DHONI ALIAS DHUNI YADAV vs STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

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2026:CGHC:21096-DB
NAFR
BABLU
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Digitally signed by
BABLU RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Date: 2026.05.06
18:56:59 +0530
WPCR No. 256 of 2026
Dhoni alias Dhuni Yadav S/o Shobharam Yadav Aged About 65 Years
R/o Village- Kodwagodan, P.S.- Kokdoor, District Kabirdham (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Chief Secretary, Department Of
Home And Police Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
2 - The Secretary Law And Legislative Affairs Department, Mantralay,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur (C.G.)
3 - Under Secretary Jail Department, Mantralay, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal
Nagar, Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
4 - Director General Prisons The Jail And Correctional Services
Chhattisgarh, Police Head Quarter Sector-19 Atal Nagar, Naya Raipur,
District- Raipur (C.G.)
5 - Collector (District Magistrate) District Durg (C.G.)
6 - Jail Superintendent Central Jail Durg (C.G.)
... Respondent(s)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Chitendra Singh, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Dr.Saurav Pande, Deputy Advocate General
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge
Order on Board

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Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice
6 .5 .2026
1. Heard Mr.Chitendra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner as
well as Dr.Saurav Pande, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing
for the respondents/State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner with the
following prayers:
“10.1 It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court
may kindly be pleased to call for the entire records
pertaining to the case of petitioner.
10.2 That, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
set aside the order dated 06/04/2026 (Annexure P/1)
passed by respondent No. 3 (Under Secretary,
C.G.State Jail Department) and may kindly direct the
Respondent authorities to consider the application for
grant of remission of the remaining jail sentence of the
Petitioner.
10.3 Further, the Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased
to direct respondent authorities for releasing the
petitioner under the provision of Section 432 of Cr.P.C.
(as amended Section 473 of B.N.S.S,2023 )or as per
other existing provision of law.
10.4 That, Any other relief which may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, may
also be granted in the interest of justice.”
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order dated 06.04.2026, whereby the application of the Petitioner for
grant of remission/premature release has been rejected, is arbitrary,

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illegal, and unsustainable in the eyes of law. The said rejection has
been made solely on the basis of a negative recommendation of the
State Sentence Review Board, without any independent application of
mind by the competent authority, which is contrary to the settled legal
position governing the exercise of powers under Rule 358(7)(viii) of the
Chhattisgarh Prison Rules, 1968. It is further submitted that the
Petitioner has already undergone the requisite period of incarceration
as prescribed under the applicable rules and policies governing
premature release of life convicts. The Petitioner’s case was duly
processed in accordance with law, and the application dated 05.06.2025
was recommended by the Jail Superintendent, Central Jail, Durg, and
was forwarded in the prescribed Proforma ‘A’. Moreover, the Learned
Trial Court had also issued a ‘No Objection Certificate’, thereby
supporting the case of the Petitioner for consideration of remission.
These material aspects clearly demonstrate that the Petitioner fulfills the
eligibility criteria for premature release.
4. Learned counsel submits that the recommendation of the State
Sentence Review Board is merely advisory in nature and cannot be
treated as binding upon the competent authority. It is incumbent upon
the authority to consider the case of the Petitioner independently by
taking into account relevant factors such as the conduct of the prisoner
during incarceration, his reformation, the likelihood of his reintegration
into society, and other mitigating circumstances. However, in the
present case, the impugned order reflects a complete non-application of
mind, as it does not disclose any independent reasoning or

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consideration of relevant materials. It is also submitted that the
impugned order is a non-speaking order, as it fails to assign any cogent
reasons for rejecting the Petitioner’s application despite favorable
recommendations from the Jail authorities and the absence of objection
from the Trial Court. Such an order is in clear violation of the principles
of natural justice and is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.
5. Learned counsel further submits that the object of incarceration is
not merely punitive but reformative in nature. The Petitioner has
undergone a substantial period of imprisonment and has maintained
good conduct during his incarceration. The denial of remission in such
circumstances defeats the very purpose of reformation and
rehabilitation, which are essential facets of the criminal justice system. It
is also contended that the authorities have failed to consider relevant
materials placed on record, including the recommendation of the Jail
Superintendent, the No Objection Certificate issued by the Trial Court,
and the Petitioner’s eligibility under the applicable rules. Instead, undue
weight has been given to the negative recommendation of the State
Sentence Review Board, rendering the decision arbitrary and legally
unsustainable. Lastly, it is submitted that the delay in deciding the
Petitioner’s application, coupled with the arbitrary rejection thereof, has
caused serious prejudice to the Petitioner. The discretionary power
vested in the authorities under the relevant rules is required to be
exercised in a fair, reasonable, and judicious manner, which has not
been done in the present case. It is also submitted that in the case of a
similarly situated co-accused, namely Rakesh Sahu, this Court in

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WPCR No. 108 of 2026, vide order dated 23.02.2026, has already
quashed a similar rejection order and held him entitled to premature
release under the Rules. Therefore, the petitioner is also entitled to
parity.
6. Per contra , learned State counsel submits that the petitioner has
been convicted for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of
the Indian Panel Code along with with other two co-accused and the
gravity of the offence warrants strict application of Rule 358(6)(ix). It is
contended that the Rule must be purposively interpreted and that the
petitioner has not completed 20 years of actual imprisonment.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
material available on record.
8. The controversy in the present case revolves around the
interpretation of Rule 358(6)(ix) of the Chhattisgarh Jail Rules, 1968,
which provides that a prisoner “who is guilty of murder in two or more
cases” shall be considered for premature release only after completion
of 20 years of actual imprisonment.
9. The expression used in the Rule is “two or more cases” and not
“two or more murders”. The distinction is clear and significant. In
criminal law, a “case” refers to a distinct prosecution arising from a
separate incident culminating in a separate trial. The Rule, therefore,
applies only where a person is convicted in two or more distinct cases
of murder.
10. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner was tried
and convicted in a single sessions trial arising out of one incident.

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Merely because there are multiple victims does not convert a single
case into multiple cases. The interpretation adopted by the respondent
authorities equating “multiple murders” with “multiple cases” is contrary
to the plain language of the Rule and legally unsustainable.
11. It is well settled that executive authorities must act strictly within
the framework of statutory provisions and cannot expand their scope by
interpretative processes. The impugned order, being based on a
manifestly erroneous interpretation of Rule 358(6)(ix), is liable to be set
aside.
12. Apart from the above, the record reveals that the petitioner has
undergone more than 16 years of imprisonment including remission, his
conduct in jail is satisfactory; and no adverse opinion has been
expressed by the competent authorities. Further, in the case of similarly
situated co-accused Rakesh Sahu, this Court in WPCR No. 108 of 2026
has already granted relief on identical grounds. Denial of similar benefit
to the present petitioner would be violative of the principle of parity and
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Jagdish ,
reported in (2010) 4 SCC 216 and Laxman Naskar v. State of West
Bengal , (2000) 7 SCC 626 has held that consideration for premature
release must be fair, reasonable and based on relevant factors.
14. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 06.04.2026 (Annexure
P-1) is quashed and set aside. It is declared that Rule 358(6)(ix) of the
Chhattisgarh Jail Rules, 1968 is not applicable to the case of the
petitioner.

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15. In view of the petitioner’s long incarceration, satisfactory conduct,
and absence of any statutory embargo, the petitioner is held entitled to
the benefit of premature release. The respondent authorities are
directed to release the petitioner forthwith, if not required in any other
case, subject to usual terms and conditions.
16. The writ petition stands allowed . No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu