The Commissioner, Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike vs K.K. Umesh Kumar

2026 INSC 637
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. __________________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 1039 of 2021)


THE COMMISSIONER,
BRUHAT BANGALORE
MAHANAGARA PALIKE … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

K.K.UMESH KUMAR & ORS. ... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
Leave Granted.
2. The issue for our consideration is whether the appellant
can be held liable under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
MINI
injuries sustained by respondent no.1 that were caused due to the
Date: 2026.06.11
13:50:38 IST
Reason:
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falling of a roadside tree on the vehicle by which the respondent
no.1 was travelling, but had stopped under the tree waiting for
the rain to subside and then proceed further.

3. The facts in which this question arose are as follows:
rd
Respondent no.1 was travelling on 23 June 2007 in an
auto from Queens Road to Chinnaswamy Stadium when due to
heavy rain it was requested by respondent no.1 that the vehicle
be pulled up to the side of the road. Along the road were older
trees, some even as old as hundred years and when the vehicle
was stationary underneath one of these trees, a branch got
detached from the tree fell on top, injuring the respondent.
Thereafter, he was admitted to Mallya Hospital and received
treatment.
1
A claim petition was filed before the Motor Accidents
Claim Tribunal, Bangalore, seeking compensation of Rs.50
th
lakhs. The Claims Tribunal in terms of order dated 10 April
2013 dismissed the claim on account of it being a natural
2
calamity. The High Court of Karnataka at Bangaluru dismissed
the claim on the point of delay. This is the proceeding in the first
round . This concurrent dismissal was challenged before this

1
MVC No.1313/2020
2
MFA No.6470/2015 (MV)
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3
Court which remanded the matter on the point of non-
condonation of delay. In the second round of proceedings, the
High Court allowed the appeal and awarded 17,10,500/- out of
which 25% was directed to be paid by the appellant herein, 50%
was to be paid by the Insurer of the autorickshaw and further 25%
by respondent no.4-Horticulture Department, Government of
Karnataka. It is this apportionment of liability towards the
appellant which has been challenged before us.

4. We have heard learned senior counsel and counsel
appearing for the parties.

5. In essence, the case of the appellant as also respondent
no.4 that is the Horticulture Department, State of Karnataka is
that they bore no responsibility for the unfortunate act that has
quite literally, befallen respondent no.1. What happened was a
natural occurrence over which the State authorities obviously had
no control. That being the case, we must understand the position
of law when it comes to such natural calamities, or in other
words, the cases that deal with the proposition of ‘ Act of God ’.
6. Naturally, let us turn to the House of Lords to understand
4
the origins of the doctrine. In Nichols v. Marsland , the Court of

3
Civil Appeal No.20865/2017
4
(1876) 2 Ex D 1.
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Appeal had a case where the respondent had, on his land,
artificial ponds with built-in safety mechanisms allowing excess
water to flow out. Due to an incident of extremely heavy rainfall,
there was a lot of excess water which flowed into the plaintiff’s
land. He claimed damages under the strict liability rule of
5
Rylands v. Fletcher , however outcome was in favour of the
defendant since the flooding was not reasonably foreseeable. ‘ Act
of God ’ or ‘ Vis Major ’ was accepted as a defence to strict liability.
Next, we must consider Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian
6
Railway Co in this case, flooding of an artificially created public
playground and paddling pool which eventually damaged the
nearby land that belonged to the respondent. The House of Lords
eventually dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim of damnum fatale since
they had altered the course of the stream. The Supreme Court of
7
the United States in its 1897 decision titled The Majestic
discussed the rule as follows:
“The act of God, said Chancellor Kent (vol. 2, p. 597),
means "inevitable accident, without the intervention
of man and public enemies" and again (vol. 3, p. 216)
that "perils of the sea denote natural accidents peculiar
to that element, which do not happen by the
intervention of man, nor are to be prevented by human
prudence."
A " casus fortuitous " was defined in the civil law to
be quod damno fatali contingit, cuivis diligentissimo
possit contingere. It is a "loss happening in spite of all

5
(1868) LR 3 HL 330
6
[1917] UKHL 3
7
166 U.S.375 (1897)
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human effort and sagacity." The words "perils of the
sea" may indeed have grown to have a broader
signification than "the act of God," but that is
unimportant here.
Judge Shipman in the Court of Appeals quotes from 1
Parsons on Shipping 255, the definition there given of
the "act of God," and the reason for it, as follows:
"The 'act of God' is limited to causes in which no man
has any agency whatever, because it was never
intended to raise, in the case of the common carrier,
the dangerous and difficult question whether he
actually had any agency in causing the loss; for if this
were possible, he should be held."”

7. We now move to the decisions of this Court. In S.
8
Vedantacharya v. Highways Deptt. of South Arcot , this Court
observed that when it comes to bridges and culverts, heavy rain
or flood are not possibilities outside the contemplation of the
department concerned. Since there was nothing on record in the
case to show that the concerned department had taken any
preventive action, the finding of the High Court dismissing the
claim was overturned and judgment was entered for the
plaintiffs. Another case was Vohra Sadikbhai Rajakbhai v.
9
State of Gujarat wherein certain landowners claimed
compensation on account of severe damage and submersion of
their lands leading to widespread loss of crops and other
vegetation. The same was resisted, averring that there had been
a great amount of rainfall leading to the dam being overfilled,

8
(1987) 3 SCC 400
9
(2016) 12 SCC 1
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necessitating 60000 cusecs of water having to be released in
order to protect the dam. The Court in order to complete justice
gave Rs 5 lacs as compensation against a claim of
Rs.21,50,000/- :
“22. There are two exceptions to the aforesaid rule
of strict liability, which were recognised
in Rylands v. Fletcher [ Rylands v. Fletcher , (1868)
LR 3 HL 330 : 37 LJ Ex 161] itself viz.:
( a ) where it can be shown that the escape was owing
to the plaintiff's default, or
( b ) the escape was the consequence of vis major or
the act of God.
An act of God is that which is a direct, violent,
sudden and irresistible act of nature as could not, by
any amount of ability, have been foreseen, or if
foreseen, could not by any amount of human care
and skill have been resisted. Generally, those acts
which are occasioned by the elementary forces of
nature, unconnected with the agency of man or other
cause will come under the category of acts of God.
Examples are : storm, tempest, lightning,
extraordinary fall of rain, extraordinary high tide,
extraordinary severe frost, or a tidal bore which
sweeps a ship in mid-water. What is important here
is that it is not necessary that it should be unique or
that it should happen for the first time. It is enough
that it is extraordinary and such as could not
reasonably be anticipated. We would like to discuss
a few cases having bearing on this issue with which
we are confronted in the instant appeal.”

8. Before proceeding further, we must also deal with Rajkot
10
Municipal Corpn. v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum on which
extensive reliance has been placed by the appellants. In that case,

10
(1997) 9 SCC 552
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the deceased Jayantilal, was walking on the footpath when a tree
fell upon him, leading to grievous injuries and eventual death.
Against the claim of Rs.1,00,000/- against the appellant
Corporation, the Trial Court granted the claim to the extent of
Rs.45,000/-. The same was confirmed by the High Court on
appeal. This Court, in its detailed judgment considered
extensively the concept of negligence, the duty of municipal
authorities etc. in the following words:
“59. … When the defendant is under a statutory duty
to take care not to create latent source of physical
danger to the property or the person who in the
circumstances is considered to be reasonably
foreseeable as likely to be affected thereby, the
defendant would be liable for tort of negligence. If the
latent defect causes actual physical damages to the
person, the defendant is liable to damages for tortious
liability. The negligent act or omission of the statutory
authority must be examined with reference to the
statutory provisions, creating the duty and the
resultant consequences. The negligent act or omission
must be specifically directed to safeguard the public
or some sections of the public to which the plaintiff
was a member, from the particular danger which has
resulted.”

9. In view of the law as discussed above, let us move to
applying the law. A tree has been on the side of the road for many
years. Because it is part of the city, the Municipal Corporation
does have a duty to ensure that those trees are looked after, from
the point of view of not only keeping the trees hale and healthy
but also that periodic maintenance thereof is undertaken to ensure
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that unfortunate incidents such as these do not happen. It is a
reality that the boundaries of City are ever expanding in India, in
view of the constant migration, and so the number of people that
a Corporation is serving increases overtime. It would be
unrealistic to expect that authorities of the Corporation can
maintain a constant vigil over each tree/shrub. In the similar vein,
while it may be perfectly within contemplation that an old branch
of an old tree may give way at any time, the prudent call cannot
be that all branches are slashed with a saw.

10. The importance of trees especially in the ever-expanding
concrete jungles that we call cities today cannot be overstated. In
our city of Delhi, for example, we find vast differences in green
cover depending on the area you travel to. In such a situation, it
is the primary duty of Centre and state level authorities to increase
greencover in cities howsoever possible, with due consultation
from experts facilitating the long term survival of each tree or
plant sown into the soil.

11. Let it be stated, lest we be misunderstood that we are not
even for a moment trivializing the injuries of the respondent or
affording any escape to the appellant from its duty of maintaining
the trees in the city. All that we are saying is that in the facts and
circumstances of this case neither was taking a shelter under the
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tree was anything out of the ordinary nor was the unfortunate
falling of a branch within contemplation of any Authority or even
the driver of the autorickshaw. In these circumstances, it would
be unfair to fasten the liability upon the appellant under the MVA.
Under Section 166, MVA a claim can be filed for an accident as
described in Section 165(1). The latter reads as follows:
“165. Claims Tribunals.—(1) A State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunals (hereafter in this Chapter referred to as
Claims Tribunal) for such area as may be specified
in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating
upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents
involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons
arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages
to any property of a third party so arising, or both.
Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it is
hereby declared that the expression “claims for
compensation in respect of accidents involving the
death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the
use of motor vehicles” includes claims for
compensation under section 140 [and section
163A]…”
(emphasis supplied)
12. The question that arises is whether the falling of a tree on
an autorickshaw, would qualify as an accident for which a claim
can be filed. The phrase emphasised by us in the Section above
was, in its corresponding form in the preceding legislation
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interpreted by this Court in Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala
11
Uttam More , :
“26. These decisions indicate that the word “use”, in the
context of motor vehicles, has been construed in a wider
sense to include the period when the vehicle is not moving
and is stationary, being either parked on the road and when
it is not in a position to move due to some breakdown or
mechanical defect. … In our opinion, the word “use” has
a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle
is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle
does not cease on account of the vehicle having been
rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or
mechanical defect or accident. In the circumstances, it
cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not in the use at
the time when it was lying on its side after the collision
with the truck.
…
33. …The words “arising out of” were not construed to
mean “arising under” as in Union of India v. E.B. Aaby's
Rederi A/S [1975 AC 797 : (1974) 2 All ER 874] which
decision was held inapplicable to the construction of
Section 20(2)(1)( h ) and it was observed by Lord Brand-
on:
“With regard to the first point, I would
readily accept that in certain contexts
the expression ‘arising out of’ may, on
the ordinary and natural meaning of the
words used, be the equivalent of the
expression ‘arising under’, and not that
of the wider expression ‘connected
with’. In my view, however, the
expression ‘arising out of’ is, on the
ordinary and natural meaning of the
words used, capable, in other contexts,
of being the equivalent of the wider
expression ‘connected with’. Whether
the expression ‘arising out of’ has the
narrower or the wider meaning in any

11
(1991) 3 SCC 530
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particular case must depend on the
context in which it is used.”
Keeping in view the context in which the expression was
used in the statute it was construed to have the wider
meaning viz. “connected with”.
34. In the context of motor accidents the expressions
“caused by” and “arising out of” are often used in statutes.
Although both these expressions imply a causal
relationship between the accident resulting in injury and
the use of the motor vehicle but they differ in the degree
of proximity of such relationship. This distinction has been
lucidly brought out in the decision of the High Court of
Australia in Government Insurance Office of N.S.W. v. R.J.
Green case [(1965) 114 CLR 437], wherein Lord Barwick,
C.J. has stated : (CLR p. 433)
“Bearing in mind the general purpose
of the Act I think the expression
‘arising out of’ must be taken to require
a less proximate relationship of the
injury to the relevant use of the vehicle
than is required to satisfy the words
‘caused by’. It may be that an
association of the injury with the use of
the vehicle while it cannot be said that
that use was causally related to the
injury may yet be enough to satisfy the
expression ‘arise out of’ as used in the
Act and in the policy.”
35. In the same case, Windeyer, J. has observed as
under : (CLR p. 447)
“The words ‘injury caused by or
arising out of the use of the vehicle’
postulate a causal relationship between
the use of the vehicle and the injury.
‘Caused by’ connotes a ‘direct’ or
‘proximate’ relationship of cause and
effect. ‘Arising out of’ extends this to a
result that is less immediate; but it still
carries a sense of consequence.”
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”
13. In view of the stated liberal interpretation of this term, will
the presence of the respondent in the auto rickshaw suffice as
‘ use ’. In ordinary circumstances, it probably would have. But take
for instance a scenario where the respondent was a pedestrian and
stood near or under the tree in an attempt to take shelter from the
heavy rain and now the branch falls on him. This is an entirely
likely scenario. In other words, the motor vehicle itself does not
play an active role in the accident. It is not part of the proximate
cause of the accident. For that reason, a claim under Section166
specifically may not be appropriate.

14. In that view of the matter, the question of law is
accordingly settled.

15. A question however refuses to leave us. Will the
respondent be forced to contend for compensation in another
round of litigation? Is this conclusion in the interest of justice?
Should we have to decide only the question of law then actual
money reaching the hands of the respondent would be delayed.
It appears to us, to be not so. A person who has suffered such life
altering grievous injuries, being left in lurch, without any money
to sustain himself, does not appeal to the conscience of justice.
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For ready reference the injuries as noticed by the High Court, is
extracted hereunder:-
“The doctor has also stated that on clinical and
radiological assessment, the following disabilities
are found:
“1. Total paraplegia both lower limbs with bladder and
bowel incontinence.
2. ‘X’ ray of the spin shows fracture healing and
implants position good.”

It is within our domain, as the final Court of the country to
ensure the law, as implemented, specially in cases like these, is
humane and in accordance with the salutary principles of the
Constitution. That apart, we may observe that the compensation
as determined by the High Court in itself, is insufficient as per the
settled principles of law, owing to a somewhat technical approach
adopted by the High Court. In that view of the matter, we enhance
the total compensation to Rs.25,00,000/- along with interest as
determined by the High Court, to be calculated from the date of
filing of the claim petition. The apportionment of liability shall
remain undisturbed. This we do under the exercise of Article 142
of the Constitution.

16. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the above. The
amount of compensation along with the interest shall be deposited
into the bank account of the respondent directly. Learned counsel
for the respondent shall furnish the bank details of the respondent
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to the learned counsel for the appellant. The amount shall be
disbursed to the respondent within four weeks from the
pronouncement of this judgment. The other parties who have
been directed to pay the amount i.e., the Insurance Company and
the Horticulture Department, Government of Karnataka, shall
also do so within four weeks.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No
costs.

…………………….…………….………..J.
(SANJAY KAROL)


…………………………………………….J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;
June 11, 2026
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