STATE vs BHAGABATI PR.ROY

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.133 of 2013

CNR No. ODHC010058612013
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Bhagabati Prasad Roy Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : None

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 31.05.2013 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Bhubaneswar, in T.R. No. 132 of 2006, whereby the
opposite party, Bhagabati Prasad Ray, was acquitted of the charges

under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d), punishable under Section 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant,
Madhusudan Ghadei, a retired teacher, had approached the office of the
Controller of Accounts, Bhubaneswar, for the final withdrawal of his
General Provident Fund (GPF) dues. The opposite party was then
working as a Dealing Assistant-cum-Clerk in the said office. According
to the prosecution, on 28.01.2006, the opposite party demanded illegal
gratification of Rs.500/- from the complainant for processing his GPF
file and asked him to meet him on 08.02.2006 for payment of the
demanded amount. Being unwilling to pay the bribe, the complainant
approached the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, and submitted a
written report. On the basis of the report, a vigilance case was registered
and arrangements were made to lay a trap.
4. On 08.02.2006, the vigilance team laid a trap after treating five
currency notes of Rs.100/- each with phenolphthalein powder and

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instructing the complainant to pay the same only upon demand. The
prosecution alleged that the opposite party demanded and accepted the
tainted money, kept it in his chest pocket, and that his hand wash and
pocket wash turned pink upon testing with sodium carbonate solution.
The tainted notes, GPF file and other relevant articles were seized during
the trap proceedings.
5. The prosecution examined eight witnesses in support of its case.
P.W.2, Madhusudan Ghadei, was the complainant; P.W.1, Kanchan
Kumar Barik, was associated with the trap proceedings; P.W.4, Binod
Bihari Maharana, was the accompanying and overhearing witness; P.W.7
was the Trap Laying Officer; and P.W.8 was the Investigating Officer.
P.W.5 was a seizure witness, while the remaining evidence included the
witness associated with the forensic examination and the sanctioning
authority. The prosecution also relied upon documentary evidence,
including the written report, trap memorandum, detection report, seizure
documents, transcript of the recorded conversation and the relevant GPF
file. The defence, on the other hand, denied the allegations and
contended that the opposite party had been falsely implicated.

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6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had failed to establish the essential allegation of demand
of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. The learned trial Court
noticed discrepancies in the testimony of the material witnesses
concerning the time and place of the trap, the movements of the
complainant and the opposite party between different floors of the
building, and the precise place where the alleged conversation and
transaction had taken place. It further considered the evidence relating to
the processing of the GPF file, particularly the endorsement made by the
opposite party on the note sheet, and the defence evidence suggesting
that the tainted currency notes had been thrust into his pocket. Although
the recovery of the tainted notes and the positive reaction of the hand-
wash solution were considered, the learned trial Court held that these
circumstances, in the absence of cogent and convincing evidence
establishing the prosecution case, did not exclude the possibility of false
implication. Holding that the prosecution had failed to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial court acquitted the opposite

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party. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced herein
for ready reference:-
“ As it reveal during that by the time of investigation
the file was already placed before the Asst.
Controller and the accused had nothing to do with
the file. Apart from that the learned Counsel also
drew attention on the evidence of D.W.1 who is a
colleague. Who is a colleague of the accused. The
categorically states that on the very date of trap after
taking his launch at ground floor while he was going
to 3rd floor found the accused was stepping down
from 2nd floor to 1st floor. He noticed a person to
whom he did not know, thrust some currency notes in
the shirt pocket of the accused. Under the above
circumstance as discussed this plea is found to be
more probable when a prosecution witness P.W.1
corroborates the fact that he found the accused was
standing in the stair case of 1st floor with the
accused. Besides during his examination 313 Cr.P.C.
has narrated the entire fact that the date of trap no
file was pending disposal with him. He has
transmitted the application and also accordingly
processed the file. Which find corroboration from
A/1. Under the scenario, abuse of official position by
the accused for pecuniary advantage by acceptance
of any illegal gratification, as alleged by the
prosecution is not sustainable. On this context,
reliance is also placed on the reported decision the
apex court in the case of Union Of India through
Inspector C.B.I. Vrs. Purnandu Viswas reported in
SCC 2005 (12) 576
In view of the above discussion, in absence
of cogent, reliable and convincing evidence non
examination of Asst Controller N.K. Tripathy even if

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the recovery of tainted notes from the possession of
the accused is accepted, the plea of the accused just
can not be ruled out as the benefit of doubt is
extended to the accused.
The accused is accordingly held not guilty U/s.7 and
13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, 1988 and acquitted
U/s.248(1) Cr.P.C. ”

7. The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the
learned trial court failed to appreciate the consistent evidence of the
complainant and the witnesses associated with the trap proceedings
regarding the demand and acceptance of the bribe amount. The
testimony of P.W.2 clearly establishes that the opposite party
informed the complainant that his work had been completed and
thereafter asked for money, which was paid to him. The opposite
party allegedly counted the currency notes and kept them in his chest
pocket. It is contended that the evidence of P.W.2 ought to have been
considered together with the testimony of the accompanying witness
and the other members of the trap team, rather than being discarded
on the basis of discrepancies which were not material to the central
allegation.

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8. He further contended on behalf of the State that the evidence
concerning the positive hand wash and pocket wash, coupled with
the recovery of the tainted currency notes and the chemical
examiner's report, furnished corroborative circumstances supporting
the prosecution case. The learned counsel submitted that the opposite
party's alleged explanation that the notes had been forcibly thrust into
his pocket was not supported by reliable evidence and ought not to
have been accepted merely because it had been put forward by the
defence. The State also challenges the reliance placed upon the
testimony of D.W.1, contending that the defence evidence did not
satisfactorily explain the recovery of the tainted notes or displace the
prosecution evidence.

9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State at
length.

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10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is
clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the

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findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”

Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against

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an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to
rebut the same in appeal.”


11. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is

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vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely
because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of

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justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 13 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.

(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok

Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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