ASHOK KUMAR GANDOTRA AND OTHERS vs UT OF J AND K TH INCHARGE POLICE STATION ANTI CORRUPTION BUREAU JAMMU

Court
Jammu and Kashmir High Court

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
AT JAMMU
Reserved on: 31.10.2026
Pronounced on: 19.11.2026
Uploaded on: 20.11.2026
Whether the operative part or full
judgment is pronounced: Full
CRM(M) No.399/2025
ASHOK KUMAR GANDOTRA & ORS.
...PETITIONERS/APPELLANT(S)
Through:
-
Mr.
Rahul Pant, Sr. Advocate, with

Mr. Aniruddh Sharma, Advocate.
Vs.
UT OF J&K …RESPONDENT(S)
Through:
-
Mr.
Raman Sharma, AAG, with

Ms. Saliqa Sheikh, Advocate.
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY DHAR, JUDGE
JUDGMENT

1) The petitioners, through the medium of present
petition, have challenged charge sheet emanating out of FIR
No.10 of 2020 for offences under Section 5(1)(d) read with
5(2) of J&K PC Act and Section 120-B of RPC registered with
Police Station, Anti-Corruption Bureau, J&K, Jammu.
Challenge has also been thrown to order dated 09.04.2025
passed by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption,
Jammu, (for short “the trial court”), whereby charges for
aforesaid offences have been framed against the petitioners.
2)
As per the allegations made in the impugned charge
sheet, petitioner No.2, who was posted as Vice Chairman,
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 1 of 22

Jammu Development Authority at the relevant time, without
floating tenders, allotted the work for renovation/interior
works of JDA Office Complex, Ground Floor, Vikas Bhawan,
Jammu, to petitioner No. 3. After conducting verification into
the aforesaid allegation, it was found that initially petitioner
No.2, in his capacity as Vice Chairman, JDA, had granted
approval for installation of 10 number of two-ton ACs and
allied electric works at Ground Floor of Vikas Bhawan, Rail
Head Complex, Jammu, by inviting tenders. Accordingly, the
tenders were floated by the Executive Engineer, JDA, upon
receipt of communication from Superintending Engineer.
During the tendering process, M/s Lumen Engineers was
found as L1, but instead of allotting work to the said agency,
petitioner No.2 deliberately and intentionally under a well-
knit conspiracy hatched with Shri T. R. Salgotra, the then
Superintending Engineer, JDA (now expired), and petitioner
No.1, the then Executive Engineer, JDA, allotted the work to
petitioner No.3 with a view to confer undue benefit upon the
said firm. The cost of the work was Rs.40.83 lacs, which
involved renovation/interior works including air
conditioning of the office complex of JDA. It was found that
scope of work was changed from installation of ACs and
allied electric works to renovation/interior works along with
installation of ACs without any tendering process, which
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 2 of 22

resulted in increase in the expenditure. It was also found
that the work was allotted to petitioner No.3 on nomination
basis without any justification and without inviting any
tenders. It was further found that validity of license of
petitioner No.3 had already expired, but still the said firm
executed the entire work of electrical/renovation/interior
works at exorbitant rates, for which payment of Rs.40.53
lacs was released in its favour. The Engineering Wing of ACB
projected a total loss of Rs. 2,12,295/- on account of civil
works so executed based on sanctioned schedule rates.
Thus, loss to the State exchequer to the extent of aforesaid
amount was estimated.
3) On the basis of aforesaid allegations, the FIR came to
be registered and investigation was set into motion. After
investigating the case, the aforesaid allegations were found
established and it was found that initially, after inviting
tenders for the work, instead of allotting the contract to L1
firm, petitioner No.1, on verbal directions of petitioner No.2,
cancelled the tender on 08.04.2011, whereafter the
participating tenderers were informed about this decision
and their CDRs/bank drafts were returned. It was also found
that on 30.04.2011, the Superintending Engineer, JDA,
marked the letter, which was received from petitioner No.2
in the month of January, 2011, to Executive Engineer, JDA,
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 3 of 22

who, vide his communication dated 24.05.2011, conveyed to
the Superintending Engineer that as per J&K Bank's
approved rates on which Shalimar Branch of J&K Bank has
been renovated, the same rates may be considered
whereafter, the Superintending Engineer put the note sheet
for approval before petitioner No.2 on 27.05.2011, who
approved the same. Pursuant thereto, an agreement was
executed by Executive Engineer, JDA, with petitioner No.3
firm on 03.06.2011, and the said firm was asked to
undertake/execute the works worth Rs.40.83 lacs.
4) During the course of investigation, spot inspection of
the work executed was conducted by the experts of
Engineering Wing of ACB, Jammu, on 05.10.2021, and it
was found that loss to the tune of Rs.1,56,428/- was caused
to the State exchequer. However, after scrutiny of the records
and upon considering the reply submitted by the petitioners,
it was found that unit price of ACs also included the charges
for transportation/installation. Accordingly, loss to the tune
of Rs 9600/- was deducted and the net loss to the State
exchequer was quantified at Rs.1,46,828/-.
5) On the basis of the aforesaid findings of the
investigating agency, the aforesaid offences were found
established and the charge sheet was laid before the trial
court. It is pertinent to mention here that the petitioners had
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 4 of 22

challenged the FIR before this Court by way of a petition
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. bearing CRM(M) No.351/2020,
which is still pending before this Court. In the said petition,
initially an interim direction was passed restraining the
investigating agency from filing the charge sheet, but later
on the said direction came to be modified and the respondent
investigating agency was permitted to file the charge sheet.
6) The learned trial court, after scrutinizing the material
on record and after hearing the parties, passed a detailed
order dated 29.03.2025, holding that the offences under
Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act and
Section 120-B of RPC are made out against the petitioners.
The charges were, accordingly, framed against them.
7) The petitioners have challenged the impugned charge
sheet and the impugned order whereby charges have been
framed against them by the learned trial court on the
grounds that the respondent investigating agency, after
scrutinizing all 44 contracting items, could manage to work
out loss only in respect of three items. It has been contended
that even in respect of these three items, the loss worked out
is totally unsustainable. It has been contended that the
investigating agency has, while calculating the loss, relied
upon the Book of Analysis Rates of 2010 issued by the
Government of India, CPWD for Delhi, which is of the year
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 5 of 22

2007. It has been submitted that CPWD Book of Analysis of
2010 is only a reprint of the book of 2007. According to the
petitioners, the rates were to be calculated on the basis of
CPWD Book of Analysis of 2012, which is based on prevailing
market rate of the materials in Delhi between April, 2011 to
September, 2011, during which period petitioner No.3 had
executed the works which are subject matter of the charge
sheet. It has been contended that if the investigating agency
would have calculated the rates on the basis of CPWD
Schedule of Rates 2012, it would have concluded that there
was no loss to the State exchequer.
8) The petitioners have, in their petition, given details of
rates of items in respect of which the Engineering wing of the
respondent investigating agency has assessed loss to the
State exchequer, and claimed that in case rates would have
been calculated on the basis of CPWD Schedule of Rates for
the year 2012, no loss to the State exchequer would have
been found. It has further been submitted that while
calculating the loss to the State exchequer, the respondent
investigating agency has not factored in the labour
component for fixing of floor tiles, thereby landing itself into
an error while calculating the loss. According to the
petitioners, these aspects of the matter have not been
properly appreciated by the learned trial court while passing
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 6 of 22

the impugned order. It has also been contended that merely
because the tenders were not floated for awarding the work
to petitioner No.3, it cannot be stated that the offence of
criminal misconduct is made out against the petitioners,
particularly when the material on record shows that there
has been no loss to the State exchequer. According to the
petitioners, at best, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 could have been
proceeded departmentally, but in no case they could have
been prosecuted for having committed the offence of criminal
misconduct as defined in Section 5(1)(d) of the J&K PC Act.
9) It has further been contended that having regard to the
nature of work that was required to be executed, which is a
specialized job of experts/highly skilled manpower having
the requisite infrastructure to deal with such kind of works,
the decision of petitioner Nos.1 and 2 in not going for tenders
cannot be questioned. It has been submitted that such kind
of specialized job can be executed by the expert entities like
petitioner No.3, who is empanelled for execution of such
works by the Jammu and Kashmir Bank Limited, and in the
instant case he has executed the works on the same rates
on which he had executed work of renovating Shalimar Road
Branch of the J&K Bank.

10) The respondent investigating agency has filed its reply
to the petition in which it has reiterated the allegations made
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 7 of 22

in the charge sheet. It has been contended that the work in
question cannot be termed as highly technical or
sophisticated, nor can it be presumed that only petitioner
No.3 was capable of executing it. It has been submitted that
awarding of work to petitioner No.3 was a pre-meditated
decision by petitioner Nos.1 and 2. It has further been
submitted that public servants have no authority to perform
their duties on the basis of presumptions without following
rules and regulations. It has been further contended that
loss to the State exchequer assessed by the Engineering
Wing of the respondent investigating agency is based on
correct appreciation of material.
11) The respondent investigating agency has given the
details in its reply with regard to the manner in which the
loss has been calculated/assessed. It has been submitted
that analysis of the respondent investigating agency is
detailed, costed item-wise by using standard indices and
quotients used in Government valuation. It has been
submitted that additions like 15% contractor's profit and
13.77% tax layered on top without establishing whether
taxes were actually payable in the same structure, assuming
all sundries, grouting water charges etc., apply at full CPWD
estimated quantities regardless of actual site-specific
efficiencies. It has been submitted that the petitioners'
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 8 of 22

assertion of savings is based on misleading and incorrect
unit comparison. It has been further submitted that the
analysis made by the respondent investigating agency is not
only legally sound but also aligned with public financial
discipline and audit standards and the same are in full
conformity with CPWD norms. It has further been submitted
that the rates applied by adopting mean of the rates
mentioned in CPWD Schedule of 2010 and CPWD Schedule
of 2012 is both logical and commonly accepted in
engineering valuation practice, when exact DSR rates for a
specific date are not available. It has also been submitted
that CPWD guidelines serve only as a standard reference for
public works and such guidelines are not binding upon the
Courts in adjudicating criminal liability or factual disputes
involving forensic analysis, especially in a case where there
is deviation from standard procedure or alleged misuse of
public funds.
12) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused record of the case including the charge sheet laid
before the court below.
13) As already stated, in the present case the petitioners
are laying challenge to the charge sheet as also the order
framing charge passed by the learned trial court. Before
testing the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioners
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 9 of 22

for assailing the charge sheet and the order framing charges,
it would be apt to understand the legal position with regard
to scope of power of this Court under Section 528 BNSS to
interfere with an order framing charge.
14) The law with regard to discharge and framing of charge
as applicable to the instant case is provided in Section 251-
A of J&K Cr.P.C. Sub-section (2) of the aforesaid provision
provides that, if upon consideration of all documents
referred to in Section 173 and making such examination, if
any, of the accused and after giving the prosecution and the
accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate
considers the charge against the accused to be groundless,
he shall be discharged whereas sub-section (3) provides that
if after undertaking the aforesaid exercise, the Magistrate is
of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence, which such Magistrate is
competent to try, the charge in writing has to be framed
against the accused. It is a settled law that the court while
framing charges is not required to conduct a mini trial and
it has only to weigh the material on record to ascertain
whether the ingredients constituting the alleged offence are
prima facie made out against the accused persons.

15) The legal position as regards scope of power of a Court
at the time of framing of charges has been settled by
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 10 of 22

Supreme Court in the case of Sajjan Kumar vs. CBI , (2010)
9 SCC 368. In the said case, the Supreme Court has laid
down the following principles.
(i) The Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the
Cr.P.C. has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out. The test to determine
prima facie case would depend upon the facts of
each case.

(ii) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained, the Court
will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The Court cannot act merely as a Post Office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider
the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced
before the Court, any basic infirmities etc.
However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.

(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the Court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
committed offence, it can frame the charge,
though for conviction the conclusion is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into
but before framing a charge the Court must apply
its judicial mind on the material placed on record
and must be satisfied that the commission of
offence by the accused was possible.

(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the Court is
required to evaluate the material and documents
on record with a view to find out if the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value
discloses the existence of all the ingredients
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 11 of 22

constituting the alleged offence. For this limited
purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the
prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is
opposed to common sense or the broad
probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise
to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not
to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.
16) 16. In Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander , (2012) 9
SCC 460, the Supreme Court has noted that test for
quashing an order framing charge in exercise of revisional
jurisdiction or inherent jurisdiction is limited to whether the
allegations, as made from the record of the case, taken at
their face value, are patently absurd and whether the basic
ingredients of the offence, for which the charge is framed,
are not made out. The relevant extracts of the judgment are
reproduced hereunder:
“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of
jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section
228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged
under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these
provisions, the court is required to consider the
“record of the case” and documents submitted
therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either
discharge the accused or where it appears to the
court and in its opinion there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed an
offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts
and ingredients of the section exists, then the
court would be right in presuming that there is
ground to proceed against the accused and frame
the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a
presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 12 of 22

court in relation to the existence of constituents of
an offence and the facts leading to that offence is
a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It
may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There
is a fine distinction between the language of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is
the expression of a definite opinion and judgment
of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to
say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court
should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is an
approach which is impermissible in terms of
Section 228 of the Code.”
xxx xxx xxx
“27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction
under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and
Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of
jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate
for us to enlist the principles with reference to
which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction.
However, it is not only difficult but is inherently
impossible to state with precision such principles.
At best and upon objective analysis of various
judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out
some of the principles to be considered for proper
exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to
quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or
together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of
the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the
more the power, the more due care and caution is
to be exercised in invoking these powers. The
power of quashing criminal proceedings,
particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section
228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly
and with circumspection and that too in the rarest
of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether
the uncontroverted allegations as made from the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and
inherently improbable that no prudent person can
ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 13 of 22

ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied
then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is
needed for considering whether the case would
end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of
charge or quashing of charge.
27.4. Where the exercise of such power is
absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage
of justice and for correcting some grave error that
might be committed by the subordinate courts
even in such cases, the High Court should be loath
to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the
prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.8. Where the allegations made and as they
appeared from the record and documents
annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and
constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of
criminality” and does not satisfy the basic
ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be
justified in quashing the charge. Even in such
cases, the court would not embark upon the
critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9. Another very significant caution that the
courts have to observe is that it cannot examine
the facts, evidence and materials on record to
determine whether there is sufficient material on
the basis of which the case would end in a
conviction; the court is concerned primarily with
the allegations taken as a whole whether they will
constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the
process of court leading to injustice.
27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called
upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate
evidence collected by the investigating agencies to
find out whether it is a case of acquittal or
conviction.
27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim
and also amount to an offence, merely because a
civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a
criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot
take into consideration external materials given by
an accused for reaching the conclusion that no
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 14 of 22

offence was disclosed or that there was possibility
of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the
record and documents annexed therewith by the
prosecution.
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the
rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence
is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more
inclined to permit continuation of prosecution
rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The
Court is not expected to marshal the records with
a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the
documents or records but is an opinion formed
prima facie.
27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under
Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from
fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well
within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where
the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of
process of the Code or that the interest of justice
favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The
power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for administration of
which alone, the courts exist….”
17) From the aforesaid analysis of the legal position, it is
clear that at this stage, the scope of power of this Court to
interfere in an order framing charge even under Section 528
of BNSS is very limited. This Court, at this stage, cannot
reevaluate the evidence or hold a mini trial as the same
would amount to assuming appellate jurisdiction, which is
impermissible in law. The scope of power of this Court would
be confined to ascertaining as to whether the trial court has
properly appreciated the material on record and whether, on
the basis of the material on record in the shape of charge
sheet, it was open to the learned trial court to form an
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 15 of 22

opinion that the petitioners/accused have committed the
offence for which they have been charged.
18) With the aforesaid legal position in mind, let us now
analyze the facts of the present case. It is an admitted fact
that petitioner No 3 has been awarded contract by petitioner
Nos.1 and 2 without floating tenders. There is material on
record to show that initially tenders were floated for
execution of the work of air conditioning and allied electric
works, but the contract was not awarded to L1 tenderer, and
instead petitioner Nos.1 and 2 took a decision to cancel the
tender, enlarge the scope of work to renovation of the office
complex and award the same to petitioner No.3 without
going for tenders.
19) The defence projected by the petitioners is that it was a
specialized kind of work which could have been executed
only by a specialized entity like petitioner No.3. Even if it is
assumed that the work that was executed by petitioner No.3
was of a specialized nature, still then there is no material on
record to show that it is only petitioner No.3 who is
competent to execute such kind of work in the whole
country. Even otherwise, renovation of an office complex or
executing the work of air conditioning is not such a
specialized kind of work that would require highly technical
or skilled know-how. Any contractor who has experience and
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 16 of 22

license in conducting such types of work would be eligible to
execute it. However, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 without inviting
tenders proceeded to award the contract to petitioner No.3,
which is a clear case of favouritism and nepotism. Petitioner
Nos.1 and 2 are public servants who were holding
responsible positions in a public authority like Jammu
Development Authority. A Government department or a
public authority, while entering into contracts or granting
other forms of largesse, cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet will
like a private individual. The actions of public servants while
dealing in such matters have to be in conformity with
standards and norms which are not arbitrary, irrational or
irrelevant. Therefore, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were under a
legal obligation to invite open competition from all eligible
contractors before awarding the contract to any of such
eligible contractors. By not doing so, petitioner Nos.1 and 2
have, prima facie, abused their official position.
20) Section 5 of the J&K PC Act defines the offence of
criminal misconduct by a public servant and as per clause
(d) of sub-section (1) of Section 5, a public servant is said to
have committed the offence of criminal misconduct if he, by
corrupt or illegal means or otherwise abusing his position as
public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person
any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. Thus, essential
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 17 of 22

ingredient to constitute an offence under Section 5(1)(d) of
J&K PC Act is that if the public servant, by corrupt means
etc. abusing his position, obtains any valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any other
person. It is not necessary that the public servant by abusing
his position should obtain pecuniary advantage only for
himself, but a public servant can be said to have committed
the offence under Section 5(1)(d) even if he/she by abusing
his/her official position obtains a valuable thing or
pecuniary advantage for any other person who may not be a
public servant. Thus, a public servant who causes wrongful
loss to the Government by benefiting a third party would
expose himself to be tried for offence falling within the
definition of Section 5(1)(d) of the PC Act.
21) The Supreme Court has, in the case of Neera Yadav vs.
CBI , (2017) 8 SCC 757, while interpreting the provisions of
Section 13(1)(d) of the Central Prevention of Corruption Act,
which is in pari-materia with Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC Act,
observed as under:
16. Section 13 of the PC Act in general lays
down that if a public servant, by corrupt or
illegal means or otherwise abusing his
position as a public servant obtains for
himself or for any other person any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage, he would be
guilty of “criminal misconduct”. Sub-
section (2) of Section 13 speaks of the
punishment for such misconduct. Section
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 18 of 22

13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC
Act lays down the essentials and
punishment respectively for the offence of
“criminal misconduct” by a public
servant….
17. A perusal of the above provision makes
it clear that if the elements of any of the
three sub-clauses are met, the same would
be sufficient to constitute an offence of
“criminal misconduct” under Section
13(1)(d). Undoubtedly, all the three wings of
clause (d) of Section 13(1) are independent,
alternative and disjunctive. Thus, under
Section 13(1)(d)(i), obtaining any valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or
illegal means by a public servant in itself
would amount to criminal misconduct. On
the same reasoning “obtaining a valuable
thing or pecuniary advantage” by abusing
his official position as a public servant,
either for himself or for any other person
would amount to criminal misconduct.
xxx xxx xxx
54. A particular kind of corruption that has
become more rampant of late is nepotism
to promote the interests of those near and
dear to them. Nepotism is in a sense a
greater evil since it involves dispersal of
favours by patrons amongst their arm
coterie, depriving others of a career or office
they deserve more. The practice of
promoting the interest of few individuals to
the detriment of many others is wholly
reprehensible and deserves to be
condemned.
22) From the aforesaid enunciation of law on the subject,
it is clear that if a pecuniary advantage is conferred on a
third person on account of misuse of official position by a
public servant, the provisions of Section 5(1)(d) of J&K PC
Act would get attracted. In the present case, as already
stated, petitioner Nos.1 and 2 have, admittedly, awarded
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 19 of 22

contract to petitioner No.3 without floating tenders, that too
after cancelling the earlier tender regarding which process
had already been completed. From this circumstance, it can
be inferred that petitioner Nos.1 and 2 were having dishonest
intention so as to confer undue benefit upon petitioner No.3.
23) Much emphasis has been laid by learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the petitioners on the contention that
in the present case no loss to the State exchequer has
occurred, as the losses calculated by the respondent
investigating agency are based on incorrect application of
rates and erroneous appreciation of facts. To support this
contention, the petitioners have put forward their own
calculations and details to rebut the calculations and details
computed by the respondent investigating agency which find
mention in the charge sheet.
24) As already stated, the legal position regarding scope of
this Court to interfere with an order framing charge is
limited, inasmuch as this Court cannot undertake a mini
trial nor can it test the veracity of the calculations and
details projected by the petitioners by way of a defence to the
calculations and details relied upon by the respondent
investigating agency. The issue as to whether the rates
mentioned in CPWD Schedule of 2012 or the mean of the
rates taken from the years 2010 and 2012 is to be relied
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 20 of 22

upon for calculation of loss to the State exchequer is a matter
which can be decided only after trial of the case when the
engineering experts of the investigating agency depose before
the trial court and they are subjected to cross-examination
by the petitioners.
25) Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has
submitted that it is only a case of application of proper rates
to the works executed by petitioner No.3, and the said
exercise does not involve undertaking a meticulous analysis
of the material on record. I am afraid the contention of
learned Senior Counsel cannot be accepted. The issue as to
which rates are applicable to the works which are subject
matter of the impugned charge sheet is a matter best left to
be commented upon by the experts who will appear as
witnesses before the trial court at appropriate stage. This
Court is not an expert to decide as to what rates are required
to be applied while calculating the loss to the State
exchequer. The trial court can decide such matters only on
the basis of the deposition of the expert witnesses, which
stage is yet to arrive.
26) At this stage, the material placed on record by the
investigating agency along with the charge sheet has to be
taken at its face value, and once the said material shows that
there has been loss to the State exchequer on account of
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 21 of 22

award of contract to petitioner No.3 by petitioner Nos.1 and
2, who have, admittedly, awarded the contract to petitioner
No.3 without following the codal formalities, it cannot be
stated that the charge against the petitioners is groundless.
27) For what has been discussed hereinbefore, I do not find
any merit in this petition. The same is dismissed
accordingly.
(Sanjay Dhar)
Judge

SRINAGAR
19.11.2026
“Bhat Altaf-Secretary”
Whether the Judgement is speaking: YES

Whether the Judgement is reportable: YES
CRM(M) No.399/2025 Page 22 of 22