JHUTHARAM S/O RAMPRATAP vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN

[2026:RJ-JP:21438-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1208/2015
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2442/2015
1.
Jhutharam S/o Rampratap Aged 63 Years, R/o Village
Heerapura, Beed Khatipura, District Jaipur.
2.
Shaitan Singh S/o Ramdas, Aged About 58 Years, R/o
Village Heerapura, Beed Khatipura, District Jaipur(Since
Deceased), Through His Legal Heirs:
2/1.
Smt. Nani Devi W/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav, Aged
About 58 Years, R/o Roshan Farm, Gandhi Path Road,
Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
2/2.
Rakesh Yadav S/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav, Aged
About 38 Years, R/o Roshan Farm, Gandhi Path Road,
Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
2/3.
Dara Singh Yadav S/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav,
Aged About 32 Years, R/o Roshan Farm, Gandhi Path
Road, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
2/4.
Smt. Anita Yadav D/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav W/o
Pradeep Yadav, Aged About 34 Years, R/o Plot No. 34,
Vishawnath Dham Colony, Niwaru Road, Jothwara, Jaipur.
2/5.
Smt. Rekha Yadav D/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav W/o
Manoj Kumar Yadav, R/o Plot No. C-290, Vaishali Nagar,
Jaipur.
2/6.
Smt. Sunita Devi D/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav W/o
Prahalad Mal, Aged About 48 Years, R/o Tehsil-
Shrimadhopur, Dhani-Banya Wali, Krishna Nagar, Mahroli,
Sikar.
2/7.
Smt. Mamta Yadav D/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav
W/o Vinod Yadav, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Roshan Farm,
Gandhi Path Road, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
2/8.
Smt. Sushila Yadav D/o Late Shri Shaitan Singh Yadav,
Aged About 35 Years, R/o Roshan Farm, Gandhi Path
Road, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
3.
M/s United Land Developers (Partnership Firm), Plot No.
8, Harsh Tower, Triveni Nagar Mod, Gopalpura Byepass,
Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Charan Singh Khangarut
S/o Shri Mukut Singh Aged About 36 Years R/o M-28,
Income Tax Colony, Durgapura, Tonk Road, Jaipur.M/s
4.
United Developers (Partnership Firm), 29, Janpath,
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Shyam Nagar, Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Vinay
Chauradiya S/o Shri Labhchand Chauradiya Aged About
53 Years R/o C-61, Sangram Colony, C-Scheme, Jaipur.
5.
M/s KNS Developers (Partnership Firm), A-48,
th
Sudarshanpura Enclave, 4 Floor, Golimar Garden Jaipur
Through Its Partner Shri Sanjiv Sharma S/o Shri Sitaram
Sharma Aged About 37 Years R/o 187, Girnar Colony,
Scheme No. 16, Gandhi Path, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur.
6.
M/s Om Developers (Partnership Firm), G-1, B-17,
Bajrangbali Apartment-1 Arya Nagar Vistar, Murlipura,
Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Anuj Badaya S/o Shri
Sitaram Badaya Aged About 40 Years R/o 191, Ward No.
69, Vidhyadhar Nagar, Sector-7, Jaipur.
7.
M/s Baap Residency LLP, Office At D-25, Lal Bahadur
Nagar, Kesar Marg, Jawahar Lal Nehru Road, Jaipur
Through Its Partner Shri Bhupendra Jain S/o Late Shri
Bhanwar Lal Jain Aged About 50 Years R/o D-25, Lal
Bahadur Nagar East, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Malviya
Nagar, Jaipur
----Appellants
Versus
1.
State of Rajasthan Through The Secretary, Urban
Development & Housing Department, Govt. of Rajasthan,
Jaipur
2.
Jaipur Development Authority, Through Its Secretary,
Indira Gandhi Circle, JLN Marg, Jaipur.
3.
The Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development
Authority.
4.
The Deputy Commissioner (Zone-7), Jaipur Development

Authority.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 19/2016
In
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2442/2015
1. Jaipur Development Authority Through Its Secretary,
Indira Gandhi Circle, JLN Marg, Jaipur.
2. Deputy Commissioner Zone-7 Jaipur Development
Authority, Jaipur.
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3. State Of Rajasthan Through The Secretary, Urban
Development And Housing Department, Govt. Of
Rajasthan, Jaipur.
4. Land Acquisition Officer, Jaipur Development Authority,
Jaipur.
----Appellants
Versus
1. Jhutharam S/o Rampratap, Aged 63 Years, Resident Of
Village Heerapura, Beed Khatipura District Jaipur.
2. Shaitan Singh S/o Ramdas, Aged 58 Years, Resident Of
Village Heerapura, Beed Khatipura, District Jaipur.
3. M/s United Land Developers (Partnership Firm), Plot No.
8, Harsh Tower, Triveni Nagar Mod, Gopalpura Byepass,
Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Charan Singh Khangarut
Son Of Shri Mukut Singh, Aged About 36 Years, Resident
Of M-28, Income Tax Colony, Durgapura, Tonk Road,
Jaipur.
4. M/s United Developers (Partnership Firm) 29, Janpath,
Shyam Nagar, Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Vinay
Chauradiya Son Of Shri Labhchand Chauradiya, Aged
About 53 Years, Resident Of C-61, Sangram Colony, C-
Scheme, Jaipur.
5. M/s KNS Developers (Partnership Firm), A-48,
th
Sudarshanpura Enclave, 4 Floor, Golimar Garden Jaipur
Through Its Partner Shri Sanjiv Sharma Son Of Shri
Sitaram Sharma, Aged About 37 Years, Resident Of 187,
Girnar Colony, Scheme No. 16, Gandhi Path, Vaishali
Nagar, Jaipur.
6. M/s Om Developers (Partnership Firm) G-1, B-17,
Bajrangbali Apartment-1 Arya Nagar Vistar, Murlipura,
Jaipur Through Its Partner Shri Anuj Badaya Son Of Shri
Sitaram Badaya, Aged About 40 Years, Resident Of 191,
Ward No. 69, Vidhyadhar Nagar, Sector-7, Jaipur.
7. M/s Baap Residency LLP Office At D-25, Lal Bahadur
Nagar, Kesar Marg, Jawahar Lal Nehru Road, Jaipur
Through Its Partner Shri Bhupendra Jain Son Of Late Shri
Bhanwar Lal Jain, Aged About 50 Years, Resident Of D-25,
Lal Bahadur Nagar East, Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Malviya
Nagar, Jaipur
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----Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Madhudsudhan Singh Rajpurohit &
Mr. Harshil Bansal
Mr. Pradeep Kumar Chaudhary with
Mr. Parth Singh Dhaked (in D.B. SAW
No. 1208/2015)
Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Advocate
General assisted by Mr. Sheetanshu
Sharma, Mr. Tanay Goyal, Ms.
Harshita Thakral & Ms. Dhriti Laddha
(in D.B. SAW No. 19/2016)
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajendra Prasad, Advocate
General assisted by Mr. Sheetanshu
Sharma, Mr. Tanay Goyal, Ms.
Harshita Thakral & Ms. Dhriti Laddha
(in D.B. SAW No. 1208/2015)
Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Madhudsudhan Singh Rajpurohit &
Mr. Harshil Bansal
Mr. Pradeep Kumar Chaudhary with
Mr. Parth Singh Dhaked (in SAW No.
19/2016)
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SANGEETA SHARMA
Judgment
Date of conclusion of Arguments : 30/03/2026
Date on which judgment was reserved : 30/03/2026
Whether the full judgment or only the
operative part is pronounced : Full judgment
th
Date of pronouncement : 27 / 05/2026
REPORTABLE
(Per Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice)
1. The present batch of Special Appeals (Writ) arises out of the
Judgment dated 15.10.2015 (herein after referred as the
impugned order) passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil
Writ Petition No. 2442/2015, whereby the writ petition came to be
partly allowed with the following directions/observation:-
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“9. In the aforesaid premises, it is held that the proceedings
initiated under the ULC Act, 1976 in respect of the land
bearing Khasra No. 194 in question, have stood lapsed in view
of the provisions contained in the Repeal Act of 1999, and that
the proceedings held for the acquisition of the said Khasra No.
194 under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 have also stood
lapsed in view of Section 24(2)(b) of the Act of 2013.
However, it is further held that the petitioners are not entitled
to any other reliefs as claimed in the petition, and that the
respondents shall be at liberty to take action against the
petitioners in accordance with law, for the illegal conversion
and use of the said land, and also for the illegal encroachment
and construction made over the land. The petition stands
partly allowed accordingly.”
2. Feeling aggrieved, two intra-court appeals have been
preferred, namely, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1208/2015 by
the original writ petitioners (Jhutharam & Ors.) and D.B. Special
Appeal (Writ) No. 19/2016 by the respondent–Jaipur Development
Authority (JDA).
Facts
3. The material facts, as emerging from the record, are that land
bearing Khasra No. 194 measuring 23 bighas and 8 biswas,
situated at Village Beed Khatipura, Tehsil Jaipur was purchased by
appellant–petitioners No. 1 and 2 on 10.11.1975, who claim to
have remained in possession thereof. Upon promulgation of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'Act of 1976') a return is stated to have been
filed by appellant No. 1 Jhutharam.
4. It appears that in the year 1991, proceedings came to be
initiated by the competent authority under the Act of 1976 in
respect of the said land. The record indicates that such
proceedings had progressed to the stage of issuance/service of
notice under Section 10(5) of the Act of 1976.
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5. The order was challenged by filing a writ petition before the
High Court, pointing out that the land did not fall in the urban area
and was an agricultural land and therefore, the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act of 1976 could not have been applied.
It was submitted that there was no delay in filing the appeal and
had been wrongly dismissed by the Divisional Commissioner on
the ground of delay. Interim order was passed restraining from
dispossession on 06.04.1993, the same continued till the writ
petition was allowed on 26.04.1997 and no challenge was made to
the said order by the state in appeal.
6. Order dated 06.04.1993 reads as under:
"He argued that the petitioner's land was not situated
within the municipal limits and further more the Urban Land
Ceiling & Regulation Act was not applicable to the agricultural
land of the petitioner. In support of the arguments, Mr. Pareek
placed reliance on a judgment of Apex Court passed in Smt.
Atia Mohammadi Begum Vs. State of UP and Others, decided
on March 15, 1993 in C.A. Nos.297 and 298 of 1993 and
another judgment of the Apex Court, reported in AIR 1975
S.C. 1415.
Admit issue notices to the respondents. Notices of the
stay application may also be issued. The rule is made
returnable within six weeks. Notices may be given 'dasti' to
the counsel for the petitioner.
Meanwhile, the petitioner shall not be dispossessed from
the disputed land."
7. It would also be apposite to quote the order dated
26.04.1997, as under:
"15. In the case of Ramdas, Chhotu Ram, Bhiwa and
another, Jhota ram, Sheo Narain, Shakti Singh, Ghanshyam &
another, and Smt. Shyama Devi & others, the petitioners have
claimed to be the legal heirs of Chandra S/o Gangaram who
has expired on 28.3.1993. It is admitted that a return was
filed by him. According to the petitioner no information with
regard to proceedings u/s 8, 9 or 10 were received by him
while according to the respondents, the notice u/s 8(3) for
draft statement was served and so was the position of the
notice u/s 9 for final statement. The petitioner was given
sufficient time as per provisions of Sec.10(1) and the land
vested with the State Government u/s 10(3). The petitioner
has not cared to file any of the documents of any of the
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proceedings nor have tried to obtain the same. It is stated
that the appeal was filed with the Divisional Commissioner
which has been dismissed. Even copy of the said order has not
been submitted. In the absence of proper documents no
adjudication could be made. Since, the order passed by the
Competent Authority which are sought to be quashed have not
been submitted, I do not consider that it would be appropriate
to adjudicate the dispute without looking to those orders only
on the basis of Khasra Girdawari. The final order has not been
submitted before this Court and it is for the petitioners to
bring to the notice of the Competent Authority the
interpretation of law as given in this judgment if the final
orders have not already been passed, who will act accordingly.
The writ petitions are premature at this stage. The writ
petitions are dismissed accordingly.

19. In the case of Kailash Chand Jaipuria, the
Competent Authority's order is dated 24.6.1991 and that of
the Appellate Authority is dated 19.4.1993. The order of
Competent Authority was exparte since the petitioner did not
appear. The Appellate Authority found that inspite of the
opportunities having been given to the petitioner for number
of times he did not appear before the Competent Authority
and there was no justification in giving him further
opportunity. It was also taken into consideration that
application under Section 20 of the Act for the land being used
for industry, has already been moved by the petitioner and no
order has been passed in that application. The learned
Advocate General relied upon the decision given in the case of
Smt. Darothi Clare Parreira & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra &
Others, (1996) 9 SCC 633, where this point was considered
and it was held that the action of publication of notification
under Section 10(3) declaring acquisition of excess vacant
land by State cannot be deferred till decision is taken on the
application submitted by the petitioner for exemption under
Sections 20 or 21. In view of this decision if the Government
ultimately comes to the conclusion that the exemption is to be
granted to the petitioner u/s 20, he cay enjoy thereafter. So
far as the non-appearance of petitioner before the Competent
Authority is concerned, though looking to the conduct of the
petitioner he does not deserve any sympathy, but in the
interest of justice one more opportunity is given on payment
of cost of Rs.2000/- which is to be paid to Mr. B.L. Awasthi,
Additional Government Advocate. The writ petition is allowed
with the observation that the petitioner would appear on the
first date fixed and if he fails to appear, no further opportunity
would be given to him."
8. In the meanwhile, JDA issued a notification under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred as the 'Act
of 1894') for acquiring the land on 23.10.1991 for the purpose of
setting up an Urban Development Scheme known as Chitrakoot
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Scheme and khasra No.194 admeasuring 23 bighas and 08 biswas
was shown to have been acquired. The award was passed on
27.05.1995.
9. Against the said award, writ petition was filed by the
petitioner pointing out that the petitioner had already purchased
the land on 10.11.1975, therefore, registered sale deed from Man
Mohan Lal and the mutation had also been entered in their favour
on 03.01.1976. On 04.09.1995, interim order was passed
restraining dispossession of the petitioner from the land, the same
was confirmed vide order dated 31.01.1997. However, on
24.04.1997, the writ petition came to be dismissed holding that in
the notification, non mentioning of the owners of the land was a
procedural irregularity and the challenge has been made after the
award has been passed. Appeal No.1398/1997 filed by the
petitioner was also dismissed on being found to be belated.
10. Further, the SLP No.21538/2000 was filed before the
Supreme Court seeking interference wherein the Supreme Court
vide order dated 12.01.2001 directed to maintain the status quo
with regards to the possession of the petitioner.
11. The Land Acquisition Officer also communicated to the
Deputy Director, JDA, that neither the possession has not been
taken nor compensation has been paid.
12. It is the case of the petitioner that the matter was placed
before the Settlement Committee of the JDA and the settlement
committee vide order dated 10.04.2002 reached to the conclusion
that the land could not be treated to be falling under the Act of
1976 and applied the judgment passed in the case of Atia
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Mohammadi Begam vs State of U.P. and Ors.: (1993) 2 SCC
546 and held that also as per the circular dated 23.07.1994 land
was not falling under the urban area. With regard to the award
passed under the Act of 1894, it was noticed that the Supreme
Court had passed an interim order to maintain the status quo.
13. It was also pointed out by the petitioner that the land
adjacent to the khasra No.194, namely 145/247 had been
regularized in terms of the Government Circular dated
26.05.2000. It was further submitted that no acquisition had
taken place of khasra No.194 and that more than seven years
have passed without any scheme being sanctioned or gazette
notification being issued. Therefore, the land acquisition stood
cancelled.
14. It was admitted by the JDA that neither the possession had
been taken nor the compensation had been paid for khasra
No.194. It was also a fact that the land would fall under the
Chitrakoot Extension Scheme and that, due to the stay order
passed by the Court, the scheme had been prevented and no
compensation had been paid. It was also stated that so far as the
Khasra No.193, 193/245 are concerned, they were part of the
acquired land and not covered under the Act. The Settlement
Committee reached to the conclusion that so far as the land
khasra No.193, 193/245 are concerned, the same had not been
acquired under the Land Ceiling Act in accordance with law and as
regards khasra No.194, finding was arrived at that although the
award was passed on 03.07.1995, possession and cultivation of
the land remained with the petitioner and was being used for
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agricultural purposes and the Supreme Court had also passed a
stay order.
15. It was also noticed that no notice for acquisition had ever
been served on the land owners and acquired land was shown to
belong to one Man Mohan Lal, who had already sold the land.
16. Taking into consideration the litigation, the Settlement
Committee decided that in order to develop the area, the land of
the petitioner to be regularized on 25% of the reserved price of
the Chitrakoot Scheme. It was noted that the reserved price for
Chitrakoot Scheme was Rs.1650/- per square meter. It was
directed that the petitioner would deposit at the rate of 25% per
square meter and the JDA will thereafter, be bound to regularize
the land and JDA would also be free to construct sector road, link
road and the same would be applicable only upon the petitioner
withdrawing the pending litigation before the Supreme Court as
well as the High Court.
17. It was further directed that if the cases are withdrawn,
demand letter shall be issued by the JDA within three weeks and
the petitioner shall deposit the amount within further three weeks,
thereafter, the map of the scheme shall be submitted before the
JDA who would pass the scheme within 30 days. In compliance of
the said decision, the Appeal No.1324/2002 was withdrawn on
08.05.2002 and the stay was also vacated.
18. It is the case of the petitioners that they had already
deposited the amount of Rs.1,45,05,000/-. However, as PIL
No.2658/2003 was filed challenging the provisions of Settlement
Committee, the implementation order of the Settlement
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Committee was kept in abeyance and therefore, the remaining
amount was not deposited.
19. It is stated that the said PIL came to be decided on
16.08.2012 after the Settlement Committee was dissolved on
15.09.2004. The matter had also been kept in abeyance on the
basis of legal opinion of the Additional Advocate General to not
implement the direction of the Settlement Committee vide letter
dated 08.09.2003. A letter was sent by the petitioner for
implementing the decision of the Settlement Committee. It was
conveyed by the JDA to the State Government on 23.05.2007 and
the State Government directed the JDA to implement the decision
of the Settlement Committee vide letter dated 21.08.2007.
However, the same was stayed by the State Government on
16.11.2007.
20. On 13.08.2013, the petitioner, therefore, made another
representation to the State Government for implementing the
Settlement Committee's decision and pointed out that the amount
of 1,45,05,000/- had already been deposited out of the total
amount of Rs.3,81,23,291.25/- as demanded on 18.05.2002.
21. In the meanwhile, with the enforcement of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of
2013') w.e.f. 01.01.2014, a contention had been raised that the
acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1991 stood lapsed in
light of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, in view of the fact that
neither possession had been taken nor compensation had been
paid as required under 24(2) of the Act of 2013. It was also
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stated that subsequent transfers of portions of the subject land
were effected in the year 2014 by way of registered sale deeds
dated 21.08.2014 and 25.08.2014 in favour of appellant–
petitioner Nos. 3 to 7.
22. Petitioner filed writ petition No.2442/2015, wherein the
respondent-JDA took a stand that the land stood vested in the
State upon acquisition and the original khatedari rights stood
extinguished. It was also stated that the conditions of the
Settlement Committee's decision had not been fulfilled and notices
for vacating and removing the encroachments on the land had
also been issued under Section 72 of the JDA Act.
23. The learned Single Judge framed three questions, while the
learned Single Judge decided the question Nos. 1 and 2 in favour
of the writ petitioner, proceeded to decide question No.3 in favour
of the JDA and dismissed the writ petition.
24. In the present appeal filed by the JDA (D.B. SAW NO.
19/2016), decision of the Single Judge with reference to question
Nos.1 and 2 are challenged while the petitioner in his appeal has
challenged the third finding.
Submission on behalf of appellants-Jhutharam and Ors.
25. Learned counsel for the appellant–writ petitioners
(Jhutharam & Ors.) submitted that D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.
1208/2015 assails the impugned order dated 15.10.2015 to the
extent of findings on issue No. (iii) concerning rejection of relief
against notices under Section 72 of the JDA Act and non-
consideration of conversion applications under Section 90-A of the
Act of 1956.
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26. It is contended that once the learned Single Judge held that
the acquisition proceedings had lapsed, there was no basis to treat
the subsequent sale deeds as void or the petitioners as
trespassers. It is further urged that the entitlement to seek
conversion under Section 90-A was not properly considered.
27. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly
held the acquisition proceedings to have lapsed under Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013, inasmuch as the award was passed more
than five years prior to 01.01.2014 and there is a categorical
finding of fact that neither possession actual or symbolic was
taken nor compensation was paid, tendered, or deposited.
28. It is submitted that though Pune Municipal Corporation v.
Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183 stood
overruled in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal
(2020) 8 SCC 129 , the same does not affect the present case. It
is urged that Indore Development Authority (supra) clarified
that both condition, non-taking of possession and non-payment of
compensation, must coexist for lapse; and in the present case, the
learned Single Judge has recorded a finding that both conditions
stand unfulfilled. It is further submitted that even as per Indore
Development Authority (supra), absence of any memorandum
of possession and failure to tender compensation would satisfy the
requirement of lapse, and thus the conclusion reached by the
learned Single Judge remains legally sustainable on the facts of
the case.
29. It is submitted that the Constitution Bench in Indore
Development Authority (supra) has clarified that the legally
recognized mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition
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Act, 1894 is by drawing of a memorandum/panchnama, which
constitutes taking of physical possession in the eye of law. The
State has candidly admitted that no memo of possession exists on
record, and none has been produced either before the learned
Single Judge or before this Court. So, in the absence of such
memo, being the recognized mode of taking possession, there is
no question of either symbolic or actual possession having been
taken, and had possession been taken under the ULC Act, there
would have been no occasion to initiate acquisition proceedings
under the Act of 1894 thereafter.
30. With regards to the plea of implied surrender of possession
in terms of the proceedings before the Settlement Committee,
learned counsel for the appellant–writ petitioners has countered
the same, submitting that no such inference can be drawn either
in fact or in law.
31. It is submitted that although the petitioners approached the
Settlement Committee, withdrew the SLP, and deposited part
amount pursuant to the decision dated 10.04.2002, the said
decision was never implemented by the State. On the contrary,
the State itself kept the matter in abeyance, later stayed its own
decision, ultimately rejecting regularization only in 2014. Thus,
the failure to conclude the process is attributable to the State and
not the petitioners.
32. With regard to compensation, learned counsel for the
appellant–writ petitioners submitted that though the award was
passed on 27.05.1995, neither compensation was ever paid,
tendered, nor deposited in the treasury or before the reference
court, which position stands admitted.
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33. It is contended that the record itself demonstrates non-
payment, inasmuch as the letter dated 19.01.2002 of the Land
Acquisition Officer clearly records that the cheques issued by JDA
were returned and were never tendered to the petitioners. It is
not even the case of the respondents that the petitioners refused
to accept compensation.
34. Learned counsel thus submits that even in light of the law
laid down in Indore Development Authority (supra), the
requirement of “payment” is not satisfied in the present case, as
there was neither tender of compensation nor deposit in
accordance with law.
35. On the issue of vesting, learned counsel for the appellant–
writ petitioners submitted that the contention of the State that the
land stood vested and, therefore, could not lapse, is misconceived
in law, as no possession, either actual or by way of memo has
been taken, the question of vesting does not arise. Reliance is
placed on the law laid down in Indore Development Authority
(supra), to submit that vesting is consequent upon possession,
and not otherwise.
36. On the issue of concluded proceedings, learned counsel for
the appellant–writ petitioners urged that proceedings can be said
to be concluded only when either possession has been taken
(leading to vesting under Section 16 of the Act of 1894) or
compensation has been paid/tendered, thereby discharging the
obligation of the acquiring authority.
37. Learned counsel further submits that even as per the law laid
down in Indore Development Authority (supra), Section 24(2)
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applies only to pending proceedings and not to concluded ones
where possession has been taken and compensation paid.
38. It is also respectfully submitted that the impugned judgment
is legally unsustainable and self-contradictory. The learned Single
Judge, having categorically held that the proceedings under the
Urban Land Ceiling Act as well as the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
stood lapsed by operation of law w.e.f. 01.01.2014 in view of
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, erred in nonetheless declaring
the sale deeds executed thereafter as void. The sale deeds dated
21.08.2014, 25.08.2014 and subsequent transactions were valid
and could not have been declared void ab initio on the ground of
subsisting acquisition. Moreover, the validity of these sale deeds
was neither under challenge in the writ petition nor was any relief
sought by the respondents in this regard; hence, the findings
travel beyond the pleadings and the permissible jurisdiction under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
39. It is further submitted that the attempt to draw parity with
the case of Choturam is wholly misconceived, as in that case there
existed a recorded possession memo, findings of forcible
possession, and deposit of compensation, whereas in the present
case there is a categorical absence of these foundational
requirements.
40. Lastly and most importantly, it is submitted that the findings
in relation to Section 90-A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act
amount to usurpation of statutory jurisdiction. Section 90-A is an
enabling provision permitting regularization and conversion of land
used for non-agricultural purposes upon payment of prescribed
charges, and its benefit extends to original khatedars as well as
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subsequent transferees. The learned Single Judge failed to
consider the proviso to Section 90-A(5), which expressly allows
retention and use of land even in cases of prior unauthorized use.
The applications filed by the petitioners under Section 90-A were
admittedly pending consideration and were not decided due to an
interim stay; thus, there was no occasion for the Court to
adjudicate upon their merits or hold the petitioners liable for
ejectment. Further, the provisions of Section 63 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act have no application in absence of completed
acquisition or lawful vesting.
41. Once the acquisition proceedings stood lapsed, the only
legally permissible course was to leave the matter to the
competent authority to decide the applications in accordance with
law, uninfluenced by any adverse observations. In view of the
above, it is most humbly submitted that the appeal preferred by
the applicants deserves to be allowed, the findings declaring the
sale deeds void and adverse observations against the applicants
be set aside, and the applications under Section 90-A be directed
to be decided afresh in accordance with law, while the appeal
preferred by JDA deserves dismissal.
Submissions on behalf of Jaipur Development Authority
42. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent–JDA,
contended that as issue No. (ii) is concerned, the learned Single
Judge has proceeded to hold that the Land Acquisition Officer was
required to take actual physical possession and not merely
symbolic possession, and further that neither such possession had
been taken nor compensation paid in the manner prescribed,
placing reliance upon Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) . It
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is submitted by the Learned Counsel that the aforesaid findings
are ex facie contrary to the law subsequently and authoritatively
laid down in Indore Development Authority (supra) , which
has clarified the legal position on the aspect, and therefore, the
said findings cannot be sustained and deserve to be set aside on
the grounds that the findings are full of contradictions.
43. Learned counsel for the respondent–JDA further submitted
that the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge are
founded upon judgments which no longer hold the field. It was
contended that reliance placed upon Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (supra) ,
Magnum Promoters Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2015) 3 SCC
327 , and Shree Balaji Nagar Residents Association v. State
of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353 , and also upon Union of
India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564 for the proposition
regarding maintainability at the instance of subsequent
purchasers, is misplaced inasmuch as the said judgments stand
overruled by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development
Authority (supra).
44. Learned counsel for the respondent–JDA, placing reliance
upon the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development
Authority (supra), submitted that the findings recorded by the
learned Single Judge on the issue of lapse under Section 24(2) of
the Act of 2013 are contrary to the settled legal position. It is
contended that an award in the present case stood passed on
27.05.1995 and the acquisition proceedings remained sub judice
for a considerable period on account of successive challenges,
including proceedings before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and thus
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the period during which interim orders operated is liable to be
excluded.
45. It is further submitted that compensation was duly tendered,
as is evident from the cheque sent on 19.01.2002, though the
same could not be disbursed in view of subsisting interim orders.
It is urged that, in terms of Indore Development Authority
(supra), tendering of compensation satisfies the requirement of
“payment” and non-deposit in Court does not result in lapse,
particularly where the landowners themselves were litigating or
declined to accept the amount.
46. It is further submitted that the conduct of the landholders
clearly indicates that the acquisition had attained finality,
inasmuch as they themselves invoked the Settlement Committee
mechanism in the year 2002, withdrew pending litigation, and, in
terms of the policy and order dated 10.04.2002, surrendered the
land treating it as Government land, coupled with an obligation to
deposit 25% of the reserve price for regularization.
47. It is contended that such surrender and vesting under
Section 16 of the Act of 1894 constitute taking of possession in
the eye of law, and in any case, as clarified in Indore
Development Authority (supra), the mode of taking possession
is by drawing of memorandum/inquest report and not necessarily
by physical dispossession. It is thus urged that the essential
conditions for lapse under Section 24(2), namely, failure of the
authorities due to inaction to both take possession and pay
compensation for a continuous period of five years prior to
01.01.2014 are not satisfied in the present case.
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48. It is further contended that the doctrine of election squarely
applies, inasmuch as the landholders had the option either to
pursue the challenge to acquisition or to accept vesting and seek
regularization upon payment; having chosen the latter, they are
estopped from asserting otherwise. It is also submitted that the
conduct of the petitioners amounts to waiver of compensation, as
under the scheme they agreed to pay the prescribed amount
without insisting upon compensation, and having partly acted
upon the arrangement, they cannot now invoke non-payment to
claim lapse. In support of the said propositions, reliance has been
placed upon judgments reported in 2013 (5) SCC 470 titled as
The Rajasthan State Industrial Development and
Investment Corporation And Anr. vs Diamond and Gem
Development Corporation Ltd. And Anr. (para 16) and 2020
(6) SCC 387 titled as Bhagwat Sharan (Dead Through Legal
Representatives) vs Purushottam & Ors. (para 26), as well as
earlier authorities including AIR 1922 Privy Council 365 titled
as Fort Press Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of
Bombay and (1981) 2 SCC 221 titled as State of Assam And
Another vs Jitendra Kumar Senapati And Others (paras 9 & 10),
to contend that rights relating to compensation can be validly
waived and that parties are bound by their election.
49. It is further urged that in view of the authoritative
pronouncement in Indore Development Authority (supra),
Section 24(2) does not revive stale or concluded proceedings, nor
permit reopening on the ground of alleged defects in the mode of
taking possession or payment of compensation. The petitioners
cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate by
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simultaneously relying upon the Settlement Committee’s order
and challenging the acquisition.
50. Learned counsel for the JDA submits that the findings of the
learned Single Judge on Issue No. (iii) are correct and warrant no
interference. It is contended that Section 90A(1) of the Rajasthan
Land Revenue Act prohibits use of agricultural land for non-
agricultural purposes without prior permission, and under Section
90A(5), any such unauthorized use renders the khatedar and
subsequent transferees trespassers liable to ejectment. Learned
counsel submits that the specific plea of unauthorized commercial
use, construction of 43 shops and 4 marriage gardens, remained
unrebutted, and is further corroborated by notices issued under
Section 72 of the JDA Act. Thus, the petitioners are trespassers by
operation of law.
51. It is further submitted that no permission under the proviso
to Section 90A(5) was ever obtained prior to execution of sale
deeds; hence, such transactions are void ab initio, as a trespasser
cannot convey valid title. The applications for conversion were also
misconceived, as Section 90A(4) applies only to lawful agricultural
use, whereas the petitioners had already put the land to
unauthorized commercial use. No application for regularization
under Section 90A(5) was ever submitted. Therefore, recourse to
ejectment under Section 91 of the Act and Section 72 of the JDA
Act was justified.
52. On the issue of alleged lapsing of ULC proceedings, learned
counsel submits that the finding of the learned Single Judge is
erroneous. It is not in dispute that the land vested under Section
10(3) and notice under Section 10(5) was issued. Reliance is
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placed on admissions made by the landholders in their memo of
appeal before the Divisional Commissioner acknowledging
preparation of possession memo and handing over of possession
to JDA in September 1991. In view of Section 58 of the Evidence
Act, such admissions require no further proof and clearly establish
that possession was taken prior to repeal of the Act of 1999.
53. It is further submitted that, as held in Chhotu Ram (following
Banda Development Authority and Bal Mukand Khatri),
preparation of a possession memo constitutes valid taking of
possession, and the said view has attained finality.
54. Accordingly, it is submitted that Appeal No. 19/2016
deserves to be allowed, while Appeal No. 1208/2015 is liable to be
dismissed with costs .
Analysis and findings
55. This court will have to examine all the aspects again which
have been considered and decided by the learned Single Judge in
view of appeals having been filed by both, the State Government
against the findings of the learned Single Judge which are in
favour of the writ petitioner, and by the writ petitioner-Jhutharam
against the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge against
the writ petitioner. From what has come on record, the following
aspects are required to be examined:
(A) Whether the land held by the petitioner could be
treated to have been acquired under the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976?
(B) Whether the proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act can be said to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of
the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land
Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013?
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(C) Whether the petitioner-Jhutharam can be said to
have no rights on the land and that the land now belongs
to JDA?
(D) Whether the petitioner-Jhutharam is not entitled to
any relief?
(E) Whether the petitioner can be said to be trespasser
and the developments made on the land can be said to be
illegal and encroachments and if not what compensation
he is entitled to receive?
(F) Whether the sale deeds executed by the petitioner
could have been declared as void ab initio by the learned
Single Judge while exercising the writ jurisdiction?
(G) Whether the petitioner is entitled to claim relief by
getting the land converted under the Section 90(A) of the
Land Revenue Act?
56. So far as the appeal filed by the JDA is concerned, the JDA
has chosen not to challenge the findings of the learned Single
Judge with regard to the proceedings under the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. So far as the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, is concerned, the findings of
the learned Single Judge are that in respect of the land bearing
khasra No.194, the proceedings stood lapsed in view of the
provisions contained under the Urban Land (Ceiling and
Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.
57. We therefore, in the present appeal hold that the land could
not have been treated to have been acquired under the Urban
land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976. The findings of the learned
Single Judge having not been challenged by the JDA, need not be
further examined in appeal.
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58. The entire crux of the appeal preferred by the JDA is with
respect to the Land Acquisition Act and the finding given by the
learned Single Judge in regards to the proceedings of Land
Acquisition Act having lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Act of
2013.
59. We have in the preceding paras noticed the arguments raised
by the counsel for the JDA. The main crux of his arguments are
that as the judgments passed in the case of Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (supra) have
been overruled, the findings of the learned Single Judge would
also stand set aside and it cannot be said that the proceedings
initiated under the Land Acquisition Act stood lapsed in terms of
Section 24(2).
60. In view of the subsequent pronouncement of the judgment
passed in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra),
following facts, therefore, need to be noticed:
61. Award was passed on 27.05.1995, which reflected that
payment of compensation would be contingent on the question of
title. As we have noticed, when the action was taken by the State
Government under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act,
1976, order was passed on 06.04.1993, restraining from
dispossession and the writ was ultimately allowed on 26.04.1997
and no challenge was made to the judgment passed on
26.04.1997 by the State. The said judgment was relating to Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the proceeding stood
lapsed. The important aspect is that the possession remained with
the writ petitioner.
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62. As regards the Land Acquisition Act, the JDA issued the
notification under Section 4 on 23.10.1991 for khasra No.194
admeasuring 23 bighas and 8 biswas and award was passed on
27.05.1995, admittedly, therefore, as on 27.05.1995, no
possession was taken of the land. A stay was operating in relation
to the earlier writ petition (supra). Name of the petitioner was also
not shown in the award. Although, High Court rejected the writ
petition challenging the award, but initially on 04.09.1995 itself,
order had been passed by the High Court restraining
dispossession.
63. The interim order was continued even by the Supreme Court
in SLP No.21538/2000 vide its order dated 12.01.2001. Thus,
admittedly, possession of the land had not been taken by the
respondents at any given point of time.
64. Thus, on the day when the Settlement Committee passed an
order dated 10.04.2002, the possession of the land was with the
writ petitioner. It is also an admitted position, that the JDA has
never paid any compensation to the land owners.
65. The JDA has admitted in its written submissions that the
proceedings of ‘acquisition’ remained sub judice and under stay in
view of the challenge to the award passed on 17.07.1995 and
finally before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in an SLP. On
19.01.2002, the JDA did send a cheque for compensation to LAO,
which was returned by the LAO in view of the interim order of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court.
66. In Indore Development Authority (supra), the Apex Court
concluded that the word ‘or’ used in section 24(2) between
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possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’.
The relevant paragraphs of the said judgments are quoted as
under:-
"366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between
possession and compensation has to be read as “nor”
or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition
proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes
place where due to inaction of authorities for five years
or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the
possession of land has not been taken nor
compensation has been paid. In other words, in case
possession has been taken, compensation has not
been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if
compensation has been paid, possession has not been
taken then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a
deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of
non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2)
in case it has not been deposited with respect to
majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries
(landowners) as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be
entitled to compensation in accordance with the
provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation
under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has
not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said
Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in
court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition
proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the
majority of holdings for five years or more,
compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the
“landowners” as on the date of notification for land
acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894
Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by
drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award
has been passed on taking possession under Section
16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no
divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013
Act, as once possession has been taken there is no
lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a
deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case
authorities have failed due to their inaction to take
possession and pay compensation for five years or
more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a
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proceeding for land acquisition pending with the
authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of
subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be
excluded in the computation of five years."
67. As noticed above, neither possession was taken of the land
from the writ petitioner- Jhutharam nor compensation was ever
paid, therefore, in terms of the Indore Development Authority
(supra) judgment, this Court has no other option, but to hold that
land acquisition proceedings under the Act of 2013 stood lapsed in
terms of the Section 24(2).
68. The effect and legal consequences of the applications
submitted by the land owners before the Settlement Committee
still requires independent consideration.
69. Section 83-A of the JDA Act was introduced and the
Settlement Committee was constituted. It would be apposite to
quote Section 83-A which was inserted vide notification dated
26.05.2001, as it was existing as under:
“ [83-A. Constitution of Settlement Committee .— (1)
The State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, constitute a Settlement Committee
consisting of a Chairman and such other members,
as it may deem fit, to resolve the disputes between
the Authority and other persons and such
Committee shall undertake to resolve the dispute
whenever so requested by the concerned person.
(2) The Settlement Committee Shall have such
powers and follow such procedure as may be
prescribed by the State Government.
(3) Any Committee already constituted for this
purpose shall be deemed to have been constituted
under this Act.
(4) The decision given by such Committee shall be
binding on the Authority.]”
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70. From the above, it is apparent that the Committee was
formed to resolve disputes between the authority and other
persons and such Committee was to undertake such exercise on
the request of the concerned persons and the decision of the
Committee was binding on the Authority. Admittedly, therefore,
the application moved by the petitioner-farmer relating to the
dispute was to be decided. In this regard, the JDA has relied on
the circular of 26.05.2000 which was existing prior to the
introduction of Section 83-A under the Act, which of course could
not have any application and we, therefore, reject the submission
relating to the application of circular dated 26.05.2000 with
respect to the decision of the Settlement Committee.
71. As we have already reached to the conclusion that
acquisition proceeding stood lapsed under the Act of 2013. The
decision of the Settlement Committee of 10.04.2002 which was on
the basis of a condition that the land owner shall withdraw his SLP
pending before the Supreme Court and shall also deposit 25% of
the reserved price of Chitrakoot scheme for the purpose of
regularization of his land has lost its significance because it is an
admitted position that till the Act of 2013 came into force, neither
the possession of the land had been taken by the JDA nor the
compensation was paid.
72. We also notice that on the other hand, the farmer was asked
to deposit 25% of the reserved price of the urban land by the
Settlement Committee with the condition that the JDA will develop
the land and make roads and lights. In this regard, the writ
petitioner deposited the sum which was more than half of the total
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amount demanded, which has remained with the JDA. On the
ground that the total amount has not been deposited, the JDA
claims the lands to be theirs, whereas, we have already noticed
that neither the compensation was paid nor possession was taken
of the land by the JDA and we, therefore, fail to understand the
submissions raised by the counsel for the JDA, that they are the
land owners.
73. We notice that even the learned Single Judge has given a
finding that the land acquisition proceedings stood lapsed. The
finding was on the basis of judgment which has been overruled,
but factually, the learned Single Judge was correct that neither the
compensation had been paid nor the possession had been taken
by the JDA in any manner even after coming into force of the Act
of 2013.
74. We also notice that the JDA itself was not ready to accept the
amount of 25% of the reserved price from the petitioner in terms
of the Settlement Committee’s award of 2002 because of the
opinion given by the counsel for the JDA to not implement the
decision of the Settlement Committee.
75. However, so far as, the farmer-writ petitioner is concerned,
he relied on the promise made by the JDA and withdrew his SLP
pending before the Supreme Court, where stay was granted in his
favour.
76. These above facts clearly reflects the approach of JDA, it has
acting like a private land dealer and has wrongfully claimed the
land, which belongs to the writ petitioner.
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77. We observe that as the land would have to be treated as an
agricultural land, it can only be converted to and used for non-
agricultural purposes after the proceedings, which can be taken by
the land owner under Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue
Act, which reads as under:
“ 90A. Use of Agricultural land for Non-
Agricultural Purposes. -(l) No person holding any
land for the purpose of agriculture, and no transferee
of such land or any part thereof, shall use the same or
any part thereof, by the construction of buildings
thereon or otherwise, for any other purpose except
with the written permission of the State Government
obtained in the manner hereinafter laid down and
otherwise than in accordance with the terms and
conditions of such permission.
(2)Any such person desiring to use such land or any
part thereof for any purpose other than that of
agriculture shall apply for the requisite permission in
prescribed manner and to the prescribed Officer or
authority and every such application shall contain the
prescribed particulars.
(3)The State Government shall, after making or
causing to be made due inquiry in the prescribed
manner, either refuse the permission applied for or
grant the same subject to the prescribed terms and
conditions.
(4)When any such land or part thereof is permitted to
be used for any purpose other than that of
agriculture, the person to whom such permission is
granted shall be liable to pay to the State Government
in respect thereof-
(a)an urban assessment levied at such rate and in
accordance with such manner as may be laid down in
rules to be made in this behalf by the State
Government; or
(b)such amount by way of premium as may be
prescribed by the State Government; or
(c)both.
(5)If any such land is so used-
(a)without the written permission of the State
Government being first obtained, or
(b)otherwise than in accordance with the terms and
conditions of such permission, or
(c)after such permission having been refused under
sub-section (3), or
(d)without making any of the payments referred to in
sub-section (4), the person originally holding the land
as aforesaid for the purpose of agriculture as well as
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all subsequent transferees, if any, shall be deemed to
be trespasser or trespassers, as the case may be, and
shall be liable to ejectment from such land in
accordance with section 91 as if he or they had
occupied or continued to occupy such land without
lawful authority and to every such proceeding the
provisions of section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy
Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) shall apply as if
such land and were in danger or being wasted,
damaged or alienated:
Provided that the State Government may, in lieu of
having such person and the subsequent transferees so
ejected from the land in question, allow him or them,
as the case may be, to retain such land, use the same
for any purpose other than that of agriculture on
payment to the State Government, in addition to the
urban assessment and premium' payable under sub-
section (4), of such fine by way of penalty as may be
prescribed.
(5A)[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
provision of this section, the agricultural land may be
used without permission for such non-agricultural
purposes as may be prescribed by the State
Government.]
(6)Where permission under this section is sought with
respect to a land situated in an urban area, the
permission shall be granted only if the desired non-
agricultural purpose is permissible in accordance with
the law applicable in that area and is in consonance
with the master plan or any other development plan
or scheme, by whatever name called, in force, if any,
in that area.
(7)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this Act or any other law for the time being in force,
when an order granting permission under this section
is passed with respect to a land situated in an urban
area, on and from the date of such order,-
(a)tenancy rights over such land of the person to
whom permission under this section is granted shall
stand extinguished, and
(b)the land shall be deemed to have been placed at
the disposal of the local authority under section 102-A
and shall be available for allotment to the person to
whom permission is granted under this section, or to
the successors, assignees or transferees of such
person, by the local authority for any permissible non-
agricultural purposes in accordance with the rules,
regulations or bye-laws made under the law
applicable to the local authority, subject to the
payment to the local authority of urban assessment or
premium or both leviable and recoverable under sub-
section (4).
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(8) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in this Act and the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955 (Act No. 3 of 1955) where before 17th June,
1999 any person, holding any land for agricultural
purposes in an urban area or within the urbanisable
limits or peripheral belt of an urban area, has used or
has allowed to be used such land or part thereof for
non-agricultural purposes or, has parted with
possession of such land or part thereof for
consideration by way of sale or agreement to sell
and/or by executing power of attorney and/or Will or
in any other manner for purported non-agricultural
use, the rights and interest of such person in the said
land or holding or part thereof, as the case may be,
shall be liable to be terminated and the officer
authorized by the State Government in this behalf,
shall, after affording an opportunity of being heard to
such person and recording reasons in writing for doing
so, order for termination of his rights and interest in
such land and thereupon the land shall vest in the
State Government free from all encumbrances and be
deemed to have been placed at the disposal of the
local authority under section 102-A and shall be
available for allotment or regularization by the local
authority for any permissible non-agricultural
purposes in accordance with the rules, regulations or
bye-laws made under the law applicable to the local
authority to the persons having the local authority to
the persons having possession over such land or part
thereof, as the case may be, on the basis of allotment
made, or Patta given, by a Housing Co-operative
Society or on the basis of any document of sale or
agreement to sell or power of attorney or a Will or any
other document purporting transfer of land to them
either by the person whose rights and interests have
been ordered to be terminated under this sub-section
or by any other person claiming through such person,
subject to the payment to the local authority of urban
assessment or premium or both leviable and
recoverable under sub-section (4):
Provided that-
(i) nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any land
belonging to deity, Devasthan Department, any public
trust or any religious or charitable institution or a
wakf;
(ii) no proceedings or orders under this sub section
shall be initiated or made in respect of lands for which
proceedings under the provisions of the Urban Land
(Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (Central Act No. 33
of 1976), the Rajasthan Imposition of Ceiling on
Agricultural Holdings Act, 1973 (Act No. 11 of 1973)
and the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Acquisition of
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Land Owners Estate Act, 1963 (Act No. 11 of 1964)
are pending.
(9) Any person aggrieved by an order of an officer or
authority made under this section may appeal within
thirty days from the date of such order to such officer
not below the rank of Collector as may be authorized
by the State Government in this behalf, who shall, as
far as practicable, disposed of such appeal within a
period of sixty days from the date of its presentation
and if he is unable to dispose of the appeal within the
aforesaid period, he shall record reasons therefor. An
order passed under this sub-section shall be final.”
78. The concept of regularization also needs to be understood.
While, the land was in the ownership of the farmers and in his
possession, the subject of regulations was to allow it to be
regularized as other lands which admittedly were an agricultural
land by depositing 25% of the reserved price.
79. If the farmer failed to deposit the amount as stipulated, the
land could not have been treated as regularized or converted into
urban land and would, therefore, continue to retain its character
as agricultural land. However, mere non-payment of the requisite
amount could, by no stretch of imagination, result in the land
being deemed to have vested in or transferred to the JDA.
80. Any such claim raised by the State authority amounts to an
impermissible assertion of ownership dehors the authority of law
and would, in effect, partake the character of arbitrary deprivation
of private property.
81. We also notice that the State has not challenged the
impugned order.
82. We, however, refrain from making any further comment in
this regard, but hold that the poor farmers’ land cannot be taken
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away by using the means, as stated by the JDA in their written
brief.
83. We are not impressed by the submission that merely
because in another case of Chhotu Ram, who also had applied for
settlement of his land and in whose case, the proceedings had not
lapsed and the judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court,
would be at the same pedestal as that of the writ petitioner.
Petitioner’s case is clearly different from that of Chhotu Ram in all
respects. As in Chhotu Ram, the possession had already been
taken over by the JDA and therefore, the proceedings cannot be
said to have been lapsed.
84. In the present case, the amount which Jaipur Development
Authority has received in terms of the decision of this Settlement
Committee also deserves to be returned back to the petitioner.
85. Other contentions which have been made before the learned
Single Judge, that the petitioner has used his land for marriage
gardens, etc. would not in any manner deprive him of his title over
the land.
86. At the best, if he has made some illegal construction on land
without getting it converted, the same is required to be
demolished. However, so far as the ownership of the land is
concerned, the same could not be said to have been handed over
to the JDA.
87. The relief as denied by the learned Single Judge based on
the submissions advanced and also on the basis of submissions of
petitioner having been entered into agreement for selling of his
land to various parties would have no effect on the core issue
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whether the land has been acquired and has come in the
ownership of the JDA is concerned.
88. We, therefore, hold that petitioner-Jhutharam is entitled to
the ownership and to have continued possession of his land
bearing khasra No.194 admeasuring 23 bighas and 8 biswas and
the JDA has no claim on the said land.
89. The amount deposited by Jhutharam in terms of the
Settlement Committee decision of 2002 deserves to be returned
back with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The land would
have to be treated as an agricultural land and can only be allowed
to be used for non agricultural purposes after depositing of the
amount required for conversion in terms of Section 90A of the
Rajasthan Land Revenue Act.
90. If such an application is moved by petitioner-Jhutharam, JDA
may take a decision to convert the land and for the said purpose,
charges may be deducted from the amount which we have
directed to be refunded as above. In the said event, the JDA may
not have to pay any interest on the said amount.
91. Accordingly, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1208/2015
filed by the Jhutharam is allowed and D.B. Civil Special Appeal
(Writ) No. 19/2016 filed by the Jaipur Development Authority is
dismissed.
92. All pending applications also stand disposed of.
(SANGEETA SHARMA),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),ACTING CJ
Govind/Gaurav/
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