Namrata Yadav vs Ramesh Kumar Yadav & Ors.

Court
Delhi High Court

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 09.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 19.11.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 19.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010408992026
+ W.P.(C) 12654/2026, CAV 418/2026 & CM APPL.
58666/2026
NAMRATA YADAV .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sanjay
Rathi, Mr. Sarthak Mannan,
Mr. Viraj, Mr. Hitanshu
Chhillar, Ms. Bhavika Rathi
and Ms. Jaanvi Rathi,
Advocates

versus

RAMESH KUMAR YADAV & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Mohit Mathur, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Atul
Guleria, Mr. Aryan Rakesh,
Mr. Pratishtha Singh and Mr.
Vivek Maurya, Advocates.
Mr. Jagdish Chandra, Ms.
Maanya Saxena and Ms.
Aishwarya Sinha, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J.
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By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:19.11.2026
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1. By way of the present petition filed under Articles 226 and 227
of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has approached this Court,
praying for grant of the following reliefs:
“19. It is most respectfully prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may
kindly set aside/quashed the impugned order dated 06.08.2026
passed in the Appeal No. 1328 of 2026 passed by the court of
the Ld. Divisional Commissioner, Appellate Authority under
Senior Citizen Act & Rules titled as “Ramesh Yadav & Anr
Versus Namrata Yadav & Anr”, thereby allowing the writ
petition in favour of the petitioner.
It is further prayed that during the pendency of the writ petition
the operation of the impugned order dated 06.08.2026 passed
in the Appeal No. 1328 of 2026 passed by the court of the Ld.
Divisional Commissioner, Appellate Authority under Senior
Citizen Act & Rules titled as “Ramesh Yadav & Anr Versus
Namrata Yadav & Anr”, may kindly be stayed by not allowing
the implementation and execution of the impugned order dated
06.08.2026.
It is further prayed that any other relief which this Hon‟ble
Court deems fit and proper may also kindly be granted in
favour of the petitioner and against the respondents.”

2. In the present case, the learned Divisional Commissioner,
Delhi, acting as the Appellate Authority under the Maintenance and
Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 [hereafter „ Senior
Citizens Act ‟] and the Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents
and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, as amended from time to time
[hereafter „ Delhi Rules 2009 ‟], vide order dated 06.08.2026
[hereafter „ impugned order ‟], allowed the appeal preferred by
respondent nos. 1 and 2, against the order dated 23.12.2025 passed by
the learned District Magistrate (North-West), Kanjhawala [hereafter
„learned District Magistrate ‟], and directed the petitioner and her
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son to vacate the property bearing no. HU-79, Pitampura, Delhi-
110034 [hereafter „ subject property ‟], upon being provided alternate
accommodation by respondent nos. 1 and 2.
3. Respondent no. 1, Sh. Ramesh Kumar Yadav, and respondent
no. 2, Smt. Kavita Yadav, are the father-in-law and the mother-in-
law, respectively, of the petitioner, and are senior citizens aged about
70 years and 64 years. Respondent no. 3, Sh. Deepesh Yadav, is the
husband of the petitioner, who is residing separately at Ashok Vihar,
Delhi.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
4. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the marriage
between the petitioner and respondent no. 3 was solemnized on
27.01.2008, and after the marriage, the petitioner started residing at
the subject property, which, according to her, is her matrimonial
home and shared household. A son, „MY‟, was born out of their
wedlock on 24.07.2009, who is stated to be presently studying in
Class XII. It is not in dispute that respondent nos. 1 and 2 reside on
the first floor of the subject property, whereas the petitioner resides in
a portion of the ground floor thereof along with her son.
5. It is stated that the matrimonial relationship between the
petitioner and respondent no. 3 became strained, and as per the
petitioner-wife, respondent no. 3-husband left the matrimonial home
on 10.01.2017; whereas , as per respondent nos. 1 and 2, respondent
no. 3 shifted to a rented accommodation in the year 2016.
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Respondent no. 3 thereafter instituted a petition seeking divorce,
being HMA No. 34/2017, and a petition seeking custody of the son,
being GP No. 62/2017, both of which are stated to be pending before
the learned Family Court, Rohini Courts, Delhi. The petitioner, along
with her son, instituted proceedings under Section 125 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 [hereafter „ Cr.P.C ‟], being MT Case No.
616/2017, wherein interim maintenance of ₹30,000/- per month was
fixed vide order dated 14.03.2019. According to the petitioner,
respondent no. 3 is in arrears of maintenance to the tune of
₹8,46,000/- up to July, 2026.
6. On 07.07.2017, the petitioner‟s father-in-law, i.e. respondent
no. 2 instituted a civil suit, bearing CS SCJ No. 713/2017, seeking
permanent and mandatory injunction for the eviction of the petitioner
from the subject property, in which an application seeking alternate
accommodation for the petitioner had also been filed on behalf of
respondent no. 3. The said suit is stated to be pending.
7. The petitioner alleges that she was subjected to cruelty,
domestic violence, and mental and physical harassment by the
respondents and other family members, and a complaint dated
14.12.2017 was made before the CAW Cell. She thereafter instituted
proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
Act, 2005 [hereafter „ PWDV Act ‟], being Ct. Case No. 1407/2018,
which are pending before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate
(Mahila Court), North-West, Rohini. In the said proceedings,
respondent no. 3 (on 22.08.2019) and respondent no. 2 (on
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18.07.2022) filed applications seeking to provide alternate
accommodation to the petitioner, which were dismissed by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court) vide order dated
14.12.2023. The appeal preferred there-against by respondent nos. 2
and 3, being CA No. 44/2024, was dismissed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, North-West, Rohini Courts, vide order
dated 12.08.2025.
8. On the criminal side, FIR No. 109/2018 was registered at P.S.
Maurya Enclave, Delhi for offences punishable under Sections
498A/406/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereafter „ IPC ‟], in
which chargesheet was filed against respondent nos. 2 and 3. Vide
order dated 31.08.2023, respondent no. 3 (husband) was discharged
for the offence under Section 406 of IPC and respondent no. 2
(mother-in-law) was discharged for the offences under Sections
498A/406 of IPC. The said order was challenged by the petitioner
herein and the same was set aside vide order dated 26.04.2024 by the
Sessions Court and charges were directed to be framed against them.
Such order was then challenged by the respondent nos. 2 and 3
herein, by way of CRL.REV.P. 957/2024, which is pending before
this Court, wherein the order passed by the learned Sessions Court
has been stayed. One FIR No. 477/2018 was also registered on the
complaint of the petitioner against respondent no. 3, alleging that he
had forged her signatures and siphoned off monies from her bank
account. On the other hand, FIR No. 367/2019 was registered against
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the petitioner and her family members, in which the petitioner and
her brother were discharged vide order dated 28.09.2021.
9. On 31.08.2019, a civil suit bearing CS SCJ No. 1318/2019 was
instituted on behalf of the petitioner‟s son, MY, against respondent
nos. 1 to 3 and other family members, claiming that the suit
properties, including the subject property, are Hindu Undivided
Family properties in which he has a share as a coparcener, and
seeking, inter alia , a declaration that the agreement to sell dated
09.01.1987 and the conveyance deed dated 12.05.2000 (registered on
16.05.2000) are null and void. The applications filed by the
defendants therein under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 [hereafter „ CPC ‟] were dismissed on 25.01.2024,
and CRP No. 154/2024 preferred there-against was dismissed by this
Court on 16.10.2024. Vide order dated 06.02.2025, the parties to the
suit were restrained from creating third-party interest in the suit
property till further orders. Thereafter, vide order dated 16.05.2026,
the learned Civil Judge partly allowed the application of the plaintiff
under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC, directing the defendants
therein not to disturb the possession of the plaintiff qua the subject
property and not to dispossess him therefrom without following due
process of law, till the disposal of the suit, while declining the prayer
for restraint against alienation and vacating the interim order dated
06.02.2025. The son of the petitioner assailed the said order in MCA
SCJ No. 4/2026, wherein the learned Appellate Court, vide order
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dated 04.07.2026, stayed the operation of the order dated 16.05.2026,
and the said appeal is stated to be pending.
10. Further, on a complaint filed by the petitioner, being Ct. Case
No. 555/2023, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, South-East,
Saket, vide order dated 24.06.2024, directed registration of an FIR
under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., pursuant to which FIR No. 210/2024
came to be registered at P.S. Kotla Mubarakpur, inter alia , in relation
to the alleged fabrication of the documents of title pertaining to the
subject property. The criminal revision petition challenging the said
order, being Criminal Revision No. 327/2024, was dismissed on
07.11.2024, against which W.P.(CRL) No. 897/2025 is stated to be
pending before this Court. It is stated that a closure report has since
been filed in the said FIR, against which the petitioner proposes to
file a protest petition.
11. In the meantime, on 18.06.2025, respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed
an application under Rule 22(2) and Rule 22(3) of the Delhi Rules
2009 before the learned District Magistrate (North-West), seeking the
eviction of the petitioner from the subject property on the grounds of
ill-treatment, harassment and destruction of property. The learned
District Magistrate called for a field verification report from the
concerned SDM (Saraswati Vihar), and also personally visited the
subject property.

12. Vide order dated 23.12.2025, the learned District Magistrate
declined the prayer for eviction, and directed the parties to continue
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to reside in their respective portions, subject to certain directions. The
relevant portion of the said order reads as under:
“iii) To check the ground reality, the undersigned also
personally visited the residence of the applicant and respondent
no. 1. It is worth mentioning that the area of the plot is nearly
500 sq yards. From the visit it was clear that the applicants and
respondent no. 1 have a separate entry to the residence. The
respondent no. 1 is living in one portion of the house but has
blocked the staircase to the 1st floor and terrace by her
household items making it difficult for the applicant to use that
side of the house. Further, respondent no. 2 is not living in that
premise ...
4) Decision:- Taking into consideration all the facts,
submissions, circumstances and material placed before this
court, sine-qua-non for eviction of property is that the applicant
has to prove two ingredients viz. non-maintenance and ill-
treatment by the son, daughter or his her legal heirs. However,
it appears that this case was initiated because of marital discord
between respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 2. Hence, in view
of all the facts it is ordered that the applicant and respondent
no. 1 to continue to stay as they were living with the following
modifications:
(i) Both parties to have separate entry and exit from each other
to and from the (ii) Both parties to not interfere in each other‟s
side of the house and (iii) Respondent no. 1 to vacate the
staircase (i.e. going from ground to first floor) from the portion
of the house where she is staying so that even the applicant has
access to the terrace (from 1st floor onwards) from both sides
of the house alongwith respondent no. 1.
Further, both the parties should not disturb each other by any
means such as disconnecting water, electricity connections or
blocking common passages etc. ...”

13. Aggrieved thereby, respondent nos. 1 and 2 preferred an appeal
under Rule 22(3)(4) of the Delhi Rules 2009 before the learned
Divisional Commissioner, being Appeal No. 1328/2026, which came
to be allowed vide the impugned order dated 06.08.2026. The
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relevant portion of the impugned order, containing the findings of the
learned Appellate Authority, is extracted hereunder:
“ Findings and Conclusion:-
I have considered the submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the
parties, perused the impugned order dated 23.12.2025 passed
by the Ld. District Magistrate, the appeal, replies and material
available on record.

The direction for restoration of utilities and peaceful
coexistence, though intended to balance the interests of the
parties, does not appear sufficient in the peculiar circumstances
of the present case to secure the peaceful and dignified living
of the appellants. A senior citizen cannot be compelled to
indefinitely endure an atmosphere of persistent conflict and
apprehension in his or her own residence.
The contention of Respondent No.1 regarding her right of
residence in the property as a shared household has also been
considered. However, such right cannot, in every circumstance,
be treated as an absolute and indefeasible right overriding the
rights and welfare of the senior citizens. The competing rights
under the Senior Citizens Act and the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 are required to be
harmoniously balanced. The appellants‟ willingness to provide
reasonable alternate accommodation to Respondent No.1 and
her son is also a relevant consideration.
On a cumulative consideration of the material on record, it is
very much evident from the videos and photographs placed on
record that the relations are acrimonious and respondent no. 1
has caused destruction of the suit property of the appellants and
also she had even manhandled her mother-in-law and their
lawyer outside the District Magistrate office. Hence, this
Appellate Authority is of the considered view that continued
cohabitation of the parties has become unworkable and that
intervention is warranted to secure the peaceful enjoyment and
welfare of the appellants. Accordingly, the present appeal is
allowed. The impugned order dated 23.12.2025 passed by the
Ld. District Magistrate is hereby set aside and the Respondents
are directed to vacate the suit property.

The appellants shall, in terms of their submission, provide
reasonable alternate accommodation to Respondent No.1 and
her son within 15 days from the date of this order, thereafter
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respondent shall vacate the suit property within 7 days and
peacefully handover the possession of the suit property to the
appellants. The shifting process shall be carried out peacefully,
in case required, concerned SDM may also assist for smooth
implementation of the above directions. It is clarified that the
present order is confined to the exercise of jurisdiction under
the Senior Citizens Act and shall not be construed as an
adjudication upon the title, ownership, HUF/ancestral character
or other proprietary rights of any party. The rights and
contentions of the parties in the pending civil, matrimonial,
criminal or other proceedings shall remain unaffected and shall
be decided by the competent forum in accordance with law.”

14. The review petition preferred by the petitioner before the
learned Appellate Authority on 19.08.2026 was withdrawn on
25.08.2026, with liberty to avail appropriate remedy in accordance
with law. Thereafter, the petitioner has approached this Court by way
of the present writ petition.
15. When the matter was taken up on 01.09.2026, both the parties
had agreed to make an endeavour to amicably settle the disputes, and
were accordingly referred to the Delhi High Court Mediation and
Conciliation Centre (SAMADHAN). However, as per the report
dated 02.09.2026 received from the learned Mediator, the parties
remained firm on their respective positions, and the mediation was
closed as a „non-starter‟.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
16. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner
argues that the impugned order suffers from a fundamental
jurisdictional infirmity, inasmuch as the learned Appellate Authority,
while exercising summary jurisdiction under the Senior Citizens Act
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and the Delhi Rules 2009, has effectively granted a decree of eviction
in respect of a property, the rights qua which are the subject matter of
pending civil and criminal proceedings. It is contended that
respondent no. 2 claims ownership of the subject property on the
strength of a conveyance deed dated 12.05.2000, which purports to
derive title from Late Sh. Balwant Singh, who had expired on
06.03.1987, i.e. about thirteen years prior to the execution of the said
deed. It is stated that the genuineness of the said document is the
subject matter of FIR No. 210/2024 as well as CS SCJ No.
1318/2019; and that the learned Appellate Authority has proceeded as
if the ownership of respondent no. 2 stood conclusively established,
thereby enforcing a disputed title through summary proceedings.
17. It is further argued that respondent nos. 1 to 3 have adopted a
calculated strategy of initiating multiple proceedings before different
forums, seeking the same relief of eviction of the petitioner, i.e. first
by way of CS SCJ No. 713/2017 and an application therein for
alternate accommodation, then by way of applications for alternate
accommodation under the PWDV Act, which were dismissed by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 14.12.2023 with the dismissal
being affirmed in appeal on 12.08.2025, and thereafter by invoking
the provisions of Senior Citizens Act. It is contended that even the
learned District Magistrate dismissed their application after due
consideration, and that the impugned order has permitted the
respondents to achieve indirectly what they failed to achieve directly,
which amounts to forum shopping, deprecated by the Hon‟ble
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Supreme Court in Union of India v. Cipla Ltd.: (2017) 5 SCC 262 . It
is also argued that the principles of issue estoppel, constructive res
judicata and finality of litigation squarely apply, and that the learned
Appellate Authority, which has no appellate or supervisory
jurisdiction over the orders passed under the PWDV Act, has granted
the very relief which had been declined therein, merely because the
respondents reiterated their willingness to provide alternate
accommodation.
18. The learned senior counsel further argues that the principal
basis of the impugned order is an alleged incident stated to have
occurred outside the office of the learned District Magistrate, which
is seriously disputed, and which, according to the petitioner, was
orchestrated by the respondents in connivance with their other son
and his wife, with the video clips thereof having been doctored. It is
contended that allegations of harassment, destruction of property and
assault, based on selective photographs and videos, have been treated
as established facts without any adjudication. It is further argued that
the learned District Magistrate had personally inspected the subject
property and recorded that the parties reside in separate portions with
separate entry and exit, and that the dispute arose out of matrimonial
discord, and that these findings have been reversed without cogent
reasons. It is also contended that the Senior Citizens Act cannot be
converted into a weapon for settling matrimonial disputes, and that
beneficial legislation does not create a presumption of truthfulness in
favour of senior citizens.
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19. It is lastly argued that the impugned order virtually directs the
eviction of the petitioner‟s son, who was not a party before the
authorities below, and whose independent rights in the subject
property are the subject matter of CS SCJ No. 1318/2019; that he is a
student of Class XII, whose education and stability would be
irreparably prejudiced by his displacement; and that the impugned
order unsettles a long-standing state of possession, since the
petitioner has been residing in the subject property ever since her
marriage. It is, therefore, prayed that the impugned order be set aside.

20. Conversely, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of respondent nos. 1 and 2 argues that the impugned order strikes a
fair balance between the right of residence of the petitioner and the
right of respondent nos. 1 and 2, who are senior citizens, to live
peacefully and with dignity in their own residence, inasmuch as the
petitioner has not been rendered homeless and respondent nos. 1 and
2 have been directed to provide alternate accommodation to her and
her son. It is submitted that though the portions occupied by the
parties may appear to have separate gates owing to the wide frontage
of the plot, the building is one common structure with a common
porch and staircase, owing to which the conflict between the parties
is a daily occurrence. It is contended that the petitioner has
disconnected the water and electricity supply to the portion of
respondent nos. 1 and 2 and blocked their access to the staircase for
years, has smashed the CCTV cameras installed on the exterior walls,
has attempted to uproot the outdoor unit of their air-conditioner, and
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that the son of the petitioner smashed the windscreen of their car. It is
also submitted that respondent no. 1 suffered a heart attack due to the
stress caused by the conduct of the petitioner. It is further contended
that during the pendency of the proceedings before the learned
District Magistrate, the petitioner and her brother assaulted
respondent no. 2, her counsel and respondent no. 3 outside the office
of the learned District Magistrate, in respect of which FIR No.
394/2025 was registered and chargesheet has been filed, and which
incident finds mention in the noting of the learned District Magistrate
dated 04.09.2025, though not in the final order.
21. It is further submitted that in compliance of the impugned
order, respondent nos. 1 and 2, vide legal notice dated 07.08.2026,
called upon the petitioner to indicate the locality of her preference for
alternate accommodation, and upon receiving no response, identified
a suitable accommodation in the same vicinity, paid one month‟s
advance rent, and informed the petitioner of the same vide legal
notice dated 20.08.2026; however, the petitioner did not shift. It is
also submitted that during and after the mediation proceedings,
respondent nos. 1 and 2 offered to purchase a three-bedroom
apartment in the same vicinity in the name of the petitioner and her
son, besides offering permanent alimony and funding the further
education of the son, but no response was received from the
petitioner. Reliance is placed on several decisions of this Court to
contend that the relief of eviction can be granted even where the title
is disputed, so long as the senior citizen has a modicum of right or
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interest in the property. It is also submitted that FIR No. 210/2024
has culminated in a closure report, and that the status report filed
before this Court in W.P.(CRL) 897/2025 records that no case is
made out against respondent nos. 1 and 2.
22. As regards the proceedings under the PWDV Act, it is argued
that the applications for offering alternate accommodation were not
decided upon an adjudication of the substantive rights of the parties;
rather, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court) had
doubted their maintainability and observed that the appropriate
remedy was to seek eviction, and the learned Additional Sessions
Judge had specifically observed that respondent no. 2 could seek
eviction of the petitioner through due procedure. It is submitted that
the proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act cannot be permitted to
become another chapter in a matrimonial dispute which has
continued for nearly ten years, and that respondent nos. 1 and 2, who
reside separately from respondent no. 3, only seek to live peacefully
in their own residence. It is lastly submitted that, without prejudice to
their rights, respondent nos. 1 and 2 remain willing to contribute
₹30,000/- to ₹35,000/- per month towards the rent of an
accommodation of the petitioner‟s own choice. It is, therefore, prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
23. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of the
parties, and has perused the material available on record, including
the written submissions filed on their behalf.
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ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
24. The principal issue which arises for consideration before this
Court is whether the learned Appellate Authority could have directed
the petitioner, who claims a right of residence in the subject property
as her shared household, to vacate the same at the instance of her
parents-in-law, who are senior citizens, and if so, whether the
directions issued in this regard adequately balance the competing
rights of the parties.
(i) The Statutory Framework and Judicial Precedents
25. The Senior Citizens Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation,
enacted to provide a simple, inexpensive and speedy remedy to
parents and senior citizens. Section 2(b) of the Act defines
„maintenance‟ to include provision for residence, and Section 2(f)
defines „property‟ to include property of any kind, whether ancestral
or self-acquired, and rights or interests in such property. Section 3
accords overriding effect to the provisions of the Act.
26. Rule 22(3)(1)(i) of the Delhi Rules 2009, as amended, provides
for the procedure for eviction from the property of a senior citizen,
and reads as under:
“(3)(1) Procedure for eviction from property/residential
building of Senior Citizen/Parents –
(i) A senior citizen/parents may make an application before the
Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate of his district for
eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir from his property
of any kind whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-
acquired, tangible or intangible and include rights or interests
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in such property on account of his non-maintenance and ill-
treatment.”

27. Recently, in Ravi Kant Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh: Civil
Appeal No. 010525/2026, decision dated 04.08.2026 , the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that the tribunals under the Senior
Citizens Act possess the power to order eviction in order to ensure
the maintenance or protection of a senior citizen, emphasising that
the dignity, respect and security afforded to the elderly is a measure
of a civilised society, and that Articles 21 and 41 of the Constitution
envisage a social order which enables every individual to live with
dignity throughout the course of life.
28. In Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh: 2025 INSC 404 ,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had also clarified that though the
Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act is empowered to order
eviction, it is not necessary or mandatory to do so in every case, and
such a direction is to be issued only where it is necessary for the
protection of the senior citizen.
29. On the other hand , Section 17 of the PWDV Act recognizes
the right of every woman in a domestic relationship to reside in the
shared household, whether or not she has any right, title or beneficial
interest in the same, and further provides that she shall not be evicted
or excluded therefrom save in accordance with the procedure
established by law. Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, in turn,
empowers the learned Magistrate to direct the respondent to secure
the same level of alternate accommodation for the aggrieved person
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as enjoyed by her in the shared household, or to pay rent for the
same, if the circumstances so require.
30. The interplay between the two enactments was examined by a
three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v.
Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District: (2021) 15 SCC
730 , wherein it was held that the Tribunal under the Senior Citizens
Act may order eviction where it is necessary and expedient to ensure
the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen, but the right of a
woman to residence in a shared household cannot be defeated by the
simple expedient of taking recourse to summary proceedings, and
that in such composite disputes, the Tribunal must appropriately
mould the reliefs. The relevant observations read as under:
“17. ... The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 may
have the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and
expedient to ensure the maintenance and protection of the
senior citizen or parent. Eviction, in other words would be an
incident of the enforcement of the right to maintenance and
protection. However, this remedy can be granted only after
adverting to the competing claims in the dispute. ...
21. ... Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have an
overriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of
competing entitlements of a woman to a right in a shared
household within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would
defeat the object and purpose which the Parliament sought to
achieve in enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the
interest of senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not
left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives.
Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored
by a sleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations
have to be harmoniously construed. Hence the right of a
woman to secure a residence order in respect of a shared
household cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of
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securing an order of eviction by adopting the summary
procedure under the Senior Citizens Act 2007.
22. ... Therefore, in the event that a composite dispute is
alleged, such as in the present case where the suit premises are
a site of contestation between two groups protected by the law,
it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the
Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after
noticing the competing claims of the parties claiming under the
PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007...”

31. Equally, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja
v. Sneha Ahuja: (2021) 1 SCC 414 , has cautioned that the right of
residence of a daughter-in-law in the shared household is not an
indefeasible right, particularly when it is pitted against the right of
aged parents-in-law to live in peace. The Court observed as under:
“83. Before we close our discussion on Section 2(s), we need
to observe that the right to residence under Section 19 is not an
indefeasible right of residence in shared household especially
when the daughter-in-law is pitted against aged father-in-law
and mother-in-law. The senior citizens in the evening of their
life are also entitled to live peacefully not haunted by marital
discord between their son and daughter-in-law. While granting
relief both in application under Section 12 of Act, 2005 or in
any civil proceedings, the Court has to balance the rights of
both the parties...”

32. This Court, too, has consistently endeavoured to harmonise the
two enactments. In Vinay Varma v. Kanika Pasricha: 2019 SCC
OnLine Del 11530 , this Court laid down broad guidelines to balance
the rights of parents-in-law and a daughter-in-law, recognising that
where the relationship between the parties is acrimonious, the parents
ought to be permitted to seek eviction from their premises, with the
obligation to secure the residence of the daughter-in-law being
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suitably provided for. The Division Bench of this Court in Manju
Arora v. Neelam Arora: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 7280 has held that
the right of residence under the PWDV Act is a right of protection
and occupation, and not of ownership; that it can be satisfied by
providing suitable alternate accommodation under Section 19(1)(f) of
the PWDV Act; and that the PWDV Act guarantees adequacy of
residence, and not parity of luxury.
33. In Ritika Kalra v. GNCT of Delhi: 2026:DHC:3704 , this
Court held that the right under the PWDV Act is a right to secure
residence and not necessarily a right to insist upon residence in a
specific property belonging to the in-laws, and upheld the eviction of
the daughter-in-law while directing the senior citizens to pay monthly
rent for alternate accommodation, with an advance deposit. Further,
in Ritu Taneja v. GNCT of Delhi: 2026 SCC OnLine Del 3199 , this
Court held that proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act cannot be
converted into a forum for adjudication of complex civil disputes
relating to inheritance, ancestral character or ownership of property,
and that such pleas cannot constitute a sustainable defence to an
eviction order passed for protecting the peaceful residence of senior
citizens.
34. It is, therefore, evident from the aforesaid statutory provisions
and judicial precedents that, firstly , the authorities under the Senior
Citizens Act are empowered to direct eviction where such eviction is
necessary and expedient for the maintenance, protection, dignity and
peaceful residence of the senior citizens; secondly , the power of
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eviction is not to be exercised mechanically or as a matter of course,
and the authority is required to examine the circumstances of each
case and advert to the competing rights and interests of the parties;
thirdly , where the person sought to be evicted is a woman asserting a
right of residence in a shared household under the PWDV Act, such
right cannot be defeated merely by resort to the summary mechanism
under the Senior Citizens Act, and the competing statutory
protections must be harmoniously construed, with the relief being
appropriately moulded so as to balance the rights of the senior
citizens with the woman's right to secure residence; and fourthly , the
right of residence under the PWDV Act is a right to secure residence
and protection, and does not, by itself, confer an indefeasible right to
reside in a particular property belonging to the in-laws, and may, in
an appropriate case, be secured by provision of suitable alternate
accommodation which adequately protects the woman's residential
needs.
(ii) Whether the reversal of the order of the learned District
Magistrate, by the Appellate Authority, suffers from any infirmity
or perversity?
35. The first and foremost argument of the petitioner is that the
learned Appellate Authority has reversed the findings of the learned
District Magistrate, which were based on a personal inspection of the
subject property, without any cogent reasons, and the Appellate
Authority has relied upon disputed allegations.
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36. This Court notes that the learned Appellate Authority is a
statutory appellate forum, which is competent to re-appreciate the
material on record and to arrive at its own conclusions. A careful
reading of the order of the learned District Magistrate itself shows
that, upon inspection, the learned District Magistrate found that
though the parties have separate entries to their respective portions,
the petitioner had blocked the staircase leading to the first floor and
the terrace with her household items, making it difficult for
respondent nos. 1 and 2 to use that side of the house; and
consequently directed the petitioner to vacate the staircase, and
directed both the parties not to disturb each other by disconnecting
water or electricity connections or by blocking common passages.
These findings and directions, far from establishing that the parties
could peacefully co-exist, themselves reflect that the portions
occupied by the parties are not self-contained, that the parties share a
common staircase, porch and terrace, and that the relations between
them had deteriorated to the extent of obstruction of access and
disruption of basic amenities.
37. The impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Authority
further records that respondent nos. 1 and 2 had relied upon CCTV
footage, photographs, police complaints, FIR, medical records, the
field verification report and the statements of neighbours and
independent witnesses. The impugned order also records the
submissions of the petitioner, who, on her part, had relied upon
photographs and videos relating to alleged water leakage in her
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portion, installation of CCTV cameras by respondent nos. 1 and 2 on
the exterior of the property, cleaning of the common porch, and
disputes concerning the exterior door of the portion occupied by
respondent nos. 1 and 2. The very nature of these rival grievances,
which evidently pertain to the common areas and shared amenities of
the subject property prima facie demonstrates that notwithstanding
the existence of separate residential portions, the parties continue to
be in a state of persistent friction in their daily lives.
38. This Court is also unable to accept the contention that since
these proceedings arose in the backdrop of the matrimonial discord
between the petitioner and respondent no. 3, the same was a
sufficient ground to decline relief to respondent nos. 1 and 2. In
Geeta Wahal v. GNCT of Delhi: 2024:DHC:6771 , this Court held
that the reliance by the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act, on
the decision in S. Vanitha ( supra ) to reject the claim of a senior
citizen, on the ground that the proceedings were an offshoot of
matrimonial discord, was misplaced to the extent that it overlooked
the necessity of balancing the competing rights involved; and rather,
as observed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja
( supra ), senior citizens in their advances years are entitled to live
peacefully, and not be haunted by the marital discord between their
son and daughter-in-law.

39. In the present case, respondent nos. 1 and 2, who are aged
about 70 and 64 years, have been living in the midst of this discord
for close to a decade. Further, the Coordinate Bench of this Court in
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Piare Khan v. GNCT of Delhi: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8568 after
examining the Rule 22(3)(1) of the Delhi Rules 2009, and several
judicial precedents, even held that, where the occupants have no right
or interest in the property, proof of ill-treatment or non-maintenance
is not a necessary precondition for seeking eviction under the Rules
40. Further, insofar as the alleged incident outside the office of the
learned District Magistrate is concerned, this Court notes that the
same is stated to have occurred during the pendency of the
proceedings before the learned District Magistrate, and is the subject
matter of FIR No. 394/2025, in which a chargesheet is stated to have
been filed. The petitioner, on the other hand, disputes the said
incident and alleges that the video clips thereof have been doctored.
This Court would refrain from recording any finding on the veracity
of the said incident, which shall be determined in the criminal
proceedings. However, even if the said incident is kept aside, the
cumulative material on record, coupled with the admitted acrimony
between the parties, the multiplicity of civil, criminal and
matrimonial proceedings pending between them for nearly a decade,
the rival allegations of harassment made by each side against the
other, and the findings recorded by the learned District Magistrate
upon inspection regarding the blocking of the staircase, prima facie
support the conclusion of the learned Appellate Authority that the
continued cohabitation of the parties in the subject property has
become unworkable. The said conclusion is a plausible view on the
material available on record, and cannot be termed as perverse so as
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to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction.
(iii) Whether the dispute as to title and the pendency of the civil
proceedings denuded the Appellate Authority of its jurisdiction?
41. One of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner is that
the title of respondent no. 2 to the subject property is under a serious
cloud, since the conveyance deed dated 12.05.2000 relied upon by
her purports to derive title from a person who had expired in the year
1987, and that the rights of the parties, including those of the
petitioner‟s son, are sub judice before the competent civil court and,
therefore, the learned Appellate Authority could not have directed
eviction in summary proceedings.
42. However, in the considered opinion of this Court, the said
contention is unmerited, since it is well-settled that an authority under
the Senior Citizens Act does not adjudicate questions of title; and, the
pendency of a title dispute does not preclude it from protecting the
senior citizen, inasmuch as the relief under the Act is not contingent
upon a conclusive determination of title, and even a modicum of right
or interest of the senior citizen in the property suffices. This Court in
Manju Tokas v. GNCT of Delhi: 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3974 ,
Pritam Singh v. GNCT of Delhi: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4406, and
Piare Khan (supra) has consistently taken this view. In Piare Khan
(supra) , the Coordinate Bench of this Court, while relying on
decision in Pritam Singh (supra) , which stood upheld by the
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Division Bench of this Court in LPA 384/2025 vide an order dated
30.05.2025, observed as under:
“47. As such, the petitioner is not precluded from invoking the
statutory mechanism under the Senior Citizens Act, 2007, with
regard to all portions of the subject property. In Pritam Singh
(supra), it has been noticed that in several judicial
pronouncements, this Court has gone to the extent of holding
that a senior citizen is entitled to seek relief under the Senior
Citizens Act, 2007, even where the title of the property is
disputed and senior citizen only has a “ modicum of right ” in
the subject property. In the present case, the
right/title/interest/ownership of the petitioner stands on a far
better footing.”

43. In the present case, it is not in dispute that respondent nos. 1
and 2 have been residing on the first floor of the subject property, and
that respondent no. 2 claims title thereto under a registered
conveyance deed. The validity of the said conveyance deed, and the
question whether the subject property is a Hindu Undivided Family
(HUF) property, are the questions which fall for determination in CS
SCJ No. 1318/2019, wherein a declaration to such effect has been
specifically sought. Similarly, the allegation of fabrication of the
documents of title is the subject matter of FIR No. 210/2024, in
which a closure report is stated to have been filed, and against which
the petitioner proposes to file a protest petition. These questions will
be determined by the competent forums/courts, and this Court
refrains from making any observation on the merits thereof.
44. It is significant to note that the learned Appellate Authority has
itself expressly clarified that the impugned order is confined to the
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exercise of jurisdiction under the Senior Citizens Act, and shall not
be construed as an adjudication upon the title, ownership, HUF or
ancestral character, or other proprietary rights of any party. The
impugned order, therefore, does not purport to decide, and cannot be
read as deciding, any question of title.
45. Insofar as the rights of the petitioner‟s son are concerned, this
Court notes that the learned Civil Judge, vide order dated 16.05.2026,
had protected the possession of the son qua the subject property only
to the extent that he be not dispossessed therefrom without following
due process of law, and that even the operation of the said order
presently stands stayed vide order dated 04.07.2026, in the appeal
preferred by the son himself. Proceedings under the Senior Citizens
Act, being statutory proceedings conducted in accordance with the
Delhi Rules, themselves constitute due process of law, as also held by
the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Vinod Kumar Bali v. Ashish
Bali: 2024:DHC:7842 . At the same time, this Court is conscious that
the son of the petitioner, who is still a minor, resides in the subject
property as a member of the petitioner‟s household, and has raised an
independent claim in respect thereof which is pending adjudication in
CS SCJ No. 1318/2019 and MCA SCJ No. 4/2026, and sufficient
safeguards qua him must be ensured.
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(iv) Whether the orders passed in the proceedings under the
PWDV Act barred the proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act?
46. Another argument of the petitioner is that the respondents are
indulging in forum shopping, since the relief of shifting the petitioner
to an alternate accommodation had already been declined by the
competent courts under the PWDV Act. In order to appreciate this
contention, it would be apposite to take note of the relevant portions
of the orders passed in the said proceedings.
47. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate (Mahila Court), while
dismissing the applications filed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 vide
order dated 14.12.2023, had observed as under:
“At the outset, it is not clear whether the present application
filed on behalf of the respondent no. 1 is maintainable or
not since the PWDV Act is a beneficial legislation with the
objective to protect the basic rights of women within their
matrimonial household. There is no dispute that the said
property is the shared household of the complainant and that
she has been residing there since her marriage with respondent
no. 1. While this Court understands that rights of the
complainant as well as respondent no. 3 mother-in-law
have to balanced, however, the appropriate remedy for the
respondent no. 3 in this regard is to file a Petition for
eviction and in fact in this case, a civil suit is already
pending between the parties and admittedly, a similar
application is pending adjudication before the Ld. Civil
Court as well. Even as per the judgments relied upon by the
respondents, there is no embargo upon the respondents to file
an eviction suit, but in my considered opinion, respondent no.
1 and 3 have no locus standi to file an application to offer
alternate accommodation to the complainant in the facts of
the present case, when the complainant is stated to be residing
in the shared household. ...
... In view of the above discussion, both the applications filed
by respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 3 are disposed of as
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dismissed. The observation made in the order shall not
tantamount to any findings on merits of this case .”
(Emphasis added)

48. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, North-West, Rohini
Courts, while dismissing the appeal [CA No. 44/2024] preferred
against the aforesaid order, vide order dated 12.08.2025, had
observed as under:
“5. The D V Act is mainly a beneficial legislation mainly to
protect the women from cruelty and harassment done by the
husband and his relatives. Though, there is provision of
alternate residence but the same has to be ordered only in rare
circumstances where the grant of residence order in favour of
the victim would be causing grave injustice to the other parties.
Admittedly, the respondent is living on the ground floor while
the appellant no. 1 is living on the first floor. It is also pertinent
to mention here that the husband of the respondent is living at a
different address at Ashok Vihar. No such circumstances have
been shown as to grant order for alternate residence for the
respondent. It is also pertinent to mention here that such
applications on behalf of husband or other relatives
through him do not seem to be maintainable in absence of
any such provisions in this Act. During the arguments, it
was also mentioned by the Ld. Counsel for the appellants
that proceedings under the Senior Citizen’s Protection Act
are also pending. The appellant no. 1 can seek eviction of
the respondent wife through due procedure ...”
(Emphasis added)

49. A perusal of the aforesaid orders reveals that the applications
of respondent nos. 2 and 3 were rejected primarily on the ground that
the respondents in proceedings under the PWDV Act, which is a
legislation for the protection of the aggrieved woman, had no locus
standi to seek her removal from the shared household by way of an
application thereunder. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate
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expressly observed that the appropriate remedy for the mother-in-law
was to seek eviction, and clarified that the observations made therein
shall not tantamount to any findings on merits. The learned
Additional Sessions Judge, while affirming the said view, took note
of the pendency of the proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act and
observed that the mother-in-law could seek the eviction of the
petitioner through due procedure. These orders, therefore, did not
adjudicate upon the independent statutory right of respondent nos. 1
and 2, as senior citizens, to seek protection under the Senior Citizens
Act; on the contrary, they indicated that the remedy available to them
lay elsewhere.
50. This Court also notes that the material relied upon by
respondent nos. 1 and 2 before the authorities under the Senior
Citizens Act included allegations of incidents which had allegedly
taken place after passing of these orders under PWDV Act, including
the incident alleged to have occurred outside the office of the learned
District Magistrate during the pendency of the proceedings under the
Senior Citizens Act.
51. In view thereof, the principles of res judicata , issue estoppel or
constructive res judicata have no application, and the invocation by
respondent nos. 1 and 2 of the very remedy which the competent
courts under the PWDV Act had themselves indicated cannot be
characterised as forum shopping. The decision in Union of India v.
Cipla Ltd. ( supra ), relied upon by the petitioner, is of no assistance to
her in the facts of the present case.
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52. This Court is, however, conscious of the caution sounded by
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in S. Vanitha ( supra ), that the summary
procedure under the Senior Citizens Act cannot be adopted as a
strategy to defeat the claim of a woman to residence in the shared
household. The petitioner has also alleged that the present
proceedings have been initiated in connivance with respondent no. 3.
In the opinion of this Court, the facts of the present case are
distinguishable from those in S. Vanitha ( supra ), where the property
had been purchased by the husband, sold by him to his father at the
same price, and thereafter gifted to the mother-in-law, in the
backdrop of the matrimonial dispute, and the in-laws were not
residing in the premises. In the present case , respondent nos. 1 and 2
are themselves residing in the subject property, and the grievance
raised by them relates to the day-to-day conflict in the premises in
which they live. Nonetheless, the safeguard, which S. Vanitha
( supra ) mandates, is that the right of the petitioner to secure a
residence must not be rendered illusory, and the reliefs must be
moulded accordingly. It is also relevant to note that the proceedings
under the DV Act, being Ct. Case No. 1407/2018, remain pending,
and the petitioner‟s right to seek appropriate reliefs therein, including
under Section 19 of the DV Act, remains unaffected.
(v) Whether the directions in the impugned order adequately
balance the competing rights of the parties?
53. Having held that the learned Appellate Authority was justified
in concluding that the continued living together in the same premises
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of the parties has become unworkable, the next question which arises
is whether the directions issued in the impugned order are adequate to
secure the right of residence of the petitioner, as mandated by S.
Vanitha ( supra ).
54. In the considered opinion of this Court, though the impugned
order is correct in principle, the directions issued therein lack the
specificity required to ensure that the right of the petitioner and her
son to secure a residence is not rendered illusory. The impugned
order merely directs respondent nos. 1 and 2 to provide „reasonable
alternate accommodation‟ within 15 days, and the petitioner to vacate
within 7 days thereafter. It does not lay down the standard of the
accommodation to be provided, the period for which the same is to be
provided, the manner of payment of rent, or the consequences of any
default on the part of respondent nos. 1 and 2. Further, a total period
of about three weeks for relocating a woman who has resided in the
subject property since the year 2008, along with her son who is a
student of Class XII, is, in the opinion of this Court, unjustified.
55. This Court also notes that the petitioner has chosen not to
respond to the notices dated 07.08.2026 and 20.08.2026 issued by
respondent nos. 1 and 2, whereby she was called upon to indicate the
locality of her preference, and was informed of the accommodation
identified by them. The right of residence under the PWDV Act, as
noted above, is a right to secure a residence of an adequate standard,
and not a right to insist upon residence in a particular property
belonging to the in-laws. At the same time, the petitioner, who is
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stated to be dependent upon the interim maintenance of ₹30,000/- per
month awarded in her favour, and who alleges substantial arrears
thereof, cannot be expected to relocate to an accommodation of an
unspecified standard, on uncertain terms, and without any assurance
of continuity. As per the averments of respondent nos. 1 and 2
themselves before the learned District Magistrate, the petitioner
presently occupies a portion of the ground floor comprising two
bedrooms, a drawing room and a kitchen, and the alternate
accommodation must be broadly commensurate therewith.

56. Respondent nos. 1 and 2 have, before this Court, expressed
their willingness to contribute up to ₹35,000/- per month towards the
rent of an accommodation of the petitioner‟s own choice. This Court
is of the view that the said offer, if structured with adequate
safeguards, would sufficiently secure the right of residence of the
petitioner and her son, while also enabling respondent nos. 1 and 2 to
live in peace in their own residence. Such a course would also be in
consonance with the mandate of S. Vanitha ( supra ) to appropriately
mould the reliefs in composite disputes of the present nature.
57. As regards the offer made by respondent nos. 1 and 2 to
purchase a three-bedroom apartment in the name of the petitioner and
her son, along with payment of permanent alimony and educational
expenses, this Court notes that the said offer was in the nature of a
proposal for an overall settlement of the disputes between the parties,
which has not been accepted by the petitioner, and the mediation
between the parties has not borne fruit. The same cannot, therefore,
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be converted into a direction by this Court. It shall, however, remain
open to the parties to explore an amicable resolution of their disputes,
including on the basis of the said offer, if they so desire.
58. To conclude , this Court finds no jurisdictional error or
perversity in the conclusion of the learned Appellate Authority that
the continued living together of the parties in the subject property has
become unworkable, and that the petitioner and her son are required
to shift to an alternate accommodation. However, in order to ensure
that the right of residence of the petitioner and her son is adequately
secured, the impugned order dated 06.08.2026 is modified, and the
following directions are issued:
(i) The petitioner shall, within a period of four (04) weeks
from the date of this judgment, identify a residential
accommodation comprising two bedrooms, a drawing room
and a kitchen, preferably in the same or an adjoining locality
and within reasonable commuting distance of the school of
her son, so as to cause minimum disruption to his education,
and shall communicate the particulars thereof to respondent
nos. 1 and 2 through counsel.
(ii) Respondent nos. 1 and 2 shall bear the rent of the said
accommodation up to a sum of ₹35,000/- per month.
Respondent nos. 1 and 2 shall also bear the security deposit,
the brokerage, if any, and the reasonable expenses of shifting.
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(iii) Within two weeks of receipt of the particulars of the
accommodation, respondent nos. 1 and 2 shall deposit the rent
for the first six months in advance, along with the security
deposit, either directly with the landlord or in the bank
account of the petitioner, as the petitioner may indicate.
Thereafter, the rent shall be paid on or before the 10th day of
each calendar month.
(iv) In case the petitioner fails to identify an accommodation
within the period stipulated in direction (i), respondent nos. 1
and 2 shall be at liberty to offer the accommodation already
identified by them, or another accommodation of a
comparable standard in the same vicinity, on the terms set out
in directions (ii) and (iii).
(v) The petitioner, along with her son, shall vacate the
portion of the subject property in her occupation, and hand
over its peaceful possession to respondent nos. 1 and 2, within
two weeks from the date of compliance of direction (iii). The
concerned SDM shall render assistance, if required, for
smooth and peaceful implementation of this direction.
(vi) The obligation of respondent nos. 1 and 2 under
directions (ii) and (iii) shall continue until the right of
residence of the petitioner is finally adjudicated in the
proceedings under the PWDV Act or in the matrimonial
proceedings between the petitioner and respondent no. 3,
W.P.(C) 12654/2026 Page 35 of 37
Signature Not Verified



Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:19.11.2026
18:00:29

subject to such orders as may be passed by the competent
court in this regard.
(vii) In the event respondent nos. 1 and 2 default in payment
of rent for two consecutive months, the petitioner shall be at
liberty to approach the learned Appellate Authority, which
shall consider the grievance expeditiously and pass
appropriate orders, including for restoration of possession, in
accordance with law.
(viii) The aforesaid arrangement is being directed on the basis
of the offer made by respondent nos. 1 and 2 themselves, and
shall be in addition to, and not in adjustment of, the
maintenance payable by respondent no. 3 to the petitioner and
her son. It shall be without prejudice to the rights and
contentions of the parties in the maintenance proceedings, the
proceedings under the PWDV Act, and any civil proceedings
pending between them.
(ix) Till the petitioner shifts to the alternate accommodation,
both parties shall maintain peace and decorum, and shall
comply with the directions issued by the learned District
Magistrate vide order dated 23.12.2025 regarding non-
obstruction of the staircase and common passages and non-
interference with the water and electricity connections of each
other.
W.P.(C) 12654/2026 Page 36 of 37
Signature Not Verified



Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:19.11.2026
18:00:29

(x) The arrangement directed herein shall remain subject to
the orders that may be passed in CS SCJ No. 1318/2019 and
MCA SCJ No. 4/2026, and nothing contained herein shall
prejudice the rights and contentions of the son of the
petitioner therein.
59. It is clarified that nothing expressed hereinabove shall be
construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the pending
civil, matrimonial, criminal or other proceedings between the parties,
including those relating to the title, ownership or ancestral character
of the subject property, which shall be decided by the competent
forums on their own merits and in accordance with law.
60. The petition is, accordingly, disposed of in the above terms.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
61. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.


DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
NOVEMBER 19, 2026/vc
W.P.(C) 12654/2026 Page 37 of 37
Signature Not Verified



Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
Signing Date:19.11.2026
18:00:29