Ratnagiri Gas And Power Private Limited vs Dinowic Pte Ltd
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 05.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010518572026
+ FAO(OS) (COMM) 294/2026, CM APPL. 74565/2026, CM
APPL. 74566/2026 & CM APPL. 74567/2026
RATNAGIRI GAS AND POWER PRIVATE
LIMITED .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Puneet Taneja, Sr. Adv.
through VC with Mr.
Manmohan Singh Narula, Mr.
Amit Yadav, Mr. Sarabjeet
Singh, Mr. Sidak Singh Narula,
Advs.
versus
DINOWIC PTE LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Giriraj Subramanium, Mr.
Jaisal Baath, Ms. Bijaharinigm
Mr. Prayuj Sharma, Mr. Aditya
Sarma, Ms. Miheeka Kapur,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J. (ORAL)
1. This appeal is filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short ‘the Act’) against the judgement
dated 17.08.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the
petition under Section 34 of the Act.
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Brief Facts
2. The brief facts are that the appellant, M/s Ratnagiri Gas and
Power Private Limited is a joint venture company promoted by NTPC
Limited and GAIL (India) Limited and owns and operates a power
plant at Dabhol, Maharashtra. The respondent, M/s Dinowic Pte. Ltd.
is a company incorporated in Singapore.
2.1 On 19.03.2014, the appellant floated an e-auction tender
through MSTC Limited for sale of 40,000 metric tonnes (MT) of
Naphtha lying at the Dabhol site. The respondent was the successful
bidder and a sale Order (for short ‘SO’) dated 02.04.2014 for
Rs.160,03,40,000/- was issued.
2.2 As per clause 5 of the SO, the respondent was required to lift
the entire quantity of Naphtha in two lots. The first lot of minimum
30,000 MT was to be lifted on or before 16.04.2014 and the balance
quantity of 10,000 MT was to be lifted on or before 21.04.2014. The
respondent was required to make payment through Letters of Credit
(LOC) within the stipulated timelines.
2.3 Disputes arose between the parties regarding delay in opening
of LOC, remittance of payments and lifting of Naphtha. The appellant
contended that the respondent failed to comply with the stipulated
timelines and was liable to pay liquidated damages (LD) under clause
9 of the SO. The appellant deducted an amount of USD 714,960.74
from the security deposit towards LD. The respondent disputed the
deduction and sought refund of the amount.
2.4 The arbitration under clause 14 of the Special Conditions of
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Contract (for short ‘SCC’) was invoked at the instance of the
respondent vide letter dated 31.01.2015. Since the arbitrator was not
appointed, a petition under Section 11 of the Act was filed and by
order dated 07.04.2015 this court appointed the sole arbitrator. The
arbitral proceedings were to be conducted under the aegis of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC).
2.5 The respondent raised three claims seeking refund of the
amount deducted from the security deposit along with interest. The
appellant raised four counter-claims towards interest on delayed
remittance, exchange-rate variation, ground rent for delayed lifting of
Naphtha and interest thereon. Vide award dated 03.09.2019, the
arbitrator allowed the claims of the respondent and directed the
appellant to refund USD 714,760.74 along with interest at the rate of
6% per annum with effect from 17.06.2014. All the counterclaims
raised by the appellant were rejected.
2.6 Aggrieved by the award, the appellant filed a petition under
Section 34 of the Act. Vide judgment dated 17.08.2026, the learned
Single Judge dismissed the petition and held that the arbitration
between the parties constituted an International Commercial
Arbitration (ICA) and no ground for setting aside the award was made
out under Section 34 of the Act. Hence, the present appeal.
Submissions of the appellant
3. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the application
for appointment of the arbitrator was to be dealt with by the authority
prescribed under Section 11 of the Act but the arbitrator was
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appointed by this court. The grievance is that the appointment was
without jurisdiction and the proceedings before the tribunal were non-
est .
3.1 It is canvassed that there is a distinction between the procedure
for appointment and the jurisdiction to make the appointment. The
submission is that though the parties may agree upon the procedure
for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(2) of the Act but the
agreement cannot confer jurisdiction contrary to the statute. Reliance
is on the decision of Madras High Court in China Datang
Technologies China Datang Technologies OnLine Mad 18937 to
contend that the freedom of parties under Section 11(2) is subject to
the statutory provision under Section 11 of the Act.
3.2 The contention is that the statutory requirement for appointment
of an arbitrator in an ICA is non-derogable and cannot be waived
under Section 4 of the Act. It is submitted that participation of the
parties in the arbitral proceedings cannot cure an appointment made in
contravention of Section 11 of the Act. Reliance is on the decision of
Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. M/s
SMEC International Pvt. Ltd ., 2026 SCC OnLine MP 5006 wherein
it was held that such an appointment suffers from inherent lack of
jurisdiction and cannot be validated by the consent of the parties.
3.3 Lastly, it is contended that there can be no estoppel against the
statute. Reliance is on the decision of Supreme Court in Krishna Rai
(Dead) through LRs v. Banaras Hindu University, (2022) 8 SCC
713.
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Submissions of the respondent
4. Per contra, the appellant raised the objection to the appointment
of the arbitrator for the first time in the present appeal despite having
participated in the arbitral proceedings. The submission is that the
appointment was made by this court in the presence of the appellant
and remained unchallenged even in the petition under Section 34 of
the Act. Reliance is on the decision of the Supreme Court in
Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam
Ltd., (2026) 3 SCC 264 to contend that a party having participated in
the proceedings cannot later challenge the process merely because the
outcome is unfavorable.
4.1 The submission is that the appellant having failed to raise the
objection before the arbitral tribunal under Section 16(2) of the Act is
deemed to have waived the right to object as contemplated under
Section 4 of the Act. The decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan
Prasad Lohia v. Nikunj Kumar Lohia, (2002) 3 SCC 572 is relied
upon to buttress the argument that an objection to the composition of
the arbitral tribunal must be raised no later than the submission of the
statement of defence failing which the party is deemed to have waived
the right to object.
4.2 The decision of the Division Bench of this court in Hala Kamel
Zabal v. Arya Trading Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 455 is relied upon
to submit that an objection to the appointment of an arbitrator in an
ICA can be waived under Section 4 of the Act if it is not raised at the
appropriate stage.
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4.3 The contention is that the appellant has admitted in ground ‘F’
of the present appeal that the objection had “inadvertently skipped the
attention of the appellant” and that it would otherwise have raised the
objection at the stage of appointment of the arbitrator or while
challenging the award under Section 34 of the Act.
5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused
the record with their able assistance. No other contention than those
noted above was pressed.
6. Before proceeding further, it would be apposite to reproduce
clause 14 of the SCC, Section 2(1)(f), Section 4 and Section 11 of the
Act:
“ Clause 14 – Arbitration
Unless otherwise specified, the matters where decision of
the Engineer-in-Charge is deemed to be final and binding
as provided in the Contract and the issues/disputes which
cannot be mutually resolved within a reasonable time, all
disputes shall be referred to arbitration by Sole Arbitrator.
Within 30 days of notice of arbitration by either party to
the other, the PRINCIPAL [RGPPL] shall suggest a panel
of three independent and distinguished persons to the
bidder/Buyer, as the case may be, to select any one among
them to act as the Sole Arbitrator.
The award of sole arbitrator shall be final and binding on
the parties and unless directed/awarded otherwise by the
sole arbitrator, the cost of arbitration proceedings shall be
shared equally by the parties. The Arbitration proceedings
shall be in English language and venue shall be New
Delhi, India.
Subject to the above, the provisions of (Indian) Arbitration
& Conciliation Act 1996 and the Rules framed there under
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shall be applicable. All matter relating to this contract are
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the court situated in
the state of Delhi.
Section 2(1)(f)
(f) “international commercial arbitration” means an
arbitration relating to disputes arising out of legal
relationships, whether contractual or not, considered as
commercial under the law in force in India and where at
least one of the parties is—
(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually
resident in, any country other than India; or
(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country
other than India; or
(iii) a company or an association or a body of individuals
whose central management and control is exercised in any
country other than India; or
(iv) the Government of a foreign country.
Section 4 – Waiver of right to object
A party who knows that—
(a) any provision of this Part from which the parties may
derogate, or
(b) any requirement under the arbitration agreement, has
not been complied with and yet proceeds with the
arbitration without stating his objection to such non-
compliance without undue delay or, if a time limit is
provided for stating that objection, within that period of
time, shall be deemed to have waived his right so to
object.
Section 11 – Appointment of arbitrators
Unamended provision of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (applicable before the 2015 amendment)
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*
(2) Subject to sub-section (6), the parties are free to agree
on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or arbitrators.
*
(5) Failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in
an arbitration with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to
agree on the arbitrator within thirty days from receipt of a
request by one party from the other party to so agree, the
appointment shall be made, upon request of a party, by the
Chief Justice or any person or institution designated by
him.
(6) Where, under an appointment procedure agreed upon
by the parties,—
(a) a party fails to act as required under that procedure; or
(b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to
reach an agreement expected of them under that
procedure; or
(c) a person, including an institution, fails to perform any
function entrusted to him or it under that procedure, a
party may request the Chief Justice or any person or
institution designated by him to take the necessary
measure, unless the agreement on the appointment
procedure provides other means for securing the
appointment.
*
(9) In the case of appointment of sole or third arbitrator in
an international commercial arbitration, the Chief Justice
of India or the person or institution designated by him may
appoint an arbitrator of a nationality other than the
nationalities of the parties where the parties belong to
different nationalities.
*
(11) Where more than one request has been made under
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sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) to the
Chief Justices of different High Courts or their designates,
the Chief Justice or his designate to whom the request has
been first made under the relevant sub-section shall alone
be competent to decide on the request.
(12) (a) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4),
(5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in an international
commercial arbitration, the reference to “Chief Justice” in
those sub-sections shall be construed as a reference to the
“Chief Justice of India”.
(b) Where the matters referred to in sub-sections (4), (5),
(6), (7), (8) and (10) arise in any other arbitration, the
reference to “Chief Justice” in those sub-sections shall be
construed as a reference to the Chief Justice of the High
Court within whose local limits the principal Civil Court
referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 2 is
situate and, where the High Court itself is the Court
referred to in that clause, to the Chief Justice of that High
Court.”
Analysis
7. Section 2(1)(f) of the Act defines an ICA as an arbitration
arising out of a commercial legal relationship where at least one of the
parties is a body corporate incorporated in a country other than India.
In the present case, the respondent is a company incorporated under
the laws of Singapore and the arbitration is an ICA.
8. Clause 14 of the SCC provides that in case the parties fail to
mutually resolve the dispute it shall be referred to a sole arbitrator.
Upon issuance of a notice of arbitration by either party, the appellant
is required to suggest within thirty days a panel of three independent
and distinguished persons to the respondent for selection of the sole
arbitrator. The venue of arbitration is New Delhi, India and the
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contract is governed by Indian law.
9. Section 2(2) of the Act provides that Part I shall apply where
the place of arbitration is in India. It shall be fruitful to cite the
following decisions of the Supreme Court:
9.1 In Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., (2026) 5 SCC 802
it was held:
“25. Section 2(1)(f) of the 1996 Act defines ‘international
commercial arbitration’ as arbitration relating to disputes
arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual or
not, considered as commercial under the law in force in
India and where at least one of the parties is a foreign
national, whether that party is an individual, a body
corporate, an association or body of individuals or a
foreign Government. Respondent 1 being a company
incorporated under the laws of Benin, the present dispute
squarely falls within the ambit of international commercial
arbitration. Once this characterisation is made, Section 2(2)
of the Act becomes immediately relevant, for it stipulates
that Part I shall apply only where the place of arbitration is
in India, thereby mandating that Part I stands excluded
where the parties have chosen a foreign seat.”
9.2 In Amway (India) Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Ravindranath Rao
Sindhia, (2021) 8 SCC 465 it was held:
“16. In this view of the matter, the argument that there is
no international flavour to the transaction between the
parties has no legs to stand on. Indeed, an analysis of
Section 2(1)(f) would show that whatever be the
transaction between the parties, if it happens to be entered
into between persons, at least one of whom is either a
foreign national, or habitually resident in, any country
other than India; or by a body corporate which is
incorporated in any country other than India; or by the
Government of a foreign country, the arbitration becomes
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an international commercial arbitration notwithstanding
the fact that the individual, body corporate, or government
of a foreign country referred to in Section 2(1)(f) carry on
business in India through a business office in India…...”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Since the place of arbitration in the present case is India, Part I
of the Act applies. Section 11 which forms part of Part I deals with the
appointment of arbitrators. Under sub-section (2) the parties can agree
on a procedure for appointment of the arbitrator subject to sub-section
(6).
10.1 Under sub-section (5) in the absence of an agreement referred to
in sub-section (2) and on failure of the parties to agree on the
appointment of a sole arbitrator within thirty days of receipt of a
request by one party from the other party, the Chief Justice (for short
‘CJ’) or any person or institution designated by the CJ shall appoint
the arbitrator.
10.2 Clause (a) of sub-section (6) provides that on failure of the
party to act as required under the agreed procedure for appointment of
an arbitrator, a request for appointment is to be made to the CJ or any
person or institution designated by the CJ to take the necessary
measure unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides
other means for securing the appointment.
10.3 Sub-section (9) provides that in the case of appointment of a
sole or third arbitrator in an ICA, the Chief Justice of India (for short
‘CJI’) or the person or institution designated by the CJI may appoint
an arbitrator of a nationality different from that of the parties in
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dispute.
10.4 Clause (a) of sub-section (12) provides that in an ICA the
reference to the CJ in sub-sections (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) and (10) shall
be construed as a reference to the CJI.
11. In the present case, on failure of the appellant to act in
accordance with the procedure laid in clause 14 of the SCC, the
respondent filed an application under Section 11 of the Act before this
court for appointment of the arbitrator. It is an admitted fact that no
other means for securing the appointment of the arbitrator was agreed
upon between the parties. The language of clause 14 clearly indicates
that a panel of three names was to be proposed by the appellant within
thirty days of issuance of notice from either of the parties. This
procedure read with sub-section (6) and clause (a) of sub-section (12)
of Section 11 provides that on failure to act in accordance with the
agreed procedure, a request for appointment was to be made to the
CJI.
12. The obvious conclusion is that in an ICA the power to appoint
an arbitrator under Section 11 read with clause (a) of sub-section (12)
is vested in the CJI. More so, when there was no separate agreement
between the parties for appointment of the arbitrator by this court. It
was not a case of merely recording the consensus arrived at between
the parties regarding the appointment of the arbitrator in terms of the
agreement. The appointment of the arbitrator by this court was
without jurisdiction.
13. The Supreme Court in Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Siva Industries
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and Holdings Ltd., (2023) 5 SCC 421 held that in the case of an ICA,
the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under Section 11 of the Act. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
“9. The respondents did not appoint their nominee
arbitrator despite the service of the arbitration notice. The
applicant filed a petition before this Court under Section
11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 for the
constitution of an arbitral tribunal in an international
commercial arbitration. The Supreme Court had exclusive
jurisdiction to entertain the arbitration petition since the
proposed arbitration between the applicant and the
respondents, of whom the second respondent is a foreign
party, was an international commercial arbitration in terms
of Section 2(1)(f) of the Arbitration Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Before proceeding further to decide the issue as to whether
there was waiver of the objection to the appointment of the arbitrator
under Section 4 of the Act, the objection that the appointment was
void ab-initio though not raised either before the arbitrator or the
learned Single Judge needs to be dealt with.
15. It is trite law that an objection of inherent lack of jurisdiction
can be raised at any stage including during execution proceedings.
Reference in this regard be made to the decision of the Supreme Court
in Hindustan Zinc Ltd. v. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., (2019)
17 SCC 82 wherein it was held:
“17. We are of the view that it is settled law that if there is
an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the plea can be taken up at
any stage and also in collateral proceedings. This was held
by this Court in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan [Kiran
Singh v. Chaman Paswan, (1955) 1 SCR 117 : AIR 1954
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SC 340] as follows : (SCR p. 121 : AIR p. 342, para 6)
“6. … It is a fundamental principle well-
established that a decree passed by a court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could
be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be
enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of
execution and even in collateral proceedings. A
defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or
territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-
matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of
the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect
cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the
question now under consideration fell to be
determined only on the application of general
principles governing the matter, there can be no
doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was
coram non judice, and that its judgment and decree
would be nullities.”
16. It would be relevant to refer to the decision of the Supreme
Court in Lion Engineering Consultants v. State of M.P. (2018) 16
SCC 758 wherein it was held that a plea of jurisdiction can be raised
in a petition under Section 34 of the Act even if no such objection was
raised under Section 16 of the Act. The relevant paragraph reads as
under:
“4. We find merit in the contentions raised on behalf of
the State. We proceed on the footing that the amendment
being beyond limitation is not to be allowed as the
amendment is not pressed. We do not see any bar to plea
of jurisdiction being raised by way of an objection under
Section 34 of the Act even if no such objection was raised
under Section 16.”
(emphasis supplied)
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17. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the
appellant had waived the right to object to the appointment, lacks
merit. Under Section 4(a) of the Act, a party having knowledge that a
provision of Part I from which the parties may derogate has not been
complied with and yet proceeds with the arbitration without raising an
objection within the prescribed time, is deemed to have waived the
right to so object. Clause (b) of Section 4 deals with non-compliance
with any requirement under the arbitration agreement. The present
controversy relates to clause (a) of Section 4 of the Act. The question
is whether the statutory requirement as to the authority competent to
appoint an arbitrator in an ICA is a provision from which the parties
may derogate.
18. Under Section 11(2) of the Act, there is a leverage with the
parties to agree upon the procedure for appointment of an arbitrator
subject to sub-section (6). In other words, even where a procedure for
appointment has been agreed upon between the parties, on failure to
comply with the agreed procedure, a request for appointment of the
arbitrator is to be made in accordance with sub-section (6) i.e. to the
CJ in the case of a domestic arbitration and to the CJI in the case of an
ICA.
19. The statutory requirement cannot be derogated by the parties.
The waiver contemplated under Section 4 of the Act cannot be
extended to confer jurisdiction upon a court that is not vested with the
power to appoint the arbitrator under the Act. The failure to raise an
objection to the appointment cannot cure the inherent lack of
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jurisdiction of the court.
20. The Supreme Court in Dr. Jagmittar Sain Bhagat v. Director,
Health Services, Haryana, (2013) 10 SCC 136 held that jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon a court by mutual consent of the parties. The
relevant paragraph reads as under:
“9. Indisputably, it is a settled legal proposition that
conferment of jurisdiction is a legislative function and it
can neither be conferred with the consent of the parties
nor by a superior Court, and if the Court passes a decree
having no jurisdiction over the matter, it would amount to
nullity as the matter goes to the root of the cause. Such an
issue can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The
finding of a Court or Tribunal becomes irrelevant and
unenforceable/ inexecutable once the forum is found to
have no jurisdiction. Similarly, if a Court/Tribunal
inherently lacks jurisdiction, acquiescence of party equally
should not be permitted to perpetuate and perpetrate,
defeating the legislative animation. The Court cannot
derive jurisdiction apart from the Statute. In such
eventuality the doctrine of waiver also does not apply.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. Applying the above principle, the participation of the appellant
in the arbitration proceedings cannot be construed as a waiver under
Section 4 of the Act. The inherent lack of jurisdiction in the
appointment of the arbitrator vitiates the entire proceedings.
22. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on
the decision of the Division Bench of this court in Hala Kamel Zabal
(supra) to contend that the procedure under Section 11(6) of the Act
and objections to the forum of appointment are subject to waiver
under Section 4, does not enhance the case of the respondent. The
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decision was on the facts of that case where the parties had expressly
agreed that the sole arbitrator would be appointed by the CJ of this
court. There is no such agreement between the parties in the present
case. It was in the backdrop of the express term in the arbitration
agreement that the Division Bench applied the principle of waiver
under Section 4 of the Act.
23. The decision of the Supreme Court in Amway India
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein it was held that the court at New
Delhi lacked jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in an ICA, was
distinguished by the Division Bench in Hala Kamel Zabal (supra). It
was considered by the Division Bench that the appointment under
challenge was in accordance with the arbitration clause expressly
agreed upon between the parties which provided for appointment of
the arbitrator by the CJ of this court.
24. It would be apposite to mention the decision of the Madras
High Court in China Datang Technologies and Engineering Co. Ltd.
(supra) wherein the decision of the Single Judge in Hala Kamel Zabal
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5604 was distinguished. It was held that the
appointment of an arbitrator by the High Court in an ICA contrary to
the statutory scheme under Section 11 of the Act is null and void and
the waiver under Section 4 of the Act is not applicable.
25. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh
v. M/s SMEC International Pvt. Ltd . (supra) also distinguished the
decision of the Single Judge in Hala Kamel Zabal (supra) and held
that appointment of an arbitrator by the High Court in an ICA is not a
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mere procedural lapse but a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction.
26. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondent on
the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Prasad Lohia v.
Nikunj Kumar Lohia (supra) to contend that failure to raise an
objection within the time prescribed under Section 16(2) of the Act
amounts to deemed waiver, is not applicable to the facts of the present
case. The decision was not a case of an ICA and dealt with the
composition of the arbitral tribunal which was held to be derogable
and the failure to raise an objection under Section 16(2) was
considered to be deemed waiver under Section 4 of the Act. However,
in the present appeal the issue relates to the inherent lack of
jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in an ICA and the appointment
being contrary to a mandatory statutory provision.
27. The Supreme Court in Krishna Rai (Dead) through LRs v.
Banaras Hindu University (supra) has reiterated that the principle of
estoppel cannot override the law. The relevant paragraphs read as
under:
“24. The case laws relied upon by the Division Bench
would have no application in the facts of the present case
as none of the judgments relied upon by the Division
Bench laid down the principle that estoppel would be
above law. It is a settled principle that the principle of
estoppel cannot override the law. The manual duly
approved by the Executive Council will prevail over any
such principle of estoppel or acquiescence.
*
32. Further in Tata Chemicals Ltd. v. Commr. of Customs,
it has been laid down that there can be no estoppel against
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15:12:21
FAO(OS) (COMM) 294/2026 Page 18 of 20
law. If the law requires something to be done in a
particular manner, then it must be done in that manner,
and if it is not done in that manner, then it would have no
existence in the eye of the law. Para 18 of the said
judgment is reproduced below: (SCC p. 636)”
“18. The Tribunal’s judgment has proceeded on the
basis that even though the samples were drawn
contrary to law, the appellants would be estopped
because their representative was present when the
samples were drawn and they did not object
immediately. This is a completely perverse finding
both on fact and law. On fact, it has been more than
amply proved that no representative of the
appellant was, in fact, present at the time the
Customs Inspector took the samples. Shri K.M.
Jani who was allegedly present not only stated that
he did not represent the clearing agent of the
appellants in that he was not their employee but
also stated that he was not present when the
samples were taken. In fact, therefore, there was no
representative of the appellants when the samples
were taken. In law equally the Tribunal ought to
have realised that there can be no estoppel against
law. If the law requires that something be done in a
particular manner, it must be done in that manner,
and if not done in that manner has no existence in
the eye of the law at all. The Customs Authorities
are not absolved from following the law depending
upon the acts of a particular assessee. Something
that is illegal cannot convert itself into something
legal by the act of a third person.”
(emphasis supplied)
28. The decision of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Construction
Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (supra) relied upon
by learned counsel for the respondent is not applicable to the case in
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:18.11.2026
15:12:21
FAO(OS) (COMM) 294/2026 Page 19 of 20
hand. It was not a case where the appointment of the arbitrator was
vitiated by an inherent lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held
that an order passed by the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act
cannot be retrospectively invalidated in review sought on the strength
of an interpretation of a similar clause in a subsequent case.
29. In view of the above, the appointment of the arbitrator being
contrary to the mandatory statutory provision is void ab initio . The
impugned award is a nullity.
30. The appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and the arbitral
award are set aside.
31. All pending applications are also disposed of.
AVNEESH JHINGAN, J
SHAIL JAIN, J
NOVEMBER 5, 2026
Ch
Reportable: Yes
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:CHANCHAL
Signing Date:18.11.2026
15:12:21
FAO(OS) (COMM) 294/2026 Page 20 of 20