Bhupinder Singh @ Titu vs The State (Nct) Of Delhi

Court
Delhi High Court

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 19.03.2026
Pronounced on: 04.05.2026
+ CRL.A. 708/2002
BHUPINDER SINGH @ TITU .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Arundhati Katju, Sr. Adv.
( Amicus Curiae ) with Ms.
Ritika Meena, Adv.s
versus
THE STATE (NCT) OF DELHI .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Aman Usman, APP for the
State with Mr. Manvendra
Yadav, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
J U D G M E N T
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
1. The present appeal under Section 374 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 [“ Cr.P.C. ”] is filed by the appellant against the
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Judgment of Conviction dated 12 August, 2002 and the Order on
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Sentence dated 16 August, 2002 passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, New Delhi [“ Trial Court ”] in Sessions Case No.
48/1998, arising out of FIR No. 1130/1996, registered under Sections
365/302/201/468/471/120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
[“ IPC ”] at Police Station Janak Puri.
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2. Vide order dated 30 August, 2005, the sentence awarded to the
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appellant was suspended, subject to him furnishing a personal bond in
the sum of Rs. 15,000/- with two sureties of the like amount.
Factual Background
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3. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 24 November, 1996, an
information was received at Police Station Janak Puri vide DD No. 46-
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B that on 23 November, 1996 at 11:00 am, one Mr. Amolak Ram
Anand (deceased), aged about 65-70 years, left his house, situated at
B-1/395, Janak Puri, for Race Course in his Maruti Car No. DBB-
5722 of green colour, but did not return, and his whereabouts were not
known. Efforts were made to trace the missing person and the car, but
neither the car nor the missing person could be traced.
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4. On 29 November, 1996, statement of PW-7, Rama Anand, the
wife of Mr. Amolak Ram Anand, was recorded. In the said statement,
she stated that her son Sunil Anand was married to one Shamita in the
year 1982 and that they were having strained relations between them
for the last four years, and a case was pending in Family Court. She
stated that Shamita was residing with her parents at Bombay and had
threatened on telephone that she will teach them a lesson. She
suspected Shamita’s involvement in the kidnapping of her husband,
Amolak Ram. On the basis of the said statement, an FIR was recorded
under Section 365 IPC. Upon investigation, it was found that Shamita
was not involved in the kidnapping.
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5. On 31 January, 1997, Smt. Rama Anand, along with her
brother, PW-8, Mr. Satpal Chadha, were going to their house from the
school in the school van, and when they reached near light crossing of
Virender Nagar, near Tihar Jail Road, they saw their car no. DBB-
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5722, which was being driven by a young man. Mr. Satpal Chadha
alighted from the van and enquired from the said person about the
owner of the car. On hearing this, the said person left the car and
escaped. Upon search of the car, certain papers, including a medical
certificate, nomination form, voter list, guide map of Agra and a
Criminal Manual containing Cr.P.C, IPC and Indian Evidence Act,
1872 were recovered.
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6. On 17 February, 1997, accused Kali Charan was arrested
under Section 41(1)(g) of Cr.P.C and his disclosure statement was
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recorded. In such statement, he stated that on 23 November 1996, he
was told by Bhupinder (appellant) that Bhupinder, along with accused
Dharminder, had murdered Mr. Amolak Ram Anand at T-1/49, Tihar
Jail Quarter. On the same fateful day, Bhupinder, along with his
companions Mahavir, Kali Charan, and Dharminder, after putting the
dead body of the deceased in his car bearing no. DBB-5722, threw the
body in the Gang Nahar, near Dadri in Uttar Pradesh, at about 10:00
pm.
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7. On 05 March, 1997, Bhupinder Singh and Chander Prakash
were arrested in this case. Bhupinder Singh (appellant) gave a
disclosure statement that he had murdered Amolak Ram Anand by
strangulation, as the deceased, Amolak Ram, had misbehaved with his
wife. He stated that the deceased was earlier working in a Coca Cola
factory and had promised the appellant a job in the said factory. He
further disclosed that the deceased used to visit his house. He was
fond of girls and was murdered in a conspiracy with the co-accused
persons.
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8. From the disclosure statements of the appellant and accused
Chander Prakash, it was also revealed that the accused, Chander
Prakash, was a Congress worker and knew high-ups and was involved
in getting jobs to youngsters. He had an office at the house of
Virender in Virender Nagar, where accused Mahavir, Kali Charan and
Dharminder used to visit in search of jobs. On the complaint of the
appellant regarding the deceased, Amolak Ram Anand, misbehaving
with his wife, all of them hatched a conspiracy and murdered Amolak
Ram Anand and threw his body in the Gang Nahar. It was also
disclosed that the car of the deceased was parked at Village Hussain
Pur (the village of accused Kali Charan) and from there it was taken to
Village Dayanatpur. The car then remained parked at Sumer Nangla,
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the village of accused Chander Prakash, from 10 December 1996 to
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27 January, 1997. On 28 January, 1997, it was brought to Delhi,
and on the basis of forged documents, its ownership was transferred in
the name of the appellant, Bhupinder Singh.
9. The stepney of the said car was recovered from Goldy Tyres
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Shop on 09 May, 1997 at the instance of accused Virender Kumar,
who was also arrested. The Investigating Officer collected the forged
documents of the car from the transport authority, obtained specimen
handwriting and signatures of the accused, and sent the same to FSL
for expert opinion.
10. The FSL result was collected and on completion of
investigation, charge sheet was filed under Sections
365/302/201/420/468/471/120-B/34 IPC. Vide Order dated
23.02.2001, the learned Trial Court declared accused Chandar
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Prakash, Mahavir and Dharminder as Proclaimed Offenders.
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11. Vide order dated 27 March, 2001, charges under Sections 120-
B/201/34 IPC were framed against the appellant Bhupinder Singh, and
accused, Kali Charan and Virender Kumar. Separate charges under
Sections 302/34 and Sections 471/468/34 IPC were also framed
against the appellant. The accused persons pleaded not guilty.
12. Statements of the accused persons were recorded under Section
313 Cr.P.C. Appellant Bhupinder Singh stated that he was innocent
and was falsely implicated. He stated that he was summoned from
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Phagwara by the police on 03 March, 1997 and was implicated in
this case. He stated that he had not purchased the car and somebody
might have used his name for the registration of the car by giving a
forged address of Tihar Village. He also stated that he was never
residing at the address shown in the Registration Certificate of the car.
He further stated that ration card was never got prepared by him nor
he got the car transferred in his name.
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13. The learned Trial Court vide its Judgment dated 12 August,
2002, acquitted the accused Kali Charan and Virender Kumar but
convicted the appellant Bhupinder Singh under Sections 302/34,
201/34, 468/34 and Section 471 IPC. Further, vide the Order on
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Sentence dated 16 August, 2002, the appellant was sentenced as
under:-
i. Rigorous Imprisonment for Life for offence under Section 302 IPC and to
pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo RI for 06 months;
ii. Imprisonment for 03 years for offence under Section 468 IPC and to pay a
fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to further undergo RI for 03 months;
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iii. Rigorous Imprisonment for 03 years for offence under Section 471 IPC
and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo RI for 03
months;
iv. Rigorous Imprisonment for 07 years for offence under Section 201 IPC
and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default to further undergo RI for 06
months.
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14 . Vide order dated 26 April, 2024, Ms. Arundhati Katju was
appointed as Amicus Curiae to defend the present appeal. The
appellant later jumped the bail and was declared Proclaimed Offender
[ “PO” ] vide the order dated 16.02.2026.
Submissions on behalf of the Appellant
15. The learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant, Bhupinder Singh
@ Titu, assailed the impugned judgment on the ground that it is
contrary to law and that the prosecution case suffers from inherent
improbabilities. It was contended that the prosecution case is founded
entirely on circumstantial evidence, there being no direct or ocular
testimony connecting the appellant with the alleged offence.
16. It was urged that the dead body of the deceased has not been
recovered and, therefore, the foundational factum of death itself
remains unproved. It was submitted that although the learned Trial
Court has proceeded on the assumption of death, such an inference is
not supported by cogent evidence on record. In absence of corpus
delicti , the prosecution case becomes inherently doubtful and
unreliable for sustaining conviction for murder.
17. Learned Amicus contended that the learned Trial Court has
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failed to appreciate that there is a complete absence of forensic or
scientific evidence linking the appellant with the alleged crime. No
fingerprints were lifted from the vehicle and no recovery whatsoever
has been effected from the appellant. Despite this, the learned Trial
Court has drawn adverse inferences, which, it is submitted, are not
borne out from the evidence on record.
18. It was further submitted that the learned Trial Court has erred in
placing reliance on photocopies of alleged vehicle transfer documents,
as the same is inadmissible in evidence in the absence of primary
evidence. It was further submitted that the allegation of forgery of
signatures of PW-7, Smt. Rama Anand, the alleged executant, is not
proved in accordance with law, particularly when the said witness
(PW-7) has not supported the prosecution’s case. Relying on the
statement of PW-7, it was contended that in her examination-in-chief,
she accepted that the signatures on the Form No. 29 and 30,
transferring the ownership of the car, belonged to her, however, in her
cross-examination, she changed her statement and disputed that the
signatures were hers.
19. It was submitted that PW-5, Sh. A.S. Yadav, an official witness
from the Transport Department, did not support the prosecution case,
as he admitted that the documents were neither prepared nor seized in
his presence and that material particulars are missing from the forms.
20. It was further contended that as per the prosecution record
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itself, the vehicle stood transferred on 31 January, 1997, but the
photocopies of the relevant forms reveal that the transfer happened on
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10 November, 1996, that is, prior to the alleged disappearance of the
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deceased, thereby falsifying and demolishing the prosecution theory
regarding forged signatures of PW-7.
21. The learned Amicus further submitted that no Test Identification
Parade [TIP] was conducted and that the complainant/PW-7 has
categorically stated that she could not identify the driver of the
vehicle.
22. It was contended that the learned Trial Court placed undue
reliance on the disclosure statements of the co-accused persons, who
have since been acquitted. No incriminating recovery has been
effected pursuant to such disclosures and, therefore, the same are
wholly inadmissible except to the limited extent permitted by law. The
learned Trial Court, it was urged, erred in treating such statements as
substantive evidence while convicting the appellant.
23. It was further contended that the prosecution case suffers from
multiple missing links, including non-examination of material
witnesses, absence of independent witnesses at the time of alleged
recoveries, and witnesses turning hostile. There is no evidence of last
seen, no established motive, and no recovery of the dead body. These
gaps, it was submitted, break the chain of circumstances, rendering the
conviction unsustainable.
24. It was further argued that the invocation of Section 34 of the
IPC is wholly misconceived. The learned Trial Court inferred
common intention without there being any evidence of prior meeting
of mind or concerted action. This becomes even more untenable in
view of the acquittal of co-accused persons, thereby demolishing the
very basis for application of Section 34 IPC.
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25. Learned Amicus submitted that the case of prosecution is based
on suspicion and conjectures and does not meet the standard of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. In these circumstances, it was prayed that
the impugned judgment be set aside and the appellant be acquitted of
all the charges.
Submissions on behalf of State
26. Per contra , learned Additional Public Prosecutor [APP] for the
State submitted that the impugned judgment does not suffer from any
infirmity, inasmuch as the learned Trial Court has given detailed and
well-reasoned findings and has convicted the appellant after a fair trial
and proper appreciation of evidence. It was contended that the case is
founded on circumstantial evidence, and the circumstances proved by
the prosecution, when taken cumulatively, form a consistent and
unbroken chain pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant.
27. It was urged that the disappearance of the deceased and the
subsequent recovery of his vehicle, which was found to have been
transferred in the name of the appellant, constitute a vital
incriminating circumstance. It was argued that the learned Trial Court
has rightly drawn an adverse inference from this circumstance,
observing that the appellant’s involvement in the transfer of the
vehicle soon after the disappearance of the deceased is a conduct
inconsistent with his innocence and is indicative of his complicity.
28. Learned APP further submitted that the documentary evidence,
particularly the transfer forms [Form 29 and 30] and related records,
establish that the appellant was directly connected with the
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transaction. The learned Trial Court has relied upon these documents
in conjunction with the expert opinion to conclude that the signatures
on the relevant documents correspond with those of the appellant,
thereby indicating his active role in dealing with the vehicle of the
deceased.
29. It was contended that the learned Trial Court has rightly placed
reliance on the expert evidence, which supports the prosecution case
that the questioned signatures tally with the specimen signatures of the
appellant. It is the prosecutions case that the appellant forged the
signatures of PW-7, Rama Anand, on the transfer forms and got the
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car transferred in his name on 31 January, 1997, which also
corroborated by the statement of PW-5. From this, a reasonable
inference has been drawn by the learned Trial Court that the appellant
was instrumental in preparing or using the documents relating to
transfer of the vehicle belonging to the deceased in his name after his
disappearance.
30. Learned APP submitted that the conduct of the appellant, as
reflected from the evidence on record, assumes significance. The
learned Trial Court observed that the appellant’s involvement in
securing transfer of the vehicle and his connection with the co-accused
persons, as emerging from the disclosure statements and other
evidence, constitute important links in the chain of circumstances.
31. It was further contended that although the disclosure statements
of the accused persons are limited in evidentiary value, the learned
Trial Court has relied upon them only to the extent they led to
recovery of material objects, including the stepney of the vehicle.
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Such recovery, coupled with other circumstances, has been rightly
treated as corroborative evidence.
32. Learned APP further submitted that minor contradictions do not
go to the root of the prosecution case and that the learned Trial Court
relied upon those portions of the testimony which were found to be
credible and consistent with the overall prosecution case.
33. It was argued that the non-recovery of the dead body had been
duly considered by the learned Trial Court, which rightly held that, in
the facts and circumstances of the present case, the absence of corpus
delicti is not fatal, particularly when the surrounding circumstances
clearly indicate that the deceased is no longer alive and that the
appellant is connected with the commission of the offence.
34. The learned APP further submitted that co-accused Kali Charan
and Virender Kumar were acquitted only on the basis of benefit of
doubt, and that the three other accused persons, namely, Chander
Prakash, Mahavir and Dharminder, have been declared Proclaimed
Offenders. It was therefore contended that the learned Trial Court was
right in convicting the appellant with the aid of Section 34 IPC.
35. It was lastly submitted that the prosecution has proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt and that the learned Trial Court has rightly
convicted the appellant after proper appreciation of the evidence.
Considering the gravity of offence and the overall circumstances, it
was submitted that the present appeal is devoid of merit and no ground
is made out which warrants interference. It was prayed that the appeal
be dismissed.
Reasoning and Analysis
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36. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have carefully
examined the entire evidence on record as well as the reasoning
adopted by the learned Trial Court in the impugned judgment.
37. The prosecution case is based entirely on circumstantial
evidence, there being no direct or ocular testimony connecting the
appellant with the offences. It is a settled principle of criminal
jurisprudence that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, each
circumstance relied upon by the prosecution must be firmly
established, and all such circumstances must form a complete and
unbroken chain leading to the hypothesis of guilt of the accused,
excluding every other possible hypothesis. Any missing link in the
chain must necessarily tilt to the benefit of the accused.
38. In the backdrop of this settled legal proposition, we now
proceed to examine the evidence in the light of facts and
circumstances of the case, to find out as to whether each link in the
chain of circumstances has been fully established by the prosecutionor
not.
39. The first and foremost aspect which falls for consideration in
the present case is the absence of corpus delicti , that is, the non-
recovery of the dead body of the deceased. The prosecution case is
based on the premise that the appellant and other co-accused persons,
acted in concert, abducted and murdered the deceased, Mr. Amolak
Ram Anand, and disposed of his body by throwing it into the Gang
Nahar. Admittedly, as per the prosecution narrative, despite efforts,
the body was not recovered.
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40. It is trite law that recovery of the dead body is not an
indispensable requirement in every case of alleged homicide.
However, in case resting purely on circumstantial evidence, the
prosecution must establish, by cogent and convincing evidence, that
the person alleged to have been murdered is indeed dead and that such
death was homicidal in nature. The burden in such a case is of a higher
degree, as the Court must guard against the possibility of conviction
based on conjectures in the absence of direct proof of death. Such
principle was observed by the Supreme Court in Rama Nand and Ors.
v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 1 SCC 511, wherein the Court
noted that:-
“ 27 . …In other words, we would take it that
the corpus delicti i.e. the dead body of the
victim was not found in this case. But even on
that assumption, the question remains whether
the other circumstances established on record
were sufficient to lead to the conclusion that
within all human probability, she had been
murdered by Rama Nand appellant? It is true
that one of the essential ingredients of the
offence of culpable homicide required to be
proved by the prosecution is that the accused
"caused the death" of the person alleged to
have been killed.
28 . This means that before seeking to prove
that the accused is the perpetrator of the
murder, it must be established that homicidal
death has been caused. Ordinarily, the
"recovery of the dead body of the victim or a
vital part of it, bearing marks of violence, is
sufficient proof of homicidal death of the
victim. There was a time when under the old
English law, the finding of the body of the
deceased was held to be essential before a
person was convicted of committing his
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culpable homicide. "I would never convict,"
said Sir Mathew Hale, "a person of murder or
manslaughter unless the fact were proved to
be done, or at least the body was found dead."
This was merely a rule of caution, and not of
law. But in those times when execution was the
only punishment for murder, the need for
adhering to this cautionary rule was greater.
Discovery of the dead body of the victim
bearing physical evidence of violence, has
never been considered as the only mode of
proving the corpus delicti in murder. Indeed,
very many cases are of such a nature where
the discovery of the dead body is impossible. A
blind adherence to this old "body" doctrine
would open the door wide open for many a
heinous murderer to escape with impunity
simply because they were cunning and clever
enough to destroy the body of their victim. In
the context of our law, Sir Hale's enunciation
has to be interpreted no more than
emphasising that where the dead body of the
victim in a murder case is not found, other
cogent and satisfactory proof of the homicidal
death of the victim must be adduced by the
prosecution. Such proof may be by the direct
ocular account of an eyewitness, or by
circumstantial evidence, or by both. But where
the fact of corpus delicti i.e. "homicidal death"
is sought to be established by circumstantial
evidence alone, the circumstances must be of a
clinching and definitive character unerringly
leading to the inference that the victim
concerned has met a homicidal death. Even so,
this principle of caution cannot be pushed too
far as requiring absolute proof. Perfect proof
is seldom to be had in this imperfect world,
and absolute certainty is a myth. That is why
under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, a fact is
said to be "proved", if the court considering
the matters before it, considers its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the
circumstances of the particular case, to act
upon the supposition that it exists. The corpus
delicti or the fact of homicidal death,
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therefore, can be proved by telling and
inculpating circumstances which definitely
lead to the conclusion that within all human
probability, the victim has been murdered by
the accused concerned…
”
41. Admittedly, no one saw the appellant or the co-accused persons
abducting Mr. Amolak Ram Anand, committing his murder, or
disposing his body. There is no recovery of any of the belongings of
the deceased, including missing car bearing no. DBB-5722, from the
possession of the appellant. If the prosecution story is to be believed
on the basis of the statements of PW-7, Smt. Rama Anand, the wife
of the deceased, and her brother, PW-8, Satpal Chadha recorded under
Section 161 Cr.P.C, it was appellant Bhupinder Singh, whom they
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allegedly saw sitting in their aforesaid car on 31 January, 1997.
However, in their testimonies before the Court, neither of them
identified the appellant as the person who ran away after leaving the
car at Jail Road Crossing.
42. PW-12, Rohtas Goel, and PW-14, Smt. Neelam, from Village
Dayanatpur were examined to prove that the appellant had parked the
car in the village, however, they turned hostile and did not support the
prosecution case. They did not even identify the appellant. Similarly,
PW-15, Sham Bihari Lal, from Village Nangla Sumer was examined
to prove that Bhupinder Singh had come to his village, posing himself
as a CBI Inspector, and had parked the car at his residence, but he also
turned hostile and did not identify the appellant. There is, thus, no
evidence that the car of PW-7 was in the possession of appellant
Bhupinder Singh at any point of time.
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43. The prosecution has placed reliance on the disclosure statement
of the appellant as also the pointing out memos prepared at the
instance of the appellant, whereby, he identified the place of murder,
place of disposing the body and also the places where the car was
parked after commission of murder. Such pointing out memos were
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prepared between 08 March, 1997 to 10 March, 1997. However, by
that time, such places were already known to the investigating agency,
having already been pointed out by the accused Kali Charan.
Therefore, the pointing out memos prepared at the instance of the
present appellant, are of no help in establishing his guilt. The Supreme
Court in the case of Anand Jakkappa Pujari @ Gaddadar v. State of
Karnataka , 2026 INSC 417, opined that information should distinctly
relate to the fact discovered. Where a fact has already been
discovered, any information received subsequently cannot be said to
lead to the discovery again.
44. Apart from the disclosure statements and the pointing out memo
prepared at the instance of the appellant and the co-accused, there is
no independent or reliable evidence to establish that deceased is no
longer alive. No witness deposed to have seen the dead body, no one
saw the appellant and co-accused committing the murder or disposing
the body, no recovery of the body has been effected and no scientific
or medical evidence has been produced to corroborate the
prosecution’s version. Therefore, we are of the view that the
prosecution’s version of disposal of the body in Gang Nahar remains
unsubstantiated.
45. The learned Trial Court has drawn an adverse inference as to
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the nature of the death primarily on the basis of circumstances such as
disappearance of the deceased and the subsequent events relating to
the transfer of the vehicle. Such an inference, in our considered view,
is not supported by a complete chain of circumstances, so as to
conclusively establish the factum of death beyond reasonable doubt.
46. It is also material to note that the specimen signatures of PW-7
and the appellant were sent to FSL for comparison with the signatures
on the transfer documents, that is, Ex. PW-5/F and Ex. PW-5/G. The
FSL Report, Ex. PW-19/A, confirms that the transfer documents bear
the signatures of the appellant, while the specimen signatures of PW-7
did not match with the questioned signatures at points marked Q-2, Q-
6, Q-9 and Q-13 on the said transfer documents. In her examination-
in-chief, PW-7 deposed that Ex. PW-5/F and Ex. PW-5/G bear her
signatures at points Q-2, Q-6, Q-9 and Q-13. She was then cross-
examined by the learned APP, and in such cross-examination, she
took a ‘U turn’ by stating that she has not signed at points Q-2, Q-6,
Q-9 and Q-13 on the said documentsEx. PW-5/F and Ex. PW-5/G.
Thus, a doubt has been created as to whether the transfer
documentsEx. PW-5/F and Ex. PW-5/G, on the basis of which the car
has been transferred in the name of the appellant, are in fact the
genuine or forged signatures of PW-7. However, there is no evidence
to prove that it was appellant who forged the signatures of PW-7 on
transfer documents or that he himself submitted the said documents
for transfer of registration of the car in his name.
47. The testimony of PW-5, an official from the Transport
Department, also does not advance the prosecution case, as he has
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admitted that the documents were neither prepared nor seized in his
presence and the essential particulars were missing. There is also no
evidence on record to show that it was the appellant who had himself
applied for the transfer of the deceased’s vehicle before the Transport
Authority. Significantly, the record itself indicates that the relevant
th
Forms Ex. PW-5/F and Ex. PW-5/G were filled up on 10 November,
1996, that is, prior to the disappearance of the husband of PW-7. This
circumstance, in fact, runs contrary to the prosecution story that after
committing the murder, the vehicle was transferred in the name of the
appellant. The learned Trial Court has failed to appropriately consider
the effect of such evidence.
48. The reliance placed by the prosecution on the disclosure
statement of the appellant and co-accused is also misplaced. The
recovery of stepney effected at the instance of co-accused, Virender,
cannot be read against the present appellant. Moreover, co-accused,
Virender, has since been acquitted by the learned Trial Court. No
discovery has been made pursuant to the disclosure statement of the
appellant in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Hence, the disclosure statement of the appellant is inadmissible in
evidence.
49. In our view, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of
establishing the corpus delicti. No circumstance brought on record
proves the murder of husband of PW-7. The mere disappearance of
the deceased, Mr. Amolak Ram Anand, coupled with inadmissible
disclosure statements and doubtful circumstances, cannot substitute
proof of death. The prosecution has failed to prove any motive, any
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PRUTHI
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last-seen evidence or any recovery of any clinching material, like
clothes of deceased, vehicle, or murder weapon to corroborate the
charge of murder. Motive has remained embedded in the inadmissible
disclosure statements. No evidence whatsoever has been led to prove
the motive of the appellant. No clinching evidence has been brought
on record to connect the appellant with the alleged abduction and
murder of the deceased
50. The Supreme Court in Indrajit Das v. State of Tripura, (2023)
18 SCC 506, stated that in a case based on circumstantial evidence,
motive has an important role to play and it carries greater importance
in such cases. Motive is an important link in the chain of
circumstances. In the present case, there is no evidence to prove the
existence of previous enmity between Mr. Amolak and the appellant
which could have converted into a reasonable motive for kidnapping
and murder. All that was suggested by the prosecution was that the
appellant, along with co-accused persons, kidnapped and murdered the
deceased and that the appellant took away the deceased’s car. This
theory is not impressive as it is not supported by any cogent evidence.
The chain of circumstances is clearly incomplete and leaves room for
reasonable doubt.
51. Insofar as the applicability of Section 34 IPC is concerned, we
find that there is no evidence of any prior meeting of minds or
common intention. The acquittal of co-accused persons further
demolishes the basis for invoking Section 34 IPC against the
appellant.
52. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered
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Signed By:VAISHALI
PRUTHI
Signing Date:04.05.2026
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opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges under
Sections 302/365/468/34 & 471 IPC.
Conclusion:
53. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The conviction and
sentence of the appellant under Sections 302/365/468/34 & 471 IPC is
set aside and he is acquitted of the said charges.
54. The Bail Bond and the Surety submitted by the accused are
hereby discharged.
55. Copy of this order be sent to the learned Trial Court and to the
concerned Superintendent Jail for information and necessary action.
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
MAY 04, 2026/ AK
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:VAISHALI
PRUTHI
Signing Date:04.05.2026
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