presented to the High Court, there
should be stated immediately after the cause title, the section and
the statute under which the application is made. In the instant
case, though the appellants have stated that the present appeal has
been filed under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, it
has been not specifically mentioned that the said appeal is under
Order 43 Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
29. Though, the nomenclature of an application is really not material
and grounds stated therein have to be seen, yet it cannot be said
that a party shall be permitted to violate the procedural requirement
of rules with impunity. There is a purpose in indicating the exact
nomenclature in clear and precise manner as to under what
provision of law an application or an appeal is filed, as it gives a
clear notice to the adversary party so that it can prepare its
FAO/14/2026 Page 15
defence, accordingly. However, in the instant case, considering the
fact that the appellants have only failed to mention the specific sub-
clause of Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the
memo of appeal, this Court is of considered opinion that the
appellant should have been more cautious. However, said non-
mentioning of the specific provision, in the considered opinion of
this Court has not affected the root of the case as well as its merit
and it is not a substantial breach either to reject the memo of
appeal or to dismiss the appeal on that ground alone.
30. Similarly, as to what should be the contents of the memo of appeal
has been specifically provided in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. Though, in case of plaints, the Order 7 Rule 1
(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 specifically provides that
the relief which plaintiffs claim shall be mentioned in the plaint.
However, no such requirement of mentioning the relief or prayer in
the memo of appeal is there in Order 41 Rule 1 (2) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. It is always convenient for the Court to
fathom as to what relief is sought for by the appellant in the appeal,
if the prayer portion is specifically included in the memo of appeal.
However, as there is no statutory requirement for mentioning the
prayer or relief sought for in appeal in the memo of appeal, same
may not be a ground for rejection of the memo of appeal under
Order 41 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or for
dismissing the appeal.
31. On perusal of the impugned order, it appears that the Trial Court, in
paragraph No. 11 therein, has observed that the petitioner
(respondent No.1 herein) has a prima facie case and balance of
FAO/14/2026 Page 16
convenience in his favour and that the injury which he will suffer in
the event of not granting of ad interim ex parte injunction would be
irreparable. The Trial Court also came to conclusion that in the
event a restraint order is not passed, there is every possibility of
multiplicity of proceeding in respect of the subject matter of the
suit. The Trial Court also came to the finding that the imputations
made against the respondent No.1 are defamatory in nature and
same are published without any authentic documents or proof in
support of the allegations which are levelled against the respondent
No.1.
32. It also appears that the ad interim ex parte injunction was granted
during the period of service of notice to the opposite parties, i.e., till
09.03.2026. It also appears that on the said date, the aforesaid
restraint order was extended on 09.03.2026, till 29.04.2026, and
thereafter, it was extended till 14.05.2026, i.e., till tomorrow. It also
appears that though, the present appellants had appeared before
the Trial Court, they are yet to file any written objection in the Misc.
(J) Case No. 156/2026. Neither they have prayed for vacation of ex
parte ad interim injunction before the Trial Court.
33. It is a settled proposition of law that an Appellate Court, including
this Court, will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the
Court of first instance and substitute its own discretion, except
where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised
arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the Court had
ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
interlocutory injunction.
FAO/14/2026 Page 17
34. As regards what can be considered as a perverse order, the Apex
Court, in the case of “Associate Builders Vs. Delhi Development
Authority” reported in (2015) 3 SCC 49 has observed as follows:
“32. A good working test of perversity is
contained in two judgments. In Excise and
Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v.
Gopi Nath & Sons [1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] ,
it was held : (SCC p. 317, para 7)
“7. … It is, no doubt, true that if a
finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring
or excluding relevant material or by
taking into consideration irrelevant
material or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered
infirm in law.”
In Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police [(1999)
2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , it was held
: (SCC p. 14, para 10)
“10. A broad distinction has, therefore,
to be maintained between the decisions
which are perverse and those which are
not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is
thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable
person would act upon it, the order
would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable
and which could be relied upon,
howsoever compendious it may be, the
FAO/14/2026 Page 18
conclusions would not be treated as
perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.”
35. Thus, from above, it appears that there is a broad distinction
between decisions which are perverse and those which are not. If a
decision is arrived at on no evidence or evidence which is
thoroughly unreliable and no reasonable person would act upon it,
the order would be perverse. However, if there is some evidence on
record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon,
howsoever, compendious it may be, the conclusion would not be
treated as perverse and the finding would not be interfered with.
36. In the instant case, the Trial Court took into consideration the fact
that the non-issuance of ex parte ad interim injunction may result
into multiplicity of suits. It also took into consideration that the
materials on record clearly indicates that the reputation of the
respondent No.1 has been dented before the society due to the
utterance made by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 as well as due to
publication of the above-mentioned news items without any
authentic basis for making such imputations. The Trial Court could
have discussed the golden principles involved in granting of ex parte
ad interim injunction more elaborately, however, the brevity of such
discussion, in itself, would not make the impugned order perverse
per se, justifying any interference by this Court at this stage. More
so, also considering the discretionary nature of the interim relief
granted to the respondent No.1 for a limited period and also
considering the fact that the ex parte ad interim injunction is
FAO/14/2026 Page 19
extended only till tomorrow, i.e., 14.05.2026, this Court is not
inclined to interfere with the impugned order at this stage.
37. Further, considering the fact that the matter is fixed before the Trial
Court tomorrow, i. e., 14.05.2026, this Court is not inclined to delve
upon the merits of the contentions raised by both the parties. As
the matter is still pending before the Trial Court, any observation
made by this Court on the merit of the case may have a bearing on
the Trial Court during final consideration of the Misc. (J) Case No.
156/2026, which may cause pre-judice to one of the parties. As the
aforesaid Misc. Case is fixed before the Trial Court tomorrow, i. e.,
14.05.2026, the appellants may put forth their case before the Trial
Court by filing written objection and may seek any relief, to which
they are legally entitled to, before the said Court.
38. The Trial Court shall make all endeavours to dispose of the Misc. (J)
Case No. 156/2026 as expeditiously as possible, after giving
opportunity of being heard to both the sides.
39. This appeal is accordingly, disposed of.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
Digitally signed by Amita
Sharma
Date: 2026.05.14 18:19:45
+05'30'
FAO/14/2026 Page 20