THE STATE OF KARNATAKA vs GAWADU SIDDAPPA PATIL SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT DHARWAD
RD
DATED THIS THE 3 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
WRIT APPEAL NO.100707 OF 2025 (ULC)
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
M.S BUILDING, BENGALURU-560001.
2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
BELAGAVI-590001.
3. THE TAHASILDAR
BELAGAVI-590001.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.RAKESH M.BILKI, GOVT. ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally signed
by PRATIBHA
M PATIL
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
DHARWAD
BENCH
Date:
2026.11.13
14:51:26 +0530
GAWADU SIDDAPPA PATIL
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRs,
SHRI. SIDHAPPA GAWADU PATIL,
AGE: 61 YEARS, OCC: AGRICULTURE,
R/O. CARE OF AJIT RAM NACHANDRA MATHWALE,
SY. NO.176 1A, PLOT NO.3,
SHUKRAWAR PETH, TILAKWADI,
BELAGAVI-590006.
…RESPONDENT
(RESPONDENT-SERVED)
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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE IN
WRIT PETITION NO.WP.NO.101109/2022 DATED 21.04.2022 AND
FURTHER DISMISS THE WRIT PETITION IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE AND EQUITY; AND ETC.
THIS WRIT APPEAL COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING
THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
AND
HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE HEMA KULKARNI
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA )
The appellants-State stands before us calling in question
the order dated 21.04.2022 passed by the learned Single
Judge in W.P.No.101109/2022, holding that taking over of
the land by the State in exercising its power under the Urban
1
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repealing Act is contrary to
law.
2. The order of the learned Single Judge reads as
follows:
“The petitioner, who is the owner of the property
bearing R.S.No.684/1 of Anagol village of Belagavi
taluka has approached this Court with a prayer to
1
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’
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declare the proceedings initiated by Deputy
Commissioner and Competent Authority, Belagavi,
declaring that the deceased Gawadu Siddappa Patil
who was holding an extent of 2603-21 sq.mts of land
in the aforesaid item of land as excess vacant land
stand abated and also for further direction to delete the
name of the Government in the aforesaid three items
of lands and restore the name of Shri Gawadu
Siddappa Patil in the owner’s Column of the revenue
records of the said lands.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation)
Repealing Act (for short, ‘the ULC Act’) came into force
in the year 1999 and having regard to Section 4 of the
said Act, as the possession of the property in question
was not taken over by the competent authority, the
entire proceedings including the order impugned herein
stands abated. He submits that the possession of the
properties in question has not been taken over by the
competent authority under Section 10(6) of the ULC
Act and therefore, the alleged possession which is said
to have taken by the Revenue Inspector cannot be
considered as a compliance of the requirement of
Section 10(6) of the Act.
3. He has relied upon the judgment of this Court in
W.P. No.63674/2011 disposed of on 2nd November
2011 and also the judgment of this Court in W.P.
No.61621/2009 disposed of on 4th September 2019
and submits that the present matter is squarely
covered by the said judgments and prays that this
petition may be disposed of in terms of the said orders.
4. Learned High Court Government Pleader
opposing the petition submits that the Revenue
Inspector has taken possession of the property in
question and therefore, it cannot be said that the
proceedings stands abated in view of Section 4 of the
repealing act. He submits that since the entire
proceedings was completed much earlier to the
repealing Act coming into force, the provisions of
Section 4 of the repealing Act is not applicable to the
facts of the case.
5. In the case on hand, though the impugned order
has been passed in the year 1985 itself, the State has
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failed to establish that the possession of land, which is
the subject matter of the impugned order has been
taken strictly in accordance with Section 10(6) of the
Act. Admittedly, the possession has been taken by the
Revenue Inspector who is not the competent authority
under Section 10 of the ULC Act.
6. This Court in W.P. No.63674/2011, in identical
circumstances, has observed as follows:
“9. ……………….As far as State of
Karnataka is concerned, the competent
authority is the Special Deputy Commissioner
who is authorized to perform the functions
under the Act including taking possession
under sub Section 6 of Section 10 of the Act.
However, the possession when taken under
sub-Section 6 by the competent authority or
delivered by the owner or person interested
under sub Section 5, then it has to be handed
over to a person who is duly authorized by
the State Government. Therefore, the
authorization of the State Government by
any person to take possession under the said
proceedings is a mandatory requirements.
The said authorization can be general
authorization which would be effective in all
cases or they could be specific authorization
on a case to case basis. Therefore, in the
absence of there being any due authorization
to any officer by the State Government,
possession taken would not be in accordance
with law since it is only a duly authorised
person of the State Government who can
receive possession under Section 10.
10. In this context, it would be relevant to
refer to a decision of the Division Bench of
this Court in the case of Mangalore Urban
Development Authority, Mangalore V/s
Leelavathi and Others reported in (2009 2
KLJ 284), wherein it has been stated that the
Revenue Inspector is not the authorized
person-competent authority under Section
10(6) to take possession fo the land. In the
instant case also, it is seen that it is the I-
Grade Revenue Inspector who has taken
possession of the land in question. There is
no provision for the competent authority to
delegate the power under sub-Section 6 of
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Section 10 to any other officer or official for
the purpose of taking possession. It is only
the competent authority, which can take
possession under sub-section 6 of Section 10
of the ULC Act. The said decision squarely
applies to the present case since in the
instant case, it is the I-Grade Revenue
Inspector and not the competent authority
who has taken possession of the land in
question. Therefore, Annexure-D is contrary
to what is envisaged under Section 10.”
Following the said judgment passed by a co
ordinate bench of this Court in W.P. No.63674/2011,
even in W.P. No.61621/2009, a similar view has been
taken.
7. Under the circumstances, I am of the considered
view that the State has failed to establish that the
possession of the property in question, which is the
subject matter of the impugned order has been taken
in compliance of requirement of Section 10(6) of the
Act and therefore, having regard to Section 4 of the
repealing Act, the entire proceedings initiated by
respondent No.2 with regard to the lands in question
under the ULC Act stand abated and consequently the
entries made in favour of the Government in the
revenue records of the land in question is directed to
be deleted and the name of Shri Gawadu Siddappa Patil
co-owners of the property shall be restored.
Writ petition is disposed of accordingly.”
3. The appeal is preferred on 27.10.2025 clearly close
to four years after the passage of the order of the learned
Single Judge. If the State were not to be a party to the
proceedings, it would have been an altogether different
circumstance. It is the only State who were the respondents
before the learned Single Judge and after hearing and
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following the orders passed by the Judges earlier, the subject
order in W.P.No.101109/2022 is passed. An affidavit is filed
in support of the application seeking condonation of delay as
an explanation for the delay of close to four years. The
application reads as follows:
“1. It is respectfully submitted that, in the above
appeal the appellants have challenging the order
passed by the learned on Single Judge on 21.04.2022
in Writ Petition No.101109/2022 (ULC).
2. The certified copy of the order dated 21.04.2022
was applied by the office of the Advocate General and
put up before the concerned Law Officer for opinion. On
going through the said judgment the concerned Law
Officer written letter to the Head of the Legal Cell
regarding disposal of the Writ Petition. Ongoing though
the judgment the Head of the Legal Cell and also on
verification with the concerned department which was
opined by the Head of the Legal Cell that, to prefer an
appeal challenging the order passed by the learned
Single Judge. Thereafter, the steps have been taken by
the concerned department seeking for the clarification
from the higher authority and also with regarding to the
possession of the subject land is concerned and
thereafter the communication was sent to the
Government on 27.11.2023 seeking permission to file
appeal challenging the in order passed by the learned
Single Judge. Thereafter received a letter from
Secretary, Dept. of Urban Development Bengaluru
directing Deputy Commissioner, Belagavi to submit
copy of the Writ Petition and Documents annexed to the
Writ Petition and statement of objections filed on behalf
of the State so as to enable them to process for
appointing LCO. Thereafter, the Dispute Resolution
Board of Dept. of Urban Development Bengaluru under
the Chairmanship of Addl. Chief Secretary, held a
meeting on 27.03.2025 to decide about filing of Writ
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Appeal against the Order of learned Single judge
W.P.No.101109/2022 (ULC) and it was resolved to file
appeal against the judgment. Thereafter, the
Government have taken decision and approved the
proposal sent by the concerned authority and issued
Government Order bearing No.UDD 02 ULC 2022,
Bengaluru dated 06.05.2025 and the said G.O came to
be received by the Advocate General office on
28.05.2025 along with original records. Thereafter, the
same was put up before the concerned law officer for
drafting on 30.08.2025.
3. It is further respectfully submitted that, Ongoing
through the judgment and documents, the Law Officer
could not draft the appeal in time due to attending the
day to day court proceedings and thereafter also other
office correspondence of the concerned Government
Department and Law Officer could not draft well within
time. Hence, there is a delay in preferring Appeal but
the said delay in filing the above Appeal is not
intentional one but it is due to bonafide and
administrative reasons as stated above. In this process
there is some delay in finalizing and filing the above
said Writ Appeal. The delay is bonafide and for the
reasons stated herein above and in the circumstances it
is prayed that the delay may be condoned by allowing
the application. If the said application is allowed no-
prejudice will be caused to the Respondents herein. On
the other hand if the said application is not allowed the
Appellants/State will be put to huge loss and the lands
being already handed over and utilized by public
authorities the same will affect the public interest also.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court be
pleased to condone the delay 1255 days in filing the
above appeal in the interest of justice.”
4. The application is an explanation as to how the file
has moved from table to table or office to office and the
opinions of several persons as to filing of the appeal or
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otherwise. There is hardly any justification for the delay of
close to four years in preferring the appeal. The Apex Court,
in the line of judgments, has clearly held that merely
because it is not that the High Court or the Apex Court
should show any lenience. The State must be treated as any
other litigants save exceptions based upon facts obtaining in
a particular case.
CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS CONDONED
DELAY:
5. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
2
HARYANA v. CHANDRAMANI holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
11. It is notorious and common knowledge that
delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this
Court — be it by private party or the State — are barred
by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal
approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat
sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is
equally common knowledge that litigants including the
State are accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. When the
State is an applicant, praying for condonation of
delay, it is common knowledge that on account of
impersonal machinery and the inherited
bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-
2
(1996) 3 SCC 132
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making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck
ethos, delay on the part of the State is less
difficult to understand though more difficult to
approve, but the State represents collective cause
of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions
are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at
slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the
files from table to table and keeping it on table for
considerable time causing delay — intentional or
otherwise — is a routine. Considerable delay of
procedural red-tape in the process of their making
decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain
amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the
appeals brought by the State are lost for such
default no person is individually affected but what
in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest.
The expression “sufficient cause” should,
therefore, be considered with pragmatism in
justice-oriented approach rather than the
technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day's delay. The factors which
are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the governmental conditions would
be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.
The court should decide the matters on merits
unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No
separate standards to determine the cause laid by
the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of sufficient cause . The
Government at appropriate level should constitute legal
cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles
are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases
require adjustment and should authorise the officers to
take a decision or give appropriate permission for
settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal
needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer
responsible to file the appeal and he should be made
personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the
State cannot be put on the same footing as an
individual. The individual would always be quick in
taking the decision whether he would pursue the
remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a
person legally injured while State is an impersonal
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machinery working through its officers or servants.
Considered from this perspective, it must be held that
the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained
and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.”
5.1. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
3
NAGALAND v. LIPOK AO holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be
laid down by hard-and-fast rules. In New India
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [(1975) 2 SCC
840] this Court held that discretion given by
Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so
as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid
rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause”
should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar
Singh v. Kanshi Ram [ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 : AIR
1917 PC 156] it was observed that true guide for a
court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is
whether the appellant acted with reasonable
diligence in prosecuting the appeal . In Shakuntala
Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [(1969) 1 SCR 1006 : AIR
1969 SC 575] a Bench of three Judges had held that
unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence
as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5
is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any
delay cannot be refused to be condoned.
10.
In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Nirmala Devi [(1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996]
which is a case of negligence of the counsel which
misled a litigant into delayed pursuit of his remedy, the
default in delay was condoned. In Lala Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770] this Court had held that
there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel
by itself is always sufficient cause for condonation of
delay. It is always a question whether the mistake
was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an
3
(2005) 3 SCC 752
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ulterior purpose. In that case it was held that the
mistake committed by the counsel was bona fide
and it was not tainted by any mala fide motive.
11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe [1981
Supp SCC 72] it was held that whether or not
there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay
is a question of fact dependent upon the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi
Devi v. Dina Nath [(1982) 3 SCC 366] it was held
that the appellant had sufficient cause for not
filing the appeal within the period of limitation.
This Court under Article 136 can reassess the
ground and in appropriate case set aside the order
made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit
the matter for hearing on merits. It was
accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the
case was remitted for decision on merits.
12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh
[(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had
held that if the refusal to condone the delay
results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be
a ground to condone the delay. Delay was
accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land
Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of
two Judges considered the question of limitation
in an appeal filed by the State and held that
Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court
to do substantial justice to the parties by
disposing of matters on merits. The expression
“sufficient cause” is adequately elastic to enable
the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner
which subserves the ends of justice — that being
the life purpose for the existence of the institution
of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court
has been making a justifiably liberal approach in
matters instituted in this Court. But the message
does not appear to have percolated down to all
the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court
reiterated that the expression “every day's delay
must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. The doctrine must be
applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic
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manner. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to have
vested right in injustice being done because of a
non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption
that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on account of
mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
Judiciary is not respected on account of its power
to legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice and is
expected to do so. Making a justice-oriented
approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the
State which was seeking condonation and not a
private party was altogether irrelevant. The
doctrine of equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant, are
accorded the same treatment and the law is
administered in an even-handed manner. There is
no warrant for according a stepmotherly
treatment when the State is the applicant. The
delay was accordingly condoned.
13.
Experience shows that on account of an
impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is
directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be
subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making, file-
pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its
part is less difficult to understand though more difficult
to approve. The State which represents collective cause
of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata
status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with
the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course
of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient
cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits
in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in
presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned,
the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to
the High Court for disposal on merits after affording
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opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram
Parkash Kalra [1987 Supp SCC 339] this Court had held
that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented
approach in rejecting the application for condonation of
delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned
and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in
accordance with law.
14. In G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition
Officer [(1988) 2 SCC 142] it was held that no general
principle saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel could be laid. The expression “sufficient
cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice and generally delays
in preferring the appeals are required to be
condoned in the interest of justice where no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona
fides is imputable to the party seeking
condonation of delay. In litigations to which
Government is a party, there is yet another aspect
which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals
brought by Government are lost for such defaults,
no person is individually affected, but what, in the
ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The
decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the
characteristics of decisions of private individuals.
The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a
private citizen as for governmental authorities.
Government, like any other litigant must take
responsibility for the acts, omissions of its
officers. But a somewhat different complexion is
imparted to the matter where Government makes
out a case where public interest was shown to
have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith
on the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It
was, therefore, held that in assessing what
constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of
Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat
unrealistic to exclude from the considerations that
go into the judicial verdict, these factors which
are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the Government. Government
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decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as
they are, by a considerable degree of procedural
red tape in the process of their making. A certain
amount of latitude is, therefore, not
impermissible. It is rightly said that those who
bear responsibility of Government must have “a
little play at the joints”. Due recognition of these
limitations on governmental functioning — of
course, within reasonable limits — is necessary if
the judicial approach is not to be rendered
unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and
unrealistic to put Government and private parties
on the same footing in all respects in such
matters. Implicit in the very nature of
governmental functioning is procedural delay
incidental to the decision-making process. The
delay of over one year was accordingly condoned.
15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by
officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and
encumbered process of pushing the files from table to
table and keeping it on the table for considerable time
causing delay — intentional or otherwise — is a routine.
Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process
of their making decision is a common feature.
Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not
impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State
are lost for such default no person is individually
affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers,
is public interest. The expression “sufficient
cause” should, therefore, be considered with
pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather
than the technical detection of sufficient cause for
explaining every day's delay. The factors which
are peculiar to and characteristic of the
functioning of the governmental conditions would
be cognizant to and requires adoption of
pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process.
The court should decide the matters on merits
unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No
separate standards to determine the cause laid by
the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to
prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The
Government at appropriate level should constitute legal
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cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles
are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases
require adjustment and should authorise the officers to
take a decision or give appropriate permission for
settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal,
needed prompt action should be pursued by the
officer responsible to file the appeal and he should
be made personally responsible for lapses, if any.
Equally, the State cannot be put on the same
footing as an individual. The individual would
always be quick in taking the decision whether he
would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or
application since he is a person legally injured
while the State is an impersonal machinery
working through its officers or servants.
16. The above position was highlighted in State
of Haryana v. Chandra Mani [(1996) 3 SCC 132] and
Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma
[(1996) 10 SCC 634]. It was noted that adoption of
strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protract ( sic )
public justice, and it would result in public mischief by
skilful management of delay in the process of filing an
appeal.”
5.2. The Apex Court in the case of SHEO RAJ SINGH
4
v. UNION OF INDIA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
Analysis
29. We have heard Mr Sharma and Mr Sen,
appearing on behalf of the appellants and the
respondents, respectively, and perused the order under
challenge.
30. Considering the aforementioned decisions,
there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped
in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties
4
(2023) 10 SCC 531
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and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply
due to technical considerations of delay. However, these
decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation
of delay being a discretionary power available to courts,
exercise of discretion must necessarily depend
upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the
degree of acceptability of the explanation, the
length of delay being immaterial.
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient
cause being shown or an acceptable explanation
being proffered, delay of the shortest range may
not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
delay of long periods can be condoned if the
explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of
course, the courts must distinguish between an
“explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation”
is designed to give someone all of the facts and
lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify
the circumstances of a particular event and allows
the person to point out that something that has
happened is not his fault, if it is really not his
fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish
an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people
tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same
thing and struggle to find out the difference between
the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to
deny responsibility and consequences when under
attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something
as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation
proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is
no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore,
each case for condonation of delay based on existence
or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its
own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is
only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often
accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard
public interest from those hidden forces whose sole
agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not
reach the higher courts for adjudication.
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33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in
mind that we are not hearing an application for
condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a
discretionary order of the High Court granting the
prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the
former, whether to condone or not would be the only
question whereas in the latter, whether there has been
proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the
prayer for condonation would be the question . Law is
fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should
not ordinarily interfere with the discretion
exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is
required, we can profitably refer to the decision in
Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [ Manjunath
Anandappa v. Tammanasa , (2003) 10 SCC 390] ,
which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat
Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor
Sabha [ Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel
Tubes Mazdoor Sabha , (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980
SCC (L&S) 197] where it has been held that:
“an appellate power interferes not
when the order appealed is not right but
only when it is clearly wrong”.
(emphasis in original)
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is
dated 21-12-2011 [ Union of India v. Sheo Raj , 2011
SCC OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of
time when the decisions in Katiji [ Collector (LA) v.
Katiji , (1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [ G. Ramegowda
v. LAO , (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [ State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani , (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V.
Ayisumma [ Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma , (1996) 10
SCC 634] and Lipok AO [ State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao ,
(2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] were holding
the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the
field now, having been overruled by any subsequent
decision. Although there have been some decisions in
the recent past [ State of M.P. v. Bherulal [ State of M.P.
v. Bherulal , (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ)
101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84]
is one such decision apart from University of Delhi
[ University of Delhi v. Union of India , (2020) 13 SCC
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745] ] which have not accepted governmental lethargy,
tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within
time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet,
the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be
tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented
approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which
have been referred to above.
35. We find that the High Court in the present
case assigned the following reasons in support of its
order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on
public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a
litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny
condonation of delay as the same could cause
miscarriage of justice.
35.2. The expression “sufficient cause” is
elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice.
Further, when substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against one another, the
former would prevail.
35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the
sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the
length of delay is not always decisive while
exercising discretion in such matters if the delay
is properly explained. Further, the merits of a
claim were also to be considered when deciding
such applications for condonation of delay.
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn
between inordinate unexplained delay and
explained delay, where in the present case, the
first respondent had sufficiently explained the
delay on account of negligence on part of the
government functionaries and the government
counsel on record before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence
would be liable to suffer and not public interest through
the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a
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pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not
border on callousness.
36. Given these reasons, we do not consider
discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in
an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to
be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for
interference, which it is not.
…. …. ….
41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the
rival contentions, we feel that the High Court's decision
[ Union of India v. Sheo Raj , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511]
to condone the delay on account of the first
respondent's inability to present the appeal within time,
for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from
any error warranting interference. As the
aforementioned judgments have shown, such an
exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal
and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where
certain leeway could be provided to the State. The
hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal
by the State being presented within the prescribed
period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to
pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a
lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly
be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand
scheme of governmental functions have to be removed
by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the
competing interests.”
5.3. The Apex Court in the case of MOOL CHANDRA v.
5
UNION OF INDIA holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
8. OA No. 1579 of 2017 came to be filed by the
appellant seeking direction to the respondent authorities
5
(2025) 1 SCC 625
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to consider his representation and same came to be
disposed of by the Tribunal vide order dated 8-5-2017
[ Mool Chandra v. Statistics , OA No. 1579 of 2017, order
dated 8-5-2017 (CAT)] directing the respondents to
dispose of the representation dated 27-7-2015 within a
period of 90 days. This resulted in the same being
disposed of and intimation/communication was
forwarded to the appellant on 9-11-2017 informing the
appellant thereunder that representation dated 27-7-
2015 has been considered and rejected. The appellant
was also intimated that his representations had already
been disposed of and same had been intimated vide
communication dated 20-11-2016/22-11-2016 itself and
also forwarded copy thereof to the appellant along with
communication dated 9-11-2017.
9. The communication dated 9-11-2017 came to
be challenged by the appellant in OA No. 3034 of 2018
as well as the communication dated 20-11-2016/22-11-
2016. The said OA is said to have been withdrawn by
the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
purportedly without his consent and knowledge on 10-8-
2018 [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine
CAT 28651]. The said order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of
India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] of the Tribunal
dismissing the OA as withdrawn reads: ( Mool Chandra
case [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine
CAT 28651], SCC OnLine CAT paras 1-2)
“ 1 . The learned counsel for applicant
seeks permission of the Tribunal to withdraw
the OA.
2 . Permission is accorded. The OA is
dismissed as withdrawn without prejudice to
the right of the applicant to pursue his remedy
in accordance with law.”
10. The appellant claims that he came to know
about this fact, namely, withdrawal of his application
before the Tribunal only in the last week of August 2019
and immediately thereafter he had applied for certified
copy of the order dated 10-8-2018 [ Mool Chandra v.
Union of India , 2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] and filed
another OA No. 2066 of 2020 before the Tribunal along
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with Miscellaneous Application No. 3679 of 2019 for
condoning the delay in filing the OA as he had been
given opportunity to pursue his remedy in accordance
with law.
11. The application for condonation of delay came
to be rejected by the Tribunal vide order dated 10-12-
2020 [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC OnLine
CAT 17285] by observing thus : ( Mool Chandra case
[ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC OnLine CAT
17285] , SCC OnLine CAT paras 3-4)
“ 3 . The delay involved is more than one
year. It is not as if the applicant was not aware
of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the OA
is filed against the order of dismissal, passed
against him was allowed and relief was granted.
It is in compliance with the order passed by the
Tribunal, that the revised order of punishment
was passed. The appellate authority rejected
the appeal in the year 2016. It is not the case
of the applicant that he did not receive the
same. Further, the applicant was very much
free to pursue the proceedings, ever since he
retired. Except stating that his earlier counsel
did not take proper steps, the applicant did not
substantiate the reasons for delay.
4 . We are not convinced with the
reasons given in the MA. The same is
accordingly dismissed. The OA shall also stand
dismissed.”
12. Being aggrieved by the same, the appellant
filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5350 of 2022 before the
Delhi High Court which dismissed the writ petition by
the impugned order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of
India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] while affirming the
order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2020 SCC
OnLine CAT 17285] of the Tribunal and observed that
justifiable penalty had been imposed by the disciplinary
authority. Hence, this appeal.
Contentions of learned advocates
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13. It is the contention of Shri Vardhman
Kaushik, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
that the High Court on the one hand having opined not
to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alleged
unexplained delay, yet proceeded to deal with the
matter on merits of the case, that too without affording
an opportunity to the appellant and as such the appeal
deserves to be allowed by setting aside the impugned
order [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC
,
OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674]. He would further elaborate
his submissions by contending that the Tribunal had
committed an error in not condoning the delay of 425
days in filing OA No. 2066 of 2020 and the delay was
due to the mistake of the counsel, who without the
knowledge and consent of the appellant had withdrawn
the earlier OA No. 3034 of 2018 and also without
prejudice to the right of the appellant to pursue his
remedy in accordance with law and it is on account of
lack of knowledge of the appellant's application having
been withdrawn and on acquiring knowledge about such
unilateral withdrawal the appellant had taken immediate
steps to prosecute his legitimate claim before the
Tribunal by filing OA No. 2066 of 2020 afresh along with
Miscellaneous Application No. 3679 of 2019 for
condonation of delay and as such the Tribunal ought to
have condoned the delay which refused to do so and the
same has been erroneously affirmed by the High Court.
He would submit that a party should not suffer for the
mistake of his counsel or the conduct of the counsel and
he has placed reliance on Rafiq v. Munshilal [ Rafiq v.
Munshilal , (1981) 2 SCC 788] and N. Balakrishnan v. M.
Krishnamurthy [ N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy ,
(1998) 7 SCC 123].
14. Shri Kaushik would further contend that the
term “ sufficient cause ” ought to receive liberal
construction by the constitutional courts to advance
substantial justice and the facts obtained in the instant
case were sufficient to hold that the delay in filing fresh
OA was not attributable to any laxity exhibited by the
appellant. On merits the learned counsel appearing for
the appellant would contend that it is an undisputed fact
that the complainant (wife of the appellant) had
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withdrawn her complaint and an affidavit to the said
effect had been filed before the enquiry officer itself and
she had also not deposed before inquiry though cited as
a witness on behalf of employer and as such the finding
of the enquiry officer holding the appellant guilty of
alleged misconduct was an erroneous finding and liable
to be set aside. Hence, he prays for the appeals being
allowed.
15. Per contra Shri N. Visakamurthy, learned
counsel appearing for the respondents would support
the impugned orders [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of
India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] and submits that
purported representations submitted by the appellant
vide letters dated 19-10-2004, 16-3-2016 and 17-3-
2016, had been examined by the Ministry and had been
rejected vide OM dated 20-11-2016/22-11-2016 and
this was challenged in OA No. 3034 of 2018 and same
had been withdrawn [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India ,
2018 SCC OnLine CAT 28651] by the appellant
unconditionally and as such no fault can be laid at the
doors of the respondents. Hence, he prays for dismissal
of the appeals.
16. Having heard the learned advocates
appearing for the parties and after bestowing our careful
and anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised
at the Bar, we are of the considered view that the
impugned orders [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023
,
SCC OnLine Del 8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of
India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8674] are not sustainable
and they are liable to be set aside for the reasons
assigned hereafter.
Discussion and findings
17. It is an undisputed fact that the appellant
was issued with the article of charge alleging that he
had deserted his wife and two school-going children and
was residing along with another lady. The said
disciplinary proceedings came to be initiated on account
of a complaint lodged by the wife of the appellant. When
the enquiry officer commenced the inquiry, she filed an
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affidavit stating thereunder that she had filed the
complaint under mistaken notion and she withdrew the
complaint. In fact, in the articles of charge issued to the
appellant she was cited as a witness by the respective
authority and neither she appeared before the enquiry
officer nor she had deposed in the inquiry proceedings.
Though, she had already filed an affidavit withdrawing
her complaint against the appellant, yet the enquiry
officer proceeded with the inquiry and submitted the
report as already noticed hereinabove, holding the
appellant guilty of the charge of deserting his wife and
children and exonerating him of charge of residing with
another lady. This resulted in an order of dismissal
being passed against the appellant and same was
challenged before the Tribunal in OA No. 116 of 2002 by
the appellant which came to be allowed and matter was
remitted to the disciplinary authority to pass fresh
order, which resulted in reinstatement of the appellant
into service and imposing of minor penalty, namely,
stoppage of one increment of pay for a period of one
year without cumulative effect.
18. On account of the said penalty having been
imposed on the appellant, representation was submitted
to the authorities for complete exoneration and grant of
promotion on a par with his juniors. In the meanwhile,
the appellant attained superannuation and thereafter OA
No. 1579 of 2017 was filed for a direction to the
respondents to consider the representation which was
unattended and a direction came to be issued by the
Tribunal on 8-5-2017 [ Mool Chandra v. Statistics , OA
No. 1579 of 2017, order dated 8-5-2017 (CAT)]
directing the respondents to dispose of the
representation within a period of 90 days and
accordingly it was disposed of as already noticed herein
supra and intimated to the appellant by communication
dated 9-11-2017.
19. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the
same in OA No. 3034 of 2018. However, the counsel
appearing for the appellant is said to have withdrawn
the said OA. On the one hand the appellant claims that
he had not authorised his counsel to withdraw OA No.
3034 of 2018 and on the other hand, the learned
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counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted
that OA had been withdrawn by the appellant through
his counsel without prejudice to the right of the
appellant to pursue his remedy in accordance with law.
This oath against oath cannot be tested in the absence
of any proof. The fact remains that there was no memo
duly signed by the appellant came to be filed for
withdrawal of the application before the Tribunal.
20. Be that as it may. On account of liberty
having been granted to the appellant to pursue his
remedy in accordance with law, yet another OA No.
2066 of 2020 along with an application for condonation
of delay came to be filed. The delay was not condoned
by the Tribunal on the ground that it was filed more
than one year after the impugned order came to be
passed. No litigant stands to benefit in
approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the
length of delay that would be required to be
considered while examining the plea for
condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay
which has been propounded will have to be
examined. If the cause for delay would fall within
the four corners of “ sufficient cause ”, irrespective
of the length of delay same deserves to be
condoned. However, if the cause shown is
insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay,
same would not be condoned.
21. In this background when we turn our
attention to the facts on hand, it would emerge from the
records that the appellant being aggrieved by the
dismissal of OA No. 2066 of 2020 on the ground of
delay had approached the Delhi High Court challenging
the same. The High Court on the ground of penalty
imposed being a minor penalty, refused to entertain the
writ petition or in other words confirmed the order
impugned before the Tribunal on merits.
22. This Court in Commr. v. Labour Commr.
[ Commr. v. Labour Commr. , (2009) 3 SCC 525 :
(2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 876] has taken a view that
while deciding an application for condonation of
delay the High Court ought not to have gone into
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the merits of the case. It has been further held :
(SCC p. 526, para 5)
“ 5 . While deciding an application for
condonation of delay, it is well settled that
the High Court ought not to have gone into
the merits of the case and would have only
seen whether sufficient cause had been
shown by the appellant for condoning the
delay in filing the appeal before it. We
ourselves have also examined the
application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act before the High Court and,
in our opinion, the delay of 178 days has
been properly explained by the appellant.
That being the position, we set aside the
impugned order of the High Court.
Consequently, the appeal filed before the
High Court is restored to its original file.
The High Court is requested to decide the
appeal on merit in accordance with law
after giving hearing to the parties and
after passing a reasoned order.”
23. If negligence can be attributed to the
appellant, then necessarily the delay which has
not been condoned by the Tribunal and affirmed
by the High Court deserves to be accepted.
However, if no fault can be laid at the doors of the
appellant and cause shown is sufficient then we
are of the considered view that both the Tribunal
and the High Court were in error in not adopting a
liberal approach or justice-oriented approach to
condone the delay. This Court in Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [ Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig , (2000) 2 SCC 48] has
held : (SCC p. 51, para 6)
“ 6 . Incidentally this point of delay and
laches was also raised before the High Court
and on this score the High Court relying upon
the decision in Abhyankar case [ N.L. Abhyankar
v. Union of India , 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574 :
(1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] observed that it is not
an inflexible rule that whenever there is
delay, the Court must and necessarily
refuse to entertain the petition filed after a
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period of three years or more which is the
normal period of limitation for filing a suit.
The Bombay High Court in Abhyankar case
[ N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India , 1994
SCC OnLine Bom 574 : (1995) 1 Mah LJ
503] stated that the question is one of
discretion to be followed in the facts and
circumstances of each case and further
stated : (SCC OnLine Bom para 22)
’ 22 . … The real test for
sound exercise of discretion by
the High Court in this regard is
not the physical running of time
as such but the test is whether
by reason of delay, there is such
negligence on the part of the
petitioner, so as to infer that he
has given up his claim or
whether before the petitioner
has moved the writ court, the
rights of the third parties have
come into being which should not
be allowed to be disturbed unless
there is reasonable explanation
for the delay.’ ”
24. Applying the aforesaid principles which
we are in complete agreement to the facts on
hand and test the same it would not detain us for
too long to set aside the impugned orders [ Mool
Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC OnLine Del
,
8673] [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2023 SCC
OnLine Del 8674] , inasmuch as the delay of 425
days in filing fresh OA No. 2066 of 2020 has been
succinctly explained by the appellant before the
Tribunal, namely, it has been contended that there
was no intimation of withdrawal of the earlier OA
by his counsel and the order of withdrawal dated
10-8-2018 [ Mool Chandra v. Union of India , 2018
SCC OnLine CAT 28651] does not reflect that such
withdrawal was based on any memo duly signed
by the appellant. Further, the High Court has
proceeded to confirm the order of the Tribunal on the
footing that penalty imposed on the appellant is only a
minor penalty, namely, withholding of one increment
without cumulative effect, by completely ignoring the
fact that in the earlier round of litigation it had been
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clearly held that punishment of dismissal imposed on
the appellant was totally disproportionate to the alleged
act.”
5.4. The Apex Court in the case of STATE OF ODISHA
6
v. SAROJ KUMAR PRADHAN holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
5. While considering an application for
condonation of delay, it is not the length of delay but
the cause for delay which will be of paramount
consideration. If the cause shown is sufficient and would
fall within the four corners of the Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, namely, ‘sufficient cause’, such delay
deserves to be condoned.”
5.5. The Apex Court in the case of DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER AND SLAO v. S.V. GLOBAL MILL
7
LIMITED holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
84. At this juncture, we deem it necessary to flag
certain concerns as to how collusion takes place with
the active connivance of the officials. The very appeals
before us, approximately 530 in number, are classic
examples of such official connivance. As a matter of
fact, we find that in most of these cases, even copy
applications had not been filed within the time
prescribed, pursuant to the judgments delivered by the
Reference Court. Even after this judgment was
reserved, numerous matters similar to the present ones
have come and continue to come before us, from across
the country. This clearly indicates the lackadaisical
6
SLP (C) No.25212 of 2024, decided on 17-11-2025.
7
2026 SCC OnLine SC 171
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approach in filing appeals before the High Courts under
Section 74 of the 2013 Act and the pan-India impact of
the same. Incidentally, we also find a delay in the filing
of most of the present appeals reiterating the
callousness and casual approach of the acquiring bodies.
We are also conscious of the fact that an alleged
collusion might involve different persons, including the
office of the acquiring body and that of their counsel.
The delay also exhibits a clear lack of coordination
between the two offices.
85. Accountability is an important facet in a
constitutional democracy governed by the rule of
law. When an instrumentality of the State and its
officials act with such connivance and collusion, it
not only undermines the administration of justice
but also erodes public confidence in the legal
system. The repeated failure to pursue remedies
within time cannot be brushed aside as mere
negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on
the erring officials. Even assuming that all the
cases may not involve an act of collusion, there is
certainly abject carelessness and indifference,
especially when disputes involve substantial
amounts of money. In most of these cases, it has
not been brought to our notice whether any action
has been initiated and, thereafter, taken against
the officers concerned. Certainly, the malice must
be addressed by creating a better management
and monitoring system. Accordingly, the
appellant(s) are directed to undertake appropriate
measures to avoid any delay in the filing of
appeals before the High Court or Special Leave
Petitions before this Court in the future.
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India , (2023) 10
SCC 531
“35. We find that the High Court in
the present case assigned the following
reasons in support of its order:
xxxxxxxxx
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35.4. Further, a distinction should
be drawn between inordinate unexplained
delay and explained delay, where in the
present case, the first respondent had
sufficiently explained the delay on account
of negligence on part of the government
functionaries and the government counsel
on record before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the
negligence would be liable to suffer and
not public interest through the State. The
High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic
view since the negligence therein did not
border on callousness.
xxxxxxxxx
41. Having bestowed serious
consideration to the rival contentions, we feel
that the High Court's decision [ Union of India v.
Sheo Raj , 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] to
condone the delay on account of the first
respondent's inability to present the appeal
within time, for the reasons assigned therein,
does not suffer from any error warranting
interference. As the aforementioned judgments
have shown, such an exercise of discretion
does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-
oriented approach by the courts, where certain
leeway could be provided to the State. The
hidden forces that are at work in
preventing an appeal by the State being
presented within the prescribed period of
limitation so as not to allow a higher court
to pronounce upon the legality and validity
of an order of a lower court and thereby
secure unholy gains, can hardly be
ignored. Impediments in the working of
the grand scheme of governmental
functions have to be removed by taking a
pragmatic view on balancing of the
competing interests.””
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CASES WHERE THE APEX COURT HAS DECLINED TO
CONDONE DELAY:
6. Before the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF
ODISHA v. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF NAMATARA
8
GIRLA HIGH SCHOOL , the appeal is by the State of
Odisha. It is preferred after a delay of 291 days totally. The
Apex Court holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
7. It is noted that there is a delay of 123 days in
filing the special leave petition and a further delay of 96
days in re-filing the same after curing defects. In the
application for condonation of delay, the State of Odisha
seeks to explain the delay by pleading as follows:
“3. It is submitted that the Petitioner on
receipt of order of the Hon'ble High Court vide
order dated 26.04.2023 and order dated
21.02.2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015 and in
I.A. No. 126 of 2025 in F.A.O. No. 582 of 2015
the petitioner considered the matter and sent it
to the law department opined that it is a fit
case for filing the present SLP against the
impugned judgments dated 26.04.2023 and
order dated 21.02.2025.
4. That the delay in filing the appeal was
on account of procedural delay in obtaining
approval from the higher authority. The delay
caused is not deliberate and intentional.”
8. Ms. Sanjana Saddy, learned counsel appearing
for the State of Odisha, submits that the delay in
presenting the special leave petition is not deliberate
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2026 SCC OnLine SC 191
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and having regard to the long line of decisions of this
Court advocating a liberal approach when an authority
under Article 12 of the Constitution is the petitioner
seeking condonation of delay, she urges that the delay
be condoned and this Court may direct the High Court
th
to examine the challenge to the order dated 30
December, 2013 of the Tribunal on merits, upon revival
of the appeal.
9. We had, upon hearing Ms. Sanjana, started
dictating an order of dismissal of the special leave
petition. It was then that she prayed for withdrawal of
the special leave petition. We had so recorded.
However, when we were about to rise for the day, Ms.
Sanjana prayed for recall of the order of dismissal of the
special leave petition as withdrawn; she also submitted,
on instructions, that the State of Odisha would invite a
detailed order with reasons in support of dismissal of
the special leave petition.
10. We recalled the order dismissing the special
leave petition as withdrawn and, instead, dismissed the
same as time-barred considering paragraphs 3 and 4 of
the application for condonation of delay, excerpted
above, with the observation that reasons would follow.
11. We now proceed to assign our reasons.
12. No cause, much less sufficient cause,
has been shown for exercise of discretion in
favour of the State of Odisha. The nature of
explanation in the application for condonation of
delay is such that with much ado, the proceedings
could be closed.
13. However, since there is a long line of
decisions of this Court propounding the law that the
expression ‘sufficient cause’ employed by the legislature
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately
elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice
and in view of the submission of Ms. Sanjana, we have
considered it appropriate to consider the matter in some
depth.
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14. Almost four decades back, in Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst Katiji , a coordinate Bench
noting that the justifiably liberal approach which this
Court has been adopting in matters instituted before it
is not being followed by the courts lower in the
hierarchy, mandated that a justice-oriented approach is
indeed called for when a ‘State’ seeks condonation of
delay as distinguished from ‘a private party’.
15. Close on the heels of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah speaking for the coordinate
Bench in G. Ramegowda v. Land Acquisition Officer had
referred to Katiji (supra) in paragraph 14 and quoted
the following passage therefrom:
“When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each other,
cause of substantial justice deserves to be
preferred for the other side cannot claim to
have vested right in injustice being done
because of a non-deliberate delay …
It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalise injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice and
is expected to do so.”
Immediately thereafter, in paragraphs 15 to 17, it
was held as under:
15. In litigations to which Government is
a party there is yet another aspect which,
perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought
by Government are lost for such defaults, no
person is individually affected; but what, in the
ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The
decisions of Government are collective and
institutional decisions and do not share the
characteristics of decisions of private
individuals.
16. The law of limitation is, no doubt,
the same for a private citizen as for
governmental authorities. Government, like any
other litigant must take responsibility for the
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acts or omissions of its officers. But a
somewhat different complexion is imparted to
the matter where Government makes out a
case where public interest was shown to have
suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on
the part of its officers or agents and where the
officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.
17. Therefore, in assessing what, in a
particular case, constitutes “sufficient cause”
for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be
somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the
considerations that go into the judicial verdict,
these factors which are peculiar to and
characteristic of the functioning of the
government. Governmental decisions are
proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by
a considerable degree of procedural red tape in
the process of their making. A certain amount
of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is
rightly said that those who bear responsibility
of Government must have “a little play at the
joints”. Due recognition of these limitations on
governmental functioning — of course, within
reasonable limits — is necessary if the judicial
approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It
would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put
government and private parties on the same
footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit
in the very nature of governmental functioning
is procedural delay incidental to the decision-
making process. In the opinion of the High
Court, the conduct of the law officers of the
Government placed the Government in a
predicament and that it was one of those cases
where the mala fides of the officers should not
be imputed to Government. It relied upon and
trusted its law officers. …
16. Katiji (supra) and Ramegowda (supra)
were consistently followed by this Court until
adoption of a different and seemingly strict
approach while dealing with applications for
condonation of delay during the last decade and a
half became discernible starting with the decision
in Postmaster General v. Living Media India
Limited , where a delay of 427 days in filing the
relevant special leave petition was not condoned.
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University of Delhi v. Union of India is another
decision (of a three-Judge Bench of this Court)
where delay of 916 days was not condoned. While
upholding the decision of the relevant high court
under challenge refusing to condone the delay of
5659 days in presentation of an appeal under
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by
the heirs of a deceased landowner, a coordinate
Bench in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Collector(LA)
very recently reiterated that the law of limitation
is founded on public policy, the object is that a
legal remedy is put to an end so that no litigation
remains pending for an indefinite period. It was
also held, departing from the earlier view, that the
merits of the case cannot be considered at the
stage of considering the application for
condonation of delay.
17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in
Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India authoring the
judgment for a coordinate Bench adopted the view
taken in Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a
host of other decisions following the same while
not interfering with an order of condonation of
delay passed by the relevant high court. However,
it was observed that a distinction ought to be
drawn between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’
that is proffered as cause for condonation of
delay. It was also emphasized that a different
approach has to be adopted while this Court is
considering an application for condonation of
delay in presentation of an appeal/application and
when it sits in appeal over a discretionary order of
the high court granting the prayer for condonation
of delay. In the case of the former, whether to
condone or not would be the only question
whereas in the latter, whether there has been
proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of
the prayer for condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed
in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is the
exasperation and consequent lament expressed by none
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other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah, CJI. in course
of authoring a brief order in Commissioner of Wealth
Tax, Bombay v. Amateur Riders Club, Bombay and
admonishing officers of the “revenue” in not acting with
promptitude. This order was made within six years of
the decision in Ramegowda (supra). We can do no
better than quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264
days. For quite some time in the past,
this Court has been making observations
as to the grave prejudice caused to
public interest by appeals brought on
behalf of the Government being lost on
the point of limitation. Such
observations have been made for over a
few years in the past. But there seems
to be no conspicuous improvement as is
apparent in the present petition which is
filed in November 1993. The explanation
for the delay, had better be set out in
petitioner's own words:
“( g ) The Advocate-on-Record
got the special leave petition drafted
from the drafting Advocate and sent
the same for approval to the Board
on June 24, 1993 along with the case
file. ( h ) The Board returned the case
file to the Advocate-on-Record on
July 9, 1993 who re-sent the same to
the Board on September 20, 1993
requesting that draft SLP was not
approved by the Board. The Board
after approving the draft SLP sent
this file to CAS on October 1, 1993.”
3. This explanation is incapable of
furnishing a judicially acceptable ground
for condonation of delay. After the
earlier observations of this Court made
in several cases in the past, we hoped
that the matters might improve. There
seems to be no visible support for this
optimism. There is a point beyond which
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even the courts cannot help a litigant
even if the litigant is Government which
is itself under the shackles of
bureaucratic indifference. Having regard
to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of
granting relief. It is true that
Government should not be treated as
any other private litigant as, indeed, in
the case of the former the decisions to
present and prosecute appeals are not
individual but are institutional decisions
necessarily bogged down by the
proverbial red-tape. But there are limits
to this also. Even with all this latitude,
the explanation offered for the delay in
this case merely serves to aggravate the
attitude of indifference of the Revenue in
protecting its common interests. The
affidavit is again one of the stereotyped
affidavits making it susceptible to the
criticism that the Revenue does not
seem to attach any importance to the
need for promptitude even where it
affects its own interest.
4. The application for condonation of delay
is, accordingly, dismissed. The special
leave petition is, therefore, dismissed as
barred by time.
(emphasis ours)
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court to
lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was laid
down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji (supra),
with much optimism that matters would improve. Their
Lordships, however, found no visible support for such
optimism and the Court's patience having been tested
to the extreme limit, held that there is a point beyond
which even the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
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20. We have found the State of Odisha to be
utterly lethargic, tardy and indolent not only
before the High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone delay.
Despite all the latitude that is shown to a “State”,
we are of the clear opinion that the cause sought
to be shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for
exercise of discretion has been set up.
22. The applications for condonation of delay in
filing the special leave petition and condonation of delay
in re-filing the same, thus, stand rejected, with the
result that the special leave petition stands dismissed as
time-barred.”
The Apex Court holds that the State of Odisha was utterly
lethargic, tardy and indolent. Condonation of delay cannot be
claimed as a matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of
the Court whether or not to condone the delay. Despite all
the latitude that is shown to a State, the Apex Court was of
the opinion that the cause sought to be shown by the State
is not an explanation but a lame excuse.
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6.1. The Apex Court later in the case of ISRAR
9
AHMAD KHAN v. AMARNATH PRASAD was considering a
condonation petition. Alleging recalcitrant attitude on the
part of the State, the Apex Court observes as follows:
“…. …. ….
BELATED/DELAYED APPEALS TO DELAY/DEFEAT
IMPLEMENTATION:
27. Delayed filing of appeals should be the
exception, but in recent times, the exception has
practically evolved to become the rule. Orders
passed by the Courts are not complied with for a
long time, and when Contempt Petitions are filed,
belated appeals, with tremendous delay, are
preferred.
28. The (alleged) continuing contumacious
conduct of the defaulting party is sought to be
justified on the mere production of a
Diary/Filing/Stamp Reporting Number showing
that an appeal has been preferred, so as to obtain
multiple adjournments in contempt matters.
29. We, in no uncertain terms, deprecate
these practices. It is felt that by such modus
operandi , disobedient litigants act brazenly which
has the further effect of bringing down the
authority and majesty of the Courts and the rule
of law, interfering in the administration of justice.
The same may well, in certain situations, border
on criminal contempt.
30. The High Courts should deal with such
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen
to be ‘State’, within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution, or like bodies, with an iron hand.
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2026 SCC OnLine SC 322
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Unless the High Courts, so also this Court deal
with these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk of
erosion of the unflinching faith that the ordinary
litigants of this country repose in the Judiciary at
all levels. It is the solemn duty of all of us
manning the Courts across the hierarchy to ensure
that the public faith never wavers
.”
The Apex Court holds that the High Courts should deal with
unscrupulous litigants, more so when they happen to be State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India or
like bodies with iron hand. Unless the High Courts, so also the
Apex Court deal with these aspects firmly, we run the clear risk
of erosion of the unflinching faith of the ordinary litigants in the
country repose in the judiciary at all levels. The duty of Courts
across all the hierarchy should be to ensure that public faith
never wavers.
6.2. The Apex Court in the case of SHIVAMMA v.
10
KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD holds as follows:
“…. …. ….
245. As already discussed in the earlier
parts of this judgment, State or any of its
instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential
treatment in matters concerning condonation of
delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. G.
Ramegowda, Major (supra) itself acknowledges
10
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that, ordinarily there is “ no general principle
saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel or
agents ”. Even if “ there is negligence, deliberate or
gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of
the party or its counsel there is no reason why the
opposite side should be exposed to a time-barred
appeal ”.
The relevant observations read as under:—
“14. The contours of the area of
discretion of the courts in the matter of
condonation of delays in filing appeals are set
out in a number of pronouncements of this
Court. See: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v.
Rewa Coalfield Ltd.; Shakuntala Devi Jain v.
Kuntal Kumari; Concord of India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi; Lala Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji.
There is, it is true, no general principle
saving the party from all mistakes of its
counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate
or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on
the part of the party or its counsel there is
no reason why the opposite side should be
exposed to a time-barred appeal. ”
246. However, the reason why, this Court
nonetheless, held that acts of fraud or bad faith on
the part of its officers or agents should not be
imputed to the Government atleast for
condonation of delay was in view of the earlier
position of law, whereby the State and its
instrumentalities were not placed on the same
pedestal as any ordinary private litigant, in view
of the impersonal character of the Government as
an entity.
247. But the position of law is no longer this.
As per Postmaster General (supra) and the
subsequent decisions of this Court, consideration
for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not and cannot vary
depending on the identity or status of the party,
whether it be the Government, a public body, or a
private litigant, so as to apply a different
yardstick.
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248. The subsequent decision of this Court
in Tejpal (supra), after duly taking note of the
change in position of law, specifically rejected the
contention that acts of mala fides on the part of
specific individuals should not be imputed to the
State or its instrumentalities. It held that to
accept such a proposition would amount to
creating an artificial distinction between the
private parties and the Government entities vis-à-
vis the law of limitation. The relevant observations
read as under:—
“54. It seems to us that acceding to the
appellants' request on the aforesaid account
would also have undesirable consequences. If
delay were to be condoned merely on the
basis of a broad general assertion of
bureaucratic indifference, without
requiring demonstration of bona fides or
an act of mala fides on the part of specific
individuals, it would create an artificial
distinction between the private parties and
the Government entities vis-à-vis the law
of limitation. This would not be in
conformity with the spirit of equality
before law as guaranteed under our
Constitution. Allowing such latitude would
further distort incentives for the
Government and encourage more laxity by
the bureaucracy in its general functioning,
thereby undermining quality governance . ”
(Emphasis supplied)
249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it
must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide
by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To
permit the State to evade the consequences of
delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with
individual officers would amount to diluting the
rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their
very object. Such an approach would not only
privilege the State unjustly over private parties
but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference
and irresponsibility within the administration.
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250. As far back as 1996, this Court in
Chandra Mani (supra) held that where the case
requires an appeal or application to be filed,
despite the delay, then prompt action should be
pursued by the officer responsible to file the
appeal and he should be made personally
responsible for lapses, if any
. Thus, even if for a
moment, we accept that, mala-fide actions of few
officers should not be imputed to the Government, the
position still remains that, once the State or its
instrumentality finds that, few of its officers were
negligent, it should promptly take action to file the
appeal or application, as the case may be, through its
other officers and simultaneously take action against the
delinquent officers.
251. As already observed, in the present case at
hand, despite the callousness exhibited by the Executive
Engineer, the respondent no. 1 herein took no steps
towards mitigating the delays and ensuring that the
appeal was preferring as soon as possible. On the
contrary, the Executive Engineer was appointed to make
representations for the respondent no. 1 in the
proceedings. Even the disciplinary proceedings against
the concerned Executive Engineer came to be initiated
much later, to be precise exactly a month before the
date on which the application for condonation of delay
was filed. In such circumstances, even if we do not
impute the deliberate inaction or mala fides on the part
of the Executive Engineer to the respondent no. 1
herein, there is nothing to show that the respondent no.
1 acted in a reasonably diligent manner.
252. Even if the case put up by the
respondent no. 1 is to be accepted at its face
value, the respondent no. 1 could be said to have
failed to assign any genuine sufficient cause to
justify the delay from the date of receiving
intimation about the order of the First Appellate
Court, passed on 15.04.2006 till the expiry of the
limitation period, which was sometime in July
2006, because it was only in the correspondence
dated 17.10.2006 that the respondent no. 1, while
acknowledging the advice tendered by its
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advocate, reflected that it would prefer a second
appeal. We have little to no hesitation in saying
that on 17.10.2006, it was already too late in the
day to take any decision or make any forms of
mind. Nonetheless, the second appeal was only
filed on 10.02.2017, with a delay of almost 11
years.
253. As already noted in the foregoing parts
of this judgment the respondent no. 1 could be
said to have failed to explain the delay on its part
from the date of the receipt of the order of the
First Appellate Court till the expiry of the
limitation period.
254. We say so because if such observations
by the High Court, to condone delay in the interest
of a State-machinery, were allowed to be
sustained by us, it would allow the State-
machineries a leeway to systematically
orchestrate delays in the guise of laxity exhibited
by their authorities. Given the majesty and
colossality a State-machinery would hold against
a private litigant, it would be grossly unfair to a
litigant, who would be perpetually entangled in
the clutches of litigation, if enormous delays, like
that of almost 11 years in the present case, are
permitted to be condoned. This Court has never
turned a blind eye to the gradients of substantive
justice.
255. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 11-years.
If the litigant chooses to approach the court long
after the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be caused
to either side by the delay being condoned . This
litigation between the parties started in 1989. We are in
2025. Almost 36 years have elapsed. However, till date
the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of
his decree. The High Court has made a mockery of
justice by condoning this delay of 3966 days and once
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again ask the appellant to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
256. As far as the contention of the respondent
no. 1 is concerned apropos to the merits of molding of
relief by awarding of compensation by the First
Appellate Court, the same is squarely answered by the
principles encapsulated in Pathapati Subba Reddy
(supra), wherein it is categorically maintained that the
court considering a condonation of delay ought not go
into the merits of the case at hand.
257. We also wish to highlight that the High
Court applied the legal position incorrectly in the
impugned order and performed an exercise of “merit-
hunting”. It gave a prima facie relevance to the
argument of the respondent no. 1 on the grounds that
the suit of the appellant was not at all maintainable in
the first place. In paragraph 13 of the impugned order,
the High Court recorded that a semblance of right
in favour of respondent no. 1 swayed its mind to
allow the condonation of delay, and it accepted
the same as a “ sufficient cause ”. We hold such
observations to be erroneous and ex facie bad in
law. Similar contentions were rejected by this
Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal ,
(2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State
was seeking a condonation of delay of 663 days.
This Court sternly noted that it will not let the
courts to be forums wherein the Government can
walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the
period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases
of this Court wherein it allowed condonation,
employing its discretionary powers, on merits or
modalities of peculiarities of those cases.
Relevant
paragraphs are extracted below:
“3. No doubt, some leeway is given for
the government inefficiencies but the sad part
is that the authorities keep on relying on
judicial pronouncements for a period of time
when technology had not advanced and a
greater leeway was given to the Government
[…]
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xxx xxx xxx
5. A preposterous proposition is sought
to be propounded that if there is some merit in
the case, the period of delay is to be given a
go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will
succeed in any case. It is really a bar of
limitation which can even shut out good cases.
This does not, of course, take away the
jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case
to condone the delay.
6. We are also of the view that the
aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we
have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”.
The object appears to be to obtain a certificate
of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing
could be done because the highest Court has
dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this
formality and save the skin of officers who may
be at default that such a process is followed.
We have on earlier occasions also strongly
deprecated such a practice and process. There
seems to be no improvement. The purpose of
coming to this Court is not to obtain such
certificates and if the Government suffers
losses, it is time when the officer concerned
responsible for the same bears the
consequences. The irony is that in none of the
cases any action is taken against the officers,
who sit on the files and do nothing. It is
presumed that this Court will condone the delay
and even in making submissions, straightaway
the counsel appear to address on merits
without referring even to the aspect of
limitation as happened in this case till we
pointed out to the counsel that he must first
address us on the question of limitation.
7. We are thus, constrained to send a
signal and we propose to do in all matters
today, where there are such inordinate delays
that the Government or State authorities
coming before us must pay for wastage of
judicial time which has its own value. Such
costs can be recovered from the officers
responsible.”
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(Emphasis supplied)
258. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay
should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the
approach of the respondents, it appears that they
want to fix their own period of limitation for
instituting the proceedings for which law has
prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction
for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the
case, it cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay, the
court must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain
the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced
that the court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical consideration.
The rules of limitation are based on the principles
of sound public policy and principles of equity. We
should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging
over the head of the respondent for indefinite
period of time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is
abundantly clear that the High Court has
erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966
days on account of certain lapses at the
administrative levels and of there being no follow-
ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain
merits in the case of the respondent no. 1 against
the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and
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that of the relief molded by the First Appellate
Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such
grounds are nowhere near to being “ sufficient
cause ” as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High
Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and
authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-
digits, or even that of single-digit, more
particularly the delay in those cases was
supported by sufficient cause. The present case,
however, stands on a very different footing, owing
to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not
inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by
the High Court.
V. CONCLUSION
261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the
impugned order of the High Court deserves to be
set aside. Before we proceed to close this
judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it
abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and
laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for
condonation of delay, and we want to convey an
emphatic message to all the High Courts that
delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and
superficial grounds, until a proper case of
sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-
machinery is able to establish that it acted with
bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.
Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously
said. But courts, and more particularly the
constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the
procedure for a litigating State agency, who also
equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing
litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a
legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State
authorities or its instrumentalities, and should
remain extra cautious, if the party seeking
condonation of delay is a State-authority. They
should not become surrogates for State laxity and
lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be
cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private
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litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of
perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their
decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at
later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this
everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate
delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so
the courts only add insult to the injury, more
particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC,
wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of
law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to
maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for
finality. More than the importance of judicial time,
what worries us is the plight of a litigant with
limited means, who is to contest against an
enormous State, and its elaborate and never-
exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve
to be disposed of at the very threshold, because,
say if a party litigating against the State, for
whatever reason, is unable to contest the
condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present
case, it reopens the lis for another round of
litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet
again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation
that we assure that a litigant is not sent from
pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law.
265. In the result, this appeal stands allowed.
The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is
hereby set aside. Apart from the costs of Rs. 25,000/-
imposed by the High Court, to be paid by the
respondent no. 1 to the appellant, we impose an
additional cost of Rs. 25,000/- on the respondent no. 1,
to be paid to the Karnataka State Legal Services
Authority within a period of four weeks from today.”
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6. In the case at hand, the learned Single Judge,
following the earlier order passed by a Co-ordinate Benches,
has allowed the petition on the score that there was no
authorization to the Revenue Inspector to take possession of
the property without an authorization being placed before it
as obtaining under sub-section (6) Section 10 of the Act.
7. The learned Government Advocate, though, would
vehemently justify the action of taking possession on the
score that there is an authorization and that too a general
authorization, which was not placed before the learned
Single Judge. It is too late in the day for the State to place
before us an additional documents, which is not even
convincing as the necessary authorization as obtaining in
law.
8. In that light, finding no warrant of interference with
the order of the learned Single Judge surely on delay as it is
trite law that the law protects the diligent and not the
indolent, which is equally applicable to the State as well.
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9. With the above observations, the writ appeal stands
dismissed .
10. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, stand
disposed as not calling for adjudication.
Sd/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(HEMA KULKARNI)
JUDGE
PMP
CT:VH
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 20