Vashist Kumar vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh

Court
Madhya Pradesh High Court

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR

BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT
th
ON THE 19 OF NOVEMBER, 2026
WRIT PETITION No. 1991 of 2012
CNR No.: MPHC010057022012
VASHIST KUMAR
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Ashok Kumar Gupta and Shri Awadesh Kumar Gupta - Advocates
for the petitioner.
Shri Devendra Mishra - Panel Lawyer for the respondents/State.
ORDER
This writ petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has
been filed by the petitioner for the following reliefs :-
"(i) It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to quash the impugned order dated 29-05-2007 Annexure
P/4 and that of order dated 14-12-2006 Annexure P/2 and order of
termination dated 27-09-1997 (not annexed) in the interest of
justice.

(ii) It is, therefore, prayed that this Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to issue an appropriate writ commanding the respondents
to reinstate the petitioner in service on the post of Constable, in the
interest of justice.

(iii) Kindly be pleased to issue any other writ or directions
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which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case including cost of the litigation may
kindly be awarded in favour of the petitioner."

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that initially the petitioner
was appointed to the post of Constable vide order dated 29.08.1990. He
further submits that, on 16.11.1996, the petitioner was assigned duty for
security purpose at Tili Hospital, where he allegedly abused one Prakash
Valmiki and assaulted him, who was posted as a Sweeper. On the basis of the
aforesaid allegations, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner; however,
he did not submit any reply to the same. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority
appointed an Inquiry Officer. Since the petitioner remained absent during the
enquiry proceedings, the Inquiry Officer proceeded ex-parte and held both
the charges to be proved against him.
3. Thereafter, a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner,
and the disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice calling upon him to
submit his explanation. The petitioner submitted his reply to the said notice.
However, the disciplinary authority, vide order dated 27.09.1997, terminated
the services of the petitioner. Being aggrieved of the termination order, the
petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, which was also
dismissed vide order dated 14.12.2006. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred a
mercy petition, which was also rejected vide order dated 29.05.2017.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was
working as a Constable and the charges levelled against him were not serious
in nature. Despite this, the disciplinary authority imposed the extreme
punishment of removal from service, contrary to Regulation 226 of the
Police Regulations.
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5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment passed by

the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ganesh Kumar Sharma vs.
State of M.P. and others, reported in 2013 (2) MPLJ 402, and the judgment
passed by the Single Bench in Purshottam Ivne vs. State of M.P., (2014) 3
MPLJ 704 and the judgment passed by the Gwalior Bench of this Court in
Bhanendra Singh vs. The State of M.P. (Writ Petition No.20078 of
2023), and submitted that before passing the order of extreme punishment of
dismissal from service, firstly; the disciplinary authority ought to consider
imposing a minor penalty and cannot be imposed the major punishment from
dismisseal from service in case of Constable. It is, therefore, contended that
the respondents, without considering the aforesaid aspect, have illegally
terminated the services of the petitioner.
6. Per contra, the counsel for respondent submitted that initially the
petitioner was appointed as a Constable on 29.08.1990. He further submits
that, prior to the passing of the impugned punishment order, as many as 11
minor punishments had been imposed upon the petitioner, out of which 8
pertained to unauthorized absence from duty. On one occasion, the penalty
of withholding one annual increment was also imposed upon the petitioner.
7. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that the
petitioner did not submit any reply to the charge-sheet and also failed to
participate in the departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, after
conducting the enquiry, found the charges levelled against the petitioner to
be proved. He further submits that the charges are serious in nature and on an
earlier occasion also, the penalty of withholding one annual increment had
been imposed upon the petitioner. Despite the imposition of the aforesaid
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penalty, the petitioner again committed similar misconduct. He further

submits that the disciplinary authority has duly complied with the provisions
of Police Regulation 226. In view of the repeated misconduct on the part of
the petitioner, the disciplinary authority rightly imposed the penalty of
dismissal from service. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
the appellate authority has rightly rejected the appeal preferred by the
petitioner, and consequently, the mercy petition has also been rejected by the
respondent authority. He further submits that, on 16.11.1996, the petitioner
was assigned duty for security purpose at Tili Hospital. During the course of
his duty, the petitioner allegedly abused one Prakash Valmiki, who was
posted there as a sweeper, and also assaulted him.
8. It is further submitted that looking to the serious charges, the
punishment is not disproportionate punishment. Each and every stage, the
principle of natural justice has already been followed by the respondents. As
the petitioner has never participate in the departmental enquiry and now the
petitioner cannot take a ground that a proper procedure has not been followed
during the enquiry. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted
that during a short period of seven years, the penalty of censure (Ninda) was
imposed upon the petitioner on 11 occasions. Despite the imposition of such
penalties, the petitioner continued to repeat similar acts of misconduct. It is
further submitted that the scope of judicial interference in the matter of
disciplinary proceedings and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority is limited.
9. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. Before considering the submissions made by counsel for petitioner, this
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Court would like to consider the scope of interference by this Court in

departmental matters. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka
and another Vs. N. Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
“8. We find that the interference in the order of punishment by the
Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court suffers from patent error.
The power of judicial review is confined to the decision-making
process. The power of judicial review conferred on the
constitutional court or on the Tribunal is not that of an appellate
authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the High Court is not
a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant. It is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent
in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that
behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated.
The Court held as under :
(AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under
Article 226 of the Constitution a court of appeal over the decision
of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held
by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence,
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the
conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is
not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under
Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence.”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 :
1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench of this Court has
held that power of judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power
of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives
fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the
authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eyes of the court.
The court/tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
an appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at
its own independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under
:
(SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review
of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial
review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair
treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority
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reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an
inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant,
the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice
are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based
on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold
inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of
fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some
evidence. Neither the technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of
proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary
proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and
conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge.
The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as
appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its
own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal
may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the
delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of
natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the
mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the
disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached,
the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the
finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the
facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where
appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power
to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a
disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings
on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or
reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before
the Court/Tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR
718 : AIR 1964 SC 364, this Court held at p. 728 that if the
conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the
disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on
the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.”
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC
416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held that interference with
the decision of departmental authorities is permitted if such
authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of
natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing
the mode of such enquiry while exercising jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423,
para 16) “16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1 LLN
160] of the High Court seems to have approached the case as
though it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.
Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be
permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

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Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of
the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory
regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision
of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the
evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the
authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious
that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion,
or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that
the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the
enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is
that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be
based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a
matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed
under Article 226 of the Constitution.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya,
(2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this Court held that
the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the
evidence led
in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been
fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence,
the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the findings in
departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:(SCC pp. 587-88,
paras 7 & 10)
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate
court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held
and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy
of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be
grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental
enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are
based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test
to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably
could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material
on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in
disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India v. G.
Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806 and
Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 : 1999
SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,
(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144].)

*
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently acquitted the
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respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt, will not in any way
render a completed disciplinary proceeding invalid nor affect the
validity of the finding of guilt or consequential punishment. The
standard of proof required in criminal proceedings being different
from the standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to different results in the two
proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental proceedings
and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the criminal
proceedings. This is more so when the departmental proceedings
are more proximate to the incident, in point of time, when
compared to the criminal proceedings. The findings by the
criminal court will have no effect on previously concluded
domestic enquiry. An employee who allows the findings in the
enquiry and the punishment by the disciplinary authority to attain
finality by nonchallenge, cannot after several years, challenge the
decision on the ground that subsequently, the criminal court has
acquitted him.”
13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v.
P.Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554, this
Court held that while reappreciating evidence the High Court
cannot act as an appellate authority in the disciplinary
proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to when the High
Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary proceedings : (SCC p.
617, para 13) “13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same
has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.”
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent relies
upon the judgment reported as Allahabad Bank v. Krishna
Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 335,
wherein this
Court held that if the disciplinary authority records a finding that is
not supported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with the
finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find that even
on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High Court could
interfere with the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority It
is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are perverse. The
finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct has been
interfered with only on the ground that there are discrepancies in
the evidence of the Department. The discrepancies in the evidence
will not make it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has
appreciated the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent

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is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the
enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal
before the State Government was also dismissed. Once the
evidence has been accepted by the departmental authority, in
exercise of power of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High
Court could not interfere with the findings of facts recorded by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the appellate authority.
We may notice that the said judgment has not noticed the larger
Bench judgments in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963
SC 1723 and B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC
749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the
orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from
patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.” The
Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India and others Vs.
Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held a
under:
“6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this stage that it
is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an Appellate
Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the
High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review
do not act as an Appellate Authority:
“Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct errors of
law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of
justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review
is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence
as an Appellate Authority.” (See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah
Khan [(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316], SCC p.
379, para 11.)
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the
evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of
the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on
record 12. From the facts collected and the report submitted by the
inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the disciplinary
authority and the Appellate Authority.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC 618 :
(1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623, para 15) A
disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof
required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof
beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that lender was a person
likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which
a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case,
the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision
based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of
dealing with all questions, either of fact or of law arising in the
appeal, as the Single Judge of the High Court. If the enquiry has
been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the
evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court. A finding
cannot be characterised as perverse or unsupported by any
relevant materials, if it was a reasonable inference from proved

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facts. (SCR p. 219) 16. In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989)
2 SCC 177 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held
at SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:
“27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment
cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction. The Tribunal
cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry officer or
competent authority where they are not arbitrary or utterly
perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power to impose
penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the competent
authority either by an Act of legislature or rules made under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If there has been an
enquiry consistent with the rules and in accordance with principles
of natural justice what punishment would meet the ends of justice
is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent
authority. If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed
on the proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute
its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of
penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the
Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot interfere
with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry officer or the
competent authority is based on evidence even if some of it is
found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the matter.”

17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998) 4 SCC 310 :

1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC p. 315, para 12 as
under:

“12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the
firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were
enquired into relate to serious misconduct. The
respondent was unable to demonstrate before us how
prejudice was caused to him due to non-supply of the
enquiry authority's report/findings in the present case. It
needs to be emphasised that in the banking business
absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty
needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in
particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the
confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired.
It is for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High
Court had committed an error while setting aside the
order of dismissal of the respondent on the ground of
prejudice on account of non-furnishing of the enquiry
report/findings to him.”

18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v.
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P.C. Kakkar [(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S)

468] this Court held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14 as
under:

“14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher
standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the
money of the depositors and the customers. Every
officer/employee of the bank is required to take all
possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to
discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty,
devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is
unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and
discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this
Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager
v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there
was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the
officer/employee acted without authority. The very
discipline of an organisation more particularly a bank is
dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting
and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting
beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline
and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee
were not casual in nature and were serious. These
aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the
High Court.”

19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal
[(2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was
pointed out as under: (SCC p.614, para 10)

“If the charged employee holds a position of trust where
honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the
matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be
dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with
public money or is engaged in financial transactions or
acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of
integrity and trustworthiness is a must and
unexceptionable.”

20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G.
Thirugnanasambandam [(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC
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(L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p. 247, para 15 held:

“15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
principles of the Evidence Act have no application in
a domestic enquiry.”


10. From perusal of the record, it is gathered that petitioner did not
submit any reply to the charge-sheet and also failed to participate in the
departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer, after conducting the enquiry,
found the charges levelled against the petitioner to be proved. Charges are
serious in nature and on an earlier occasion also, the penalty of withholding
one annual increment had been imposed upon the petitioner. Despite the
imposition of the aforesaid penalty, the petitioner again committed similar
misconduct. The disciplinary authority has duly complied with the provisions
of Police Regulation 226. In view of the repeated misconduct on the part of
the petitioner, the disciplinary authority rightly imposed the penalty of
dismissal from service. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances,
the appellate authority has rightly rejected the appeal preferred by the
petitioner, and consequently, the mercy petition has also been rejected by the
respondent authority. On 16.11.1996, the petitioner was assigned duty for
security purpose at Tili Hospital. During the course of his duty, the petitioner
allegedly abused one Prakash Valmiki, who was posted there as a sweeper,
and also assaulted him. Looking to the serious charges, the punishment is not
disproportionate punishment. Each and every stage, the principle of natural
justice has already been followed by the respondents. The petitioner has
never participate in the departmental enquiry and now the petitioner cannot
take a ground that a proper procedure has not been followed during the
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enquiry. During a short period of seven years, the penalty of censure (Ninda)

was imposed upon the petitioner on 11 occasions.
11. Looking to the aforesaid facts and the fact that, on earlier
occasions, as many as 11 minor penalties, including the punishment of
withholding of one annual increment, have been imposed upon the petitioner,
it is evident that despite having been subjected to disciplinary action on
several occasions, the petitioner has repeatedly indulged in misconduct.
Therefore, the judgments cited by the petitioner in Ganesh Kumar Sharma
(supra), Purshottam Ivne (supra), Bhanendra Singh (supra) and Narendra
Singh Verma (supra) are distinguishable and are not applicable to the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
12. In view of the above, no case is made out for interference by this
Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India and, therefore, the petition deserves to be dismissed.
13. Accordingly, this petition sans merit and is hereby dismissed.

(ANAND SINGH BAHRAWAT)
JUDGE

mc

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