Sudha Apparels Limited vs Mr. Ravi Sethia Resolution Professional Of Future Lifestyle Fashions Limited Ip Registration No. Ibbi/Ipa-001-Ip-P01305/2018-2019/12052
- Court
- National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
- Case type
- IA
- Decided on
- 06-04-2026
<div> <br /> <br /> 1 <br /> <br /> <b>NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL </b><br /> <b>PRINCIPAL BENCH </b><br /> <b>COMPANY APPEAL (AT)(INS) NO. 2026/2024 </b><br /> st<br /> <b>(</b> Arising out of judgement and order dated 1 October, 2024 passed by National <br /> Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai in IA No.4147 of 2023 in <br /> CP(IB)/959(MB)/2022) <br /> <b>In the matter of: </b><br /> Sudha Apparels Ltd., <br /> 2/5 Sarai Bose Road, Sukh Sagar, <br /> th<br /> Flat No.BA, 8 Floor, <br /> Kolkata, West Bengal 700020 Appellant <br /> <br /> Vs <br /> Mr. Ravi Sethia, <br /> RP of Future Lifestyle Fashion Ltd <br /> KPMG India Services, LLP <br /> nd<br /> 2 Floor, Block T2(B Wing) <br /> Lodha Excelus, Apollo Mills Compound <br /> N.M. Joshi Marg, Mahalaxmi, <br /> Mumbai 400011 Respondent <br /> <br /> <b>For Appellant </b> : Mr. Sumesh Dhawan, Mr. Aseem, Chaturvedi, Mr. Arpit <br /> Kumar Singh, Mr. Anuj Shrotriya, Ms. Kavya Tekriwal, <br /> Advocates. <br /> <br /> <b>For Respondent </b> : Mr. J Rajesh, Ms. Nandita Bajpai, Md. Arsalan Ahmed, <br /> Mr.Dhrupad Vaghani, Mr. Yashwardhan Agarwal, Mr. Ali <br /> Abbas Masoodi, Mr. Rahat, Advocates. Mr. Anand Singh <br /> Sengar, Advocate for Intervenor. <br /> <br /> <b>JUDGEMENT </b><br /> <b>JUSTICE YOGESH KHANNA, MEMBER (JUDICIAL) </b><br /> The present appeal is filed by the appellant under Section <i>61</i> of IBC, 2016, <br /> st<br /> being aggrieved of an impugned order dated 1 October, 2024 passed by the Ld. <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 2 <br /> <br /> National Company Law Tribunal, in IA No. <i>4147 </i> <i>of </i> <i>2023</i> in <br /> CP(IB)/ <i>959(MB)/2022.</i> <br /> 2. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant the <br /> st nd<br /> appellant is an owner of the ground floor, 1 floor and 2 floor of Plot No.5, <br /> Block-BG, Action Area-IB, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata, West Bengal 700156, <br /> herein called the <i>leased</i> property. A lease agreement dated 17.09.2008 was <br /> executed between the appellant and M/s Home Solutions Retail India Ltd for a <br /> period of years. As per the terms of the lease deed, the lessor was entitled to <br /> <i>21</i><br /> terminate the lease deed <i> if there was default in payment of rent for two </i><br /> <i>consecutive months. </i><br /> 3. The business of M/s Home Solutions Retail India Ltd was taken over by <br /> th<br /> M/s Pantaloons Retails India Ltd (PRIL), on or about 16 March, 2013 M/s PRIL <br /> then changed its name to Future Retail India Ltd. The Future Retail India Ltd <br /> further assigned its lease hold rights to the Corporate Debtor. <br /> 4. Vide IA No. <i>4147/2023</i> , the appellant sought for vacant and physical <br /> possession of the leased property from the Corporate Debtor on the ground the <br /> lease has since been terminated <i>vide</i> notice dated <i>14.04.2023</i> , prior to the <br /> initiation of the CIRP of the Corporate Debtor due to non-payment of rental since <br /> February, 2022. <br /> 5. Admittedly the moratorium started on 04.05.2023 and the termination <br /> notice was never challenged by the Corporate Debtor or by the Respondent. It <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 3 <br /> <br /> was argued the appellant being a legitimate, absolute and undisputed owner of <br /> the subject property has sought possession of subject property but the said <br /> application was dismissed by the Ld. NCLT on the ground the appellant allegedly <br /> failed to establish its ownership over the leased premises and also failed to file <br /> documents of lease as well as of termination notice and lastly the <i>possession of </i><br /> <i>the premises with the CD could not be disturbed</i> <i>in the light of moratorium</i> under <br /> Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code. <br /> 6. It is the submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant despite <br /> the claim of lease rental having been admitted to an extent of <i>90%</i> by the <br /> Resolution Professional on 18.03.2024, the impugned order was passed holding <br /> <i>interalia</i> the appellant could not file the proof of ownership/landlordship over <br /> the subject property. <br /> 7. It is the submission of the appellant the admission of claim of rental by <br /> the Resolution Professional was sufficient proof of the ownership/landlordship <br /> of the appellant herein and the application ought not to have been dismissed on <br /> this ground alone. The status of the appellant as owner of the property has never <br /> been denied even by the learned counsel for the RP. Nevertheless we find the <br /> possession on 04.05.2023 was with the corporate debtor, hence the question to <br /> be determined is can the possession be taken from RP and be restored to the <br /> owner/landlord <i> during moratorium</i> . Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of Code reads as under:- <br /> <i> </i><br /> <i> </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 4 <br /> <br /> <i>“Section 14 Moratorium </i><br /> <i>(1)</i> <i> </i> <i>Subject to provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on </i><br /> <i>the </i> <i>insolvency </i> <i>commencement </i> <i>date, </i> <i>the </i><br /> <i>Adjudicating Authority shall by order declare </i><br /> <i>moratorium for prohibiting all of the following, </i><br /> <i>namely: -- </i><br /> <i>(a)</i> <i> </i> <i>xxxxx </i><br /> <i>(b)</i> <i> </i> <i>xxxxx </i><br /> <i>(c)</i> <i> </i> <i>xxxxx </i><br /> <i>(d)</i> <i> </i> <i>the recovery of any property by an owner or </i><br /> <i>lessor where such property is occupied by or in </i><br /> <i>the possession of the corporate debtor. </i><br /> 8. Before proceeding further let us see how the impugned order has dealt <br /> with this issue - <br /> <i>16. The Applicant has not only failed even to prima facie </i><br /> <i>demonstrate its right, title, and interest in respect of the leased </i><br /> <i>premises but also has not established the existence of a valid </i><br /> <i>lease arrangement with the Corporate Debtor prior to the </i><br /> <i>insolvency commencement date. Undisputedly, the issues of </i><br /> <i>ownership and possession are triable issues that require </i><br /> <i>adducing of oral and documentary evidence which is not </i><br /> <i>possible in a summary procedure followed by this Tribunal. On </i><br /> <i>account of the above, without expressing any opinion with </i><br /> <i>respect to the ownership and possession of the leased </i><br /> <i>premises, we leave it open to the parties to file seek an </i><br /> <i>appropriate remedy before a competent civil, court/ authority/ </i><br /> <i>forum to establish their respective right, title, and i) interest in </i><br /> <i>the Leased Premises once the statutory moratorium ceases to </i><br /> <i>be effective as per the provisions of Section 14(4) of the Code. </i><br /> <i>17. Even otherwise, so far as the question of handing over </i><br /> <i>possession to the Applicant is concerned, Section 14(l)(d) of the </i><br /> <i>Code prohibits recovery of any property by an owner or lessor </i><br /> <i>where such property is occupied by or in the possession of the </i><br /> <i>corporate debtor, more so when it is being used for sustaining </i><br /> <i>the corporate debtor as going concern. The Hon'ble NCLAT had </i><br /> <i>an occasion to deal with a similar issue in Company Appeal </i><br /> <i>{AT) (Insolvency)No. 323 af2018 in MI s Navbharat Castings </i><br /> <i>LLP vs. MI s Moserbear India Ltd. & Anr". In this matter, the </i><br /> <i>Hon'ble NCLAT was dealing with the issue as to whether the </i><br /> <i>order of moratorium will apply to the leasehold property of a </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 5 <br /> <br /> <i>landlord in which the corporate debtor is a tenant, particularly </i><br /> <i>after the decree of eviction had been passed in favour of the </i><br /> <i>landlord against the corporate debtor. It was held as under; - </i><br /> <i>"3. On hearing, the learned counsel for the Appellant and in </i><br /> <i>view of sub-clause (i) of clause (d) of Section 14 of the Insolvency </i><br /> <i>and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the recovery of the f property by </i><br /> <i>the owner occupied by the Corporate Debtor is not permissible </i><br /> <i>during the period of moratorium. " </i><br /> <i>18. The findings recorded in the afore-cited case are </i><br /> <i>unambiguous and lucid. The recovery of property by the owner/ </i><br /> <i>landlord occupied by the Corporate Debtor is not permissible </i><br /> <i>during the period of moratorium. The legislative intent of the </i><br /> <i>moratorium is obviously to keep corporate debtors assets </i><br /> <i>together during the resolution process and to ensure that he </i><br /> <i>corporate debtor continues as a going concern. Any unilateral </i><br /> <i>termination of a lease deed during the moratorium period </i><br /> <i>militates against the goal of keeping the corporate debtor as a </i><br /> <i>going concern. In the present case, the Respondent in his reply </i><br /> <i>has pleaded that over 80% of the Corporate Debtor's business </i><br /> <i>is conducted from the Leased Premises, which is the only outlet </i><br /> <i>where business is being run and that possession of these </i><br /> <i>premises is vital for the Corporate Debtor's continued viability </i><br /> <i>as a going concern. On this account also, we are not inclined to </i><br /> <i>direct the Respondent to hand over possession of the Leased </i><br /> <i>Premises. </i><br /> <i>19. The Applicant has pleaded in its application that the claim </i><br /> <i>filed by it before the Respondent/RP in Form 'B' has not been </i><br /> <i>verified as on the date of filing the captioned Application. The </i><br /> <i>Respondent/RP too confirmed the same in his affidavit-in-reply. </i><br /> <i>However, as per the written arguments submitted by the </i><br /> <i>learned Counsel for the Respondent/RP, the claim filed by the </i><br /> <i>Applicant was admitted to the tune of INR 10,00,39,996/- out </i><br /> <i>of the total claim of INR 11,69,64,411.33/- on 18th March, </i><br /> <i>2024. In support of the above submission, the learned Counsel </i><br /> <i>for the RP has annexed a copy of proof of admission of claims </i><br /> <i>as Annexure 'A' to the copy of written arguments placed on </i><br /> <i>record. The aforesaid annexure confirms the fact of admission </i><br /> <i>of claim as narrated above. Since the claim submitted by the </i><br /> <i>Applicant has already been verified and partially admitted by </i><br /> <i>the Respondent, no direction in respect of the said claim needs </i><br /> <i>to be given to the Respondent any more. 20. On the basis of </i><br /> <i>the above discussion, we are of the view that the applicant has </i><br /> <i>failed to concretely establish its the ownership qua the leased </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 6 <br /> <br /> <i>premises and also the arrangement of lease between the </i><br /> <i>Applicant and the Corporate Debtor. Therefore, in the given </i><br /> <i>circumstances, the possession of the premises in question </i><br /> <i>cannot be ordered to be handed over. Even otherwise, </i><br /> <i>possession of premises which is being used to keep the </i><br /> <i>Corporate Debtor as a going concern cannot be disturbed in </i><br /> <i>light of the moratorium u/s 14(1)1(d) of the Code. However, </i><br /> <i>looking at the facts and circumstances of this case, as </i><br /> <i>discussed above, we feel it necessary to issue a note of caution </i><br /> <i>to the RP to be circumspect enough while dealing with the </i><br /> <i>property in question and must satisfy himself to the hilt with </i><br /> <i>regard to the title of the leased premises as to whether the same </i><br /> <i>legally and legitimately vests in the Applicant. </i><br /> 9. At the outset the finding the appellant is not an owner/landlord of the <br /> leased premises is wholly against the admitted position, thus this finding has to <br /> go. To proceed further four dates are relevant; <b>a) </b> 09.03.2023 when rectification <br /> notice was issued requiring the Corporate Debtor to make payment of the <br /> outstanding dues; <b>b)</b> 14.04.2023 when the notice of termination was issued and <br /> is filed on record alongwith postal receipt and tracking report; <b><i>(c)</i></b> 04.05.2023 <br /> when the Insolvency commenced at the instance of financial creditor; and <b><i>(d)</i></b> <br /> 15.06.2023 when the Resolution Professional intimated the possession cannot <br /> be delivered back in view of Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code as also the Corporate <br /> Debtor is not in a position to make payment of rental and the dues shall be <br /> treated as <i>insolvency cost</i> . It was argued by the learned senior counsel for the <br /> appellant there is no proceeding uptil now to challenge the termination of lease <br /> deed. <br /> 10. Further learned senior counsel for the appellant referred to IA <br /> No. <i>5614/2025</i> filed in the present appeal, more specifically to IA No.4007/2025 <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 7 <br /> <br /> in CP No.959/2022 moved before the Ld. NCLT by the Resolution Professional <br /> stating inter alia as follows: - <br /> <i>14. In view of the challenges detailed hereinabove, the </i><br /> <i>Applicant sought the views and directions of the members of </i><br /> <i>the CoC with respect to the continued viability of operating the </i><br /> <i>store at Central Mall, Kolkata. The members of the COC were </i><br /> <i>specifically requested to consider either (i) vacating the Central </i><br /> <i>Mall Kolkata to reduce ongoing costs and liabilities; or (ii) </i><br /> <i>providing interim finance to enable the store to continue </i><br /> <i>operations as a going concern. The members of COC were </i><br /> <i>apprised that continuation of operations at the said premises </i><br /> <i>would necessitate, inter alia payment of outstanding electricity </i><br /> <i>dues of amounting to approximately INR 50 lakhs (Indian </i><br /> <i>Rupees Fifty Lakhs), cost for procuring additional inventory, </i><br /> <i>and covering operational overheads to sell even the existing </i><br /> <i>inventory. In light of the same, in order to mitigate these </i><br /> <i>financial challenges, the Applicant suggested securing interim </i><br /> <i>finance from the members of the CoC, failing which the store </i><br /> <i>will have to be shut down. </i><br /> <i>15. Accordingly, the Applicant proposed that a resolution be </i><br /> <i>passed by the CoC approving priority funding/interim finance </i><br /> <i>of INR 5 Crores to be drawn down and utilized as and when </i><br /> <i>required for continued operations of the Corporate Debtor. The </i><br /> <i>members of the CoC were requested to consider the agenda and </i><br /> <i>accord their approval for the said interim finance in order to </i><br /> <i>enable the Corporate Debtor to continue functioning as a going </i><br /> <i>concern and to preserve its value during the CIRP However, the </i><br /> <i>agenda for interim finance was rejected by the CoC. A copy of </i><br /> <i>the Minutes of the 27th Committee of Creditors Meeting held on </i><br /> <i>30th April 2025 along with the voting results is hereto annexed </i><br /> <i>and marked as Exhibit "C" </i><br /> th<br /> 11. The learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out to Minutes of 27 <br /> Meeting for the Committee of Creditors of Corporate Debtor held on 30.04.2025 <br /> wherein similar issue was raised before Committee of Creditors and following <br /> was noted: - <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 8 <br /> <br /> <i>• The representative from Edelweiss ARC subsequently </i><br /> <i>asserted that continuing store operations at this juncture, </i><br /> <i>considering the low volumes of sales, is unsustainable and that </i><br /> <i>injecting funds through interim finance would not be a viable </i><br /> <i>solution. The Chairperson informed the CoC that vacating the </i><br /> <i>premises would require approximately three months, during </i><br /> <i>which logistics and warehousing costs would need to be </i><br /> <i>addressed to store the inventory elsewhere. COC took note of </i><br /> <i>the same. </i><br /> <i>• Furthermore, a representative from Edelweiss ARC enquired </i><br /> <i>from the Chairperson that given that there is no electricity at </i><br /> <i>Kolkata Central Store, can the inventory of this store to moved </i><br /> <i>to some other operational store. The Chairperson clarified that </i><br /> <i>no large format store of FLFL is operational presently. If the CoC </i><br /> <i>members decides to sell the existing inventory otherwise than </i><br /> <i>through the stores, a structured approach for the sale of this </i><br /> <i>inventory in lots will have to be finalized. However, it was </i><br /> <i>suggested that such alternate ways of liquidating inventory </i><br /> <i>should be evaluated only after the SMPL hearing is completed. </i><br /> <i>• Representative from Edelweiss ARC informed the Chairperson </i><br /> <i>that they do not intend to provide additional financial </i><br /> <i>assistance at this stage, considering the response from SMPL </i><br /> <i>during the last COC meeting. The representative from IDBI </i><br /> <i>Bank sought clarification regarding whether Sudha Apparels </i><br /> <i>was a group company of Future Group. The Chairperson </i><br /> <i>clarified that Sudha Apparels is not affiliated with Future </i><br /> <i>Group. </i><br /> <i>• The Chairperson accordingly informed that as discussed with </i><br /> <i>COC members, an evaluation for continuing the Central Mall, </i><br /> <i>Kolkata store will be done by the Chairperson and thereafter </i><br /> <i>decision for closure of the store will be </i> <b><i>executed as deemed </i></b><br /> <b><i>necessary. The members took note of the same. </i></b><br /> <i> </i><br /> 12. It was thus argued by the learned counsel for the appellant the company <br /> is <i>not a going concern</i> and is a <i>dead wood</i> and even otherwise, the premises <br /> sought to be vacated are lying locked and not in use of Corporate Debtor. Further <br /> the premises is not, even otherwise, in possession of the <i>Resolution Professional</i> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 9 <br /> <br /> and is lying with sub-tenants who had also sought permission from this Court <br /> to handover the premises, either to the Resolution Professional or to the owners <br /> of the premises. Reference was made to Kothapally Krishna Redyy Vs Vijay <br /> Kumar Iyer, & Anr wherein an order was pronounced on 15.01.2024 in CP(IB) <br /> No.527(MB)/2022 by the Ld. NCLT as under: - <br /> <i>14. So far as the relief sought by the Applicant with regards to </i><br /> <i>the possession of the property is concerned, in our considered </i><br /> <i>view, the RP is not justified in retaining the possession on </i><br /> <i>account of the following circumstances: </i><br /> <i>i. & ii xxx. </i><br /> <i>iii. No rentals have been paid to the Applicant during the CIRP </i><br /> <i>period at any point of time even though a period of more than </i><br /> <i>two years has already passed. It cannot be disputed that the </i><br /> <i>rentals during the CIRP period is required to be mandatorily </i><br /> <i>treated and paid as CIRP cost. </i><br /> <i>iv. Admittedly, no business is being transacted in the premises </i><br /> <i>in question nor the Corporate Debtor is being run as a going </i><br /> <i>concern. Therefore, the RP cannot be allowed to retain the </i><br /> <i>possession merely on the ground that it will further bring down </i><br /> <i>the value of the Corporate Debtor. </i><br /> <i>v. Even though the building in question was raised by the </i><br /> <i>Corporate Debtor but as per the terms and conditions of the </i><br /> <i>Lease Deed executed between the Applicant and the Corporate </i><br /> <i>Debtor, upon termination of lease the Corporate Debtor was </i><br /> <i>required to give back the property on “As Is Where Is” basis </i><br /> <i>which would imply that apparently the Corporate Debtor is not </i><br /> <i>entitled to claim any compensation on account of the fact that </i><br /> <i>the building on the leased land was raised by it. </i><br /> <i>vi. The Applicant cannot be put to a double jeopardy, as on one </i><br /> <i>hand no rent is being admittedly paid to him since February, </i><br /> <i>2022 which includes pre and post CIRP periods nor the </i><br /> <i>possession is being handed over to him which is resulting in a </i><br /> <i>continuing loss to him and such type of status quo cannot be </i><br /> <i>allowed to be maintained endlessly causing severe prejudice to </i><br /> <i>the Applicants and his rights as a lessor. vii. No meaningful </i><br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 10 <br /> <br /> <i>purpose is being served by retaining the possession of the </i><br /> <i>property by the Corporate Debtor as it would unnecessarily </i><br /> <i>increase the financial burden of the Corporate Debtor which is </i><br /> <i>already under acute stress.</i> <br /> <br /> 13. Thus it was argued once a lease agreement is lawfully terminated prior to <br /> the commencement of CIRP, all contractual and possessory rights of the <br /> corporate debtor in the subject premises stand extinguished in <i>praesenti</i> as a <br /> matter of general law and no right, title or interest survives in the corporate <br /> debtor on the insolvency commencement date, and consequently there is no <br /> “ <i>asset</i> ” or “ <i>property</i> ” capable of attracting the protection of moratorium under <br /> Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the IBC. It was argued the Hon’ble Supreme Court in A A <br /> Estates (P) Ltd. v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Coop. Housing Society Ltd., <i>2025 SCC </i><br /> <i>OnLine SC 2579</i> (paras 16.6 & 16.11), placing reliance on TATA Consultancy <br /> Services Ltd. v. SK Wheels (P) Ltd. (RP), <i>(2022) 2 SCC 583</i> , categorically held <br /> <i>Section 14(1)(d) is intended to protect the existing estate of the corporate debtor as </i><br /> <i>it stands on the date of commencement of CIRP and it cannot be stretched to revive, </i><br /> <i>re-create or resurrect contractual rights those were lawfully extinguished before </i><br /> <i>insolvency proceedings were initiated. To extend moratorium protection to non-</i><br /> <i>existent rights would be to defeat the commercial certainty and sanctity of lawful </i><br /> <i>termination under general law</i> . The present case is also covered under the <br /> Explanation <i>(a)</i> to Section <i>18</i> of IBC which expressly excludes assets owned by <br /> a third party in trust or contractual agreement from the definition of assets which <br /> the resolution professional can take control of during CIRP. <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 11 <br /> <br /> 14. It is argued in the present case, the lease rentals were not paid since <br /> February 2022 and in view thereof a Defect Rectification Notice dated 09 March <br /> 2023 was issued, and even thereafter the rentals remained unpaid, the <br /> Appellant then proceeded with the valid, legal and unchallenged termination of <br /> the Lease Agreement vide Termination Notice dated 14 April 2023; notably, such <br /> termination preceded the commencement of CIRP on 04 May 2023 and was also <br /> preceded by recourse to remedies, including proceedings before the civil court <br /> under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, clearly establishing that it was not <br /> motivated by insolvency, and significantly, even the RP/Respondent has at no <br /> stage challenged the said termination on the ground of it being insolvency-<br /> driven, and has thus waived any such objection. It was argued this position <br /> leaves no subsisting proprietary, possessory, or enforceable right in favour of the <br /> Corporate Debtor as on the insolvency commencement date, rendering Section <br /> <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the IBC wholly inapplicable to the Subject Premises. <br /> 15. It was argued the consistent judicial position, including of the same Bench <br /> of the Ld. Adjudicating Authority, supports restoration of possession on identical <br /> facts, <i>viz</i> Kothapally Krishna Reddy (supra) involving pre-CIRP lease termination, <br /> wherein the RP was directed to vacate and hand over possession, recognising the <br /> premises as not constituting an asset of the Corporate Debtor; however, the <br /> Impugned Order departs from this settled position solely on a self-created issue <br /> of ownership which was never raised, agitated, or put in issue by any party. <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 12 <br /> <br /> 16. It is argued the plea that rentals would be treated as CIRP costs is wholly <br /> illusory; despite repeated assertions, no mechanism or decision ensures such <br /> payment, and the CoC in its 27th Meeting has expressly declined to treat rentals <br /> as CIRP costs), leaving no prospect of recovery. This untenable plea is merely a <br /> device to justify continued unlawful retention, causing ongoing prejudice to the <br /> Appellant. <br /> 17. Heard. <br /> 18. Thus, we need to examine if recovery of any property by an owner or lessor, <br /> where such property is occupied by or in possession of the Corporate Debtor, <br /> whether is prohibited in terms of Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code. Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of <br /> the Code is absolute and covers property which is in possession of the Corporate <br /> Debtor. This is further evinced from the reading of Regulation <i>31(b)</i> of the CIRP <br /> Regulations, which states the amount due to a person whose rights are affected <br /> under Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the code shall be treated as CIRP costs. It shows even <br /> the termination notice was delivered before the initiation of CIRP, Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> <br /> would still apply and restrict the lessor from recovering the property occupied by <br /> the Corporate Debtor. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of <i>Rajendra K. </i><br /> <i>Bhutta vs. Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority and Another, </i><br /> <i>(2020) 13 SCC 208</i> , while interpreting Section <i>14(1)(d) </i> of the Code, had made a <br /> distinction between the expression <i>'occupied by'</i> and <i>'in the possession of’</i> . The <br /> Hon'ble Supreme Court held the expression ‘ <i>occupied'</i> would have to be confined <br /> to physical occupation or use and not to legal possession, which is a separate <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 13 <br /> <br /> concept in law. Similarly, this Tribunal in the matter of <i>Suprivo Kumar Chaudhari </i><br /> <i>v Jhunjhunwala Oil Mills Ltd., Company Appeal (AT)(Ins) No. 794 of 2021</i> decided <br /> on the question whether the premises used as the registered office of the <br /> Corporate Debtor could be recovered by the landlord during the subsistence of <br /> moratorium after initiation of CIRP, this Tribunal held the recovery which was <br /> done by the owner is after the initiation of the CIRP and such recovery is a clear <br /> infringement of Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code. Further in the matter of <br /> Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation v Santanu T Ray, Resolution <br /> Professional, Comp.App.(AT)(Ins) No. <i>1004 of 2021</i> , this Tribunal reiterated the <br /> lessor could not have taken possession of the leased property when the <br /> moratorium had been triggered by virtue of CIRP. The Appellant has relied upon <br /> the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of A A Estates <br /> Private Limited v Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-operative Housing Society, <i>SLP (C) </i><br /> <i>No. 10758 of 2025</i> to contend since the development right were terminated before <br /> the initiation of CIRP, the actual physical possession of the Corporate Debtor <br /> may also be ejected during the CIRP. However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has <br /> distinguished recovery during moratorium in para <i>15.10</i> of the judgement. <br /> Relying upon Rajendra K Bhutta, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held Section <br /> of the Code is applicable when the Corporate Debtor is in actual physical <br /> <i>14(1)(d)</i><br /> occupation of the property under a subsisting joint development license and the <br /> termination sought to recover such occupied property during the moratorium. <br /> Further, in para <i>16.9</i> of the Judgement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has brought <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 14 <br /> <br /> juridical possession under the protection of Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code. Thus, <br /> the actual physical possession of the Property cannot be taken away during the <br /> subsistence of the moratorium. <br /> 19. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in R.V. Bhupal Prasad v State <br /> of Andhra Pradesh and Ors, <i>(1995) 5 SCC 698</i> has relied upon Lallu Yashwant v <br /> Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR <i>1968 SC 620</i> to hold the possession of a tenant who had <br /> ceased to be a tenant, after expiry or termination of the lease, is protected by law <br /> until he is duly ejected. Although he may not have a legal right to continue in <br /> possession after the termination or expiry of the tenancy, his possession was <i>at</i> <br /> <i>sufferance</i> , recognised as juridical and is protected by the common law. <br /> 20. Admittedly the Appellant terminated the Lease Agreement on 14.04.2023 <br /> and subsequently filed an application under Section <i>9</i> of the Arbitration and <br /> Conciliation Act, 1996, to injunct the Corporate Debtor from alienating the <br /> Property before the Commercial Court at Rajarhat. The Appellant was allegedly <br /> aware of all the company petition(s) filed before the Ld. <br /> Adjudicating Authority to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. The Ld. <br /> Commercial Court passed an order dated 29.04.2023, after noting the <br /> submissions made by the Appellant that the Corporate Debtor is purportedly <br /> alienating or encumbering assets and directed the Corporate Debtor to refrain <br /> from dealing with or disposing of the property. It is pertinent to mention the <br /> order dated 29.04.2023 was passed merely <i>five</i> days before the initiation of the <br /> CIRP. <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 15 <br /> <br /> Further the allegations of the Resolution Professional are the Appellant had <br /> violated the provisions of Section 14 of the Code by not allowing the electricity <br /> distribution company to reconnect electricity, in effect affecting the going <br /> concern status of the Corporate Debtor. The Property is the only premises where <br /> the operation of the Corporate Debtor continues under its brand "CENTRAL"; <br /> furthermore, more than 80% of the Corporate Debtor's business comes from the <br /> subject Property. The Resolution Professional disclosed at the 30th CoC meeting <br /> that the Central Store recorded total sales of Rs. Lakhs during the CIRP, <br /> <i>1211.74</i><br /> whereas all the other stores combined recorded total sales of Rs. <i>713.71</i> Lakhs <br /> during the CIRP. The possession of the Property by the Corporate Debtor is <br /> critical to maintain the Corporate Debtor as a going concern and to resolving the <br /> Corporate Debtor in the CIRP. Moreso, when a total of <i>16</i> stores have been <br /> vacated during CIRP, and the Resolution Professional team is currently in the <br /> process of vacating <i>7</i> more stores, and only <i>two</i> stores as of date are operational, <br /> i.e., Central and Surat Stores. <br /> 21. Further it is the case of the Resolution Professional that WBSEDCL in <br /> their Affidavit disclosed an employee of the Appellant namely Santosh Agarwal <br /> stopped the WBSEDCL from reconnecting the electricity that kept the Central <br /> Store in the dark, which led to a steep decline in its sales. In view of disclosures <br /> made by WBSEDCL, the Resolution Professional had filed an I.A. No. <i>685 of 2026</i> <br /> against the Appellant under Section <i>74</i> of the Code to prosecute the Appellant <br /> and its employees. Section <i>74(2)</i> of the Code provides where any creditor violates <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 16 <br /> <br /> the provision of Section <i>14</i> , knowingly and willfully authorises and permits such <br /> contravention by the creditor shall be visited with the penal consequences <br /> prescribed therein. The moratorium was in the knowledge of the Appellant, and <br /> thus it was alleged the appellant's conduct of withholding and obstructing <br /> effective electricity supply amounts to a frustration of the moratorium. <br /> 22. We have also gone through the judgement rendered by the Hon'ble High <br /> Court of Delhi in Acipiter Investments Aircraft Limited vs Union of India & Anr., <br /> , and we are of the considered view it does not apply <br /> <i>2024 SCC OnLine Del 3125</i><br /> to the present case as it has been rendered in the context of aircrafts which <br /> <i>automatically stand de-registered as the aircrafts in the possession of the lessee </i><br /> <i>upon the termination of the lease</i> . Clause 7 of the Civil Aviation Manual was relied <br /> upon by the Hon'ble High Court at para <i>19.6</i> of the judgement. Further, the <br /> Ministry of Corporate Affairs, had keeping in mind the Aircraft Act and Aircraft <br /> Rules, and the fact is signatory to the Cape Town Convention excluded aircraft, <br /> aircraft engines and air frames from the operation of moratorium under Section <br /> <i>14</i> of the Code as recorded in para <i>38.5</i> to <i>38.7</i> of the judgement. The judgement <br /> in Ram Ratan Modi vs Sammelan Tea and Beverages Pvt. Ltd. <i>2024 SCC OnLine </i><br /> <i>917</i> , does not apply to the facts of the present case as the Resolution Professional <br /> did not have possession of the tea gardens and had filed the application to take <br /> possession. The Resolution Professional was not allowed from taking possession <br /> of the tea garden where the lease deed had expired pursuant to which the <br /> possession was returned prior to CIRP. Therefore, Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 17 <br /> <br /> did not apply as the owner/lessor was not recovering possession of the tea <br /> gardens. <br /> 23. The Appellant has also relied upon Kashi Vishwanathan Sivaraman v New <br /> Okhla Industrial Development Authority Comp. App. (AT)(Ins) <i>574 of 2024</i> , <br /> wherein the Resolution Professional, after the cancellation of the lease deed by <br /> the lessor, added the cancelled lease of the subject land <i>as an asset of the </i><br /> <i>Corporate Debtor</i> and invited Expression of Interest to obtain resolution plans <br /> from prospective resolution applicants. This Tribunal held the Resolution <br /> Professional could not have taken such action, including the preparation of an <br /> Information Memorandum projecting the cancelled plot as the asset of the <br /> Corporate Debtor. This case does not deal with the recovery of any property by <br /> an owner or lessor where such property is occupied by or in the possession of <br /> the corporate debtor in terms of Section <i>14(1)(d)</i> of the Code. The case of Mack <br /> Star Marketing Pvt Ltd Ashish Chawchharia <i>2022 SCC OnLine NCLAT 3378</i> does <br /> not deal with the issue raised in the present case. In Mack Star (Supra), the <br /> Resolution Professional sought a refund of the security deposit. The Resolution <br /> Professional submitted the property shall be vacated only upon refund of the <br /> security amount. The Lessor, submitted the lease had not been terminated, and <br /> the lease amount shall be added in the CIRP Cost. In such circumstances, this <br /> Tribunal directed the Resolution Professional to vacate the property, and after <br /> that, the security amount will be refunded. <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 18 <br /> <br /> 24. Admittedly, in the present case the Resolution Professional is still in <br /> possession of the leased property; thus we find no force in the appeal and it is <br /> dismissed. However, we request the Resolution Professional/the LD NCLT to <br /> conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible, preferably within <i>3</i> <br /> months from today. <i> </i><br /> 25. Pending application(s) <i>viz </i> I.A. No. <i>7609/2024</i> , <i>7608/2024</i> , <i>8440/2024</i> , <br /> <i>2195/2025</i> , <i>5067/2025</i> , <i>5614/2025</i> and <i>773/2026</i> are also disposed of. <br /> <br /> <br /> <b>(Justice Yogesh Khanna) </b><br /> <b>Member (Judicial) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>(Mr. Ajai Das Mehrotra) </b><br /> <b>Member (Technical) </b><br /> <b>Dated: 06.04.2026 </b><br /> <b>BM </b></div>