THE CARDOMON MERCHANTS vs MAHANTSWAMY S/O REVANSIDDAYYA PYATIMATH

- 1 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026



IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKAAT DHARWAD


TH
DATED THIS THE 15 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

AND

THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

WRIT APPEAL NO.100876 OF 2026 (S-R)

BETWEEN:

1. THE CARDOMOM MERCHANTS,
CO OPERATIVE BANK LTD.,
HAVERI, NEAR RAILWAY STATION,
HAVERI, KARNATAKA – 581110,
R/BY ITS MANAGER.

2. THE CHAIRMAN,
THE CARDOMOM MERCHANTS
CO OPERATIVE BANK LTD., HAVERI,
AND THE DIRECTOS OF THE SAID BANK,
HAVERI, KARNATAKA – 581110.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. F.V. PATIL,ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. MAHANTSWAMY
S/O. REVANSIDDAYYA PYATIMATH,
A/A: 61 YEARS, OCC: RETIRED MANAGER,
ND
R/O: DHEERSHREE 2 MAIN,
NEAR ANUR KIRANI STORES,
VIDYANAGAR EAST, HAVERI,
KARNATAKA – 581110.

2. THE DEPUTY REGISTRAR,
OF CO OPERATIVE SOCIETIES,
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION BUILDING,
HAVERI DISTRICT, HAVERI,










Digitally signed
by RAKESH S
HARIHAR
Location: High
Court of
Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench

- 2 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

KARNATAKA – 581110.

3. THE ASSISTANT REGISTRAR,
OF CO OPERATIVE SOCIEITIES,
HAVERI SUB DIVISION, HAVERI OFFICE,
DANESWHARI NAGAR, HEGGERI ROAD,
HAVERI, KARNATAKA – 581110
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. MALLIKARJUNSWAMY B. HIREMATH,
ADVOCATE FOR R1;)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TOSET ASIDE
THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 12.08.2026 PASSED BY THE
LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN WRIT PETITION NO.102939/2026
(S-R) AS NOT MAINTAINABLE, AND PASS SUCH OTHER
ORDERS AS THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.

THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI

- 3 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )

The appellant, the Cardamom Merchants Co-operative
Bank Limited, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Bank’ for short)
stands before us calling in question the order of the learned
Single Judge dated 12.08.2026 in WP No.102939/2026, by
which the learned Single Judge allows the petition, directs
payment of gratuity of Rs.20,00,000/- to respondent No.1 and
leave encashment of Rs.2,23,944/- and the fixed deposits that
were in their possession of Rs.75,969/- along with 10% interest
thereon.
2. Heard the learned counsel Sri. F.V. Patil appearing
for the appellants/Bank and the learned counsel
Sri.Mallikarjunswamy B Hiremath for the respondent No.1.
3. Facts adumbrated are as follows:
RespondentNo.1 joins the Bank as a daily wager in the
year 1991. In the year 2011, when the respondent was working
as a Manager, a complaint comes to be registered in Complaint
No.52 of 2011 before the Consumer Disputes Redressal

- 4 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

Commission for deficiency of service of Rs.45,00,000/- on
account of the alleged dereliction of duty by respondent No.1.
Long thereafter, on 31.05.2025, respondent No.1 retires on
attaining the age of superannuation and then submits
representations for release of terminal benefits, the gratuity
and leave encashment interalia . The Bank declines to release
any of the benefits, which drives respondent No.1 to go to the
doors of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies
(hereinafter referred to as ‘DRCS’ for short). The DRCS passes
the following order on 03.12.2025:
“ªÉÄîÌAqÀ «µÀAiÀÄPÉÌ ¸ÀA§A¢ü¹zÀAvÉ, G¯ÉèÃRzÀ°è ²æÃ
JªÀiï.Dgï.¥ÁånªÀÄoÀ ¤ªÀÈvÀÛ ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÀÄ ¢. PÁqÀðªÀĪÀiï ªÀÄZÀAðlì
PÉÆÃ-D¥sï ¨ÁåAPÀ °.. ºÁªÉÃj ¸Á:vÁ:f:ºÁªÉÃj EªÀgÀ zÀÆgÀÄ CfðAiÀÄ£ÀÄß
¥Àj²Ã°¸À¯ÁV, G¯ÉèÃTvÀgÀÄ ¤ªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQ£À°è 38 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À PÁ®
¸ÀÄ¢ÃWÀðªÁV ¸ÉÃªÉ ¸À°è¹ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ 17 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À PÁ® ªÀåªÀ¸ÁÜ¥ÀPÀgÉAzÀÄ
PÁAiÀÄð¤ªÀ𻹠¢£ÁAPÀ:31-05-2025 gÀAzÀÄ ªÀAiÉÆäªÀÈwÛ ºÉÆA¢gÀÄvÁÛgÉ.
ºÁUÀÆ ¤ªÀÈwÛ £ÀAvÀ£ÀzÀ CªÀjUÉ §gÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ UÁæZÀÆån, UÀ½PÉ gÀeÉ, ¸À£ï
2024-25 £Éà ¸Á°£À ¨ÉÆãÀ¸ÀÄì & J¥sï.r ªÉÆvÀÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß EzÀĪÀgÉUÀÆ
PÉÆnÖgÀĪÀÅ¢®èªÉAzÀÄ F PÀZÉÃjUÉ zÀÆgÀ£ÀÄß ¸À°è¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
PÀ£ÁðlPÀ ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼À ¤AiÀĪÀÄ-1960 PÀ®A 18(5) gÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ
¤ªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQUÉ ¤AiÀĪÀiÁªÀ½UÀ¼À£ÀÄß gÀƦ¹PÉÆArzÀÄÝ, CzÀgÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ ¸ÉêÁ
¤ªÀÈvÀÛ £ËPÀgÀjUÉ zÉÆgÀPÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ²æà ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¤ÃqÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ¨ÁåAQ£À
PÀvÀðªÀåªÁVzÉ. DzÀÝjAzÀ G¯ÉèÃTvÀgÀ zÀÆgÀÄ CfðAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥Àj²Ã°¹,
¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀjAzÀ ±Á¸À£À§zÀÞªÁV ¤ªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQUÉ §gÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ªÉÆvÀÛUÀ¼ÉãÁzÀgÀÆ
EzÀÝ°è CªÀÅUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀmÁªÀuÉ ªÀiÁrPÉÆAqÀÄ ¸ÀzÀjAiÀĪÀjUÉ ¤ÃqÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ
ªÉÆvÀÛUÀ¼À£ÀÄß PÀÆqÀ¯Éà ¥ÁªÀw¸ÀĪÀÅzÀÄ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¸ÀzÀgÀ «µÀAiÀÄzÀ §UÉÎ F PÀZÉÃjUÉ
ªÀgÀ¢ ªÀiÁqÀ®Ä ¸ÀÆa¹zÉ.
®UÀvÀÄÛ:zÀÆgÀÄ Cfð”

- 5 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026


This is rejected by the following endorsement:

“UÉ,
²æÃ
JªÀiï.Dgï.¥ÁålªÀÄoÀ
¤ªÀÈvÀÛ ªÀiÁå£ÉÃdgÀ, ¢ ¹.JªÀiï.¹. ¨ÁåAPÀ °..
«zÁå£ÀUÀgÀ, ºÁªÉÃj

ªÀiÁ£ÀågÉÃ,

«µÀAiÀÄ: vÀªÀÄä ¥ÀvÀæ ¢£ÁAPÀ:04-11-2025 £ÉÃzÀÝgÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ.


ªÉÄïÁÌt¹zÀ «µÀAiÀÄzÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ vÀªÀÄUÉ w½AiÀÄ¥Àr¸ÀĪÀÅzÉãÉAzÀgÉÃ,
ªÉÄîÌAqÀ vÀªÀÄä ¥ÀvÀæzÀ°è ¤ªÀÈwÛ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À£ÀÄß ¥ÁªÀw¸ÀĪÀ §UÉÎ PÉýPÉÆArzÀÝ®èzÉÃ
ªÀiÁ£Àå G¥À¤§AzsÀPÀgÀÄ, ¸ÀºÀPÁgÀ ¸ÀAWÀUÀ¼ÀÄ, ºÁªÉÃj f¯Éè ºÁªÉÃj EªÀjUÉ ¸ÀzÀgÀ
«µÀAiÀĪÁV zÀÆgÀÄ zÁR¯É ªÀiÁrzÀÄÝ EzÀÄÝ ¸ÀzÀj «µÀAiÀÄzÀ §UÉÎ DqÀ½vÀ ªÀÄAqÀ½
¸À¨sÉAiÀÄ°è vÉUÉzÀÄPÉÆAqÀ ¤tðAiÀÄzÀ ¥ÀæPÁgÀ vÀªÀÄä ¤ªÀÈwÛ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À PÀÄjvÀÄ ¨ÁåAQ£À
PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¸À®ºÉUÁgÀjAzÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¸À®ºÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉƼÀî®Ä w½¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.
CzÀgÀAvÉ ¨ÁåAQ£À PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¸À®ºÉUÁgÀjAzÀ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ ¸À®ºÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¥ÀqÉzÀÄPÉÆArzÀÄÝ
CzÀgÀ£ÀéAiÀÄ vÀªÀÄUÉ §gÀ¨ÉÃPÁzÀ ¤ªÀÈwÛ ¸Ë®¨sÀåUÀ¼À gÀPÀAUÀ¼À£ÀÄß £ÀªÀÄä ¨ÁåAQ£À°è oÉêÀtÂ
ªÀiÁr CzÀjAzÀ §gÀvÀPÀÌ §rØAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸ÀzÀgÀ oÉêÀtÂAiÀÄ°è ¸ÉÃj¹ ªÀiÁ£Àå gÁ¶ÖæÃAiÀÄ
UÁæºÀPÀgÀ ªÁådåUÀ¼À ¥ÀjºÁgÀ DAiÉÆÃUÀ, zɺÀ° EªÀgÀ°è£À C¦Ã® £ÀA.901/2019
£ÉÃzÀÝgÀ°è DUÀĪÀ CAwªÀÄ DzÉñÀªÀ£ÀÄß DzÀj¹ vÀªÀÄä ¤ªÀÈwÛ ¸Ë®¨sÀåzÀ PÀÄjvÀÄ
¤zsÀðj¸À¯ÁUÀĪÀÅzÀÄ CAvÁ F ªÀÄÆ®PÀ vÀªÀÄUÉ w½¹zÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛzÉ.

ªÀAzÀ£ÉUÀ¼ÉÆA¢UÉ,

vÀªÀÄä «±Áé¹
For The Cardamom Merchants co-op Bank Ltd., Haveri

Sd/-
ªÀiÁå£ÉÃdgÀ
Manager”
The endorsement of the Bank drives the respondent No.1
before the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.102939 of

- 6 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

2026. The learned Single Judge allows the claim. Allowing of
the claim has driven the Bank before us.
4. The learned counsel Sri.F.V.Patil appearing for the
appellants/Bank would vehemently contend that the appellant
is a Co-operative Bank and it was not a State under Article 12
of the Constitution of India for this Court to exercise the writ
jurisdiction and to entertain the petition and further direct the
benefits that to be granted. He would submit that unless the
threshold bar is crossed by the writ petitioner of maintainability
of the petition, the learned Single Judge ought not to have
granted the relief. The learned counsel would further contend
that the case of the Bank is not that they will not give gratuity
or leave encashment since the Bank has suffered an order at
the hands of the State Commission and the matter is pending
before the National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission.
It is only after the National Consumer Dispute Redressal
Commission's order, the release of the terminal benefits would
happen. Therefore, he would submit that the order of the
learned Single Judge be set-aside and appropriate direction be
issued thereon.

- 7 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

5. Per contra , learned counsel Sri. Mallikarjunswamy
B. Hiremath appearing for respondent No.1 would submit that
the employee did not at the outset approach this Court in the
writ petition. The employee first approaches the DRCS. The
Bank declines to adhere to the directions of the DRCS. Left with
no choice, respondent No.1 had to approach this Court seeking
a direction and the direction that is sought is a dispute between
employer-employee and not a dispute with others. It is his
terminal benefits that was sought, which was gratuity and leave
encashment interalia . The learned counsel submits that this
Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the petition and on
that score, the order of the learned Single Judge is in
consonance with law. This Court should, therefore, not
entertain the subject appeal.
6. We have given our anxious consideration to the
submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have
perused the material on record.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The
primary projection of the learned counsel for the appellants is
that a writ petition was not maintainable before the learned

- 8 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

Single Judge, for the learned Single Judge to have travelled
through and passed an order directing release of terminal
benefits. The said submission is noted only to be rejected for
the reason that no writ petition can be held to be not
maintainable before this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It is a discretionary remedy. It is
entertainable or otherwise is the only issue that has to be gone
into.
8. In a plethora of judgments, the Apex Court hold
that when rights of the parties, particularly, of the payment of
terminal benefits of the employees of the Co-operative Bank or
otherwise or even incidental remedies that are sought, it is for
the Court to excise its discretion and hold whether the writ
petition was entertainable or otherwise. There is vast difference
between the phrases ‘maintainability’ and ‘entertainability’. The
learned Single Judge having held that the writ petition is
maintainable and entertainable on cogent reasons. There is no
warrant of interference with the finding of the learned Single
Judge, which holds the writ petition to be maintainable and

- 9 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

entertainable. The submission of the learned counsel
Sri.F.V.Patil would thus tumble down.
9. The other submission is that the payment of
gratuity is not being denied, but it would be subject to or
pursuant to the order passed by the National Consumer Dispute
Redressal Forum. Before the State Commission, the
proceedings were instituted in the year 2011. The order of the
State Commission is now before the National Consumer Dispute
Redressal Forum. Gratuity cannot be denied to an employee
unless it is an action taken in accordance with the Payment of
Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for
short). Section 4 of the Act delves into the right of an employee
to get gratuity. Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Act clearly
mandates the circumstances under which gratuity to an
employee can be denied. It is only if the services of the
employee is terminated for offences involving moral turpitude
or allegations involving moral turpitude. That is not the issue in
the case at hand. There is not even an enquiry against the
respondent No.1. What the Bank wants to project is that the
proceedings pending before the National Consumer Dispute

- 10 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

Redressal Forum would be an impediment for release of
payment of gratuity. This submission again is noted only to be
rejected. Therefore, the respondent No.1 is entitled to the
benefit of gratuity that is accrued to him.
10. Whether the Bank is a State or not State, gratuity
must be paid to an employee. It would not mean that this Court
would not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition seeking
payment of gratuity and direct payment of gratuity
notwithstanding the mechanism under the Act as terminal
benefits being a property, which is a right under Article 300A of
the Constitution of India, is now by now too well settled a
principle of law. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
1
JHARKHAND v. JITENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA , has held
as follows:
“…. …. ….
8.It is an accepted position that gratuity and
pension are not bounties. An employee earns these
benefits by dint of his long, continuous, faithful and
unblemished service. Conceptually it is so lucidly
described in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India [(1983) 1
SCC 305 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 145] by D.A. Desai, J.
who spoke for the Bench, in his inimitable style, in
the following words: (SCC pp. 319-20, paras 18-20)


1
(2013) 12 SCC 210

- 11 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

“ 18 . The approach of the respondents raises a vital and
none too easy of answer, question as to why pension is
paid. And why was it required to be liberalised? Is the
employer, which expression will include even the State,
bound to pay pension? Is there any obligation on the
employer to provide for the erstwhile employee even
after the contract of employment has come to an end
and the employee has ceased to render service?

19 . What is a pension? What are the goals of pension?
What public interest or purpose, if any, it seeks to
serve? If it does seek to serve some public purpose, is it
thwarted by such artificial division of retirement pre and
post a certain date? We need seek answer to these and
incidental questions so as to render just justice between
parties to this petition.

20 . The antiquated notion of pension being a
bounty a gratuitous payment depending upon the
sweet will or grace of the employer not claimable
as a right and, therefore, no right to pension can
be enforced through court has been swept under
the carpet by the decision of the Constitution
Bench in Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar
[(1971) 2 SCC 330 : 1971 Supp SCR 634] wherein
this Court authoritatively ruled that pension is a
right and the payment of it does not depend upon
the discretion of the Government but is governed
by the rules and a government servant coming
within those rules is entitled to claim pension. It
was further held that the grant of pension does
not depend upon anyone's discretion. It is only for
the purpose of quantifying the amount having
regard to service and other allied matters that it
may be necessary for the authority to pass an
order to that effect but the right to receive pension
flows to the officer not because of any such order
but by virtue of the rules. This view was
reaffirmed in State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh
[(1976) 2 SCC 1 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 172 : (1976) 2
LLJ 377] .”

It is thus a hard earned benefit which accrues
to an employee and is in the nature of “property”.
This right to property cannot be taken away without
the due process of law as per the provisions of
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

- 12 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

14. The right to receive pension was
recognised as a right to property by the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [(1971) 2 SCC
330 : 1971 Supp SCR 634] , as is apparent from the
following discussion: (SCC pp. 342-43, paras 27-33)
“ 27 . The last question to be considered,
is, whether the right to receive pension by a
government servant is property, so as to attract
Articles 19(1)( f ) and 31(1) of the Constitution.
This question falls to be decided in order to
consider whether the writ petition is maintainable
under Article 32. To this aspect, we have already
adverted to earlier and we now proceed to
consider the same.

28 . According to the petitioner the right to
receive pension is property and the respondents
by an executive order dated 12-6-1968 have
wrongfully withheld his pension. That order
affects his fundamental rights under Articles
19(1)( f ) and 31(1) of the Constitution. The
respondents, as we have already indicated, do
not dispute the right of the petitioner to get
pension, but for the order passed on 5-8-1996.
There is only a bald averment in the counter-
affidavit that no question of any fundamental
right arises for consideration. Mr Jha, learned
counsel for the respondents, was not prepared to
take up the position that the right to receive
pension cannot be considered to be property
under any circumstances. According to him, in
this case, no order has been passed by the State
granting pension. We understood the learned
counsel to urge that if the State had passed an
order granting pension and later on resiles from
that order, the latter order may be considered to
affect the petitioner’s right regarding property so
as to attract Articles 19(1)( f ) and 31(1) of the
Constitution.

29 . We are not inclined to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the
respondents. By a reference to the material
provisions in the Pension Rules, we have already
indicated that the grant of pension does not
depend upon an order being passed by the
authorities to that effect. It may be that for the
purposes of qualifying the amount having regard

- 13 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

to the period of service and other allied matters,
it may be necessary for the authorities to pass an
order to that effect, but the right to receive
pension flows to an officer not because of the
said order but by virtue of the rules. The rules,
we have already pointed out, clearly recognise
the right of persons like the petitioners to receive
pension under the circumstances mentioned
therein.

30 . The question whether the pension
granted to a public servant is property
attracting Article 31(1) came up for
consideration before the Punjab High Court
in Bhagwant Singh v. Union of India [AIR
1962 Punj 503] . It was held that such a
right constitutes ‘property’ and any
interference will be a breach of Article 31(1)
of the Constitution. It was further held that
the State cannot by an executive order
curtail or abolish altogether the right of the
public servant to receive pension. This
decision was given by a learned Single
Judge. This decision was taken up in letters
patent appeal by the Union of India. The
Letters Patent Bench in its decision in Union
of India v. Bhagwant Singh [ILR (1965) 2
Punj 1] approved the decision of the learned
Single Judge. The Letters Patent Bench held
that the pension granted to a public servant
on his retirement is ‘property’ within the
meaning of Article 31(1) of the Constitution
and he could be deprived of the same only
by an authority of law and that pension does
not cease to be property on the mere denial
or cancellation of it. It was further held that
the character of pension as ‘property’
cannot possibly undergo such mutation at
the whim of a particular person or authority.

31 . The matter again came up before a
Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
in K.R. Erry v. State of Punjab [AIR 1967 Punj
279 : ILR (1967) 1 Punj 278] . The High Court
had to consider the nature of the right of an
officer to get pension. The majority quoted with
approval the principles laid down in the two
earlier decisions of the same High Court, referred
to above, and held that the pension is not to be
treated as a bounty payable on the sweet will and

- 14 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

pleasure of the Government and that the right to
superannuation pension including its amount is a
valuable right vesting in a government servant. It
was further held by the majority that even
though an opportunity had already been afforded
to the officer on an earlier occasion for showing
cause against the imposition of penalty for lapse
or misconduct on his part and he has been found
guilty, nevertheless, when a cut is sought to be
imposed in the quantum of pension payable to an
officer on the basis of misconduct already proved
against him, a further opportunity to show cause
in that regard must be given to the officer. This
view regarding the giving of further opportunity
was expressed by the learned Judges on the
basis of the relevant Punjab Civil Service Rules.
But the learned Chief Justice in his dissenting
judgment was not prepared to agree with the
majority that under such circumstances a further
opportunity should be given to an officer when a
reduction in the amount of pension payable is
made by the State. It is not necessary for us in
the case on hand, to consider the question
whether before taking action by way of reducing
or denying the pension on the basis of
disciplinary action already taken, a further notice
to show cause should be given to an officer. That
question does not arise for consideration before
us. Nor are we concerned with the further
question regarding the procedure, if any, to be
adopted by the authorities before reducing or
withholding the pension for the first time after
the retirement of an officer. Hence we express no
opinion regarding the views expressed by the
majority and the minority Judges in the above
Punjab High Court decision on this aspect. But we
agree with the view of the majority when it has
approved its earlier decision that pension is not a
bounty payable on the sweet will and pleasure of
the Government and that, on the other hand, the
right to pension is a valuable right vesting in a
government servant.

32 . This Court in State of M.P. v.
Ranojirao Shinde [AIR 1968 SC 1053 : (1968) 3
SCR 489] had to consider the question whether a
‘cash grant’ is ‘property’ within the meaning of
that expression in Articles 19(1)( f ) and 31(1) of
the Constitution. This Court held that it was

- 15 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

property, observing ‘it is obvious that a right to
sum of money is property’.

33 . Having due regard to the above
decisions, we are of the opinion that the right of
the petitioner to receive pension is property
under Article 31(1) and by a mere executive
order the State had no power to withhold the
same. Similarly, the said claim is also property
under Article 19(1)( f ) and it is not saved by
clause (5) of Article 19. Therefore, it follows that
the order dated 12-6-1968, denying the
petitioner right to receive pension affects the
fundamental right of the petitioner under Articles
19(1)( f ) and 31(1) of the Constitution, and as
such the writ petition under Article 32 is
maintainable. It may be that under the Pension
Act (23 of 1871) there is a bar against a civil
court entertaining any suit relating to the matters
mentioned therein. That does not stand in the
way of writ of mandamus being issued to the
State to properly consider the claim of the
petitioner for payment of pension according to
law.”

15. In State of W.B. v. Haresh C. Banerjee
[(2006) 7 SCC 651 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1719] this
Court recognised that even when, after the repeal
of Article 19(1)( f ) and Article 31(1) of the
Constitution vide Constitution (Forty-fourth
Amendment) Act, 1978 w.e.f. 20-6-1979, the right
to property no longer remained a fundamental
right, it was still a constitutional right, as provided
in Article 300-A of the Constitution. Right to receive
pension was treated as right to property.
Otherwise, challenge in that case was to the vires
of Rule 10(1) of the West Bengal Services (Death-
cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules, 1971 which
conferred the right upon the Governor to withhold
or withdraw a pension or any part thereof under
certain circumstances and the said challenge was
repelled by this Court.

16. The fact remains that there is an imprimatur to
the legal principle that the right to receive pension is
recognised as a right in “property”. Article 300-A of the
Constitution of India reads as under:

- 16 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026


“ 300-A. Persons not to be deprived of
property save by authority of law .—No
person shall be deprived of his property save by
authority of law.”

Once we proceed on that premise, the answer
to the question posed by us in the beginning of this
judgment becomes too obvious. A person cannot be
deprived of this pension without the authority of
law, which is the constitutional mandate enshrined
in Article 300-A of the Constitution. It follows that
attempt of the appellant to take away a part of
pension or gratuity or even leave encashment
without any statutory provision and under the
umbrage of administrative instruction cannot be
countenanced.

17. It hardly needs to be emphasised that the
executive instructions are not having statutory
character and, therefore, cannot be termed as “law”
within the meaning of the aforesaid Article 300-A.
On the basis of such a circular, which is not having
force of law, the appellant cannot withhold even a
part of pension or gratuity. As we noticed above, so
far as statutory Rules are concerned, there is no
provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the
given situation. Had there been any such provision
in these Rules, the position would have been
different.”
(Emphasis supplied)

In that light, there is no warrant of interference with the order
of the learned Single Judge. The writ appeal lacking in merits
must fail and it does fail.
11. Accordingly, the appeal stands rejected .

- 17 -
HC-KAR
NC: 2026:KHC-D:17229-DB
WA No. 100876 of 2026

CNR: KAHC020173472026

As a consequence, pending applications, if any, are also
disposed.



Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE



Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE


JTR
CT: ASC
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 10