RACHITA MASHI MEWA vs JOWEL MEWA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 312 of 2023
Rachita Mashi Mewa, aged about 39 years, wife of Jowel Mewa,
resident of Village Haranganj, P.O. and P.S. Korrah, District
Hazaribag, Jharkhand ... O.P./Appellant
Versus
Jowel Mewa, aged about 45 years, son of Late Jayant Kumar Mewa,
resident of Haranganj, P.O. and P.S. Korrah, District Hazaribag,
Jharkhand … Petitioner/Respondent
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CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ PRASAD
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For the Appellant: Mr.Nikhilesh Kr Chatterjee, Advocate
Mr Shiv Prasad, Advocate
For the Respondent: Mrs Vani Kumari, Advocate
Ms Vaishnavi Kaushik, Advocate
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Reserved on 05.10.2026 Pronounced on 27/10/2026
Per : Manoj Prasad, J.

1. Heard Mr Nikhilesh Kumar Chatterjee, learned counsel for the
appellant, who appears with Mr Shiv Prasad, and Mrs Vani Kumari,
learned counsel for the respondent, who appears with Ms Vaishnavi
Kaushik.
2. The present First Appeal has been filed by Rachita Mashi
Mewa, the opposite party/appellant, under Section 19(1) of the
Family Courts Act, 1984, impleading the petitioner, Jowel Mewa, as
the respondent. It challenges the judgment and decree passed by the
learned Additional Principal Judge, Additional Family Court,
Hazaribagh, in Original Matrimonial Suit No. 29 of 2021, vide
judgment dated 20.09.2023, with the decree sealed and signed on
20.09.2023 itself. The learned Additional Principal Judge decreed the
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suit of the petitioner/respondent, Jowel Mewa, which was instituted
under Section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869, with a prayer for judicial
separation on the grounds of cruelty and desertion.
3. This appeal was admitted on 06.03.2024.Both the parties were
represented with their respective Advocates who have appeared
through vakalatnama.
4. The appellant-wife challenges the decree for judicial
separation, bringing counter-allegations of cruelty and desertion, and
other grounds, alleging that she has been subjected to treatment by
the present respondent. It is further alleged that the respondent failed
to satisfy the requirements of Section 22 of the Divorce Act.

5. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner-respondent
filed an application for a decree of judicial separation under Section
22 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, leading to the institution of
Original Suit No. 29 of 2021 on 28.01.2021, wherein the present
respondent claimed that the marriage between the parties was
solemnised on 25.04.2007 under the Roman Catholic Rites.
Thereafter, the present appellant and the respondent lived together as
husband and wife and were blessed with two children, born out of
wedlock, who, on the date of institution of the Suit, were aged about
12 years and 9 years. However, the present appellant is alleged to be
an ill-tempered lady and to have had frequent quarrels with the
respondent. Despite all this, the parties lived together at different
places in the course of his posting with the Indian Army. In October,
2013, on completion of 17 years of service with the Indian Army, the
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respondent came down to Hazaribagh and, after waiting for six
months, joined Tata Iron & Steel Company (TISCO) as a Security
Guard, and since then he has been working there as a security guard.
Both husband and wife started living together in the quarter given by
TISCO. However, during the COVID pandemic, the wife and
daughter were sent to Hazaribagh. Thereafter, the relationship
between the husband and wife became strained, and the respondent
alleges that frivolous allegations were levelled against him relating to
an illicit relationship with a lady constable. The appellant even
physically assaulted her mother-in-law and picked frequent quarrels
with the respondent. A false and frivolous case under Section 498A
of the IPC and Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was also
instituted, and they were even harassed by the police at the instance
of the appellant. It is further stated that the present appellant has
deserted the respondent with no intention of restoring conjugal life,
and therefore a decree for judicial separation was prayed for.
6. Countering the respondent’s allegations, the present appellant
filed a detailed written statement denying them and reasserting that
the respondent and his mother began torturing the present appellant
for non-fulfilment of a dowry demand, for which the Korrah police
registered an FIR under Section 498A of the IPC. The defence of the
appellant also reasserts an allegation of an illicit relationship with a
lady constable, and she further alleges that she was neglected by her
husband, who was also unfaithful to her. The education of their
children became the responsibility of the present appellant, and the
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respondent ignored this responsibility. Other allegations were also
denied. It is stated that the maintenance case was also instituted as
Maintenance Case No. 33 of 2022, and with such assertions, a prayer
was made to dismiss the respondent’s Suit.
7. The learned trial court, upon consideration of the parties'
pleadings, framed issues for determination, including the issue as to
whether the present appellant had treated the present respondent with
such cruelty as to justify passing a decree for judicial separation on
the ground of cruelty in terms of Section 22 of the Divorce Act. The
other issues were also as to whether the present respondent was
deserted by his wife for a continuous period of two years or more
immediately preceding the application for judicial separation in terms
of Section 22 of the Divorce Act.
8. After the issues were framed, three witnesses were examined
on behalf of the present respondent, including the respondent
himself, the respondent's mother and the respondent's sister-in-law
(Bhabhi). Certified copies of the FIR of Korrah P.S. Case No. 124 of
2019 and of the chargesheet in the said case have also been filed.
9. On behalf of the O.P. (appellant herein), three witnesses have
also been examined, including the respondent, her mother and her
brother. No documentary evidence is on the record on behalf of the
present appellant/wife.
10. The learned trial court, after considering the oral and
documentary evidence, decided the issue with regard to cruelty by
the wife against the husband, observing that although the marriage
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was solemnised in 2007 and the couple lived happily for a
sufficiently long period, the relationship between the parties began to
deteriorate after the husband’s retirement on completion of 17 years
of service with the Indian Army. The learned trial court also
discussed the filing of the complaint leading to the registration of the
FIR, which was instituted at the instance of the present appellant,
with allegations of demand for dowry and harassment. Discussing the
evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the present
appellant, the trial court observed that the allegations of demand for
dowry or cruelty by the husband against the wife were not supported
by their evidence. The trial court referred to the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mangayakarasi vs. M.
Yuvaraj, ( 2020) 3 SCC 786, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that if the husband and his family members are exposed to
criminal litigation and it is ultimately found that such allegations are
unwarranted and without basis, the same amounts to mental cruelty
on the husband.
11. The trial court also observed that on account of such behavior
of the present appellant, her mother-in-law was forced to stay away
from herown house along with the present respondent.
12. Further reliance is placedonthe judgmentof the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Joydeep Majumdar vs. Bharti
Jaiswal Majumdar reported in (2021) 2 JBCJ 60 SC, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if allegations are likely to
affect the Career and reputation of the husband, the same amounts to
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cruelty. The Court therefore considering that false and frivolous
allegations,made out of vengeance,which were unverified and
unsubstantiated including allegations of adultery affecting the
reputation of the present respondent, amounted to cruelty and held
that the present respondent succeededin establishing the case that he
hadsuffered sufficient mental pain and agony because of conduct of
the respondent (appellant herein) and accordingly, held that the
present respondentwas entitled to a decree for judicial separation.
13. Similarly deciding the issue with regards to desertion for a
continuous period of 2 years and more immediately preceding the
presentation of the petition, the Court considered that in order to
prove desertion for the purpose of judicial separation,it is not only
that the factum of physical separation is sufficient but there should be
also animus deserendi on part of the desertingspouse.The respondent
in his evidence on affidavit has stated to be living separately since
08.08.2019 which fact was also admitted by the appellant that her
husband is living separate from the date when she had lodged a case
of dowry harassment against them. The Court concluded that there
has been sufficient evidence on record to show that there has been
desertion of the present respondent by the appellant for a period of 2
years or more before filing of the application under Section 22 of the
Divorce Act and hence decided the said issue also in favour of the
present respondent. Consequently,the suit of the present respondent
was decreed and a decree for judicial separation was passed.
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14. The Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the present
appellant submits that the Learned Trial Court committed manifest
error of law and fact in passing the impugned judgment and decree.
Desertion for a period of 2 years or more is a prerequisite for
granting a divorce under Section 22 of the Indian Divorce Act, and,
as per the admitted case of the parties, this desertion took place only
after the lodging of the FIR, which has been brought on record as
Exhibit-1 and is dated 08.08.2019. The minimum period of 2 years
from that date would have lapsed on 07.08.2021, while the Original
th
Matrimonial Suit was instituted in January 2021, i.e., on 28 day of
January 2021. Thus, no ground for desertion was made out, and this
was not considered by the Learned Trial Court. The findings of the
Learned Trial Court therefore suffer from manifest perversity, if not
from failure to follow the mandate of law as contained under Section
22 of the Divorce Act.
15. So far as the alleged grounds of cruelty are concerned, learned
counsel submits that an FIR was registered at the instance of the
present appellant against the present respondent and her mother, and
the police, after investigation, submitted a chargesheet under Section
498A of the IPC. At the time of submission of the chargesheet, the
Investigating Officer found a lack of sufficient evidence against the
mother-in-law, i.e. the mother of the respondent. However, in the
course of the hearing, the judgment passed in the said case, i.e. G.R
Case No. 5 of 2020, which has been brought on record and is not
disputed, shows that the present respondent was acquitted of the
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charges levelled against him, holding that the prosecution failed to
prove the charges for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC
beyond the shadow of a reasonable doubt, and that, as there was a
lack of sufficient evidence, the accused was acquitted of the charge
levelled against him.
16. Learned counsel submits that mere acquittal in a criminal case
does not amount to the institution of a false case, and, apart from
that, no other allegation of cruelty is made. Rather, the present
appellant was the victim of the respondent's illegal acts, who now
seeks a decree for judicial separation. Considering these facts, a
prayer is made to set aside the impugned judgment and decree and
allow the present appeal.
17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent submits that the impugned judgment and decree do not
warrant any interference. Admittedly, the parties have been living
separately since 2019, and by now almost 7 years have lapsed, yet no
effort has been made for restitution of conjugal rights. Levelling false
allegations imputing the husband's character amounts to cruelty.
Lodging a false case against the husband's aged mother and against
the husband is also cruelty, and these aspects of the case have been
considered by the learned trial court while passing the impugned
judgment. Learned counsel submits that the impugned judgment does
not warrant any interference. Prayer is made to dismiss the appeal.
18. Having heard the parties the point for determination which
falls for our consideration is whether the respondent established
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itscase of desertion and cruelty by the appellant so as to entitle him
to a decree for judicial separation in terms of Section 22 of the
Divorce Act, 1869.
19. Section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869 is quotedfor the sake of
conveniencehereunder:
“No decree shall hereafter be made for a divorce a mensa et
toro, but the husband or wife may obtain a decree of judicial
separation, on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion for two
years or upwards, and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a
mensa et toro under the existing law, and such other legal effect as
hereinafter mentioned.”
20. Apparently, to be entitled to a decree for judicial separation on
the ground of desertion, the minimum requirement is that such
desertion should be for 2 years or upwards. By the 2001 Amendment,
the words ‘without reasonable cause’ have been omitted after the
word ‘desertion’ and before the words ‘for 2 years or upwards’.
Thus, desertion simpliciter for 2 years or upwards is sufficient
ground for the purpose of obtaining a decree for judicial separation.
In the facts of the present case, the respondent, in its plaint, has
alleged at paras 17 and 18 that the opposite party, i.e. the present
appellant, instituted a false case under Section 498A of the IPC
against the petitioner (respondent herein) on 08.08.2019 and
prevailed upon the officer-in-charge, Korrah P.S. Thereafter, the
petitioner and his mother-in-law were taken into police custody and
were badly beaten up. Thereafter, the opposite party (present
appellant) never allowed the petitioner (present respondent) to enter
his own house, confined the mother of the petitioner inside the house,
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and on and off assaulted her in the most inhuman manner. Thus, the
pleading of desertion at the most begins from 08.08.2019. This fact
also has come up in the evidence, and the present appellant has
admitted the same in her evidence. Admittedly, the Suit was
st
instituted on 28.01.2021, as it appears from the 1 order sheet. The
minimum period of 2 years prior to the institution of the Suit, or to
the presentation of any application for the grant of a decree for
judicial separation, was not complete. Therefore, the cause of action
for a decree for judicial separation on the ground of desertion was
premature. The finding of the learned trial court on the issue of
desertion is, therefore, ex facie, not in accordance with law, and
the timeline has not been considered. To that extent, the decree
for judicial separation on the ground of desertion is not in
accordance with law, and the same is set aside.
21. However, the present respondent also invoked an additional
ground of cruelty to obtain a decree for judicial separation. The
contentions relate to the filing of a false case against the present
respondent and his mother by the present appellant for the offence
under Section 498A of the IPC. On perusal of exhibits 1 and 2, i.e.
the FIR and the chargesheet, it is apparent that the FIR was also
lodged by the present appellant against her mother-in-law, but the
police found no material to send the mother-in-law for trial and
found a lack of evidence against her. Prima facie, this is evidence of
the false implication of the mother-in-law ( mother of the respondent ) .
The law is settled that filing false cases against the husband's
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parents amounts to cruelty on the husband . Further, as brought on
record during the course of the hearing, the case against the present
respondent, registered as G.R. Case No. 5 of 2020 (Rachita Mashi
Mewa vs Jowel Mewa), was heard by the learned Judicial Magistrate
st
1 Class, Hazaribagh, and by judgment dated 28.01.2026, the present
respondent-Jowel Mewa was acquitted, observing that the
prosecution failed to prove the charges against him and that there
was insufficient evidence to support the allegations against him. This
also corroborates the assertions that cruelty was meted out to the
respondent by the appellant.
22. Another dimension of cruelty, as alleged by the respondent,
was levelling offalse allegations of adultery, which hada bearing on
his character. Such allegations also stand substantiatedin the written
statement filed by the present appellant, whichwerenot corroborated
by any convincing evidence on record.
23. We therefore hold the considered view that such allegations,
which bear on a person's character and remain uncorroborated by any
convincing evidence, amount to cruelty towards that person (the
husband herein).
24. We therefore areof the considered view that the learned trial
Court did not commit any error in law or fact in concluding that the
present respondent was entitled to a decree for judicial separation on
the ground of crueltymeted out by the present appellant against the
respondent.
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25. Predominantly, these allegations of cruelty related to mental
cruelty,which were corroborated by the evidence and the materials on
record, as discussed by us.
26. We are therefore of the considered view that, although the
respondent was unable to make out a case of desertion as required
under Section 22 of the Divorce Act, 1869, the respondent succeeded
in establishing a case of cruelty for the purpose of being entitled to a
decree for judicial separation in terms of Section 22 of the said Act.
The point for determination, as formulated by us, accordingly stands
answered.
27. In view of our preceding discussions, despite holding that the
finding of the learned trial court on the point of desertion was not in
accordance with law, we still affirm the decree for judicial separation
under Section 22 of the Divorce Act on the ground of cruelty.
28. The present appeal, therefore, stands disposed of.


(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)



(Manoj Prasad, J.)
th
27 October, 2026
A.F.R.
Pramanik/
Uploaded on 28.10.2026
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