Shyam Sundar vs State (Nct Of Delhi) & Ors.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~J
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment pronounced on: 01.07.2026
+
W.P.(C) 9558/2020 and CM APPL.30647/2020
SHYAM SUNDAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Trideep Pais, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sanya
Kumar, Mr. Chiranjeev Singh
Marwaha, Ms. Saloni Ambastha, Ms.
Sakshi Jain and Ms. S. Abinaya,
Advs.
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Premtosh K. Mishra, CGSC, Mr.
Shrey Sharma, Mr. Anubhav
Upadhyay and Mr. Arpit Bansal,
Advs. along with Insp. Ram Manohar,
DIU North East Distt.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner seeking
compensation for the custodial death of his son, Deepak, who is stated to
have died an unnatural death while in custody at Police Station Karawal
Nagar.
2. The factual matrix, as set forth by the petitioner, is that on
15.01.2018, the deceased was arrested at approximately 11:10 a.m. from the
premises of Karkardooma Courts by SI Sandeep in connection with FIR No.
334/2017 registered at PS Karawal Nagar. Pursuant to the arrest, when the
petitioner went to the police station to meet his son, the petitioner himself
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was detained and confined in the lock-up along with the deceased. At about
5:30 p.m. on the same day, the petitioner was released. It is alleged,
however, that both the petitioner and his son were subjected to mistreatment,
physical assault and threats by SI Sandeep and Constable Karamveer Singh,
who also demanded a sum of Rs. 20,000 - 30,000/- for securing the release
of the deceased. Later that night, the petitioner received a telephonic
communication from SI Sandeep, wherein particulars regarding the deceased
were sought and the demand for money was reiterated. The petitioner,
allegedly being of indigent means, expressed his inability to arrange the
funds.
3. The next morning, upon contacting the police station, the petitioner
was informed that the deceased had been produced before the Court. Shortly
thereafter, the petitioner received a call from a local politician,
Satyapradhan, informing that the petitioner’s son had allegedly committed
suicide while in custody. On 16.01.2018, at 11.56 a.m. the deceased was
declared ‘brought dead’ at Guru Tegh Bahadur Hospital.
4. Subsequently, a request for magisterial enquiry was made by the
SHO, PS Karawal Nagar, before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
Karkardooma Courts. The responsibility for arrangement of post-mortem,
conducting photography of the concerned lock-up, seizing the ligature
material purportedly used by the deceased and coordinating with the Crime
Team for lifting fingerprints from the spot was given by the concerned
Metropolitan Magistrate to SI Sandeep Kumar.
5. On 17.01.2018, a post-mortem examination was conducted by a
medical board, which opined the cause of death to be “asphyxia due to ante-
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mortem hanging”. The body of the deceased was thereafter handed over to
the petitioner.
6. The concerned Metropolitan Magistrate, vide the Final Inquest Order
dated 22.07.2019, observed as under:
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SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the deceased was the
biological son of the petitioner’s brother. Upon the demise of his biological
mother, when he was approximately one year old, the deceased was adopted
by the petitioner. Since then, they shared a father-son relationship. In
support thereof, an affidavit dated 17.03.2026, has been filed by the
petitioner.
8. The petitioner contends that the demise of his son is attributable to
negligence on the part of the police officials stationed at PS Karawal Nagar.
Reliance is placed upon the recovery of a stole from the room where the
deceased was confined, allegedly used as ligature material. The FSL Report
dated 31.05.2018 (Annexure -G) records that two blades were recovered
from the lock ‑up and that the possibility of the ligature material being cut
using the blades could not be ruled out.
9. It is emphasized that upon arrest, Deepak was searched and no such
objects were recovered. In the absence of any explanation for the presence
of said items in the lock ‑up, it is submitted that the same were subsequently
planted to create a facade of suicide.
10. It is the case of the petitioner that since his son met with an unnatural
death while in custody, the State is liable to compensate him.
11. Reliance is placed upon the Departmental Enquiry Order dated
26.09.2018, which, according to the petitioner, establishes negligence on the
part of the police officers at PS Karawal Nagar. The said Departmental
Enquiry Order dated 26.09.2018 reads as under :
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12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that punishment imposed
in a departmental enquiry does not preclude the grant of compensation to the
petitioner for the unnatural death of his son in custody.
13. In support of his contentions, as regards compensation, learned
counsel has relied upon the following judgments:
a. Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, In re , (2017) 10 SCC
658
b. Parvathamma v. Chief Secretary to Government of
Karnataka, 1995 SCC OnLine Kar 245
c. Gopichand v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom
1005
d. Kiran v. State, 2007 SCC OnLine Del 877
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e. Prema Devi v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine All 457
14. It is further submitted that in determining the quantum of
compensation payable in the present case, the principle of multiplier, as
devised in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation, (2009) 6 SCC 121,
ought to be applied.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
15. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the claim for
compensation in the present case is misconceived, inasmuch as it proceeds
on the assumption that compensation is an automatic consequence of every
custodial death. It is contended that the determination of compensation is
strictly governed by Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(CrPC) and the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme, 2018 framed
thereunder, which together constitute a comprehensive statutory framework
for assessing both entitlement and quantum.
16. Relying upon the dicta laid down in Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi)
2025 SCC Online Del 4543, learned counsel contends that compensation is
to be determined within the confines of the concerned Victims
Compensation Scheme and on a case-to-case basis, with the competent
Legal Services Authority assessing the appropriate quantum having regard
to the facts of each case.
17. It is further contended that in Prema Devi v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC
OnLine All 457, the Allahabad High Court awarded compensation having
regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case, without
prescribing any standardised quantum.
18. It is emphasised that in the present case, the medical evidence on
record attributes the cause of death to ante-mortem hanging and does not
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disclose any external injuries or conclusive material indicating custodial
violence. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondents submits that in
the absence of any established culpability or direct nexus between the
alleged acts of the authorities and the death, the present case stands on a
materially different footing from those involving proven custodial brutality.
19. It is submitted that compensation is not to be awarded on the basis of
parity or broad generalisations, but must be calibrated in accordance with
the statutory parameters, factual findings and the degree of State
responsibility in each case.
REASONING AND ANALYSIS
20. In the present case, it remains undisputed that the deceased suffered
an unnatural death in custody at Police Station Karawal Nagar. The
question, however, is whether such a death attracts liability for
compensation. This Court, in the present proceedings, is not required to
adjudicate upon the precise cause of death or upon the allegations of foul
play or custodial violence. The issue before this Court is limited to the
entitlement of the petitioner, on account of an unnatural death in custody, to
compensation and the appropriate quantum thereof rather than to the
attribution of criminal culpability or the establishment of foul play.
21. The present petition raises questions of constitutional significance.
Custodial death is not merely an individual tragedy but a matter of systemic
concern, striking at the very foundation of the rule of law. When a person is
deprived of liberty and placed in the custody of the State, the authorities
assume a heightened duty of care. Any lapse resulting in death within
custody, whether attributed to violence, negligence, unexplained
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circumstances or even suicide, demands judicial scrutiny, for it implicates
both the dignity of the individual and the credibility of the justice system.
22. In Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons, In re , (2017) 10 SCC 658,
the Court referred to the ‘Guidelines on Investigating Deaths in Custody’
issued by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), wherein
suicide has been classified as unnatural death and observed as under:
“9. On the issue of defining natural and unnatural deaths, the learned
Amicus Curiae drew our attention to the Guidelines on Investigating
Deaths in Custody issued by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). According to ICRC, “death” is the irreversible cessation
of all vital functions, including brain activity. Death is “natural” when it
is caused solely by disease and/or the aging process. It is “unnatural”
when its causes are external, such as intentional injury (homicide,
suicide), negligence or unintentional injury (death by accident). We have
perused the guidelines provided by ICRC and are of the view that these
guidelines deserve consideration and circulation by the Central
Government and all the State Governments.”
23. The jurisprudence concerning custodial deaths has been shaped by a
rich corpus of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court as well as the High
Courts of various States.
24. In Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa , (1993) 2 SCC 746, the Apex
Court emphasized the strict duty of care owed by the State towards persons
in custody and held that the right to life cannot be curtailed except in
accordance with law. The Court further clarified that the duty of care on the
part of the State is strict and admits of no exceptions. The Court observed as
under:
“31. It is axiomatic that convicts, prisoners or undertrials are not
denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only such
restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the
enjoyment of the fundamental right by such persons. It is an obligation of
the State to ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights
of a citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the citizen is in
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its custody. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials or other
prisoners in custody, except according to procedure established by law.
There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to
ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life.
His liberty is in the very nature of things circumscribed by the very fact
of his confinement and therefore his interest in the limited liberty left to
him is rather precious. The duty of care on the part of the State is strict
and admits of no exceptions. The wrongdoer is accountable and the State
is responsible if the person in custody of the police is deprived of his life
except according to the procedure established by law. I agree with
Brother Verma, J. that the defence of “sovereign immunity” in such
cases is not available to the State and in fairness to Mr Altaf Ahmed it
may be recorded that he raised no such defence either.
XXX XXX XXX
35. This Court and the High Courts, being the protectors of the civil
liberties of the citizen, have not only the power and jurisdiction but also
an obligation to grant relief in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles
32 and 226 of the Constitution to the victim or the heir of the victim
whose fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
are established to have been flagrantly infringed by calling upon the
State to repair the damage done by its officers to the fundamental rights
of the citizen, notwithstanding the right of the citizen to the remedy by
way of a civil suit or criminal proceedings. …..The decisions of this
Court in the line of cases starting with Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar
[(1983) 4 SCC 141 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 798 : (1983) 3 SCR 508] granted
monetary relief to the victims for deprivation of their fundamental rights
in proceedings through petitions filed under Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution of India, notwithstanding the rights available under the civil
law to the aggrieved party where the courts found that grant of such
relief was warranted. It is a sound policy to punish the wrongdoer and it
is in that spirit that the courts have moulded the relief by granting
compensation to the victims in exercise of their writ jurisdiction.”
25. Following the principles laid down in Nilabati Behera (supra), the
Karnataka High Court in Parvathamma v. Chief Secretary to Government
of Karnataka, 1995 SCC OnLine Kar 245, emphasized that once a prisoner
is in custody, custodial death cannot be treated in a casual or cavalier
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fashion and that public law remedies must be moulded to protect the rule of
law:
“8. We have given our anxious consideration to this unfortunate episode
and we feel that in the circumstances of the case it would have been
necessary for the police to show that there was no negligence on their
part. After all when a prisoner is in police custody it is the duty of the
police to keep him alive and well till judicial remand. There are some
aspects in this case which have caused us anxiety. It is not known in the
first place as to why a woollen rug was given to the deceased in the month
of May when it is generally warm in Bangalore. We are also not able to
understand how the deceased was able to cut the woollen rug into a rope
in the presence of the police. We are also not able to understand how and
by what means the deceased hanged himself in the very presence of
Muniswamy the Head Constable and Beeraiah the police constable. If it
is the case of the police that Muniswamy and Beeraiah had left the police
station and arrived immediately after the occurrence, then it is not stated
why the police station was left unmanned by any person. It is impossible
to believe that the police station would have been left empty without any
policeman being present in the police station. All these matters could
have been cleared if the two alleged eyewitnesses were examined at the
enquiry.
XXX XXX XXX
10. However, in all cases of police lock-up deaths whether it is by suicide
or on account of atrocities committed by the police, the onus undoubtedly
rests on the police to show that there has been no negligence on their
part. We may at this stage refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Bahera v. State of Orissa
[(1993) 2 SCC 746 : AIR 1993 SC 1960.] . This was a case of lock-up
death. While dealing with this case, at para 13 their Lordships have held
as follows:
“In this context, it is sufficient to say that the decision
of this Court in Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [AIR 1965 SC 1039.] , upholding the
State's plea of sovereign immunity for tortious acts of
its servants is confined to the sphere of liability in
tort, which is distinct from the State's liability for
contravention of fundamental rights to which the
doctrine of sovereign immunity has no application in
the Constitutional scheme, and is no defence to the
constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of
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the Constitution which enables award of
compensation for contravention of fundamental
rights, when the only practicable mode of
enforcement of the fundamental rights can be the
award of compensation. The decisions of this Court
in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar [(1983) 4 SCC 141 :
AIR 1983 SC 1086.] and others in that line relate to
award of compensation for contravention of
fundamental rights, in the constitutional remedy
under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution. On the
other hand, Kasturilal related to value of goods
seized and not returned to the owner due to the fault
of Government servants, the claim being of damages
for the tort of conversion under the ordinary process
and not a claim for compensation for violation of
fundamental rights. Kasturilal is, therefore,
inapplicable in this context and distinguishable”.
XXX XXX XXX
16. We find it necessary to state that whenever a victim's family
complains of an infringement of an indefeasible right of the citizens while
in police custody, the Courts will have to evolve while exercising writ
jurisdiction, new tools to give relief in public law by moulding it
according to the situations with a view to preserve and protect the rule of
law. The old doctrine of relegating the aggrieved to the remedies
available in civil law is a hollow right to a poor citizen of the country.
The Courts have an obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the
citizens because in the last resort the Courts and the law are for the
people and they are expected to respond to their aspirations. The
indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and
the remedies available in public law as laid down by the Supreme Court
is a strict liability for contravention of a basic rights of the citizens. The
purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to
assure the citizens that they live under a legal system which aims to
protect their interests and preserve their rights. As we have said earlier,
once a prisoner is in police custody, custodial death cannot be treated in
casual and cavalier fashion. We find as stated earlier, the legal heirs of
the victims do not get any relief for many years.”
26. The Bombay High Court in Gopichand v. State of Maharashtra,
2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1005, dealt with a case of custodial suicide and
examined the liability of the State in such circumstances. The Court rejected
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the argument that suicide in custody stands on the same footing as suicide
outside custody. The relevant extracts are as under:
“76. In the present case, the death, may be due to suicide, is in police
custody, and there exists a logical relationship between the act of State
and the death. While it is urged by the State that claiming compensation
for a suicidal death is too a remote cause, and is not attributable to any
wrong by the State, a contrary conclusion that the suicidal death in
custody will stand on par with suicide elsewhere is as well a too far
stretched and far extended argument.
77. While in general parlance and in the welfare concept, even in motor
accidents and other acts of fatal accidents, the concept of ‘No Fault
Liability’ is emerging, attempting to keep a track with the doctrine of
‘Strict Liability’ by analogous principle ought not come into play when
the death occurs while in police custody.
78. Being a matter of judicial notice, the fact that somebody has to be in
police custody itself creates a grave psychological trauma. Existence of a
trauma will have to be accepted as a rule, and where nothing wrong
happens, the trauma would not result in actionable claim, however,
something grave, such as depravation takes places, the trauma and its
effects on the mind of the detenue will have to be presumed. Upon such
assumption, it shall suffice for the claimant to prove that somebody was
unduly kept in police custody, aggravating the trauma and as its
consequence, being a matter of sheer personal knowledge and privy as
far as the police is concerned, they shoulder the burden of proving that
the things around the detenue were normal, and yet nothing, except
something sheer personal to the detenue is the cause of suicide.
79. In the present case, we are, therefore, on the facts of the case,
compelled to hold that the police have failed to bring on record any piece
of evidence to show that things were completely normal at their end, and
gravely abnormal at the end of detenue, and yet there has to be a strong
logical bond between the fact of death and the police, still police have by
their lapses failed to discord the said bond.
80. In the result, this Court is satisfied that the death, though suicidal,
attracts a tortuous liability to the State, though such liability would not
be on the same rigours and lines.”
27. In Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (supra), the following
observations were made:
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“46. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1
SCC 416 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 92] this Court recognised that at the time of
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
1966 in 1979, the Government of India made a specific reservation to the
effect that the Indian legal system does not recognise a right to
compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention and only became
a party to the covenant, subject to this reservation. It was noted, however,
that the reservation has lost its relevance in view of the law laid down by
this Court in several cases wherein compensation has been awarded for
the infringement of a fundamental right of a citizen. It was also noted that
while there is no express provision in the Constitution for grant of
compensation, this right has been judicially evolved in cases of
established unconstitutional deprivation of personal liberty or life. This
Court summed up the law in the following words: (SCC p. 443, para 54)
“54. Thus, to sum up, it is now a well-accepted
proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that monetary or
pecuniary compensation is an appropriate and indeed an
effective and sometimes perhaps the only suitable remedy for
redressal of the established infringement of the fundamental
right to life of a citizen by the public servants and the State is
vicariously liable for their acts. The claim of the citizen is
based on the principle of strict liability to which the defence of
sovereign immunity is not available and the citizen must
receive the amount of compensation from the State, which
shall have the right to be indemnified by the wrongdoer. In the
assessment of compensation, the emphasis has to be on the
compensatory and not on punitive element. The objective is to
apply balm to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor
or the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the
offence (irrespective of compensation) must be left to the
criminal courts in which the offender is prosecuted, which the
State, in law, is duty-bound to do. The award of compensation
in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any
other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully
available to the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with
respect to the same matter for the tortious act committed by
the functionaries of the State. The quantum of compensation
will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case
and no straitjacket formula can be evolved in that behalf. The
relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the
fundamental rights of the citizen, under the public law
jurisdiction is, thus, in addition to the traditional remedies
and not in derogation of them. The amount of compensation as
awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress the
wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any
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amount which may be awarded to the claimant by way of
damages in a civil suit.”
47. Ajab Singh v. State of U.P. [Ajab Singh v. State of U.P., (2000) 3 SCC
521 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 718] , Murti Devi v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Murti
Devi v. State (NCT of Delhi), (1998) 9 SCC 604 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1330]
and more recently Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rohtash Kumar v.
State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 290 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 205] illustrate
that custodial death is a clear violation of the prisoner's rights under
Article 21 of the Constitution and relief could be moulded by granting
compensation to the next of kin of the deceased.
48. In addition to the above decisions and several others rendered by this
Court, almost every High Court in the country has, at one time or
another, also granted compensation for the unnatural death of a person
in custody, whether an undertrial or a convict. …
XXX XXX XXX
54. The case law indicates that over the last several decades this Court
and almost every High Court has relied on Article 21 of the Constitution
and thought it appropriate to compensate the next of kin for an unnatural
custodial death. The constitutional courts can go on delivering judgment
after judgment on this issue and award compensation, but unless the State
realises that custodial death is itself a crime and monetary compensation
is not necessarily the only appropriate relief that can be granted to the
next of kin of the deceased, such unnatural deaths will continue unabated.
Therefore, what is needed is a review of all prisons with a humanitarian
nuance.
XXX XXX XXX
58.1. The Secretary General of this Court will transmit a copy of this
decision to the Registrar General of every High Court within one week
with a request to the Registrar General to place it before the Chief Justice
of the High Court. We request the Chief Justice of the High Court to
register a suo motu public interest petition with a view to identifying the
next of kin of the prisoners who have admittedly died an unnatural death
as revealed by NCRB during the period between 2012 and 2015 and even
thereafter, and award suitable compensation, unless adequate
compensation has already been awarded.”
28. In light of the above, the respondents’ submission that compensation
is not an automatic consequence of custodial death cannot be accepted. It is
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well settled that when a person is in custody, he does not lose his
fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and the
State assumes an absolute and inalienable duty to protect his life and dignity.
An unnatural death in custody, even if by suicide, is not a private act
divorced from State responsibility, but reflects an omission of duty on the
part of those charged with safekeeping. The State cannot escape
responsibility by invoking statutory schemes or by contending absence of
direct culpability. The very fact of custodial death, being unnatural, attracts
liability and obliges the Court to mould relief in the form of compensation.
29. This Court is therefore of the view that the custodial death of the
petitioner’s son, being unnatural, attracts liability. The State, as custodian of
life and liberty, is bound to compensate the next of kin for the infringement
of fundamental rights under Article 21. The entitlement of the petitioner to
compensation is thus beyond dispute. Having held that compensation is
payable, the next question that arises is the determination of its quantum.
30. As regards the quantum of compensation to which the petitioner in the
present case is entitled, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that
the principle of multiplier, as devised in Sarla Verma (supra) ought to be
applied. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents, relying upon the
dicta laid down in Shakila v. State (supra) contended that compensation
must be confined to the statutory framework under Section 357A CrPC and
the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme, 2018.
31. In Kiran v. State (supra), a Division Bench of this Court, in
determining the quantum of compensation payable to the widow and
children of the deceased who suffered custodial death, applied the norms
ordinarily used in motor accident claims and observed as under:
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“18. In Ajab Singh's Case, the Supreme Court had awarded Rs. 5.00
lakhs to the next of kin of the victim who was earning around Rs. 5,00/-
per month only. That can, however, be only a broad guideline for this
Court to follow. The process by which we arrive at a figure may still have
to be based on some objective consideration which we will attempt to
enlist in the paras that follow.
19. In claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, the Parliament has
now introduced the concept of compensation on no fault basis. While the
concept may not be applicable to cases of custodial deaths, we see no
reason why the norms on which the amount of compensation is
determined can not be borrowed as a guideline for award in such cases.
There is a presumptive income of Rs. 18,000/- in all cases where there is
no evidence regarding such income. The petitioner was not, however,
jobless as he was according to the petitioner earning Rs. 4,000/- per
month. Even if we were to reduce that amount to Rs. 3,000/- per month
and deduct one-third out of the same towards his personal expenditure,
the monthly accretion to the family would be in the tune of Rs. 2,000/- per
month or Rs. 24,000/- per year. The deceased was around 26 year old on
the date of his death. A multiple of 16 would take the amount of
compensation to Rs. 3,84,000/-. Addition of a sum of Rs. 16,000/- to that
amount towards funeral expenses and loss of consortium would take the
amount payable to the petitioner and her children to Rs. 4.00 lakhs which,
in our opinion, would meet the ends of justice subject to any enhancement
which the petitioner and her children may claim in private law
proceedings, if otherwise entitled against those found responsible for the
death.”
32. Further, in Prakash Kaur v. State of Punjab , CWP-3342-2016, the
Punjab and Haryana High Court, held that the State is obligated to
compensate the next of kin of the deceased who died in custody. It was
categorically stated that mere absence of active participation of jail
authorities does not absolve the sovereign of its obligation to ensure
protection of life of inmates. Further, the Court, referring to Sarla Verma
(supra), applied the multiplier principle and awarded the compensation
accordingly. Relevant observations are as under:
“ Further reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court passed in CWP
No.11695 of 2020 titled as Ram Lal and others Vs. State of Punjab and
others' decided on 28.04.2022, wherein this Court has observed as under:
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[11]. It is a settled principle of law that the Court can grant
appropriate relief in case of deprivation of constitutional
guarantee of life and personal liberty. A claim in public law
of compensation for contravention of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed
in the Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for
enforcement and protection of such rights. Though such
claims are based on strict liability, by resorting to
constitutional remedy provided for enforcement of
fundamental rights which is distinct from, and also in
addition to, the remedy in private law for damages i.e. torts
resulting from contravention of the fundamental right.
[12]. In Phoolwati vs. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh)
and others, 2008(1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 167, while deciding
such cases, the parameters as laid down in motor accident
claim cases can be relied. The multiplier as provided in
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 can be applied to the cases of
custodial death as well. In order to calculate the
compensation to be awarded to the dependants of the
deceased, the parameters as laid down in Sarla Verma and
others vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another,
2009(3) R.C.R. (Civil) 77 (SC) and National Insurance
Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and others, 2017(4)
R.C.R. (Civil) 1009 (SC) can be relied.
[13]. The annual income of the deceased as per income tax
returns (Annexures P-2, P-3 and P-4) has been relied upon
by learned Senior counsel for the petitioners. According to
the aforesaid documents, annual income of the deceased is
prima facie proved to be Rs.3,52,588/-.
[14]. As per legal position, future prospects @ 25% are to
be considered while assessing the compensation. The amount
of Rs.88,147/- has to be assessed towards future prospects of
the deceased. In this manner, total annual income comes out
to be Rs.4,40,735/-. Out of the aforesaid amount, deduction
towards personal expenses to the tune of 1/4th has to be
applied. In this way an amount of Rs.1,10,184/- has to be
deducted from Rs.4,40,735/- and the annual loss of
dependency would come out to be Rs.3,30,551/-. Since the
deceased Mohinder Pal @ Bittu was aged about 49 years at
the time of the occurrence, therefore, as per ratio of Sarla
Verma and others's case (supra) on the basis of age of the
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deceased, multiplier of 13 can be applied to the aforesaid
annual loss of dependency and the amount comes out to be
Rs.42,97,163/-.
[15]. In view of ratio of National Insurance Company
Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and others's case (supra) an
additional amount of Rs.70,000/- has to be assessed under
the conventional heads i.e. funeral expenses, loss of estate
and consortium is to be considered. In this way the total
amount of compensation comes out to be Rs.43,67,163/-
(42,97,163/- +70,000/-).”
xxx xxx xxx
Having held so, the issue which now arises for consideration of this Court
is as to whether in the event of occurrence of an unnatural death of a
person while in custody, would his heirs be entitled to compensation or
not?
The perusal of the precedent judgments referred to above and extracted in
the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, squarely hold that Article 21
of the Constitution of India, 1950 comes in operation with full force at a
time when life and liberties of a person in the custody of State are taken
away without law. The agencies and instrumentalities of the State cannot
be obliterated of their obligation to ensure protection of a life and liberty
of an individual when he is confined to prison/jail under the orders of a
Court. It cannot be left open to the State Agencies to wash off their
responsibility by holding it as an event of private dispute amongst two
private individuals and seek exoneration from all obligations to ensure
safety and security of inmates while in prison. The assessment of danger,
the possible plight and the maintenance of law and order within the jail
premises is the responsibility of the State. It was in the aforesaid
background and recognising the settled legal principles that writ
jurisdiction of the Court has been regularly invoked and exercised
repeatedly to strike a balance in the equitable relief for the next of the kin
of the deceased.
I am therefore, of the opinion that in light of the judgments referred to
above, the State would be obligated to compensate the petitioners who
are next of kin of the Vikram Singh @ Vicky. The mere absence of active
participation of jail authorities does not absolve the sovereign of its
obligation to ensure protection of life of inmates. Absence of participation
is solely a shield against criminal prosecution of the persons who would
be so involved and cannot be cited as the basis to wriggle out of the civil
and tortuous liabilities.
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Having held as above, the next question which arises for determination is
the quantum of compensation to be awarded to the petitioners. It has been
pointed out that the minimum wages as were in force at the relevant point
of time were Rs.240/- per day. Upon consideration, number of days when
a daily wager may be in a position to get work in an year is
approximately 200 days, the annual income of deceased Vikram Singh @
Vicky could be assumed as Rs.48,000/-. By applying a deduction of 1/3rd
i.e. Rs.16,000/-, the annual dependency of deceased would work out to
Rs.32,000/- per annum. The age of the deceased was 25 years and taking
into consideration the parameters and yardsticks enshrined in the Motor
Vehicle Act, 1988, the multiplier of 18 would be attracted as per the law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Ms. Sarla
Verma and others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and another reported
as (2009) 6 SCC 121. The amount of compensation thus comes to
Rs.5,76,000/-. An additional amount of Rs.70,000/- is also awarded under
the Conventional Heads i.e. litigation expenses, loss of estate and
consortium. Even though the judgments in relation to the compensation
under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 take into consideration the future
prospects of a person, however, taking into consideration the criminal
antecedents and the possibility of the petitioner being convicted, the
aforesaid aspects for assessing compensation are not being gone into at
this stage.”
33. In Sanjeevani v. State of Maharashtra , 2021 SCC OnLine Bom
3704, the Court applied the multiplier principle in terms of the dicta laid
down in Sarla Verma (supra) while determining the compensation payable
to the widow and parents of the deceased who died an unnatural death in
custody :
“15. Admittedly, the deceased was 18 years of age at the time of the
incident. Post Mortem report shows the age of the deceased as 18 years.
Income of the deceased is not on record. Therefore, notional income of
Rs. 4,000/- per month can be considered for calculating the amount of
compensation. After deducting 1/4th expenditure for himself, the total
amount payable for compensation is Rs. 3,000/- per month. The multiplier
to be applied would be 17 as per the guidelines framed by the Honourable
Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport
Corporation reported in (2009) 6 SCC 121 . Having regard to the age of
the deceased and his notional income per year, the amount of
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compensation can be calculated as under:—
Age Multiplier Income per year Total amount
18 years 17 Rs. 36,000/- Rs. 6,12,000/-
Loss of love and affection Rs. 20,000/-
Total Rs. 6,32,000/-
16. Thus, the total amount of ex-gratia compensation comes to Rs.
6,32,000/-.”
34. Recently, in Prema Devi v. State of U.P., 2026 SCC OnLine All 457,
the Allahabad High Court, while dealing with a case strikingly similar to the
one at hand, reiterated the settled principles governing compensation in
cases involving custodial death and observed as under:
“9. The Tripura High Court in the decision of Rasheda Khatun (Supra),
directed the State to pay compensation for custodial death, relying upon
the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in D.K. Basu (Supra) wherein
it was observed that the purpose of compensation is to ameliorate the
wound of the kin of the deceased and not to act as a deterrent for the
transgressor. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are delineated
below:-
“ 17. For determination of the quantum of compensation
we may profitably refer to the decision of the Apex Court in
the case of D.K. Basu v. State of W.B: reported in (1997) 1
SCC 416 wherein the Apex Court has held that the
objective of such monetary compensation is to apply balm
to the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or the
offender, as awarding appropriate punishment for the
offence must be left to the criminal courts in which the
offender is prosecuted. Observation made by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in paragraph- 54 of the judgment is as under:
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“54. Thus, to sum up, it is now a well accepted
proposition in most of the jurisdictions, that
monetary or pecuniary compensation is an
appropriate and indeed an effective and sometimes
perhaps the only suitable remedy for redressal of
the established infringement of the fundamental
right to life of a citizen by the public servants and
the State is vicariously liable for their acts. The
claim of the citizen is based on the principle of
strict liability to which the defence of sovereign
immunity is not available and the citizen must
receive the amount of compensation from the State,
which shall have the right to be indemnified by the
wrongdoer. In the assessment of compensation, the
emphasis has to be on the compensatory and not on
punitive element. The objective is to apply balm to
the wounds and not to punish the transgressor or
the offender, as awarding appropriate punishment
for the offence (irrespective of compensation) must
be left to the criminal courts in which the offender
is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty bound
to do. That award of compensation in the public
law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to any
other action like civil suit for damages which is
lawfully available to the victim or the heirs of the
deceased victim with respect to the same matter for
the tortious act committed by the functionaries of
the State. The quantum of compensation will, of
course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case
and no strait-jacket formula can be evolved in that
behalf. The relief to redress the wrong for the
established invasion of the fundamental rights of
the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is,
thus, in addition to the traditional remedies and not
in derogation of them. The amount of compensation
as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to
redress the wrong done, may in a given case, be
adjusted against any amount which may be
awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a
civil suit.”
XXX XXX XXX
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13. It is undisputed that the deceased was in the custody of the State and
had committed suicide. There may have been circumstances surrounding
him which drove him to take such an extreme step, resulting in a patently
unnatural death. Ergo, the State is absolutely liable for the unnatural
death of the deceased, as an amplified duty is cast upon the State for the
death of a prisoner in custody of police without any exception. No State
can shirk its duties and responsibilities for providing better facilities to
prisoners. Accordingly the case of custodial death is made out in the
present case.
XXX XXX XXX
17. In view of the foregoing analysis, this Court finds that the death of the
deceased occurred while in custody and control of the State authorities,
and that the material placed on record unmistakably establishes a
violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. Custodial torture is a naked violation of human
dignity and degradation that destroys self-esteem and being of the victim
to the absolute core. Custodial torture is a calculated assault on human
dignity and whenever human dignity is wounded, civilisation takes a step
backwards. Despite recommendations for banishing torture from the
investigative system, growing incidence of torture and deaths in police
custody and prisons continue to persist. Custodial violence and deaths
strike the very core of the rule of law and are an affront to human dignity.
The State, being the custodian of life and liberty of persons in its custody,
bears a strict and non-delegable duty to ensure their safety. Failure to
discharge this obligation attracts public law liability.
18. ….. The contention of the State that the death was due to suicide and
was not an unnatural death does not hold water as has been categorically
demonstrated by the judgments as discussed above. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Re- Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons (Supra) has
categorically held that a suicide would amount to an (internal)
intentional injury and would be an unnatural death wherein the liability
would squarely fall on the State. In light of the same, one may patently
come to a conclusion that the facts of the present case disclose a clear
infringement of constitutional protections, warranting intervention under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
19. It is well settled, inter alia, in Nilabati Behera (Supra) and D.K. Basu
(Supra) that this Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, is empowered to award monetary
compensation as a remedy in public law for established violations of
fundamental rights, independent of and in addition to remedies available
in private law. Monetary compensation, while not a complete substitute
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for the loss of life, could provide some measure of solace for the bereaved
family and act as a deterrent against future custodial violence.”
35. In Shakila v. State (NCT of Delhi) , 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4543, the
petitioner’s son had succumbed, while undergoing treatment, to grievous
injuries sustained in an alleged scuffle between two groups of inmates. The
trial court in the concerned proceedings, acquitted all the accused. In the
writ petition, the petitioner sought a twofold relief: (i) judicial inquiry into
the death of her son; and (ii) compensation on the ground that the deceased
was the sole breadwinner upon whom the petitioner was dependent. During
the pendency of the petition, however, the petitioner passed away. Prior to
her demise, the petitioner, at the behest of the National Human Rights
Commission, was granted an interim compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-.
Following the petitioner’s demise, her children (siblings of the deceased)
and her grandchildren sought revival of the petition and compensation as
claimed. The questions that arose for consideration before this Court were:
“ 24. The Questions that thus, stands posited for the consideration of this
Court are:
1) Whether siblings, not being expressly mentioned in the list of
Dependents in the Scheme, are entitled to the benefits of the scheme or
not?
2) Whether the fact of a female sibling being married would lead to a
conclusion that they can't be “Dependent”?
3) Whether the children of siblings would be excluded from the benefits
of the scheme?”
36. In Shakila v. State (supra), the the Court delineated the contours of
the Delhi Victims Compensation Scheme, 2018 , and while affirming the
liability of the State in cases of unnatural deaths in custody, held as under:
“60. Apropos the discussion and analysis hereinbefore, this Court
concludes as follows:
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A. The Petitioners, by virtue of their being the siblings, married or
unmarried or the children of the siblings, are not, ipso facto, disentitled
from the benefits of the DVCS Scheme.
B. The receipt of Rs. 1,00,000/- by the Mother, prior to her demise, would
not preclude the substituted Petitioners from being entitled to the benefit
of the scheme since;
i. The same was in the nature of an interim payment, and
ii. The same was not in terms of a Scheme of the Central Govt. or of the
GNCTD.
C. The State, owing a duty to ensure the security of the general public,
including persons who are incarcerated, has a responsibility to
compensate in cases of unnatural deaths in custody. This is also in line
with the proposed scheme of the Delhi Government. However, there may
be certain exceptions to the general class of such deceased prisoners, e.g.
those who suffer death due to natural causes or those who perish in an
attempt to escape. It is clarified that these are merely illustrative and in
no manner limited, and further, do not preclude the State from excluding
such other persons who they believe should be exempt from the benefits of
the Scheme.
D. In the present case, no particulars of the loss or injury suffered by the
Petitioners have been provided. Equally, though, is the fact that, based on
the restrictive interpretation canvassed by the Respondents, no
determination on the “dependency” or of any loss or injury suffered by
the Petitioners, been carried out.
E. The Schedule for payment of compensation in the event of the demise
of a Victim is as follows:
“DELHI VICTIM COMPENSATION SCHEME, 2018
SCHEDULE
S. No. Particulars of loss or
Minimum limit of
Upper limit of
compensation
compensation
injury
1. Loss of life Rs. 3 Lakhs Rs. 10 Lakhs
*
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…”
F. The interim compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/-, is less than the minimum
amount prescribed by the Schedule of the DVCS. The Schedule provides
for a minimum and an upper limit, and the same are Rs. 3 and Rs. 10
Lakhs, respectively. The Mother, admittedly being a dependent, should
have received at least 3 Lakhs, if not more. This Court, in its Judgment in
Mohini v. State (Govt. of NCT, Delhi) 19 has held that the compensation
as awarded should be just and adequate and at Para 20 of the said
Judgment, states as follows:—
“20. In view of the above legal position, Clause 4 of the Scheme
has to be interpreted so as not to defeat the object of the Scheme.
The Scheme read with Section 357A of Cr. P.C. envisages that the
victim or the dependent should receive just compensation. To knock
out an applicant under the Scheme merely because some meagre or
token compensation was received by the applicant under some
other statutory provisions would be unfair and contrary to the very
object of the Scheme. Clause 4 is added to ensure that no victim or
dependent gets a bonanza or largesse. It is not intended to inflict
injury. Clause 4 has to be read conjointly and would have to take
its colour from Section 357A Cr. P.C. read with Clause 5 and
Schedule to the Scheme. Reading Clause 4 of the Scheme in this
manner would mean that the victim can be said to “have been
compensated for the loss and injury” from some other scheme when
he has received compensation equivalent to or more than what is
the minimum stipulated in the Schedule to the Scheme. Such an
applicant would not be entitled to receive any compensation under
the present Scheme. However, where the amount received is less
than the minimum stipulated under the Schedule, it cannot be
said that he has been compensated for the loss and injury and the
concerned authority shall grant appropriate compensation under
the Scheme but taking into account the amount of compensation
already received by the victim/dependent. ”
G. The Mother, during her lifetime, should have been paid, at the very
least, the minimum amount of compensation. She was forced to come to
this Court for “appropriate compensation”, but before the determination
of the petition, unfortunately, passed away. The Petitioners, at the very
least, would be entitled to the prescribed minimum under the scheme.
H. This Court directs that a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- be paid immediately to
the Petitioners, being the difference between the sum of the prescribed
minimum of Rs. 3,00,000/- Lakhs and the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- received
by way of interim compensation.
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I. The Court directs the DSLSA to conduct a fact-finding exercise to
evaluate the actual physical or monetary dependence that the substituted
Petitioners may have had on the Victim, to determine the loss or injury
that they may have suffered.
J. The DSLSA would determine the further compensation payable as
follows:
i. The DSLSA will make a determination on whether or not “Loss” or
“Injury” has been suffered by a person who claims to be a “Dependent”;
ii. The determination of “loss” or “injury” would entail the DSLSA
examining actual monetary or other loss occasioned or actuated by the
physical absence of the Victim. This could include the loss of livelihood,
security in terms of monetary support, etc. and in terms of the definition
of “Injury”, “any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in mind,
reputation or body”, and include emotional, financial loss, etc. Though
the term used to define “injury”, given the salutary nature of the scheme
would have to be construed in the widest possible manner, without
limiting the same, this Court believes that loss of reputation to the family,
emotional loss in terms of security or otherwise due to the physical
presence of the Victim could be some of the aspects that may be kept in
mind while making a factual determination.
K. Based on the said determination, the DSLSA may take an appropriate
decision for the grant of compensation of such further amount as is
permissible under the scheme. This exercise may be carried out by the
concerned Respondent authorities within the period as prescribed in the
Scheme.”
37. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents upon
Shakila v. State (supra), to contend that compensation must be confined to
the statutory framework under Section 357A CrPC and the Delhi Victim
Compensation Scheme, 2018 is misconceived. In Kiran v. State (supra), the
Division Bench of this Court was of the view that the concept of
compensation on no fault basis could be borrowed as a guiding principle in
cases of custodial death, and in computing the quantum of compensation
applied the multiplier method. In Shakila v. State (supra), however, the
Court was concerned with a distinct set of issues, and in the course of that
adjudication did not advert to the judgment of the Division Bench in Kiran
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v. State (supra). Needless to say, this Court is bound by the decision of the
Division Bench and the exposition therein must guide the present
adjudication.
38. It is well settled through a catena of judgments, some of which have
been adverted to hereinabove, that the compensation for custodial death
flows directly from the violation of Article 21 of the Constitution and
constitutes a remedy in public law. The writ jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 226 is wide enough to mould compensation as an equitable relief.
Such compensation is distinct from and in addition to the statutory or private
law remedies. The statutory scheme under Section 357A of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 is only one avenue of relief; it supplements and
does not curtail or exclude the power of this Court under Article 226 to
award compensation for established infringement of fundamental rights.
Custodial death, being unnatural, prima facie attracts liability under Article
21.
39. Therefore, in view of the above discussion, this Court is inclined to
hold that the petitioner is entitled to monetary compensation, to be
determined in accordance with the multiplier principle in terms of Sarla
Verma (supra).
40. Further, in Jagdish v. Mohan , (2018) 4 SCC 571, the Supreme Court,
emphasized that the role of compensation is vindicating dignity and
observed as under:
“14. ………. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine
attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of
compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question
whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide
a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering.
Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights,
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they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law
must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an
assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity.”
41. The MLC (Annexure-C) and the Post Mortem Report (Annexure-L)
reflect the age of the deceased as 19 years. It has been submitted that the
deceased, working as a waiter, used to earn between Rs.12,000/- and
Rs.15,000/- per month. Applying the multiplier principle in accordance with
Sarla Verma (supra), read with National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
Sethi , (2017) 16 SCC 680, the amount of compensation is calculated as
1
under:*
BASIS
CALCULATION AMOUNT
Monthly income 12,000
Annual income 12,000 *12 1,44,000
Future prospects 1,44,000* 40% 57,600
Annual income including
future prospects
1,44,000 + 57,600 2,01,600
Deduction @ 50 % (personal
and living expenses)
2,01,600 /2 1,00,800
Multiplier (18) 1,00,800 * 18 18,14,400
Loss of estate 15,000
Funeral expenses 15,000
Total 18,44,400
42. The monthly income of the deceased is taken at Rs.12,000/-, which
translates to an annual income of Rs.1,44,000/-. Since the deceased was
1
In terms of Ram Lal and others Vs. State of Punjab and others 2022 SCC OnLine P&H 4664.
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earning fixed wages, 40% of the annual income is added towards future
prospects, which comes at Rs.2,01,600/-. As the deceased was a bachelor,
50% is deducted as personal and living expenses. Applying the multiplier of
18 (recommended for age 15 to 20 years), loss of dependency is computed at
Rs.18,14,400/-. In addition, conventional amounts of Rs. 15,000/- towards
loss of estate and Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses are awarded. Thus,
the total amount of compensation comes to Rs.18,44,400/-.
43. Accordingly, the respondents are directed to pay the petitioner,
compensation of Rs.18,44,400/- within a period of 8 weeks from today.
44. The petition stands disposed of in the above terms. Pending
application also stands disposed of.
SACHIN DATTA, J
JULY 1, 2026/ss
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