THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN vs DR. RACHITA MATHUR WIFE OF DR. RISHABH BHARGAWA

Court
Rajasthan High Court

[2026:RJ-JP:35855-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 79/2025
CNR: RJHC020100962025 | URN: SAW / 224U / 2025
in
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15018/2024
The State of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary, Medical
Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
----Appellant
Versus
1. Dr. Rachita Mathur Wife of Dr. Rishabh Bhargawa, Aged About
31 Years, Resident Of C-37, Peeyush Path, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur.
2. Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary,
Ghooghara Ghati, Madarpura, Jaipur Road, Ajmer
3. Dr. Manoj Arya S/o Shri Chhuni Lal, Resident Of 65, Tagore
Nagar, Kartaarpura Jaipur Rajasthan Working At Respiratory
Medicine Dept. (Rnt Medical College) Badi Udaipur Rajasthan.
----Respondents
Connected With
D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 93/2025
CNR: RJHC020124392025 | URN: SAW / 285U / 2025
in
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15018/2024
Rajasthan Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary,
Ghooghra Ghati, Madarpura, Jaipur Road, Ajmer – 305001
----Appellant
Versus
1. Dr. Rachita Mathur W/o Dr. Rishabh Bhargawa, Aged About 31
Years, Resident Of C-37, Peeyush Path, Bapu Nagar, Jaipur.
2. The State of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary, Medical
Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.
----Respondents
For State
:
Mr. Vigyan Shah, AAG assisted by
Mr. Sankalp Vijay
Mr. Yuvraj Samant with
Ms. Neha Amola &
Mr. Tilak Vaid
For RPSC
:
For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Mathur, Sr. Adv. assisted by
Mr. Aditya Kiran Mathur &
Mr. Deependra Yadav
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Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Sr. Adv. assisted
by Mr. Sarthak Rastogi,
Mr. Tushar &
Ms. Manaswi Tyagi for private
respondents
Mr. Neeraj Kumar Sharma for private
respondent
Mr. R.A. Katta for Intervenor
Ms. Alankrita Sharma with
Mr. Yogesh Kalla for Intervenors
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP TANEJA
Judgment
Date of Conclusion of Arguments 20.08.2026
Date on which Judgment was reserved 20.08.2026
Whether the full Judgment or only operative
part is pronounced
Full Judgment
Date of Pronouncement 27.10.2026
REPORTABLE
Per: Sandeep Taneja, J.
1. By way of these intra-court appeals, the State of Rajasthan and
the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (for short, ‘RPSC’) have
challenged the judgment dated 10.01.2025, whereby the learned Single
Judge allowed Civil Writ Petition (for short, ‘CWP’) No.15018/2024 filed
by Dr. Rachita Mathur, petitioner-respondent No.1, and directed the
appellants to conclude the recruitment to the post of Assistant
Professor, initiated pursuant to the advertisement dated 27.11.2021, in
accordance with the notification dated 23.05.2022 and the amended
Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Medical Service (Collegiate Branch) Rules,
1962 (for short, ‘the Rules of 1962’).
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2. The brief facts leading to the filing of these appeals are that the
RPSC issued an advertisement dated 27.11.2021 for recruitment to the
post of Assistant Professor in the Medical Education Department, under
the Rules of 1962. A total of 337 posts were advertised for 43 subjects
classified under broad speciality and super speciality. The last date for
submission of applications was 22.12.2021.
2.1 Respondent No.1 applied for the post of Assistant Professor (Skin
& VD). The total number of posts advertised, in the said broad speciality
of Skin & VD, was only three.
2.2 The advertisement containing the selection process under the
head of ‘Other Details’ provided that the selection would be made
through interview. It was further provided that, if the RPSC receives
more number of applications, it could conduct a screening test to keep
the number of candidates within an appropriate limit.
2.3 The RPSC conducted the screening test on 05.05.2022 and
06.05.2022 for the subjects for which the number of applications
received was in excess. The screening test for the subject Skin & VD
was held on 06.05.2022. Respondent No.1 appeared in the said test.
The answer key for the said test was released on 10.06.2022.
2.4 In the meantime, on 10.05.2022, the Full Commission of the
RPSC took a decision to allocate weightage of marks in such a manner
that the subjects with regard to which the screening test is not
conducted, the weightage of marks for the academics would be 40%
and for interview 60%. However, the subjects for which the screening
test is conducted, the weightage of marks for the screening test, the
academics and the interview would be 40%, 20% and 40%,
respectively.
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2.5 On 23.05.2022, the Department of Personnel, Government of
Rajasthan issued Rajasthan Various Service (Second Amendment)
Rules, 2022 whereby the provision pertaining to scrutiny of applications
and examinations contained in various rules mentioned in the schedule
to the said notification was amended, inter alia , restricting the
weightage of interview marks to a maximum of 10%. Vide the said
notification, Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 also came to be amended.
2.6 It transpires that some candidates belonging to the reserved
categories filed three separate writ petitions, being CWP No.1777/2022,
titled Dr. Hariom Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.; CWP
No.4027/2022, titled Dr. Rajveer Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
and CWP No.5305/2022, titled Dr. Rajmal Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan
& Ors., in respect of the same recruitment. In the said writ petitions,
the grievance of the petitioners was with regard to filling up the backlog
vacancies of the reserved categories wherein, by an interim order dated
04.05.2022, the RPSC was directed not to declare the result qua the
said recruitment.
2.7 On 14.05.2024, respondent No.1 filed an application in the
aforementioned CWP No.1777/2022, seeking her impleadment as a
party respondent therein. The said application was allowed by the
learned Single Judge, vide order dated 20.05.2024, and she was
impleaded as a party respondent.
2.8 It appears that the aforesaid writ petitions seeking the filling up of
backlog vacancies in the reserved categories were decided by order
dated 24.05.2024, on the basis of consensus between the parties,
granting liberty to the petitioners therein to make representations
before the State Government.
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2.9 On 28.05.2024, respondent No.1 filed an application, being WMAP
No.186/2024, in the disposed-of CWP No.1777/2022, for
modification/clarification of the order dated 24.05.2024 and prayed that
the RPSC be directed to adhere to the notification dated 23.05.2022 in
the present recruitment. The learned Single Judge, by order dated
30.05.2024, allowed the said application and observed that the order
dated 24.05.2024 should be read harmoniously with the notification
dated 23.05.2022. The appellants were accordingly directed to consider
the contents of the notification dated 23.05.2022 qua the selection
process.
2.10 Being aggrieved by the order dated 30.05.2024, the appellants,
who were respondents in the said writ petition, i.e., CWP No.1777/2022,
filed another application, being WMAP No.242/2024, for
vacation/modification of the order dated 30.05.2024. The learned Single
Judge, by order dated 06.09.2024, disposed of the said application,
granting liberty to respondent No.1 to file a fresh writ petition to raise
her grievances.
2.11 Pursuant to the liberty so granted by the learned Single Judge,
respondent No.1 filed a fresh writ petition, being CWP No.15018/2024,
praying therein that the selection process prescribed in the
advertisement dated 27.11.2021 be struck down as constitutionally
invalid. Further, a direction was also sought to the appellants to adhere
to the notification dated 23.05.2022 issued by the Department of
Personnel, Government of Rajasthan, in the present selection process.
2.12 The said writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge
vide the impugned judgment dated 10.01.2025 and the appellants were
directed to conclude the selection process in congruence with the
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notification dated 23.05.2022 and the amended Rule 19 of the Rules of
1962. While issuing the said direction, the learned Single Judge further
directed the appellants to follow the ratio laid down in Ajay Hasia & Ors.
Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. reported in (1981) 1 SCC 722, Ashok
Kumar Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. reported in AIR 1987
SC 454. It was also directed that the candidature of respondent No.1 be
considered conscientiously on the basis of merit scored by her.
3. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment dated 10.01.2025,
the State of Rajasthan and the RPSC have preferred the instant
appeals.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants, while assailing the impugned
judgment, submitted that the notification and rules amended after
issuance of the advertisement would not apply to a selection process
that had already commenced and therefore, the learned Single Judge
erred in holding that the notification dated 23.05.2022 would apply to
the present recruitment which began on 27.11.2021.
4.1 Learned counsel submitted that the learned Single Judge also
erred in holding that Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962, being procedural in
nature, shall have retrospective effect. It was also submitted that the
learned Single Judge also erred in observing that the notification dated
23.05.2022 was applied retrospectively by the RPSC to two previously
issued recruitment advertisements.
4.2 Learned counsel further submitted that the employer has
discretion to prescribe the manner in which marks are to be allocated
for assessing the suitability of a candidate. It was also submitted that
earlier the RPSC in its Full Commission meeting held on 24.04.2019
decided to allocate 40% of the total marks to the screening test, 20%
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to the academics and 40% to the interview. In respect of the
recruitment under consideration, on the basis of the said earlier
decision, again a similar decision was taken by the RPSC in the Full
Commission meeting held on 10.05.2022 and proceeded with the
selection process accordingly.
4.3 Learned counsel further submitted that respondent No.1 was well
aware of the selection process and had participated in the screening
test without any protest and, therefore, respondent No.1 was estopped
from raising any objection. It is further submitted that on the issue of
delay and laches, the learned Single Judge has erred in holding that
respondent No.1 had challenged the selection process before the date of
screening test.
4.4 Learned counsel lastly submitted that otherwise also respondent
No.1 is not entitled to the equitable relief as she deliberately suppressed
the material fact of previously filing a writ petition, along with other
petitioners, being CWP No.8167/2023, titled as Dr. Sukhdev Khadav &
Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan, before the Principal Seat at Jodhpur, in
relation to the same recruitment, with the prayer to restrict the
weightage of interview marks to a maximum of 12.5%. It was
submitted that the writ petition, in the instant case, is liable to be
dismissed solely on the ground of concealment of such material fact.
4.5 Learned counsel for the appellants, in support of their arguments,
relied upon the judgments passed in the cases of Lila Dhar Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (1981) 4 SCC 159, N.T. Devin Katti Vs.
Karnataka Public Service Commission, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 157,
Anzar Ahmad Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC 150,
Rashmi Mishra Vs. M.P. Public Service Commission, reported in (2006)
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12 SCC 724, Assam Public Service Commission & Ors. Vs. Pranjal
Kumar Sarma & Ors., reported in (2020) 20 SCC 680, and Tej Prakash
Pathak & Ors. Vs. High Court of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (2025) 2
SCC 1.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the private respondent and the
intervenors advanced the same arguments. They additionally relied
upon the judgments passed in the cases of Manish Kumar Shahi Vs.
State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2010) 12 SCC 576 and Bhaskar
Laxman Jadhav & Ors. Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education
Society & Ors., reported in (2013) 11 SCC 531.
6. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel appearing for
respondent No.1, while opposing the appeals, argued in favour of
upholding the findings recorded in the impugned judgment dated
10.01.2025. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the finding of the
learned Single Judge that allocation of 40% of the marks to the
interview was excessive, was based on the well-considered and settled
legal position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of
Ajay Hasia (supra) and Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra). He further
submitted that the said allocation of marks was not disclosed in the
advertisement dated 27.11.2021.
6.1 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that, as the notification
dated 23.05.2022 was issued pursuant to the Cabinet decision dated
10.05.2022 and the selection process had not been concluded on the
date of issuance of the said notification, the learned Single Judge was,
therefore, right in holding that the said notification was applicable to the
present recruitment process. He supported the impugned judgment by
further submitting that amended Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962, being
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procedural in nature, has retrospective application. He, therefore,
prayed to dismiss the appeals.
6.2 In response to the contention with regard to the concealment of
material fact in the writ petition, learned Senior Counsel submitted that
respondent No.1 was not aware of the same; a colleague of hers may
have obtained her signature on the vakalatnama and filed the writ
petition before the Principal Seat at Jodhpur.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record. We have also gone through the impugned
judgment.
8. Before examining the impugned judgment on its merits, it is
apposite to deal with the issue raised by the appellants with regard to
concealment of material fact in the writ petition filed by respondent
No.1.
8.1 It is the case of the appellants that respondent No.1 deliberately
concealed the material fact of previously filing a writ petition, being
CWP No.8167/2023, titled Dr. Sukhdev Khadav & Ors. Vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors., filed on 31.05.2023, before the Principal Seat at
Jodhpur, seeking a direction that, in terms of the notification dated
23.05.2022, the weightage of interview marks be restricted to a
maximum of 12.5%. The Court at the Principal Seat, Jodhpur, dismissed
the said writ petition by order dated 10.07.2023 giving reference to the
order dated 20.04.2023 passed in the case of Ramesh Kumar Jakhar &
Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., CWP No.18047/2021, treating the
writ petition as premature and considering that the notification dated
23.05.2022 is subsequent to the advertisement. It is further their case
that since the said fact came to the knowledge of the appellants only
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during the pendency of the present appeals, the same was placed on
record by way of an additional affidavit filed by the appellant-State.
8.2 In the instant case, respondent No.1 by way of CWP
No.15018/2024 invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which is discretionary in
nature and is based on the principle of equity. It is a well-settled
principle of law that a person invoking such jurisdiction is required to
approach the Court with clean hands and to make complete disclosure
of all the material facts. Thus, one who seeks equity must do equity.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Dalip Singh Vs. State of
U.P. and Ors. , reported in (2010) 2 SCC 118 , has held that any
person who approaches the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
is duty bound to place all the facts before the Court without any
reservation and in case material facts are suppressed or twisted facts
are placed before the Court, then refusal to entertain a writ petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution would be justified. It was also
observed that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice
or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not
entitled to any relief, interim or final. Further, in the case of V.
Chandrasekaran and Anr. Vs. Administrative Officer and Ors. ,
reported in (2012) 12 SCC 133 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed
as under:
“34. The Appellants have not approached the court
with clean hands, and are therefore, not entitled for
any relief. Whenever a person approaches a Court of
Equity, in the exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction, it is expected that he will approach the
said court not only with clean hands but also with a
clean mind, a clean heart and clean objectives. Thus,
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he who seeks equity must do equity. The legal
maxim "Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum
Alterius Detrimento Et Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem",
means that it is a law of nature that one should not
be enriched by causing loss or injury to another.
(Vide: The Ramjas Foundation and Ors. v. Union of
India and Ors.: AIR 1993 SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.)
K.L. Anand : (1995) 1 SCC 242; and Ramniklal N.
Bhutta and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.:
AIR 1997 SC 1236).
35. The judicial process cannot become an
instrument of oppression or abuse, or a means in the
process of the court to subvert justice, for the
reason that the court exercises its jurisdiction, only
in furtherance of justice. The interests of justice and
public interest coalesce, and therefore, they are very
often one and the same. A petition or an affidavit
containing a misleading and/or an inaccurate
statement, only to achieve an ulterior purpose,
amounts to an abuse of process of the court.”
Also, in the case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav (supra), the
Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under:
“46. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is
material for adjudicating a case and what is not
material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose
all the facts of a case and leave the decision making
to the Court. True, there is a mention of the order
dated 2nd May 2003 in the order dated 24th July
2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough
disclosure. The Petitioners have not clearly disclosed
the facts and circumstances in which the order dated
2nd May 2003 was passed or that it has attained
finality.
47. We may only refer to two cases on this subject.
In Hari Narain v. Badri Das: AIR 1963 SC 1558
stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate,
untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave
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granted to an Appellant may be revoked. It was
observed as follows:
It is of utmost importance that in making
material statements and setting forth
grounds in applications for special leave,
care must be taken not to make any
statements which are inaccurate, untrue or
misleading. In dealing with applications for
special leave, the Court naturally takes
statements of fact and grounds of fact
contained in the petitions at their face
value and it would be unfair to betray the
confidence of the Court by making
statements which are untrue and
misleading. That is why we have come to
the conclusion that in the present case,
special leave granted to the Appellant
ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special
leave is revoked and the appeal is
dismissed. The Appellant will pay the costs
of the Respondent.
48. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation v. Union of
India: (2010) 14 SCC 38, the case law on the
subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant
does not come to the Court with clean hands, he is
not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is
not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It
was said:
The principle that a person who does not
come to the court with clean hands is not
entitled to be heard on the merits of his
grievance and, in any case, such person is
not entitled to any relief is applicable not
only to the petitions filed under Articles
32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but
also to the cases instituted in others courts
and judicial forums. The object underlying
the principle is that every court is not only
entitled but is duty bound to protect itself
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from unscrupulous litigants who do not
have any respect for truth and who try to
pollute the stream of justice by resorting
to falsehood or by making misstatement or
by suppressing facts which have a bearing
on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in
the case.”
8.3 The appellant-State has filed the additional affidavit to bring on
record the fact of filing CWP No.8167/2023, by respondent No.1 along
with the other petitioners therein. Respondent No.1 has not filed any
counter affidavit to refute the said contention. As such, it remains
undisputed that the fact of filing of the previous writ petition before the
Principal Seat at Jodhpur was not disclosed by respondent No.1 in the
writ petition. In the absence of any counter affidavit, we are also unable
to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that a colleague
of respondent No.1 may have obtained her signature on the
vakalatnama and filed the writ petition without her knowledge.
Moreover, as respondent No.1 is a highly educated person possessing a
master’s degree in medical science, it is difficult to comprehend that a
colleague of hers got the vakalatnama signed without her knowledge.
It can, therefore, be safely concluded that such a contention on behalf
of respondent No.1 is nothing but an afterthought to cover up the non-
disclosure of material fact in the writ petition.
8.4 In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
respondent No.1 did not approach the Court with clean hands by
deliberately concealing the material fact in the writ petition, and for this
reason alone, she is not entitled to any relief under the extraordinary
and discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, the writ petition
is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. However, since the writ
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petition filed by her has been allowed, we deem it appropriate to
examine the impugned judgment on its merits on the basis of the
arguments advanced by the parties.
9. The main issue which arises for consideration is whether the
notification dated 23.05.2022 and the amended Rule 19 of the Rules of
1962 can be applied retrospectively to the present recruitment process
which commenced pursuant to the advertisement dated 27.11.2021.
9.1 The RPSC, on 27.11.2021, issued an advertisement inviting
applications for recruitment to the post of Assistant Professor. The said
advertisement was issued in accordance with Rule 19 of the Rules of
1962, as it stood on the date of issuance of the advertisement. The
same is reproduced hereunder:
“19. Scrutiny of applications – The commission shall
scrutinize the applications received by them and
require as many candidates qualified for
appointment under these rules as seem to them
desirable to appear before them for interview.
Provided that the decision of the Commission
as to the eligibility or otherwise of a candidate, shall
be final.”
9.2 The Rajasthan Various Service (Second Amendment) Rules, 2022
(for short, ‘Rules of 2022’), notified vide notification dated 23.05.2022,
were framed by the Governor of Rajasthan in exercise of the powers
conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India by
which Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 came to be amended. Rule 1(2) of
the aforesaid Rules of 2022 specifically provides that it shall come into
force from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette. The said
rules were published in the Official Gazette on 23.05.2022. Apparently,
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the aforesaid rules have not been given retrospective operation. It is,
therefore, clear that by virtue of Rule 1(2) of the said Rules, they will
apply prospectively from 23.05.2022.
9.3 The law with regard to the applicability of the rules to a
recruitment process is well settled. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Assam Public Service Commission (supra), observed as
under:
“….The other relevant question is whether the
method of selection should be permitted to be
changed midway, by adopting the 2019 Procedure
incorporated with effect from 01.04.2019 for the
vacancies, which were advertised on 21.12.2018.
13. The law with regard to applicability of the Rules
which are brought anew during the selection process
have been crystallized by this Court. It has been
held that the norms existing on the date when the
process of selection begins, will control the selection
and the alteration to the norms would not affect the
ongoing process unless the new Rules are to be
given retrospective effect. (See State of Bihar and
Ors. v. Mithilesh Kumar: (2010) 13 SCC 467).
Similarly in N.T. Devin Katti and Ors. v. Karnataka
Public Service Commission and Ors.: (1990) 3 SCC
157, this Court held that a candidate has a limited
right of being considered for selection in accordance
with the Rules as they existed on the date of
advertisement and he cannot be deprived of that
limited right by amendment of the Rules during the
pendency of the selection, unless the Rules are to be
applied retrospectively.
14. If we proceed with the above enunciation of the
law in Mithilesh Kumar (supra) and N.T. Devin Katti
(supra), the conclusion is inevitable that for the
current recruitment process for which advertisement
was issued on 21.12.2018, the 2019 Procedure
(which came into effect from 01.04.2019) can have
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no application, particularly when the first phase of
the selection i.e. the screening test was conducted
under the 2010 Rules.”
(emphasis supplied)
Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Tej Prakash
Pathak (supra), while reiterating the above position, observed as
under:
“65. We, therefore, answer the reference in the
following terms:
(1) Recruitment process commences from the
issuance of the advertisement calling for applications
and ends with filling up of vacancies;
(2) Eligibility criteria for being placed in the Select
List, notified at the commencement of the
recruitment process, cannot be changed midway
through the recruitment process unless the extant
Rules so permit, or the advertisement, which is not
contrary to the extant Rules, so permit. Even if such
change is permissible under the extant Rules or the
advertisement, the change would have to meet the
requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution and
satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness;
(3) The decision in K. Manjusree (supra) lays down
good law and is not in conflict with the decision in
Subash Chander Marwaha (supra). Subash Chander
Marwaha (supra) deals with the right to be appointed
from the Select List whereas K. Manjusree (supra)
deals with the right to be placed in the Select List.
The two cases therefore deal with altogether
different issues;
(4) Recruiting bodies, subject to the extant Rules,
may devise appropriate procedure for bringing the
recruitment process to its logical end provided the
procedure so adopted is transparent, non-
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discriminatory/non-arbitrary and has a rational
nexus to the object sought to be achieved.
(5) Extant Rules having statutory force are binding
on the recruiting body both in terms of procedure
and eligibility. However, where the Rules are non-
existent, or silent, administrative instructions may fill
in the gaps;
(6) Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible
right to appointment. The State or its instrumentality
for bona fide reasons may choose not to fill up the
vacancies. However, if vacancies exist, the State or
its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny
appointment to a person within the zone of
consideration in the select list.”
(emphasis supplied)
From the above position of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, it is clear that a recruitment is governed by the rules which are in
force on the date of issuance of the advertisement and an amendment
made subsequent to the beginning of the process will have no impact
on that particular recruitment which is already under process, unless
the amended rules are specifically given retrospective effect.
9.4 It is not in dispute that, in the present case, the recruitment
process began on 27.11.2021, i.e., the date of issuance of
advertisement, and on the said date, the above-noted unamended Rule
19 was in force. Subsequently, the notification amending the said rule
was issued on 23.05.2022, i.e., midway through the recruitment
process. Therefore, in light of the above settled legal position, we are of
the considered opinion that the amended Rule 19 cannot be applied to
the present recruitment.
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9.5 We find that after the amended Rule 19 came into effect, the
RPSC, vide its letter dated 21.07.2022, had sought advice from the
State Government regarding the applicability of the notification dated
23.05.2022 to the present recruitment. The State Government, in
response, vide letter dated 28.07.2022, clarified that the recruitment
would be governed by the rules existing on the date of issuance of the
advertisement. The stand of the appellant-State was, thus, clear that
the present recruitment would be governed by the extant Rule 19 of the
Rules of 1962.
9.6 Moving to the findings recorded in the impugned judgment on this
point, we find that the learned Single Judge has applied the amended
Rule 19 with retrospective effect on the premise that the said
amendment is procedural in nature. The amended Rule 19 reads as
under:
“19. Scrutiny of applications and examinations.-
(1) The applications received by the Commission which
are found to be incomplete shall be rejected by them.
Before appearing in the examination, it should be ensure
by the candidate himself/herself that he/she fulfils the
conditions in regard to age, educational qualifications,
experience, if any, etc. as provided in these rules. Being
allowed to take the examination shall not entitle the
candidate to presumption of eligibility. The Commission
shall scrutinise later on the applications of such
candidates only as qualify in the written examination and
shall call only the eligible candidates for interview.
(2) The candidates shall have to appear in the written
examination and the candidates who obtained such marks
as may be fixed by the Commission in their discretion
shall be summoned by the Commission for interview shall
have to appear in interview. The allocation of marks for
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interview shall not be more than 10% of the total marks
taken in to account for the purpose of selection.
(3) The scheme and syllabus of written examination shall
be such as may be decided by the Commission, from time
to time.
(4) The decision of the Commission regarding the
eligibility or otherwise of a candidate shall be final.”
A perusal of the amended Rule 19 indicates that not only the
manner of scrutiny of applications has changed but also there is a
substantial change in the scheme of selection. Under the earlier rule,
the selection was to be made primarily on the basis of the interview.
However, under the amended rule, the selection process is to be
conducted in two phases i.e., the written exam and the interview. All
candidates are required to appear in the written examination and only
those candidates who qualify in the examination would be called for
interview. Further, the allocation of marks for interview would not be in
excess of 10%. Apparently, the entire scheme of selection has
undergone a substantial change, which, if applied to the present
recruitment, would affect the substantive rights of the candidates and
therefore, the amendment made in Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962 cannot
be termed merely a procedural amendment.
9.7 The learned Single Judge, on the basis of the affidavit of the
Chairman of the RPSC, also observed that the RPSC itself had applied
the notification dated 23.05.2022 retrospectively to the advertisements
dated 12.05.2022 and 23.05.2022, issued for recruitment to the posts
of Occupational Therapist – 2022 and Hospital Caretaker – 2022,
respectively. Learned counsel for the appellants have submitted that the
learned Single Judge misconstrued the said affidavit. We, therefore,
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deem it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the said
affidavit, which reads as under:
“XXXXXX
1. That the Deponent is submitting the present
affidavit in compliance of the order dated
29.07.2024 passed by this Hon'ble Court, seeking
submission on the issue of application of the
Government Notification dated 23.05.2022.
2. That it is humbly submitted on behalf of the
Applicant/Non-Petitioner that the Rajasthan Public
Service Commission has not made the notification
dated 23.05.2022 applicable in any examination or
recruitment in a retrospective manner.
3. That further it is submitted that in no
recruitment examination being conducted by the
Commission prior to the notification dated
23.05.2022 the aforesaid has been made applicable.
4. That the recruitment examinations conducted
by the Commission after the notification dated
23.05.2022, in all the recruitment whereby the
notification has been made applicable is annexed
herewith and marked as Annexure – AA1.
5. That it is also worth pointing out that two
recruitment notifications concerning the post of
Occupational Therapist-2022 and Hospital Care
Taker-2022 had been notified vide advertisement
dated 12.05.2022 and 23.05.2022 respectively, the
online application window of the above examinations
were open as on date when the notification was
issued.
6. That in light of the notification, the
Commission received the letter dated 01.07.2022
from the Department of Health and Family Welfare
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to make the above notification applicable in the
recruitment to the 55 posts of Hospital Care Taker.
7. That in light of the notification, the
Commission received the letter dated 04.08.2022
from the Department of Health and Family Welfare
to make the above notification applicable in the
recruitment to the 24 posts of Occupational
Therapist.
8. That, hence Corrigendum in both the above
detailed advertisements for the recruitment
examinations were issued on 23.08.2022 for Hospital
Care Taker and on 16.11.2022 – for Occupational
Therapist, whereby fresh online applications were
sought by the commission.
XXXXXXX”
(emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the above affidavit reveals that the deponent, i.e.,
the Chairman of the RPSC categorically stated therein that the RPSC
had not made the notification dated 23.05.2022 applicable in any
examination or recruitment in a retrospective manner. Insofar as the
advertisement dated 12.05.2022 for recruitment to the post of
Occupational Therapist – 2022 is concerned, the window for submission
of online applications was open when the notification dated 23.05.2022
came into effect. Insofar as the advertisement dated 23.05.2022 for
recruitment to the post of Hospital Caretaker – 2022 is concerned, the
said advertisement was issued on the same date on which the said
notification became effective. Moreover, in para 8 of the affidavit, it was
also stated that in both the cases, corrigenda were issued inviting fresh
applications. The above categorical statement of the Chairman of the
RPSC on oath has not been refuted by respondent No.1. Hence, in the
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above facts and circumstances, it cannot be said that the amended Rule
19 was made applicable retrospectively to the aforesaid recruitments.
9.8 For the above reasons, we are unable to concur with the finding of
the learned Single Judge that the notification dated 23.05.2022 and the
amended Rule 19 have retrospective effect.
10. This leads us to the next issue, namely, whether the allocation of
40% marks to the interview is excessive.
10.1 In this regard, it is relevant to note that RPSC, in its Full
Commission meeting dated 24.04.2019, decided to allocate the marks
among the screening test, the academics and the interview in the ratio
of 40:20:40. This decision was in respect of about 23 recruitment
advertisements. One of the said advertisements was dated 17.01.2020
and related to the post of Assistant Professor in Medical Education
Department.
10.2 It is also relevant to note that in respect of the instant
recruitment, on 18.12.2021, i.e., prior to the last date for submission of
applications, some candidates filed a writ petition being CWP
No.18047/2021, titled Ramesh Kumar Jakhar and Ors. Vs. State of
Rajasthan, before the Principal Seat at Jodhpur. In the said writ petition,
the selection criteria prescribed in the advertisement dated 27.11.2021
was challenged on the ground that the selection process provided
therein carried 100% weightage for the interview, whereas in the
previous selection process initiated pursuant to the advertisement dated
17.01.2020, the selection criteria was in the ratio of 40:20:40 towards
the screening test, the academics and the interview, respectively. The
said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 20.04.2023, on the
submission of the RPSC that due weightage would be given to the
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marks obtained by the candidates in the screening test and the
academics, as well as to the marks awarded in the interview. The
aforesaid fact has also been placed by the appellant-State before this
Court by way of an additional affidavit to which no counter-affidavit has
been filed by respondent No.1. Further, there is nothing on record to
show that the order dated 20.04.2023 was further challenged by
anyone. Hence, the said order has attained finality.
10.3 On 10.05.2022, for the present recruitment also, the Full
Commission of the RPSC, following its earlier decision, decided to
allocate 40% weightage for screening test, 20% for academics and 40%
for interview.
10.4 It is also not the case of respondent No.1 that she was unaware of
the Full Commission decisions dated 24.04.2019 & 10.05.2022 and the
order dated 20.04.2023 passed by the Court. However, respondent No.1
has not challenged any of the aforesaid decisions of the RPSC and the
order dated 20.04.2023 passed in the case of Ramesh Kumar Jakhar
(supra).
10.5 At this stage, it is also pertinent to note that respondent No.1, in
the writ petition, challenged the conditions of advertisement relating to
the selection process. She chose not to challenge the extant Rule 19 of
the Rules of 1962. It is not in dispute that the advertisement was issued
in conformity with the aforementioned rule. In that view of the matter,
we are of the view that in the absence of any challenge to Rule 19, the
challenge to the process prescribed in the advertisement cannot be
maintained.
10.6 Further, it is also relevant to mention here that, in the instant
matter, it is not the case of respondent No.1 that the action of the RPSC
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bifurcating the marks among the screening test, academics and
interview is illegal or invalid and the entire selection process should be
conducted exclusively through the interview. The only case of
respondent No.1 is that the weightage of the marks for the interview
should not be more than 10% of the total marks as prescribed in the
amended Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962. We have already held that the
said amended rule is not applicable to the present recruitment process.
10.7 With regard to the weightage of marks, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, in the case of Lila Dhar (supra), has held that it is for the
experts to determine the weightage to be allocated to the interview for
assessing the suitability of a candidate. The relevant paragraphs of the
said judgment are reproduced hereunder:
“6. Thus, the written examination assesses the
man's intellect and the interview test the man
himself and "the twain shall meet" for a proper
selection. If both written examination and interview
test are to be essential features of proper selection,
the question may arise as to the weight to be
attached respectively to them. In the case of
admission to a college, for instance, where the
candidate's personality is yet to develop and it is too
early to identify the personal qualities for which
greater importance may have to be attached in later
life, greater weight has per force to be given to
performance in the written examination. The
importance to be attached to the interview test must
be minimal. That was what was decided by this
Court in Periakaruppan v. State of Tamilnadu, Ajay
Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc.,
(supra) and other cases. On the other hand, in the
case of services to which recruitment has necessarily
to be made from persons of mature personality,
interview test may be the only way, subject to basic
and essential academic and professional
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requirements being satisfied. To subject such
persons to a written examination may yield unfruitful
and negative results, apart from its being an act of
cruelty to those persons. There are, of course, many
services to which recruitment is made from younger
candidates whose personalities are on the threshold
of development and who show signs of great
promise, and the discerning may in an interview
test, catch a glimpse of the future personality. In the
case of such services, where sound selection must
combine academic ability with personality promise,
some weight has to be given, though not much too
great weight, to the interview test. There cannot be
any rule of thumb regarding the precise weight to be
given. It must vary from service to service according
to the requirements of the service, the minimum
qualifications prescribed, the age group from which
the selection is to be made, the body to which the
task of holding the interview test is proposed to be
entrusted and a host of other factors. It is a matter
for determination by experts. It is a matter for
research. It is not for Courts to pronounce upon it
unless exaggerated weight has been given with
proven or obvious oblique motives. The Kothari
Committee also suggested that in view of the
obvious importance of the subject, it may be
examined in detail by the Research Unit of the Union
of Public Service Commission.
7. In this background, let us now examine the
situation presented by the Rajasthan rules. The
Rajasthan Judicial Service rules have been made by
the Governor of Rajasthan in consultation with the
High Court of Rajasthan and the Rajasthan Public
Service Commission. The High Court may be
expected to know the precise requirements of the
judicial service of the State and the calibre of the
available source-material, while the Public Service
Commission is an expert body thoroughly conversant
with recruitment policies and selection methods.
Both the High Court and the Public Service
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Commission are independent bodies, outside
executive control, occupying special positions and
enjoying special status under the constitution.
Neither is an outside agency. Both are well-
acquainted with the particular needs of their State
and the people. If the Governor, in consultation with
the High Court and the Public Service Commission of
the State makes rules Stipulating seventy five
percent of the marks for the written examination and
twenty five percent for the interview test, on what
basis can a Court say that twenty five percent for the
interview test is on the high side? It must not also be
forgotten that the interview test is generally
Conducted and was, in the present case, conducted
by a body consisting of a Judge of the High Court,
the Chairman and a member of the Public Service
Commission and a special invitee-expert. There can
surely be no lifetime grievance or hint of
arbitrariness against this body. Yet another factor
worthy of consideration is that the candidates
expected to offer themselves for selection are not
raw graduates freshly out of college but are persons
who have already received a certain amount of
professional training. The source-material is such
that some weightage must be given to the interview
test and can it possibly be said that twenty five per
cent of the total marks is an exaggerated weightage.
We may add here that it has been made clear by the
Chairman, Rajasthan Public Service Commission on
whose behalf a counter affidavit has been filed
before us that the marks obtained by the candidates
at the written examination were not made available
to the members of the interview Board either before
or at the time of the interview. We are unhesitatingly
of the view that the selection cannot be struck down
on the ground that more than due weightage was
given to the interview test.
8. The second ground of attack must fail for the
same reason as the first ground of attack. The rules
themselves do not provide for the allocation of
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marks under different heads at the interview test.
The criteria for the interview test has been laid down
by the rules. It is for the interviewing body to take a
general decision whether to allocate marks under
different heads or to award marks in a single lot. The
award of marks under different heads may lead to a
distorted picture of the candidate on occasions. On
the other hand the totality of the impression created
by the candidate on the interviewing body may give
a more accurate picture of the candidate's
personality. It is for the interviewing body to choose
the appropriate method of marking at the selection
to each service. There cannot be any magic formulae
in these matters and courts cannot sit it judgment
over the methods of marking employed by
interviewing bodies unless, as we said, it is proven
or obvious that the method of marking was chosen
with oblique motive.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.8 Following the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the
Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Manish Kumar Shahi Vs. State of
Bihar and Ors. , reported in (2010) 12 SCC 576 , made the following
observations:
"12. In State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin and Ors.: 1987
Supp SCC 401, the Court referred to the ratio of the
Judgment in Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.
(supra), refused to nullify the selection made for
recruitment to the U.P. Civil Service (Judicial Branch)
and observed:
In A.K. Yadav v. State of Haryana a
Constitution Bench of this Court approved
the view expressed in Lila Dhar case. The
Court observed there cannot be any hard
and fast rule regarding the weight to be
given as against the written examination.
It must vary from service to service;
according to the requirement of the
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service, the minimum qualification,
prescribed age group from which the
selection is to be made, the body to which
the task of holding the interview test is
proposed to be entrusted and a host of
other factors. It is a matter for
determination by experts. The court does
not possess the necessary equipment and
it would not be right for the court to
pronounce upon it. In Lila Dhar case 25
per cent of marks fixed for viva voce test
was upheld. In A.K. Yadav case selection
made by the Haryana Public Service
Commission for appointment to the post of
Haryana Civil Service (Executive and other
allied services) was under challenge. The
Court held that allocation of 33.3 per cent
for viva voce was high as it opened door
for arbitrariness and in order to diminish it
if not eliminate the same the percentage
needs to be reduced. The Constitution
Bench made observation that marks for
viva voce test should not exceed 12.2 per
cent. In spite of these observations the
Constitution Bench did not interfere or
strike down the selection instead it
directed the Commission to give one more
opportunity to the aggrieved candidates to
appear at the competitive examination. In
the instant case there has been no
allegation of mala fides or arbitrariness
against the Commission which held the
viva voce test.
13. In Mehmood Alam Tariq and others v. State of
Rajasthan and Ors.: (1988) 3 SCC 241, the Court
distinguished the earlier Judgments in Ajay Hasia v.
Khalid Mujib Sehravardi : (1981) 1 SCC 722, Ashok
Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana : (1985) 4 SCC
417, relied upon Lila Dhar v. State of Rajasthan and
Ors. (supra) and held that prescription of 33%
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marks for interview for recruitment to the Rajasthan
State and Services (Direct Recruitment by Combined
Competitive Examinations) Rules, 1962, Rajasthan
Service Rules, 1954, Rajasthan Police Service Rules,
1954, Rajasthan Forest Service Rules, Rajasthan
Forest Subordinate Service Rules, 1963 is not
violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Some of the observations made in that Judgment are
extracted below:
On a careful consideration of the matter,
we are persuaded to the view that the
prescription of minimum qualifying marks
of 60 (33 per cent) out of the maximum
marks of 180 set apart for the viva voce
examination does not, by itself, incur any
constitutional infirmity. The principles laid
down in the cases of Ajay Hasia, Lila Dhar,
Ashok Kumar Yadav, do not militate
against or render impermissible such a
prescription. There is nothing
unreasonable or arbitrary in the stipulation
that officers to be selected for higher
services and who are, with the passage of
time, expected to man increasingly
responsible positions in the core services
such as the Administrative Services and
the Police Services should be men
endowed with personality traits conducive
to the levels of performance expected in
such services. There are features that
distinguish, for instance, Accounts Service
from the Police Service -- a distinction that
draws upon and is accentuated by the
personal qualities of the officer. Academic
excellence is one thing. Ability to deal with
the public with tact and imagination is
another. Both are necessary for an officer.
The dose that is demanded may vary
according to the nature of the service.
Administrative and Police Services
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constitute the cutting edge of the
administrative machinery and the
requirement of higher traits of personality
is not an unreasonable expectation.
14. The same view has been reiterated in the Anzar
Ahmad v. State of Bihar and Ors.: (1994) 1 SCC
150, P. Mohanan Subordinate Administrative 1962
and Pillai v. State of Kerala and Ors.: (2007) 9 SCC
497 and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and Ors.:
(2009) 5 SCC 515.
15. In view of the law laid down in the above
mentioned Judgments, it must be held that
earmarking of 200 marks for viva voce test as
against 850 marks for written examination does not
violate the doctrine of equality embodied in Articles
14 and 16 of the Constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
10.9 We find that the observation made by the learned Single Judge
that the allocation of 40% of the total marks to the interview is on the
higher side is mainly premised on the judgment passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Hasia (supra). It is, however,
pertinent to note that the case of Ajay Hasia (supra) relates to
admission to an educational institution and not appointment to public
employment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Lila Dhar
(supra), has already held that the observations made in the case of
Ajay Hasia (supra) are per incuriam, insofar as they relate to public
employment. The observations made in Ajay Hasia (supra), therefore,
have to be considered in the context of the facts involved in that case,
and the same cannot be applied in a strict sense to the selection
process for appointment to public employment.
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10.10 The learned Single Judge also relied upon the judgment of Ashok
Kumar Yadav (supra). However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a later
judgment passed in the case of Anzar Ahmed (supra), after taking into
consideration the judgment passed in Ashok Kumar Yadav (supra),
upheld the allocation of 50% marks for academic performance and 50%
marks for interview and observed as under:
“13. In Ashok Kumar Yadav and Ors. Etc. Etc. v.
State of Haryana and Ors. Etc.: [1985] Suppl. 1 SCR
657, the selection for the Haryana Civil Service
(Executive) and Allied Services was made on the
basis of written examination and interview. The
allocation of marks for interview was 33.3% in the
case of ex-service officers and 22.2% in the case of
other candidates. After quoting the observations of
Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Liladhar's case (supra), it has
been observed by the Court:
"....The competitive examination may be
based exclusively on written examination
or it may be exclusively on interview or it
may be a mixture of both. It is entirely for
the Government to decide what kind of
competitive examination would be
appropriate in a given case....It is not for
the Court to lay down whether interview
test should be held at all or how many
marks should be allowed for the interview
test. Of course the marks must be minimal
so as to avoid charges of arbitrariness, but
not necessarily always. There may be
posts and appointments where the only
proper method of selection may be by a
viva voce test.
...... Now if both written
examination and viva voce test are
accepted as essential features of proper
selection in a given case, the question may
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arise as to the weight to be attached
respectively to them. ... There cannot be
any hard and fast rule regarding the
precise weight to be given to the viva voce
test as against the written examination. It
must vary from service to service
according to the requirement of the
service, the minimum qualification
prescribed, the age group from which the
selection is to be made, the body to which
the task of holding the viva voce test is
proposed to be entrusted and a host of
other factors. It is essentially a matter for
determination by experts. The Court does
not possess the necessary equipment and
it would not be right for the Court to
pronounce upon it, unless to use the
words of Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Liladhar's
case "exaggerated weight has been given
with proven or obvious oblique motives."
XXXXXX
20. In the instant case, we find that the State
Government in its letter dated September 20, 1990
has clearly stated that selection should be made on
the basis of interview. On the basis of this letter the
Commission could have made the selection wholly on
the basis of marks obtained at the interview. But in
accordance with the past practice, the Commission
has made the selection on the basis of interview
while keeping in view the academic performance and
with that end in view the Commission has allocated
50% marks for academic performance and 50%
marks for interview. It cannot be held that the said
procedure adopted by the Commission suffers from
the vice of arbitrariness. By giving equal weight to
academic performance the Commission has rather
reduced the possibility of arbitrariness.”
(emphasis supplied)
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[2026:RJ-JP:35855-DB] [SAW-79/2025]
10.11 In view of the above law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, it is clear that it is for an expert body to determine the weight to
be given to the interview. We find that the RPSC, being an expert body,
has adopted the method of allocation of marks uniformly and without
any discrimination. Moreover, no oblique motive has been alleged
against the RPSC in making such allocation of marks which was also
followed in the previous recruitment processes. Hence, the action of the
RPSC cannot be said to suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. In these
circumstances, we are unable to agree with the finding recorded in the
impugned judgment that allocation of 40% of the total marks to the
interview is excessive.
11. Turning to the last issue, namely, whether the writ petition filed
by respondent No.1 was barred by the doctrine of estoppel and also
suffered from delay and laches, we find that despite being aware of the
terms and conditions of the advertisement dated 27.11.2021 and Rule
19 of the Rules of 1962 as it then stood, respondent No.1 did not
challenge the same rather appeared in the screening test held on
06.05.2022 without any protest or objection. Furthermore, as noted in
para 10.4 above, despite being aware of the decisions dated 24.04.2019
and 10.05.2022 of the RPSC and the order dated 20.04.2023 passed in
the case of Ramesh Kumar Jakhar (supra), respondent No.1 chose not
to lay any challenge to the same.
11.1 The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ashok Kumar Vs.
State of Bihar, reported in (2017) 4 SCC 357 , has held that a
candidate who participates in a selection process without raising any
objection cannot subsequently be permitted to challenge the
examination process. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
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(34 of 36)
[2026:RJ-JP:35855-DB] [SAW-79/2025]
Meeta Sahai Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. , reported in (2019) 20
SCC 17 , observed as under:
“17. It is well settled that the principle of estoppel
prevents a candidate from challenging the selection
process after having failed in it as iterated by this
Court in a plethora of judgments including Manish
Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar: (2010) 12 SCC 576,
observing as follows:
16. We also agree with the High Court that
after having taken part in the process of
selection knowing fully well that more than
19% marks have been earmarked for viva
voce test, the Appellant is not entitled to
challenge the criteria or process of
selection. Surely, if the Appellant's name
had appeared in the merit list, he would
not have even dreamed of challenging the
selection. The Appellant invoked
jurisdiction of the High Court Under Article
226 of the Constitution of India only after
he found that his name does not figure in
the merit list prepared by the Commission.
This conduct of the Appellant clearly
disentitles him from questioning the
selection and the High Court did not
commit any error by refusing to entertain
the writ petition.
The underlying objective of this principle is to
prevent candidates from trying another shot at
consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein
every disgruntled candidate, having failed the
selection, challenges it in the hope of getting a
second chance.”
(emphasis supplied)
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(35 of 36)
[2026:RJ-JP:35855-DB] [SAW-79/2025]
In view of the above settled legal position, we are of the
considered opinion that respondent No.1 participated in the selection
process without any objection and, hence, she is estopped from
challenging the selection process prescribed in the advertisement dated
27.11.2021.
11.2 Insofar as the issue of delay and laches is concerned, leaving
aside CWP No.8167/2023, the filing of which has been deliberately
concealed, respondent No.1, for the first time, on 14.05.2024 filed the
application for impleadment in CWP No.1777/2022, apparently nearly
two and a half years after the submission of her application pursuant to
the said advertisement and almost two years after the date of issuance
of notification dated 23.05.2022, whereby Rule 19 of the Rules of 1962
was amended. Thereafter, as noted above, pursuant to the liberty
granted by order dated 30.05.2024, respondent No.1 filed the writ
petition in the instant matter. However, no justification for such an
inordinate delay of two and a half years has been provided in the writ
petition.
11.3 A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that with regard to
delay and laches, the learned Single Judge held that respondent No.1
and similarly situated persons had assailed the alleged illegalities before
the screening test was conducted. We find that the said conclusion
drawn by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable for the following
reasons: firstly, CWP No.1777/2022 was concerned with the non-
application of reservation for filling up backlog vacancies, whereas in
the present matter, respondent No.1 has challenged the selection
process and hence the petitioners in the said petition cannot be said to
be similarly situated to respondent No.1; and secondly, it is undisputed
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[2026:RJ-JP:35855-DB] [SAW-79/2025]
that respondent No.1 had not challenged the selection process before
the date of the screening test.
11.4 If a person wants to invoke the extraordinary remedy, he should
come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. In
case he approaches the Court with delay, he is required to furnish a
reasonable explanation for the delay. In the case at hand, respondent
No.1 has grossly failed to furnish any explanation, much less a
justifiable explanation for an inordinate delay of two and a half years. In
view thereof, it is clear that the writ petition filed by respondent No.1
suffers from delay and laches. We are, therefore, of the considered
opinion that the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 deserves to be
dismissed.
12. As a result of the above discussion, the instant appeals are
allowed. The impugned judgment dated 10.01.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge is quashed and set aside and the writ petition filed
by respondent No.1 is also dismissed.
13. All the pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
(SANDEEP TANEJA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J
1-2/S-A/SAHIL SONI
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