The Chairman National Book Trust India . vs Ar Abdul Gaffar .

REPORTABLE
2026 INSC 1202
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14369 OF 2015

THE CHAIRMAN
NATIONAL BOOK TRUST, INDIA AND ANOTHER … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS
A.R. ABDUL GAFFAR AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. Shorn of any unnecessary factual matrix, the only question that arises
1
for our consideration is whether the National Book Trust is a ‘State’ or not
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
2. While answering this question in reference, the Full Bench of High
2
Court of Delhi examined the Trust independently on the principles laid down
by this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport
3
Authority of India and Others , Ajay Hasia and Others vs. Khalid Mujib
4
Sehravardi and Others and, principally, Pradeep Kumar Biswas vs.
5
Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Others . It proceeded on the
basis that the inquiry was not to be determined by any single factor but by
considering, cumulatively, whether the body was financially, functionally and
Signature Not Verified

1
For short, ‘the Trust’
2
For short, ‘High Court’
3
(1979) 3 SCC 489 (3-Judge Bench)
4
(1981) 1 SC 722 (5-Judge Bench)
5
(2002) 5 SCC 111 (7-Judge Bench)
Digitally signed by
MINI
Date: 2026.11.06
15:32:04 IST
Reason:
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 1 of 14

administratively dominated by, or under the control of, the Government, and
whether such control was of a pervasive nature, in order to bring it under the
ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution.
3. In examining the Trust against these parameters, the Full Bench took
note of the following:
a) The Trust had been brought into existence pursuant to Government
resolutions dated 15.06.1957 and 28.09.1962. The scheme of its
Rules indicated substantial governmental involvement in its
constitution, composition, administration and financial affairs.
b) Chairman of the Trust was appointed by the Government and held
office at its pleasure; the Trust and its Executive Committee
contained several Government nominees, including representatives
of the concerned Ministries; and important aspects of the
functioning of the Trust, including its rule-making framework,
financial administration, accounts and audit, remained subject to
governmental involvement or approval.
c) The nature and objects of the Trust, which principally involved the
production, publication and dissemination of literature and
knowledge at moderate prices, including publication and translation
of Indian and foreign works.
The Full Bench was of the view that these functions had to be
considered alongside the manner in which the Trust had been
constituted, funded and administered, rather than in isolation from
the governmental control exercised over it.
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 2 of 14

4. On a cumulative consideration of these circumstances, the Full Bench
vide its judgment dated 01.06.2012 concluded that the Government exercised
deep and pervasive control over the Trust. It held that the Trust was, in
substance, an instrumentality or alter ego of the Government and
consequently fell within the expression ‘other authorities’ in Article 12 of the
Constitution.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned
Amicus Curiae Shri Sanjay Jain, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms.
Harshita Sukhija, learned counsel. We have carefully perused the judgment
rendered in reference by the Full Bench, the material placed before us and
the note tendered by the learned Amicus .
6. Before examining the status of the Trust, it is necessary to keep in view
the evolution of law under Article 12 of the Constitution. The expression
‘State’ in Article 12 is an inclusive definition and extends beyond the
Government and the legislatures to ‘all local or other authorities’ within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or the State
Government. The expression was deliberately cast in wide terms so that
constitutional obligations attaching to the State could not be avoided merely
by transferring the performance of governmental or public functions to a
6 7
separate legal form. This Court in catena of decisions has progressively
recognised that the constitutional conception of State could not be confined

6
Ajay Hasia (supra) at Para 7.
7
Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur vs. Mohan Lal and Others, 1967 SCC OnLine SC
18; Sukhdev Singh and Others vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi and Another,
(1975) 1 SCC 421; and Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra)
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 3 of 14

to bodies which were formally departments of Government or created by
statute. The constitutional obligation under Part III of the Constitution cannot
depend merely upon the form in which governmental power or functions are
organised.
7. In Ajay Hasia (supra) , this Court made it clear that even a society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 could, depending upon
the facts, constitute an instrumentality or agency of Government and
consequently fall within Article 12. The form of incorporation was thus not
treated as determinative. Placing reliance on the decision in Ramana
Dayaram Shetty (supra) , this Court in Ajay Hasia (supra) had documented
some tests to determine as to when a corporation or authority can be regarded
as an instrumentality of a State. The relevant observations are reproduced
herein below:
“ 9. The tests for determining as to when a corporation can
be said to be an instrumentality or agency of Government
may now be culled out from the judgment in the
International Airport Authority case [(1979) 3 SCC 489] .
These tests are not conclusive or clinching, but they
are merely indicative indicia which have to be used
with care and caution, because while stressing the
necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the
expression “other authorities”, it must be realised that
it should not be stretched so far as to bring in every
autonomous body which has some nexus with the
Government within the sweep of the expression. A wide
enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise
limitation. We may summarise the relevant tests gathered
from the decision in the International Airport Authority
case [(1979) 3 SCC 489] as follows:
“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share
capital of the corporation is held by Government,
it would go a long way towards indicating that the
corporation is an instrumentality or agency of
Government. (SCC p. 507, para 14)
(2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so
much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the
corporation, it would afford some indication of the
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corporation being impregnated with Governmental
character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(3) It may also be a relevant factor ... whether the
corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State
conferred or State protected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control
may afford an indication that the corporation is a
State agency or instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para
15)
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of public
importance and closely related to Governmental
functions, it would be a relevant factor in
classifying the corporation as an instrumentality
or agency of Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)
(6) ‘Specifically, if a department of Government is
transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong
factor supportive of this inference’ of the
corporation being an instrumentality or agency of
Government.” (SCC p. 510, para 18)
If on a consideration of these relevant factors it is found
that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of
Government, it would, as pointed out in the International
Airport Authority case [(1979) 3 SCC 489] , be an
“authority” and, therefore, ‘State’ within the meaning of the
expression in Article 12.”
*
11. We may point out that it is immaterial for this purpose
whether the corporation is created by a statute or under a
statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or
agency of the Government and not as to how it is
created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic
person is born but why it has been brought into
existence. The corporation may be a statutory
corporation created by a statute or it may be a
government Company or a Company formed under the
Companies Act, 1956 or it may be a society registered
under the Societies. Registration Act, 1860 or any
other similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin,
it would be an “authority” within the meaning of
Article 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the
Government and that would have to be decided on a
proper assessment of the facts in the light of the
relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or
agency of the Government is not limited to a
corporation created by a statute but is equally
applicable to a Company or society and in a given case
it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the
relevant factors, whether the Company or society is an
instrumentality or agency of the Government so as to
come within the meaning of the expression “authority”
in Article 12.”
(emphasis supplied)
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8. The tests laid out in Ajay Hasia (supa) were later considered by this
Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), wherein this Court explained that
these tests are not rigid set of principles or mechanical checklist. In Pradeep
Kumar Biswas (supra), the real inquiry is whether, having regard to the
cumulative facts, the body is financially, functionally and administratively
dominated by or under the control of the Government, and whether such
control is particular to the body and pervasive. Conversely, where the
Government exercises merely regulatory control of the kind ordinarily
exercised over autonomous bodies, such control would not bring the body
within Article 12 of the Constitution. The relevant observations are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the
tests formulated in Ajay Hasia [Ajay Hasia v. Khalid
Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : 1981 SCC (L&S)
258] are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body
falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be
considered to be a State within the meaning of Article
12. The question in each case would be — whether in
the light of the cumulative facts as established, the
body is financially, functionally and administratively
dominated by or under the control of the Government.
Such control must be particular to the body in
question and must be pervasive. If this is found then
the body is a State within Article 12. On the other
hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether
under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make
the body a State.”
(emphasis supplied)
9. The above decisions of this Court bring to fore the liberal interpretation
afforded to the phrases of ‘State’ and ‘other authorities’ under Article 12 of the
Constitution for over the years. The inquiry essentially centres on the nature
and degree of control exercised by the State over the authority in question, as
well as the nature of the functions discharged by it. For an authority to fall
within the ambit of Article 12, the State’s control must be sufficiently deep
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 6 of 14

and pervasive so as to establish that the authority is, in substance, an
instrumentality or agency of the State, with its autonomy substantially
circumscribed by such control.
10. Reverting to the case at hand, the Trust before us has argued that it is
a society/trust and is not a juristic person in the same manner as a statutory
corporation. We find no substance in this submission as the decision of this
Court in Ajay Hasia (supra) itself establishes that registration as a society
8
does not place a body mandatorily beyond Article 12 of the Constitution.
More so, it is trite that the State may act through a corporation incorporated
under the Companies Act, 2013 or a society formed under the Societies
Registration Act, 1860. The constitutional inquiry is therefore directed at the
substance of the relationship between the body and the Government, and not
at the nomenclature or legal form adopted for carrying on its activities.
11. In this regard, the material relating to the Trust has to be examined.
the Trust was brought into existence pursuant to a Government of India
resolution dated 15.06.1957 and was thereafter reorganised by another
Government resolution dated 28.09.1962. Its very creation was thus
attributable to the Government. The objects for which it was established were
not the consequence of an independent private initiative subsequently
subjected to governmental regulation, rather, the Trust was conceived and
structured by the Government to pursue an identified national objective
9
relating to the production and dissemination of literature at moderate prices.

8
Ajay Hasia (supra) at Para 11.
9
Introduction of the Trust
See official website: https://www.nbtindia.gov.in/aboutus__5__history.nbt
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 7 of 14

10
12. Moreover, the administrative structure (under the Rules ) of the Trust
is particularly significant. Rule 3 provides for the appointment of its Chairman
by the Government of India and places representatives of the Ministries of
Education, Finance and Information and Broadcasting in its governing body.
The Government is further empowered to nominate other members. More so,
members appointed by the Government hold office for a prescribed term of 3
11
years and the Chairman holds office at the pleasure of the Government. The
Chairman is the chief executive officer of the Trust and exercises the powers
12
necessary for its day-to-day functioning.
13. This is not merely a case where a Government officer happens to be
associated with an otherwise independent organisation. The governing
structure of the Trust itself places governmental representatives at the heart
of the decision-making process. Rule 26 itself provides for the Executive
Committee, which is entrusted with the administration, direction and control
of the affairs of the Trust, includes representatives of the Ministries of
Education, Finance and Information and Broadcasting, with the Finance
Ministry representative also functioning as the Financial Adviser. Other non-
official members of the Executive Committee are also nominated by the
Government. The Executive Committee exercises the principal managerial
powers of the Trust, while its regulatory power is itself subject to the previous
13
approval of the Government of India.

10
Memorandum of Association and Rules of the National Book Trust, India
See Rules: https://www.nbtindia.gov.in/writereaddata/attachment/wednesday-may-27-
20264-51-07-pmannexure-iii-memorandum-of-association-rules.pdf
11
Rules 7 and 13.
12
Rules 48 and 50.
13
Rule 42.
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 8 of 14

14. The extent of governmental involvement becomes even more apparent
from the provisions governing the financial and institutional framework of the
Trust. Financial matters are required to be placed before the Financial Adviser
as per Rule 57; in specified cases of disagreement, the matter may travel to
14
the Ministers of Education and Finance. The annual report and audited
accounts are required to be submitted to the Government under Rule 59.
More so, the accounts are to be maintained in the form prescribed by the
Government in consultation with the Comptroller and Auditor-General of
15
India , and the CAG or a person authorised by it is empowered to audit the
accounts with powers analogous to those available in the audit of Government
16
accounts. The governing framework further requires governmental approval
under Rule 60 for specified alterations to the rules and purposes of the Trust.
15. These provisions cannot, in our view, be characterised as isolated
instances of ordinary regulatory supervision. They operate cumulatively as
the Government participates in the constitution of the body; determines a
substantial part of its governing composition; appoints its Chairman; retains
control over the tenure of that office; participates in its financial
administration; exercises oversight through the audit mechanism; receives its
annual reports and accounts; and retains a measure of control over alteration
of the very framework within which the Trust functions. When these features
are viewed together, they disclose a relationship substantially different from

14
Rule 51
15
For short, ‘CAG’
16
Rule 58
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 9 of 14

that which exists between the Government and an ordinary private society
subject merely to regulatory legislation.
16. We are conscious that financial assistance is an important, but not an
exclusive, factor in the inquiry under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Trust
has emphasised that Government grants constitute only one of its sources of
income and that, for certain years, its own receipts constituted a substantial
part of its total income. It has been argued that the Full Bench of the High
Court was therefore not justified in treating the mere receipt of Government
grants as conclusive. But according to us, neither does the fact that the Trust
generates income from the sale of its publications answer the constitutional
question in its favour. There has to be a cumulative understanding i.e.,
financial autonomy in one aspect cannot be isolated from the statutory or
regulatory structure governing the body, its composition, management and
17
governmental supervision.
17. The material placed by the learned Amicus is relevant in this regard.
The Amicus has correctly approached the question not by asking whether
Government funding constitutes the entirety of the Trust's income, but by
examining its financial, functional and administrative relationship with the
Government cumulatively. The rules concerning the Trust's accounts and the
audit by the CAG further demonstrate that Government involvement in its
financial affairs is structurally embedded and is not confined merely to
imposing conditions upon an occasional grant. The fact that the Trust earns

17
Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) at Para 40.
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revenue from its publications therefore does not, by itself, displace the
pervasive governmental control disclosed by its governing framework.
18. We do not proceed on the basis that publication of books, by itself, is a
sovereign or exclusively governmental function. Nor do we accept the
proposition that every activity having educational or public utility necessarily
converts the body undertaking it into ‘State’. This Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd.
18
and Another vs. Union of India and Others , made it clear that the
existence of a public function, in isolation, is insufficient; what is required is
the cumulative satisfaction of the test under Article 12 of the Constitution.
19. The relevance of the Trust's functions lies in their character when
considered alongside its creation and governmental control. Its objects
include production and promotion of good literature, making such literature
available to the public at moderate prices, publication of classical Indian
literature, translation of important Indian and foreign works, dissemination
of knowledge, book exhibitions and seminars, and measures directed towards
making books accessible to the public. These functions are not merely
incidental activities of a private commercial publisher, rather they reflect the
very public and national purposes for which the Trust was established by the
Government.
20. The subsequent material placed by the learned Amicus reinforces,
rather than creates, this functional character. The Trust has continued to
undertake programmes connected with the dissemination of educational

18
(2005) 4 SCC 649 at Para 22 to 24.
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 11 of 14

material, promotion of Indian languages and reading culture, and
implementation of governmental initiatives such as the PM-YUVA (Young
19
Authors Mentorship Scheme). We do not rest our conclusion upon
developments occurring after the Full Bench judgment, however, they are
relevant only as corroborative material demonstrating that the governmental
purpose underlying the Trust's creation and functioning has not been merely
formal or historical.
21. The learned Amicus has also drawn our attention to various decisions
of this Court where societies and other non-statutory bodies were brought
within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution on an examination of their
actual relationship with the Government. Conversely, several other decisions
have been placed before us which demonstrate that registration as a society
and association with Government are not, by themselves, sufficient. The
lesson from this line of decisions establish that a society is not automatically
“State” merely because it is associated with the Government; the Court must
examine how it is constituted and how far the Government controls its
functioning.

22. We may also clarify an aspect which appears to have weighed with the
appellant before the Full Bench and has been reiterated before us. The
declaration that the Trust is ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution does
not convert the Trust into a department of the Government of India, nor does
it make every employee of the Trust a civil servant or confer upon such

19
Ministry of Education, ‘Government Launches YUVA – Prime Minister’s Scheme for
Mentoring Young Authors’ (PIB, 29.05.2021-Press Release)
See: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1722644&reg=48&lang=2
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 12 of 14

employees all constitutional protections available to Government servants
under Part XIV of the Constitution. Article 12 of the Constitution performs a
distinct constitutional function for the purposes of Part III of the Constitution,
and has no automatic consequence under Articles 309, 310 or 311 of the
20
Constitution.
23. There will be, consequently, no merit in the submission that recognising
the Trust as ‘State’ would necessarily lead to all consequences associated with
Government employment. The question before us is narrower extending to
whether the Trust is sufficiently an instrumentality of the Government so as
to attract the constitutional discipline of Part III of the Constitution. On that
question, the cumulative features of the Trust's constitution and functioning
point in only one direction.
24. We, therefore, find that the Full Bench of the High Court was correct in
placing emphasis not upon any one individual factor but upon the cumulative
effect of the Government’s control over the Trust. The Government’s role
begins with the creation of the Trust, extends to its governing composition
and appointment of its principal functionary, permeates its executive and
financial administration, and continues through audit, reporting and
governmental approval over aspects of its governing framework. This is not
the limited or general regulatory supervision which can be excluded from the
ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution.

20
Ajay Hasia (supra) at Para 12; Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) at Para 20.
Civil Appeal No. 14369/2015 Page 13 of 14

25. In our considered view, the Trust accordingly satisfies the test of being
financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the
control of the Government, with that control being particular to the Trust and
pervasive in character. Its registration as a society, or the fact that it generates
part of its income independently cannot displace the cumulative
constitutional character of the institution.
26. We therefore uphold the conclusion of the Full Bench of the High Court
that National Book Trust is an ‘other authority’ within the meaning of Article
12 of the Constitution and is consequently a ‘State’ for that purpose.
27. Therefore, no interference is called for. The Appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed.
28. We place on record our sincere appreciation for the valuable assistance
rendered by Shri Sanjay Jain, learned senior counsel, as A micus Curiae to
this Court.
………………………………………J.
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)



.………………………………………J.
(AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI ;
NOVEMBER 06, 2026.
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