Pritam Singh Garcha And Anr. vs State Of Chhattisgarh And Ors.

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CGHC010157032015 2026:CGHC:45026
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 638 of 2015
1 - Pritam Singh Garcha S/o Late J.S. Garcha Aged About 67 Years R/o H. No.
865/1, Near Gandhi Udyan Civil Lines, Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - Narendra Pal Singh Garcha S/o Late J.S. Garcha Aged About 57 Years R/o
H. No. 865/1, Near Gandhi Udyan Civil Lines, Raipur Chhattisgarh
... Petitioners
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Secretary, Department Of Housing And
Enviornment Mantralaya, Naya Raipur Chhattisgarh
2 - The District Collector Collectorate, Raipur Chhattisgarh
3 - The Sub Divisional Officer Cum Land Acquisition Officer, Tehsil Aarang
Abhanpur, District Raipur Chhattisarh
4 - Naya Raipur Development Authority Through Its Chief Executive Officer,
New Rajendra Nagar, In Front Of Vijeta Complex, R.D.A., Building Raipur
Chhattisgarh
... Respondents
For Petitioners : Mr. Kabeer Kalwani, Advocate appears on
behalf of Mr. Anurag Singh, Advocate
For State : Mr. Anmol Sharma, PL
For Respondent No.4 : Mr. Anuroop Panda, Advocate appears on
behalf of Mr. Rajendra Tripathi, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
26/10/2026

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1. The petitioners, in this Writ Petition, have prayed for the following
reliefs:-
“(i) Call for the entire record of land acquisition
proceedings of Revenue Case no. 4/A/82 year 2011-
12.
(ii) Set aside the notification issued under Section
4(1) of the land acquisition act in Revenue case no.
4/A/82 year 2011-12.
(iii) Set aside the Award dated 31.5.2013 passed in
Revenue case no. 4/A/82 year 2011-12.
(iv) Set aside the entire land acquisition
proceedings of Revenue case no. 4/A/82 year 2011-
12.
(v) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit be granted.”
2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioners are joint owners of
Khasra Nos. 938 and 1901, admeasuring 0.16 hectares and 8.41 hectares,
respectively, situated at Village Barauda, Tehsil Arang. On 25.03.2015,
they noticed construction activities near their lands and, upon inquiry,
came to know that the subject lands had been acquired by the respondent
authorities for the development of Naya Raipur. The acquisition
proceedings in Revenue Case No. 4/A/82 of 2011-12 commenced on
21.10.2011, and the award was passed on 31.05.2013. The petitioners
contend that no notice, including notice under Section 9 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 1894’), was
served upon them and that the award was passed without affording them
an opportunity of hearing.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the land acquisition
proceedings are vitiated due to non-compliance with the mandatory
provisions of Sections 4(1), 9 and 12 of the Act, 1894 as no public notice
was issued at the prescribed places and no individual notice was served
upon the petitioners. He further submits that the petitioners were not
afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing the award dated
31.05.2013. He also submits that the respondents have failed to follow
the due procedure for taking physical possession of the subject lands. He,
therefore, prays for setting aside the entire acquisition proceedings,
including the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, 1894, and
the award dated 31.05.2013.
4. Per contra, learned State counsel submits that the land acquisition
proceedings were conducted in accordance with law and that the
notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act were
duly published in newspapers and on the notice board of the concerned
Gram Panchayat. He further submits that notice under Section 9 was
issued on 13.09.2012 at the address of the petitioners available in the
revenue records. He submits that the award was passed on 31.05.2013
and possession of the subject land was taken on 23.11.2013, pursuant to
which the land vested in the Government and development work was
undertaken. He further submits that the petitioners have approached this
Court after an inordinate delay of more than two years without
satisfactorily explaining the delay and that, in view of the passing of the
award and taking over of possession, the relief sought by the petitioners
cannot be granted. He places reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble

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Supreme Court in U.P. Jal Nigam and Another v. Jaswant Singh and
Another , (2006) 11 SCC 464 , and prays for dismissal of the writ
petition.
5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 submits that the acquisition
proceedings were conducted by following the statutory procedure
prescribed under the Act, 1894. The notification under Section 4 was
published on 03.12.2011 in the newspapers Dainik Bhaskar and Nava
Bharat and was also published in the Official Gazette. Thereafter, the
notification under Section 6 was published in Dainik Bhaskar and Hari
Bhoomi, Raipur Edition, on 24.07.2012 and 26.07.2012, respectively,
and was gazetted on 26.07.2012, as reflected in the relevant records. The
notification under Section 4 was also affixed on the notice board of the
concerned Gram Panchayat, Barauda, on 06.12.2011. He, therefore,
submits that the prescribed procedure for publication of the acquisition
notifications was duly followed. He further submits that the aforesaid
position is supported by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
May George v. Special Tehsildar and Others, (2010) 13 SCC 98 , and
Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan and Others, (2008) 4
SCC 695.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available
on record.
7. The records reveal that the notification under Section 4 of Act, 1894, was
published on 03.12.2011 in the widely circulated newspapers Dainik
Bhaskar and Nava Bharat and was also published in the Official Gazette.
Subsequently, the notification under Section 6 of the Act, 1894, was

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published in Dainik Bhaskar and Hari Bhoomi , Raipur Edition, on
24.07.2012 and 26.07.2012, respectively, and was gazetted on
26.07.2012. Further, the notification under Section 4 was affixed on the
notice board of the concerned Gram Panchayat, Barauda, on 06.12.2011.
Thus, the contention that the acquisition notifications were not published
at conspicuous places is not borne out by the record.
8. It further appears from the record that notices under Sections 9(1) and
9(2) of the Act, 1894, were issued to the petitioners at their respective
addresses recorded in the revenue records. The mere contention that the
petitioners had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings, particularly
in view of the publication of the acquisition notifications in newspapers
and the Official Gazette, does not establish any illegality in the
acquisition proceedings.
9. Furthermore, the award was passed on 31.05.2013, and possession of the
subject lands was taken over on 23.11.2013. In view of the publication of
the acquisition notifications and the subsequent passing of the award and
taking over of possession, the contention of the petitioners that they had
no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings does not, by itself, warrant
interference with the acquisition proceedings.
10.In the matter of May George (supra) , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
considered the issue relating to service of notice in land acquisition
proceedings and held as under:
“ 29. The view taken by us hereinabove stands
fortified by a large number of judgments of this
Court wherein it has been held that if there is an

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irregularity in service of notice under Sections 9 and
10, it could be a curable irregularity and on account
thereof, award under Section 11 would not become
invalid (see State of T.N. v. Mahalakshmi Ammal
[(1996) 7 SCC 269] and Nasik Municipal Corpn. v.
Harbanslal Laikwant Rajpal [(1997) 4 SCC 199] ).”
11.Likewise, in Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:
“16. This Court has repeatedly held that a writ
petition challenging the notification for acquisition
of land, if filed after the possession having been
taken, is not maintainable. In Municipal Corpn. of
Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
Investment Co. (P) Ltd. [(1996) 11 SCC 501] where
K. Ramaswamy, J. speaking for a Bench consisting
of His Lordship and S.B. Majmudar, J. held:
“29. It is thus well-settled law that when there
is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and
when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings
have become final, the Court should be loath to
quash the notifications. The High Court has, no
doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution to quash the notification under Section
4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should
be exercised taking all relevant factors into
pragmatic consideration. When the award was
passed and possession was taken, the Court should
not have exercised its power to quash the award
which is a material factor to be taken into
consideration before exercising the power under
Article 226. The fact that no third-party rights were

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created in the case is hardly a ground for
interference. The Division Bench of the High Court
was not right in interfering with the discretion
exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the
writ petition on the ground of laches.”
12.The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in U.P. Jal Nigam (supra) observed in
paragraph 12 as under:
“12. The statement of law has also been summarised
in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as
follows:
“In determining whether there has been such delay
as to amount to laches, the chief points to be
considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the
defendant's part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing
by while the violation of a right is in progress, but
assent after the violation has been completed and
the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to
give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he
has done that which might fairly be regarded as
equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct
and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has
put the other party in a position in which it would
not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of
time and delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of laches.”

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13.In the present case, the award has already been passed and possession of
the subject lands has been taken over, pursuant to which the lands have
vested in the Government and development work under the Naya Raipur
Development Scheme has been undertaken. In such circumstances, the
petitioners, who appear to have remained fence-sitters, cannot be
permitted to challenge the acquisition notifications and the award at this
stage.
14.It is also pertinent to note that, insofar as any grievance relating to the
quantum of compensation is concerned, the Act, 1894, provides a
statutory remedy by way of seeking a reference under Section 18 thereof.
15.In view of the aforesaid discussion, particularly the publication of the
acquisition notifications, issuance of notices at the addresses available in
the revenue records, passing of the award on 31.05.2013 and taking over
of possession on 23.11.2013, this Court finds no ground to interfere with
the acquisition proceedings in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
16.Consequently, the writ petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No
order as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Priyanka