SHANTA W/O YALLAPPA DHAKALUCHE vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
RD
DATED THIS THE 23 DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO.100385 OF 2025 (ULC)
BETWEEN:
SHANTA W/O. YALLAPPA DHAKALUCHE,
SINCE DECEASED BY HER LRS.
1. VILAS W/O. YALLAPPA DHAKALUCHE,
AGE: 65 YEARS, OCC: SERVICE,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
2. SHANKAR S/O. YALLAPPA DHAKALUCHE,
AGE: 56 YEARS, OCC: SERVICE,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
3. PANDU S/O. YALLAPPA DHAKALUCHE,
AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: SERVICE,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench
4. SUJATA W/O KRISHNA DESURKAR,
AGE: 40 YEARS, OCC: HOUSE HOLD,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
5. RAJASHREE W/O. SUBHASH DHAKALUCHE,
AGE: 45 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
6. AMIT S/O. SUBHASH DHAKALUCHE,
AGE: 35 YEARS, OCC: NIL,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
7. BHAGYASHREE D/O. SUBHASH,
AGE: 80 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD,
R/O: H.NO.378, TANAJI GALLI,
ANGOL, BELAGAVI.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. PRASADKUMAR B. GUNAKI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
M.S. BUILDNIG, BENGALURU - 01.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
BELAGAVI – 590 016.
3. THE TAHSILDAR,
TQ & DIST: BELAGAVI – 590 016.
4. THE BELAGAVI URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
REPRESENTED BY ITS COMMISSIONER,
ASHOK NAGAR, BELAGAVI – 590 016.
5. THE DEPUTY CONSERVATOR OF FORESTS,
SOCIAL FORESTRY DIVISION,
ZILLA PANCHAYAT, BELAGAVI – 590 016.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. RAKESH M. BILKI, GA FOR R1 TO R3 & R5;
SRI. G.I. GACHCHINMATH, ADVOCATE FOR R4)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S. 4 OF KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER DATED 19/03/2025 PASSED IN WRIT
PETITION NO.113892/2019 (ULC) BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE
AND ALLOW THE WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE APPELLANTS IN THE
INTEREST OS JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
THIS WRIT APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
Heard the learned counsel Sri.Prasadkumar B Gunaki for
the appellants, learned Additional Government Advocate
Sri.Rakesh M Bilki for the respondents/State and the learned
counsel Sri. G.I.Gachchinamath for respondent No.4/Belagavi
Urban Development Authority.
2. The appellants are before the Court calling in
question an order of the learned Single Judge in WP No.113892
of 2019, disposed on 19.03.2025. The appellants/petitioners
sought declaration that the proceedings under the Urban Land
(Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (the ‘1976 Act’, for short)
initiated by the Competent Authority would stand abated and
sought several other reliefs incidental to seeking a declaration
of that kind.
3. The learned Single Judge by a detailed order
referring to every contention and the spectrum of the law
relating to the subject framed the following issues:
- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
“ i) Whether the proceedings under the ULC Act
1976 have culminated and attained finality?
ii) Whether the petitioners’ would be entitled for
compensation of the excess land determined
by the competent authority under the ULC Act
1976?
iii) Whether on account of the excess land which
has been determined by the competent
authority being acquired for the CITB Belagavi
upon the land being declared excess, would
they be entitled for compensation on account
of the acquisition proceedings?
iv) Whether the petitioners would be entitled for
a mandamus to restore their names in respect
of R.S.No.203/4/4 and R.S.No.701 of Angol,
Belagavi?
v) What order? ”
4. The issues are answered and the petition comes to
be dismissed on the following reasons:
“…. …. ….
8. I answer the above points as under:
9. Answer to Point No.1: Whether the
proceedings under the ULC Act 1976 have
culminated and attained finality?
9.1. The submission of Sri.Prasadkumar Gunaki,
learned counsel for the petitioners is that the
proceedings under ULC Act 1976 have not
culminated and have not attained finality,
therefore, the repeal of the ULC Act would
enure to the benefit of the petitioners. It is
not in dispute that the competent authority
had held that the declarant, that is, the
family of the petitioners held excess land of
- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
10241.31 square meters in RS No.301 and
3035.10 square meters in RS No.203/4/4 of
Angol village, Belagavi district. Notification
under Subsection (1) of Section 10 of the
ULC Act had been issued on 9.11.1985 and a
notification under Subsection (2) of Section
10 having been issued thereafter is also not
in dispute., so, also it is not in dispute that
on 6.10.1986 a notification under Subsection
(3) of Section 10 of the ULC Act had been
issued and thereafter a notification under
Subsection (5) of Section 10 had been issued
on 8.3.1988 calling upon the petitioner to
hand over the possession to the revenue
inspector, thus I’am of the considered
opinion that the submission of
Sri.Prasadkumar Gunaki learned counsel for
the petitioners can not be accepted.
9.2. The further contention of Sri.Prasadkumar
Gunaki is that the Revenue Inspector was
not authorized to take possession, it is only
the competent authority who could take
possession. Therefore, Subsection (5) of
Section 10 has not been complied with and it
is on that basis that it is contended that the
proceedings have not attained finality.
9.3. Learned AGA has contended that the
petitioners have suppressed various
documents and events from this court
inasmuch as an appeal in appeal
No.304/2005 had been filed by the family
members of the petitioners wherein they had
admitted that the notification had been
issued in the name of Yallappa Devappa
Dhakluche. Another writ petition having been
filed in WP No.18407/1990, the said writ
petition had been withdrawn on 21.12.1993
reserving right to seek for enhancement of
compensation under Section 18 of the LA
Act. Thus, he submits that a challenge
having been made by the family members
which enures to the benefit of the entire
family, only reservation being made for
- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
enhancement of compensation. At this stage,
it cannot be contended that the proceedings
under the ULC Act have not been completed
when the writ petition had been withdrawn
way back on 21.12.1993 reserving the rights
aforesaid.
9.4 He submits that a large portion of the land in
the aforesaid survey numbers having
acquired for formation of a layout by the
BUDA, compensation has been awarded in
relation thereto and it is only that
compensation which the petitioners would be
entitled to receive. Apart from the
compensation as regards the land which has
been held to be in excess after the said
acquisition, as regards which there is a
recommendation which has been made by
the Regional Commissioner for awardal of
compensation as per the market value,
which the petitioners have not collected. He
therefore, submits that the petitioner cannot
take advantage of their own wrongs and
seek to press the repeal of the ULC Act into
service.
9.5. Sri.Hulyal, learned Counsel appearing for
respondent No.4 would submit that during
the pendency of the proceedings under the
ULC Act against the petitioners, the City
Improvement Board, Belagavi, the
predecessor of BUDA had issued a
notification under Section 15B of the
Karnataka Improvement Boards Act, 1976
for acquisition of the land in Angol village
including RS No. 701 measuring 3 acres 3
guntas. A declaration also being published on
9.4.1980 under Section 18 of the said Act.
The excess land under the ULC Act 1976 had
been handed over to the Improvement Board
for formation of the layout. The SLAO had
declared an Award on 12.04.1990 and it is
the SLAO who took possession of the land
acquired by drawing a Panchnama on
12.06.1990 in pursuance of which necessary
- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
mutation entry was made on 22.06.1990 as
per ME No.11483. Since there was a writ
petition filed by Vithal Devappa Dhakaluche
in WP No.38088/2002, the compensation
amount was not received. However, the CITB
Belagavi formed residential sites, roads, civic
amenities in the entire land acquired in
R.S.701, entire land for which the layout had
been designated. Though some of the lands
in RS number 701, 705, 706 and 710 have
been earmarked as open space, the same
would not enure to the benefit of the
petitioners since the open space is a
composite part of the layout plan of the
BUDA and the said open space is required for
better enjoyment of the site owners in the
layout.
9.6. It is in this background that it would have to
be considered as to whether the proceedings
under the ULC Act 1976 have culminated
and attained finality.
9.7. This is a peculiar case where there are two
actions which have occurred simultaneously.
One is the declaration of excess land under
the Act of 1976, the other is the acquisition
of land under the Karnataka Improvement
Trust Board Act. Both of them having been
taken up parallelly, the acquisition being
completed, the excess land also being part of
the acquisition has been taken possession of
and handed over to the BUDA and thereafter
BUDA has formed a layout.
9.8. In so far as the excess land under the ULC
Act is concerned, the contention of the
Counsel for the Petitioner is that the revenue
officer was not authorized to receive the
possession. This aspect by itself could have
helped the petitioners if not for the
petitioners having filed proceedings in W.P.
No. 18407/1990 and having withdrawn the
same on 21.12.1993 reserving right to seek
for enhancement of compensation. Once the
- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
family members of the petitioners withdrew
the said writ petition which had challenged
the orders dated 27.03.1989 and 26.05.1990
and only right reserved being for
compensation, the question of the
petitioners claiming that the Revenue
Inspector was not authorized and or
possession was not taken cannot be
sustained. The facts and documents on
record would categorically establish the
possession having been taken over, the
layout having been formed, sites in the said
layout having been allotted to various
persons which cannot be now sought to be
contradicted by the petitioners.
9.9. Thus, I answer point number 1 by
holding that the proceedings under the
ULC Act 1976 in the present matter have
culminated and have attained finality.
10. ANSWER TO POINTs NO.2 and 3: Whether the
petitioners would be entitled for compensation
of the excess land determined by the
competent authority under the ULC Act, 1976?
And
Whether on account of the excess land which
has been determined by the competent
authority being acquired for the CITB Belagavi
upon the land being declared excess, would
they be entitled for compensation on account of
the acquisition proceedings?
10.1. The compensation which would have to be
looked into in the present matter is two-fold.
One as regard the land which has been
acquired on behalf of the CITB, Belagavi, now
the BUDA, and the other being the excess
vacant land after such acquisition.
10.2. Insofar as the acquisition is concerned, an
award has been passed determining the
- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
compensation payable and it is as such clear
that the petitioners would be entitled for the
compensation as determined under the award
subject to any challenge made to the said
award.
10.3. Insofar as the compensation in respect of the
excess vacant land is concerned, there is
already a recommendation made for
compensation to be paid on a commercial
basis, which the petitioners would be entitled
to. Thus, the compensation that the
petitioners would be entitled to on both the
above counts would continue to be their
entitlement which they cannot be deprived of.
The respondents would be liable to make
payment of the due compensation amounts in
terms of the above.
11. ANSWER TO POINT No.4: Whether the
petitioners would be entitled for a mandamus
to restore their names in respect of R.S.
No.203/4/4 and R.S. No.701 of Angol,
Belagavi?
11.1. In view of my finding to point No. 1 that the
proceeding under the ULC Act 1976 have
culminated and have attained finality and also
on account of the finding that the petitioners
would be entitled for compensation, both
under the ULC Act, as also under the
Improvement Trust Board Act, the question of
the petitioners’ names being required to be
restored in respect of RS No.203/4/4 and RS
No. 701 of Angol village, Belagavi would not
arise. There being no vested right in their
favour, the acquisition having been completed,
so also the proceedings under the ULC Act
having culminated, the question of issuance of
any mandamus to restore their name in
respect of the aforesaid survey numbers would
not arise.
- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
12. ANSWER TO POINT No.5: What Order?
In view of my answer to points No.1 to 4 above, no
grounds being made out, the petition stands
dismissed .”
5. The learned Single Judge observes that the
proceedings under the 1976 Act have culminated and attained
finality. The counsel would admit that the acquisition
proceedings have culminated and the property has been
developed now into sites. The learned Single Judge further has
protected the interest of these petitioners for claiming
compensation.
,
6. The learned counsel for the appellants would now
submit that a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of
NARAYAN S/o GANESH BABLE @ KAMATI v. THE STATE
OF KARNATAKA, WA No.100002 of 2018 c/w WA
No.100089 of 2018, disposed on 11.03.2020
has directed
that in such cases, compensation must be determined or
considered in terms of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (the ‘2013 Act’ for short).
- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
,,
7. The Apex Court in the case of BIHAR
INDUSTRIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SCOPE
1
SALES PRIVATE LIMITED observes that interference is not
warranted in an intra-Court appeal, unless the impugned order
broods perversity and holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
13. We must also bear in mind the nature and
extent of jurisdiction that an intra-court appellate
Bench of a high court exercise. Such appellate
jurisdiction is conferred either under the Letters
Patent or by the relevant statutory provisions. It is
pertinent to note that both - Single Bench and
Division Bench - exercise the same jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our view,
the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction is
warranted only where the judgment or order under
challenge is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from
perversity. Such jurisdiction ought not to be invoked
merely because another view is possible on the
same set of facts, particularly where the view
adopted by the Single Judge is a plausible and
reasonable one. In other words, an intra-court
appellate Bench ought not to substitute its own
view, merely because such Bench considers its view
to be better than the one taken by the Single Bench;
so long as the view taken by the Single Bench is a
plausible one, interference should stay at a
distance.
14. We find it profitable to refer to certain
precedents, relevant paragraphs wherefrom are
reproduced below:
14.1 In Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami
15
Temple , it was held:
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 112
- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
2. Mr Ram Kumar, learned counsel for the
appellants, inter alia contends that the Letters
Patent Bench of the High Court could not have
upset a finding of fact recorded by a learned
Single Judge on fresh reconciliation of the two
documents, arriving at different results than those
arrived at earlier by the two courts
aforementioned. Though the argument sounds
attractive, it does not bear scrutiny. Against the
orders of the trial court, first appeal lay before the
High Court, both on facts as well as law. It is the
internal working of the High Court which splits it
into different ‘Benches’ and yet the court remains
one. A letters patent appeal, as permitted under
the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court
appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench,
sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own
orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was
vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an
appeal against an order of a subordinate
court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High
Court exercises the powers of a Court of
Error. So understood, the appellate power
under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in
contrast to what is ordinarily understood in
procedural language. That apart the
construction of the aforementioned two
documents involved, in the very nature of their
import, a mixed question of law and fact, well
within the powers of the Letters Patent Bench to
decide. The Bench was not powerless in that
regard.
(emphasis ours)
14.2 This Court in Narendra & Co. (P)
16
Ltd. v. Workmen noted that:
5. … Be that as it may, in an intra-court
appeal, on a finding of fact, unless the
Appellate Bench reaches a conclusion that
the finding of the Single Bench is perverse, it
shall not disturb the same. Merely because
another view or a better view is possible,
there should be no interference with or
disturbance of the order passed by the
Single Judge, unless both sides agree for a
fairer approach on relief.
- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
14.3 On whether a remand could be ordered in
exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction, this Court
in Roma Sonkar v. M.P. State Public Service
17
Commission expressed reservations in the following
words:
3. We have very serious reservations
whether the Division Bench in an intra-court
appeal could have remitted a writ petition in
the matter of moulding the relief. It is the
exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. The learned Single Judge as well as
the Division Bench exercised the same
jurisdiction. Only to avoid inconvenience to
the litigants, another tier of screening by the
Division Bench is provided in terms of the
power of the High Court but that does not
mean that the Single Judge is subordinate to
the Division Bench. Being a writ proceeding,
the Division Bench was called upon, in the
intra-court appeal, primarily and mostly to
consider the correctness or otherwise of the
view taken by the learned Single Judge.
Hence, in our view, the Division Bench needs
to consider the appeal(s) on merits by
deciding on the correctness of the judgment
of the learned Single Judge, instead of
remitting the matter to the learned Single
Judge.
18
14.4 In AAI v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee , while
referring to its decision in Narendra (supra), this Court
observed as follows:
41. The position is, thus, settled that in an
intra-court writ appeal, the appellate court
must restrain itself and the interference into
the judgment passed by the learned Single
Judge is permissible only if the judgment of
the learned Single Judge is perverse or
suffers from an error apparent in law.
However, the Division Bench, in the present
case, failed to record any such finding and
rather, proceeded to delve into extensive
reappreciation of evidence to overturn the
judgment of the learned Single Judge.
(emphasis ours)
- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
15. Bearing in mind the larger public interest that
was involved coupled with the fact that the plot of land in
question was sought to be reserved for establishment of
an educational institution, we are of the firm opinion that
dismissal of the writ petition was an available option for
the Single Judge. The view taken by the Division Bench
that BIADA lacked the authority to cancel the allotment
though prima facie may appear to be appealing, yet, the
same is debatable.
15.1 Applying the principles governing the exercise
of intra-court appellate jurisdiction, as laid down in the
aforesaid precedents, to the facts of the present case, we
observe that judicial discipline demanded due
deference to the exercise of discretion by the court
of first instance, particularly when such discretion
was exercised on relevant considerations. The
Single Judge having refused exercise of discretion
on a ground which, in our opinion, is valid, the
Division Bench ought to have been loath to allow
the writ petition, and that too in exercise of its
intra-court appellate jurisdiction.
The judgment and
order of the Single Judge was far from being wholly
incorrect or perverse.”
(Emphasis supplied)
In light of the afore-quoted judgment of the Apex Court, the
subject appeal being an intra-Court appeal, unless we find
perversity in the order, there would be no warrant of
interference with the order of the learned Single Judge, as a
matter of course.
8. A perusal at the order of the learned Single Judge
quoted supra would not brood any perversity for us to interfere
and consider obliteration of the same. More so, in the light of
- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
the fact that the counsel for the appellants would submit that
the compensation that they are entitled to must be determined
in terms of the 2013 Act.
9. In the event the compensation is not paid to these
appellants in the light of the order of the learned Single Judge,
who would observe that the appellants cannot be deprived of
the right to compensation, the appellants would be entitled to
the compensation that is to be determined and paid to them, if
not already paid, and if it is now to be determined and paid, it
would be in terms of the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench in
NARAYAN supra , wherein it is held as follows:
“…. …. ….
15. The moot question that arises for consideration
of this Court is;
“Whether the appellants are entitled to
restoration of the land in question to an extent of
1392.62 sq.mts. in terms of Section 3(2) of the
Repeal Act, 1999?
16. Section 3(2) of the Repeal Act, 1999 reads
thus:
“3. Saving.-(1) The repeal of the principal
Act shall not affect-
(a) XXXX
(b) XXXX
(c) XXXX
(2) Where –
- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in
the State Government under subsection (3) of
Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of
which has not been taken over by the State
Government or any person duly authorized by
the State Government in this behalf or by the
competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the
State Government with respect to such land
then, such land shall not be restored unless the
amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the
State Government.”
17. In terms of the aforesaid provision, the crucial
point is, whether the possession of the land in question
has been taken over by respondent No.4. Annexure-R2
mutation entry depicts that the entire extent of 1 acre in
Sy.No.710/1 was taken possession by Urban City
Improvement Board, Belagavi (BUDA). AnnexureR3 dated
04.04.1994 indicates the date fixed on 26.04.1994 to
take possession of the land in question by the
Government on the premise that BUDA has taken
possession on 31.03.1984. Annexure-R4 indicates the
name of City Improvement Board, Belagavi in the RTC
records relating to 38 guntas in Sy.No.710/1. AnnexureR5
indicates that, on 31.03.1984 the excess land of 1392.62
sq.mt. was taken into possession by respondent No.4.
Annexure-R6 discloses that, excluding the excess land,
the compensation was determined only to the extent of
26 guntas 2 annas and 2 paise. Annexure-R11 is the
notification dated 07.04.1980 issued by the Government
of Karnataka exercising power under Section 18 of the
Boards Act, 1976.
18. All these documents prima facie indicate that
no possession of the land in question was taken by
respondent No.4 in accordance with law by issuing the
notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A.Act, 1894.
Moreover, the acquisition notification relates to 1 acre,
the award dated 06.09.1989 is passed only in respect of
26 guntas 3 annas 2 paise of the said land acquired. It is
an admitted fact that no award has been passed in
respect of the land in question i.e. 13 guntas 12 annas 4
paise (1392.62 sq.meters) neither by BUDA nor by the
- 17 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
competent authority under the ULC Act. No documents
are placed on record to show that notice was issued to
the appellants for taking over the possession of land in
question or issuance of Section 16(2) notification under
the L.A.Act, 1894. In the circumstances, the possession of
land in question said to have been taken by BUDA prima
facie appears to be not in a manner known to law. Further
there is serious dispute inasmuch as the layout said to
have formed and developed utilizing the lands in
question. It is a categorical submission of the learned
counsel for the appellants that the possession of the
vacant land is still in the possession of the appellants.
19. Though the learned counsel appearing for
BUDA and the State Government argued that no relief
could be granted to the appellants considering the delay
and laches, we are not inclined to accept the same, as no
award has been passed till date relating to the lands in
question.
20. It is well settled law that the Court exercising
the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
of India can mould the relief in the interest of justice and
equity, keeping in mind the subsequent events/changed
circumstances of the case. As contended by the
learned counsel for the BUDA, if the third party
rights are created and the lands are developed, it
would not be appropriate to direct the respondents
to restore the lands to the appellants de-hors the
rights accrued to the third parties and more
particularly, without providing an opportunity of
hearing to them. If the developmental activities
taken by the BUDA creating the private/third party
interest is established, it would be justifiable for
respondent No.2 to examine the aspect of granting
compensation for the lands in question by passing
an appropriate award. In such circumstances, in
view of the law declared by the Constitutional
Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P. (C)
Nos.9036-9038 of 2016 (D.D. 06.03.2020) (Indore
Development Authority V/s Mahoharlal and others) ,
Section 24(1)(a) of the Act, 2013 would attract
since no award has been made as on 01.01.2014.
However, these aspects have to be addressed by
the Deputy Commissioner considering the materials
- 18 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:15902-DB
WA No. 100385 of 2025
CNR: KAHC020090772025
placed/to be placed by the parties regarding the
actual possession taken vis-à-vis the development
of the land in question as aforesaid. Hence, the
matters are remitted to the 2nd respondent to examine
whether the appellants are entitled to the benefit of
saving clause under Section 3(2) of the Repeal Act, 1999
or for the compensation in accordance with law.
21. Since the parties are represented by their
respective learned counsels, the parties are directed to
appear before the 2nd respondent-Deputy Commissioner
on 07.04.2020 without waiting for any notice. The 2nd
respondent-Deputy Commissioner shall take an
appropriate decision in accordance with law in the light of
the observations made hereinabove, in an expedite
manner, in any event not later than six weeks from the
date of the appearance of the parties before him.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. With the aforesaid observations, finding no warrant
to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge, the writ
appeal stands disposed .
As a consequence, the pending IAs are also disposed.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
JTR/CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 34