Pd Adlakha vs Gunita Gulati

Court
Delhi High Court

$~6
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 25.08.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010043542023
+ RC.REV. 39/2023, CM APPL. 6819/2023 (Stay) & CM APPL.
899/2026 (For payment of arrears of rent)

PD ADLAKHA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Anupam Srivastava, Senior
Advocate along with Mr.
Dhairya Gupta and Mr. Vasuh
Misra, Advocates.
versus

GUNITA GULATI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Brahme, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR

% JUDGEMENT (Oral)
1. The present Rent Control Revision Petition, under Section 25-B
1
(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 , seeks the setting aside of
2
the Judgment dated 09.11.2022 passed by the learned Additional
3
Rent Controller, South-East District, Saket Courts, Delhi , in
Eviction Petition being E. 101/2017, titled “Gunita Gulati v. P.D.
Adlakha” , whereby the learned ARC has passed an order of eviction
after trial against the Petitioner herein.
2. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
seeks to assail the Impugned Judgment on the sole ground that the

1
DRC Act
2
Impugned Judgment
3
Learned ARC
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BHATIA
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Power of Attorney Holder, who deposed on behalf of the Petitioner,
was not competent to depose or testify with respect to the Petitioner’s
medical condition. It would be submitted that the facts concerning the
Petitioner’s medical condition were within her personal knowledge
and, therefore, could have been proved only through her own
testimony. The Power of Attorney Holder, not having personal
knowledge of the Petitioner’s medical condition, could neither depose
on her behalf in respect thereof nor satisfactorily answer questions
pertaining to the same. It would, therefore, be contended that the
reliance placed upon such testimony and the documents concerning
the Petitioner’s medical condition vitiates the findings returned in the
Impugned Judgment, thereby warranting its setting aside.
3. Per contra , learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent would submit that the learned ARC has not just
considered the medical documents but has also considered the public
document being Order dated 03.01.2018 passed by the learned Co-
ordinate Bench of this Court in CS(OS) 207/2015, titled “Gunita
Gulati @ Mani Chularatnaphol v. Gurmeet Kaur” and that there was
no dispute as regards the contents of the same, which note the medical
condition of the Petitioner.
4. He would further submit that the learned ARC has accorded his
consideration to the entire aspect of the matter and there arises no
scope for any interference in the limited revisional jurisdiction
exercisable by this Court.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent also
submits that no claim will be made with respect to arrears, if at all.

ANALYSIS:
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BHATIA
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6. This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record.
7. Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.

8. The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in S arla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
4
Co. Ltd. , Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
5 6
Singh , and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua , has
consistently held that thejurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
9. The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia , in Pankaj
7
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors. , and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
8
Grover .
10. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,

4
(1998) 8 SCC 119
5
(2014) 9 SCC 78
6
(2022) 6 SCC 30
7
2024:DHC:9322
8
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 39/2023 Page 3 of 12

therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“ 23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”

11. In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.

12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
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BHATIA
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undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Judgment
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
13. It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the
Impugned Judgment are required to be examined.
14. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the
relevant findings of the learned ARC in the Impugned Judgment
pertaining to the only ground urged before this Court, which read as
under:
“Bonafide requirement

16. The petition states that the tenanted premises is required by the
petitioner so that she may get her medical treatment for her heart
related ailments from a hospital which is situated near the tenanted
premises. The petitioner has placed on record medical prescriptions
Ex.PW1/2 and Ex.PW1/4 which show that she has been consulting
a cardiologist of Max Health Care Hospital. The fact regarding the
medical ailments of the petitioner and her need for advanced
medical supervision has been recorded by Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in order dated 03.01.2018 in CS(OS) No.207/15 case titled as
"Gunita Gulati Vs. Gurmeet Kaur". It may be noted that there is no
dispute between the parties regarding the said order dated
03.01.2008 passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. The respondent
has infact relied upon the said order as is evident from written
submissions filed by the respondent. Further, the medical condition
of the petitioner has not been categorically denied by the
respondent or the RW-1, It is only asserted on behalf of the
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respondent that the documents relied upon by the petitioner are
only prescriptions by the doctor and the petitioner does not require
any specialized treatment in Delhi. Further, RW-1 has deposed in
his cross-examination that he is not aware of medical condition of
the petitioner. This shows that the respondent has not categorically
denied the ailment of the petitioner. Further in the case of "J.S.
Sharma & Sons Vs. Shiv Devi Meena" (2001)SCC online Del 3063
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held that the petitioner is not
required to file voluminous documents pertaining to her medical
illness. The petitioner thus suffers from heart related ailments and
being a citizen of Thailand she requires the tenanted premises for
her treatment in India.
17. In the light of above, it may be safely concluded that the initial
onus to prove the bonafide requirement of the petitioner to get
treatment for her heart related ailments stands discharge and now
the onus has shifted upon the respondent to disprove the same.
18. The first defence taken by the respondent in this regard is that
the petitioner is a citizen of Thailand and she has been receiving
her treatment there and treatment in Delhi is not needed. In the case
of "Urmil Joshi & Ors. Vs. Raj Batra" (2012) SCC Online Del
1321 Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a similar factual scenario
observed as follows:

"Counsel has not been able to point out any provision of
law whereby an India, who had acquired foreign
citizenship is disentitled to enjoy residence in his own
property in India when he chooses to return to India. The
passport of the respondent was brought in the Court which
shows that ever since 1988 he has been staying in India
and even in 1991 his visa was extended up to the year
1994."

"The landlord is the best judge of his residential
requirement. He has a complete freedom in the matter. It is
no concern of the courts to dictate to the landlord how, and
in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a
residential standard of their own."

19. The above observation of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi makes it
clear that just because the petitioner has acquired Thailand's
citizenship, she does not become disentitled to the tenanted
premises. Further, that, the respondent cannot dictate as to where
the petitioner should get her medical treatment. It is petitioner's
choice as to whether she wants treatment in Thailand or in Delhi.
The petitioner cannot be forced to get her treatment in Thailand
only because the same suits the needs of the respondent. Thus I am
not inclined to accept this defence of the respondent.
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BHATIA
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20. Another limb of defence of the respondent is that the petitioner
has only got routine check-up in Delhi and she does not require any
treatment in Delhi. To this, a part of the cross-examination. of PW-
1 needs to be seen. PW-1 in his cross-examination has stated that
the petitioner "is willing to visit in India and stay here for medical
treatment however she requires some place to stay which she does
not have". This statement of PW-1 shows that due to lack of
accommodation in Delhi the petitioner has not been able to get her
proper treatment in Delhi. Thus, this argument of respondent that
the petitioner has got only routine check-up in Delhi is without any
force. In fact due to lack of accommodation in Delhi, the petitioner
is unable to get thorough treatment.
21. ⁠21. It is further contended on behalf of respondent that by
setting up a case of bonafide requirement for medical treatment, the
petitioner is infact trying to evict the respondent to sell the tenanted
premises. I am not inclined to accept this defence either. There is
always a presumption that the need of the landlord is bonafide. In
the case of "Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company
Limited" MANU SC 0665 (1998) Hon'ble Apex Court observed:

"The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section
14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for
occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide.
When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for
his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed
on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide.
When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when
the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent
Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of
the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is
not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how
else he can adjust himself without getting possession of
the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of
bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite
unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the
landlord could have adjusted himself." (Emphasis
supplied)

22. Thus there is a presumption in favour of the petitioner that the
tenanted premises is indeed required by the petitioner for her
medical treatment and the petition is not filed only to evict the
respondent from the premises. The respondent has not placed, any
document to rebut this presumption.
23. None of the arguments of the respondent controverting the
bonafide need of the petitioner is convincing and thus it may be
said that the respondent has failed to discharge the onus which
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BHATIA
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shifted upon him. Accordingly, it is held that the petitioner requires
the tenanted premises bonafidely for her treatment in New Delhi.”
(emphasis supplied)

15. As is apparent, the learned ARC has not just relied upon the
documents which were exhibited, but has also relied upon the
judgment and admittedly, the contents of which are not denied.
16. The principal, and indeed the sole, contention urged on behalf
of the Petitioner is that the Power of Attorney Holder, who appeared
as PW-1 on behalf of the Petitioner before the learned ARC, was not
competent to depose with respect to the Petitioner’s medical
condition, the same being a matter within the exclusive personal
knowledge of the Petitioner. It is, therefore, contended that the
medical prescriptions and the testimony of the Power of Attorney
Holder concerning the Petitioner’s medical condition could not have
been relied upon by the learned ARC while returning a finding with
respect to the bona fide requirement of the Petitioner.
17. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention. At the
outset, it is required to be noted that the finding returned by the
learned ARC with respect to the Petitioner’s medical condition is not
founded solely upon the oral testimony of the Power of Attorney
Holder. A perusal of the Impugned Judgment would show that the
learned ARC has taken into consideration the medical prescriptions
placed on record by the Petitioner as well as the Order dated
03.01.2018 passed by a learned Coordinate Bench of this Court in
CS(OS) 207/2015, titled “ Gunita Gulati @ Mani Chularatnaphol v.
Gurmeet Kaur ”. The learned ARC has specifically recorded that the
said Order noted the medical ailments of the Petitioner and her
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BHATIA
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requirement of advanced medical supervision.
18. Significantly, the learned ARC has further recorded that there
was no dispute between the parties with regard to the contents of the
aforesaid Order dated 03.01.2018. On the contrary, the Respondent
himself had relied upon the said Order in his written submissions
before the learned ARC. The learned ARC has also taken note of the
fact that the Petitioner’s medical condition was not categorically
denied by the Respondent. The challenge raised by the Respondent
before the learned ARC was essentially with respect to the nature and
sufficiency of the medical treatment allegedly required by the
Petitioner in Delhi, and not a categorical denial of the existence of her
medical ailments.
19. The finding of the learned ARC regarding the existence of the
Petitioner’s medical condition, therefore, cannot be understood as
having been returned merely on the basis of the deposition of the
Power of Attorney Holder. The said finding is based upon
documentary material placed on record and other material which was
admittedly available before the learned ARC. The Order dated
03.01.2018 passed by this Court was also not disputed by the
Respondent. Thus, even assuming that the Power of Attorney Holder
could not have deposed with respect to matters exclusively within the
personal knowledge of the Petitioner, the same would not render the
entire finding of the learned ARC unsustainable, particularly when the
finding is independently supported by documentary and other material
available on record.
20. It is also relevant to note that the learned ARC has not returned
its finding on the bona fide requirement of the Petitioner solely by
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BHATIA
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proceeding on the existence of her medical condition. The learned
ARC has considered the rival submissions concerning the requirement
of the Petitioner to reside in Delhi for the purposes of medical
treatment. The defence of the Respondent that the Petitioner, being a
citizen of Thailand, ought to obtain treatment only in Thailand was
specifically considered and rejected. The learned ARC, relying upon
the applicable principles governing the assessment of a landlord's
bona fide requirement, held that it is not for the tenant to dictate the
manner or the place in which the landlord should reside or obtain
medical treatment.
21. The learned ARC has further considered the contention that the
Petitioner had only been undergoing routine check-ups in Delhi and
did not require any specialised treatment or prolonged stay in the city.
Upon consideration of the material before it, including the
circumstances in which the Petitioner sought to reside in Delhi for the
purposes of obtaining medical treatment, the learned ARC found the
said defence to be unpersuasive. The learned ARC has also considered
and rejected the allegation that the plea of medical necessity had been
set up merely as a pretext for securing eviction of the Respondent and
thereafter selling the tenanted premises.
22. Thus, the Impugned Judgment discloses a consideration of the
material available on record and the respective pleas advanced by the
parties. The conclusion regarding the bona fide requirement of the
Petitioner is not based upon an isolated statement made by the Power
of Attorney Holder, but upon an overall appreciation of the
documentary material, the undisputed circumstances emerging from
the record and the defence raised by the Respondent.
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BHATIA
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23. The argument advanced on behalf of the Petitioner would, in
effect, require this Court to reappreciate the evidentiary material
considered by the learned ARC and to arrive at a different conclusion
as to the weight to be attached to such material. Such an exercise
clearly falls outside the limited scope of jurisdiction exercisable by
this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. As
noticed hereinabove, this Court does not sit in appeal over the findings
returned by the learned ARC and cannot substitute its own view
merely because another view may be possible on the material
available on record.
24. The Petitioner has been unable to demonstrate that the learned
ARC has ignored any material evidence or taken into consideration
any material which was wholly irrelevant or impermissible. Nor has it
been demonstrated that the finding regarding the bona fide
requirement of the Petitioner suffers from perversity, manifest
illegality or any error apparent on the face of the record. The mere
contention that a particular part of the evidence, namely the testimony
of the Power of Attorney Holder concerning the medical condition of
the Petitioner, ought not to have been relied upon cannot, in the facts
of the present case, furnish a ground for interference when the finding
of the learned ARC is otherwise supported by independent material on
record.
25. It is further pertinent that the learned ARC has specifically
noted that the Respondent had not categorically disputed the
Petitioner’s medical ailments. The controversy raised by the
Respondent was primarily directed towards questioning the extent of
the requirement and the necessity of obtaining treatment in Delhi. The
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BHATIA
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learned ARC, upon considering the said defence, has returned a
reasoned finding that the Respondent cannot dictate to the Petitioner
the place at which she should seek medical treatment or the manner in
which she should arrange her residence for such purposes.
26. This Court, therefore, finds that the decision-making process
adopted by the learned ARC does not suffer from any jurisdictional
error, material irregularity or manifest perversity warranting
interference in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under the proviso
to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. The finding returned by the
learned ARC with respect to the bona fide requirement of the
Petitioner is based upon material available on record and constitutes a
plausible view of the matter. This Court, in the exercise of its limited
revisional jurisdiction, finds no ground to substitute such view with
another.
27. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the present Revision
Petition. The Impugned Judgment dated 09.11.2022 passed by the
learned Additional Rent Controller, South-East District, Saket Courts,
Delhi, in Eviction Petition being E. 101/2017, titled *“Gunita Gulati v.
P.D. Adlakha”*, calls for no interference in exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the
DRC Act.
28. The present Petition, along with pending Application(s), if any,
stands disposed of.



HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 25, 2026/tk/va

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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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