Mohd Anzar Ahmad vs State Nct Of Delhi Through Sho Ps Jaitpur Delhi

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 14.10.2026
Date of Decision: 02.11.2026
Uploaded on: 02.11.2026
# CNR No. DLHC010117152025
+ CRL.A. 276/2025 & CRL.M.(BAIL) 504/2025
MOHD ANZAR AHMAD .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Aishwarya Rao, Ms. Mansi Rao,
Advs.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI THROUGH SHO PS JAITPUR DELHI &
ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Meenakshi Dahiya, APP for the
State.
Ms. Urvashi Jain, Mr. Aman Bidhuri,
Mr. Hemant Singh, Advs. for
victim/R-2.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE MADHU JAIN
JUDGMENT
MADHU JAIN, J.
1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.
2. The present criminal appeal has been filed under Section 415(2) of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023,(hereinafter referred to as
‘BNSS’), whereby the appellant is seeking setting aside of the judgment
dated 03.08.2024 and the order on sentence dated 15.01.2025 passed by the
learned ASJ, South East District, Saket Courts, Delhi, in connection with
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 1 of 30

FIR No. 902/2014 , registered at P.S. Jaitpur, Delhi for the offences
punishable under Sections 363 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) and under Section 6 of Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter referred to as
‘POCSO Act’).
Factual Matrix:
3. The case of the prosecution is that Sh ‘J’, father of victim gave a
complaint to the Police that his daughter Ms. M had left for school in the
morning of 05.12.2014 at 07:00 AM, but did not return back home. Despite
search, the victim was not found. He suspected that someone had enticed away
his daughter. On the basis of this complaint, FIR was registered U/s 363 IPC
and investigation commenced. After about 2 months, the missing minor girl
was finally recovered from Akbarpur, UP and brought to Delhi on 13.02.2015.
At that time she was around two months pregnant. Accused/Appellant was
apprehended from Akbarpur and was arrested, and continues to be in Judicial
Custody till date. During that time accused was already married to one Rubina
Begum who is alleged to have accompanied Sh. ‘J’ during the recovery of his
minor daughter from Akbarpur. Victim’s pregnancy was medically
terminated on 20.02.2015.
4. After completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed naming Mohd.
Anzar Ahmad as accused of offences punishable u/s 363, 376, 506 of IPC &
Section 6 of POCSO Act. Cognizance was taken by Ld. Trial Court. The copy
of the chargesheet was supplied to the accused in compliance of Section 207
Cr. P.C. Matter was then fixed for consideration on point of charge. FSL result
came to be filed later by way of supplementary chargesheet.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 2 of 30

5. Vide order dated, 07.10.2015, Ld. Trial Court framed Charges for
offences U/s 363 IPC, U/s 6 POCSO Act & U/s 506 IPC against the accused
Mohd. Anzar Ahmad. Accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Matter
was listed for prosecution evidence.
6. To prove its case against the accused and discharge its burden, the
prosecution examined fourteen witnesses before the learned Trial Court,
whose testimonies have been discussed in the impugned judgment as under:
“26. Minor Victim Ms ‘M’ was examined as PW-1 .
Accused was on visiting terms with her family. She
deposed that on 05.12.2014, she was going to her
school with her friends. While her friends went
inside the school and she remained outside, accused
Mohd. Anzar, whom she used to call Mama was
present there. He made her sit in an auto and put
something on her mouth due to which she became
unconscious. When she regained her consciousness,
she found herself at Muradabad in a Jhopri. Some
known persons of Anzar were also there. She
deposed that when she used to sleep, accused would
forcibly rape her and when she resisted he would
forcefully do it everyday. When she cried, accused
would put his hand on her mouth and beat her.
Whenever, she asked him to let her talk with her
parents, he would beat her. From Moradabad,
accused took her to Bengal and thereafter to
Akbarpur and kept her in a Jhopdi. The incidents
narrated by the victim continued even at these
places. On one day, she finally found opportunity
and called her father. Her father reached alongwith
with Rubina, i.e, wife of accused Anzar. They were
accompanied by police. She was brought back to
Delhi and accused was arrested. She was medically
examined and was found two months pregnant, MTP
was conducted with her consent. MTP report is
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 3 of 30

Ex.PW1/B, She also proved her statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C as Ex.PW1/C wherein she had
narrated the atrocities committed upon her by
accused before Ld. Magistrate. She correctly
identified accused Anzar Ahmed at the time of her
deposition. During her cross examination by Ld.
Defence counsel, she admitted that she was kept in
Juggi where friend of accused also resided with his
family. She also admitted that accused also used to
go out during the day to bring articles. However,
she denied that she could go out of the Jhopdi. She
denied that she had attained majority or that she
went with the accused out of her free will.
27. Sh J, father of the victim (name not being
disclosed to protect the identity of the victim) was
examined as PW-2 . He deposed that at the relevant
time, his daughter/victim Ms. M was studying in
Class 8th in a government School and was about 15
years old. On 05.12.2014, Ms. M left her home for
school in morning but she didn’t return. Present FIR
was registered on the basis of his complaint. He
identified accused Mohd. Anzar as his neighbor and
was missing since the date Ms. M was missing. In
February 2015, Ms. M was finally recovered from
District Akbarpur, U.P in his presence. Accused was
also apprehended.
28. Sh J further proved that after about 2 months,
accused had met him at railway station when he was
returning from the place where he had retained his
daughter. He was apprehended by the IO and
interrogated. Subsequently Ms. M was recovered
from jhuggi at the instance of accused. Ms. M was
in a state of trauma and started weeping after seeing
them. During cross examination by Ld. Defence
counsel Sh J affirmed that his daughter was 15 years
old and denied suggestion that she had attained
majority. He affirmed that accused had met them at
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 4 of 30

the Railway station and that wife of accused had
accompanied him during recovery of his daughter.
No contrary suggestion was put to this witness by
Ld. Defence Counsel with respect to the manner of
apprehension of accused or recovery of the victim.
29. Smt. M W/o Sh. J, Mother of the victim examined
as PW-3 . She was given the same initial ‘M’ as that
of the victim by Ld Predecessor Court. To avoid any
confusion she is being referred with initial ‘MM’
hereinafter.
30. Smt MM, PW3 corroborated the testimony of her
husband Sh. J regarding the manner in which their
daughter Ms. M went missing and recovered from
Akbarpur. She accompanied Ms. M during her
medical examination. During her cross-
examination by Ld. Defence counsel, she denied that
Ms. M had completed 18 years of age as on
05.12.2014. She denied that she had mentioned
lesser age of Ms. M at the time of her School
examination while affirming that she had provided
Birth certificate of her daughter for her admission
in School. She denied that Ms. M left home out of
her own free will or that She had married the
accused.
31. Sh. Rajbir Singh, MRT, AIIMS Hospital/ PW-5
proved that MLC No. 1696/15 dated 13.02.2015 of
Ms. M D/o Sh. MJ i.e, victim was prepared by Dr.
Devender Shiv Karthik who was posted as a Senior
Resident in Department of Obs. & Gynae at the
relevant time.
32. PW-6 ASI Kirpal Singh, Duty Constable, AIIMS
Hospital had proved DD no 27 A dated 13.02.2015
whereby he received information about the abortion
of Ms M and transmitted the same to IO/SI Suraj
Singh.
33. MLC and Potency test of accused have been
proved by PW7, Constable Dinesh.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 5 of 30

34. ASI Dharmender, PW-8 proved that on
directions of IO SI Suraj Singh, he alongwith
complainant had gone to Akbarpur, UP where they
found the accused at Railway station. Accused was
identified by complainant Sh. J. Subsequently,
accused took them to Jhuggi from where victim was
recovered and prepared site plan Ex.PW8/A at her
instance. Then accused was brought to Delhi and
handed him to IO SI Suraj Singh. Victim was also
brought back. During his cross-examination by Ld.
Defence counsel, he admitted that he went to
Akbarpur in a car arranged by IO and did not make
any departure entry before leaving. He denied
making Ex.PW8/A at the Police Station. He could
not recall the name of the Railway station where
they met accused. The victim girl was recovered in
February 2015, witness was examined on
26.02.2020 i.e, after more than 5 years. It is
common knowledge that human memory fades with
passage of time, the fact that the witness was unable
recall the name of the Railway station where they
met accused is not fatal to the case of the
prosecution.
35. PW9 Dr. Deepak, Sr. Department of Radio
Diagnosis, AIIMS proved the signatures & hand
writing of Dr. Bijay on the MLC, radiology form and
ultra sound report of Victim.
36. PW 10 , HC Rekha proved that she accompanied
the victim Ms. M, obtained her the samples &
Sample seal from doctor and handed over the same
to IO. During cross-examination she affirmed that
she did not speak with the victim on the way to
hospital.
37. PW11 , SI Chandra Shekhar proved that he
received complaint from Sh. J regarding his missing
daughter and attested the statement vide memo
Ex.PW2/A and prepared rukka Ex.PW11/A. Rukka
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 6 of 30

was then handed to Duty Officer and FIR was
registered. Thereafter further investigation was
handed over to IO. During cross-examination he
affirmed recording statement of father of victim.
38. PW12 , Smt. Rubina Begum was the wife of
accused at the time of the incident. She received
information about arrest of accused from police.
She turned hostile and did not support the
prosecution. However, this can be attributed to the
fact she was the wife of accused at the time of the
incident. She subsequently divorced the accused and
remarried. It is quite possible that since her
remarriage, she might have forgiven the accused for
the offences and was tempted to save him. Her not
supporting the prosecution is duly explained and is
not fatal to the prosecution’s case.
39. PW13, Retired SI Suraj Singh was assigned the
investigation of the case. He recorded statements of
witnesses u/s 161 CrPC. Despite search of victim
but no clue was found. On 10.02.2015, Sh J
expressed that accused Md. Anzar Ahmad had kept
Ms. M in Akbarpur, UP. SHO was informed and on
his directions, HC Dharmender was sent to
Akbarpur UP with complainant.
On 13.02.2015, HC Dharmender returned back to
Police Station along with complainant, child victim
‘M’ and accused Mohd. Anzar Ahmed. Smt MM also
reached there. He recorded the statement of ‘M’ and
thereafter, sent her to AIIMS Hospital for her
medical examination through Ct. Rekha,
accompanied by Smt ‘MM’. After the medical
examination, Ct. Rekha, Ms. M and Smt MM
returned back to Police Station. Ct. Rekha handed
over MLC, medical report, sealed exhibits along
with samples with seals intact, of Ms. M to him
which was seized vide memo Ex.PW10/B. Case
property was deposited in Malkhana. MLC and
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 7 of 30

Potency test of accused Mohd. Anzar Ahmed was
conducted at AIIMS Hospital through Ct. Dinesh.
The MLC, potency test report, and sealed exhibits
along with sample taken from the accused were
handed to him by Ct Dinesh.
40. During medical examination of child victim, she
was found pregnant. Subsequently information
about her MTP was received through DD No.27A
dated 20.02.2015, PS Jaitpur vide Ex.PW13/A. IO
collected sealed exhibits taken during the MTP vide
seizure memo Ex.PW13/B and deposited it into
malkhana. He collected age document from school
of Ms. ‘M’. Despite cross-examination, the IO
remained consistent in his deposition and affirmed
what he had deposed in his examination-in-chief.
41 . The exhibits / samples were sent to FSL
subsequently after his suspension.
42. PW 14 , SI Madhuri had prepared
supplementary chargesheet after receiving FSL
result.”
7. On the completion of prosecution evidence, statements of accused
persons u/s 313 Cr. P.C. were recorded thereafter, during which accused
denied all the allegations levelled by the prosecution. He stated that victim
was born in 1997 and was a major at the relevant time. He stated that Victim’s
younger sister was aware about their relationship. He denied that the victim
was pregnant at the time of her recovery. He also denied meeting father of
victim or his own wife at the Railway Station. He stated that his wife was
informed after his arrest. In his explanation he stated that he and victim were
in love and their relationship was consensual. Victim was forced and tortured
by her parents, so she left her home. He stated that they got married and lived
together thereafter. He claimed to have been falsely implicated in the present
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 8 of 30

case. In Pursuance of application u/s 315 Cr. P.C. accused examined himself
as sole defence witness.
th
8. The learned Trial Court, vide the impugned judgment dated 3rd
August 2024, convicted the appellant and held as under:
“58. On the basis of above said discussions, the
prosecution has been able to prove the case against
the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. The
accused took the minor girl of 14 years 4 months out
of the lawful custody of her parents. He kept her in
confinement, threatened her and committed
aggravated penetrative sexual assault for a period
of more than two months as a consequence which
she became pregnant and had to undergo MTP. In
view of the same, accused Mohd. Anzar Ahmad is
convicted for the offence punishable under Section
363 IPC, Section 506 IPC & Section 6 of POCSO
Act 2012.”
9. Consequent upon the judgment of conviction, the learned Trial Court,
th
vide Order on Sentence dated 15 January 2025, imposed the following
sentence upon the present appellant:
“ …
Convict has been convicted for offences, U/s 363
IPC, U/s 506 IPC and U/s 6 POCSO Act. The
convict was 25 years old as on the date of
commission of offence while the victim girl was 14
years old. There is a considerable age gap between
the victim and the convict. Convict was already
married and had children when he ran away with
the victim. As a consequence of offence, victim
became pregnant and had to undergone MTP. Thus,
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 9 of 30

the convict does not deserve to be shown any
leniency.
As per record, convict has been in custody since
13.02.2015. The previous conviction/involvement
report of the convict shows that he has no previous
involvement in any similar case. The act of convict
has caused alarm in society and in mind of victim.
In interest of justice, a balance has to be drawn
between reformative theory and deterrent theory of
punishment. The measurement of punishment in a
given case must depend upon the atrocity of the
crime, the conduct of the criminal and the
defenceless and unprotected state of the victim.
Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner
in which the court responds to the society’s cry for
justice punishment befitting the crime so that the
courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The
courts must not only keep in view the rights of the
criminal but also the rights of the victim of the crime
and the society at large while considering
imposition of appropriate punishment.
Considering the overall facts and circumstances,
convict Mohd. Anzar Ahmad is sentenced as
follows:
a) Simple imprisonment for 05 years and to
pay fine of Rs.20,000/- for offence U/s 363 IPC.
b) Simple imprisonment for 02 years for
offence U/s 506 IPC.
c) Simple imprisonment for 30 years and to
pay fine of Rs.25,000/- for offence /s 6 POCSO Act .
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 10 of 30

In default of payment of fine, convict shall
undergo for simple imprisonment for period of 30
days.
All sentences shall run concurrently...”
10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned judgment and order on
sentence, the appellant has challenged both before this Court.
Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment is contrary to the evidence on record and that the prosecution has
failed to establish the charges beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that
the prosecution case suffers from material inconsistencies concerning the
circumstances in which the victim allegedly left her home, the places where
she was kept, and the manner and place of her recovery.
12. Learned counsel submits that the investigating officer did not
adequately verify the place of recovery and that the discrepancy in the
references to Akbarpur, and Faizabad casts doubt on the prosecution
version.
13. Learned counsel also submits that PW-8 in his deposition, could not
recall the name of the railway station where the appellant was allegedly
found, and who admitted that no departure entry had been made before
proceeding to the place of recovery.
14. Learned counsel further submits that no local police official or
independent public witness was associated with the recovery proceedings
and that no separate recovery memo was prepared.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 11 of 30

15. Learned counsel further submits that PW-3 admitted that the victim
had earlier refused to return home and agreed to do so only after the tabeez
allegedly supplied by the appellant was removed. It is argued that this
circumstance supports the defence that the victim was accompanying the
appellant voluntarily.
16. Learned counsel also submits that the absence of DNA evidence
connecting the appellant with the pregnancy and the FSL report cannot be
treated as corroboration of the prosecution case. It is contended that the
victim’s testimony regarding the alleged assault is not supported by the
requisite medical or forensic evidence and that the prosecution failed to
examine material witnesses who could have corroborated the circumstances
in which the victim allegedly left her school.
17. Learned counsel also submits that the school record was not
independently verified by PW-4. It is further argued that the presumptions
under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act could not have been invoked
in the absence of reliable foundational evidence. The appellant’s counsel
contends that the victim’s alleged willingness to accompany the appellant
has not been properly considered.
Submissions on behalf of respondents
18. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 2, submits
that the testimony of the victim is consistent on the material aspects of the
prosecution case. It is contended that the victim was a child at the time of
the incident and that her testimony regarding the appellant taking her away,
keeping her at different places and repeatedly subjecting her to sexual
assault has been accepted by the learned Trial Court after appreciation of
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 12 of 30

the evidence.
19. Learned counsel submits that the victim’s pregnancy and the
subsequent medical termination of pregnancy corroborate the occurrence of
sexual intercourse during the period in question. The discrepancies
concerning the precise location of recovery and the inability to obtain a
conclusive DNA comparison, it is argued, do not by themselves discredit
the victim’s testimony.
20. Learned APP for the State submits that the victim’s age is established
by the school record and the testimony of PW-4, and that the plea of consent
is unavailable in law if the victim was below eighteen years of age.
21. Learned APP for the State further submits that the sentence imposed
by the learned Trial Court does not call for reduction, particularly in view
of the victim’s age, the duration of the alleged exploitation, the pregnancy
and the subsequent medical termination.
Findings and Analysis
22. This Court has considered the rival submissions, the impugned
judgment dated 03.08.2024, the order on sentence dated 15.01.2025 and the
evidence on record.
Questions raised by the challenged conviction are:
Whether the victim was below eighteen years of
age on the date of the incident & whether her
testimony establishes that the appellant took her
away and subjected her to penetrative sexual
assault?
Age of the victim
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 13 of 30

23. The incident is alleged to have taken place on 05.12.2014. The
prosecution relied upon the testimony of PW-4, Sh. Bal Kishan, retired
Principal of SDMC Primary School, Jaitpur, to establish the victim’s age.
PW-4 produced Ex PW- 4/C, the original school record and deposed that
the victim had been admitted to Class I on 18.07.2007 and that her date of
birth was recorded as 10.07.2000.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 14 of 30

24. PW-3 stated that she had admitted the victim to the school but could
not recall the victim’s date of birth. She also stated that she had submitted
copies of an electricity bill and an election identity card, denied having
deliberately recorded a lesser age. She expressly denied the suggestion that
the victim had completed eighteen years of age on 05.12.2014. The affidavit
bearing the mother’s thumb impression/signature was produced through
PW-4 as part of the school record. The defence did not establish that the
document was forged or that the date recorded in it was deliberately
misstated.
25. The appellant’s suggestion that the victim was born in 1997 is not
supported by any birth record proved by the defence. Further, PW-1 stated
that she was fifteen years old when her testimony was recorded, while PW-
2, her father, consistently stated that she was about fifteen years old at the
time of her disappearance and denied that she was a major. The Court does
not treat the parents’ estimates of age as a substitute for documentary proof.
Those statements, however, are consistent with the age reflected in the
school record. On the basis of the evidence available, this Court, therefore,
finds that the prosecution has established that the victim was below
eighteen years of age on the date of the incident.
Testimony of the victim
26. It is settled that a conviction for a sexual offence may rest on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix where her evidence is cogent, consistent on
material particulars and inspires confidence. In Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT
of Delhi) (2012) 8 SCC 21 , the Supreme Court explained the concept of a
“sterling witness”, whose testimony inspires confidence and withstands
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 15 of 30

scrutiny even in the absence of independent corroboration. Similarly, in
Nirmal Premkumar v. State 2024 SCC OnLine SC 260 , the Court
classified oral testimony into three categories: wholly reliable, wholly
unreliable, and testimony falling in between. It clarified that where the
victim’s testimony is clear and consistent, it falls within the first category,
for which corroboration is not required as a matter of law.
11. Law is well settled that generally speaking, oral
testimony may be classified into three categories,
viz.: (i) wholly reliable; (ii) wholly unreliable; (iii)
neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. The
first two category of cases may not pose serious
difficulty for the Court in arriving at its
conclusion(s). However, in the third category of
cases, the Court has to be circumspect and look for
corroboration of any material particulars by
reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, as a
requirement of the rule of prudence.”
xxxxx
13. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling
witness” without further corroboration, but the
quality and credibility must be exceptionally high.
The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be
consistent from the beginning to the end (minor
inconsistences excepted), from the initial
statement to the oral testimony, without creating
any doubt qua the prosecution’s case. While a
victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual
offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account
from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and
gaps, could make it difficult for a conviction to be
recorded.”
27. PW-1 is the principal witness to the alleged abduction and sexual
assault. She deposed as under:
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 16 of 30

“On 05.12.2014 I was going to my school G.G.S.S.
School no.2, Molarband New Delhi with my friends.
My friends went inside the school but I was outside
school. One person Mohd. Anzar met me there. He
was in visiting terms at our house and we were
calling him Mama. He made me sit in an auto and
put something on my mouth. I became unconscious.
When I regained my conscious I found myself at
Muradabad in a Jhopri. Some known person to the
Anzar was also there. When I used to sleep, he raped
me without my consent. I denied and asked him not
to do such activities with me but he forcefully doing
the same daily basis. When 1 used to cry at that time
but he used to put his hand on my mouth and gave
beatings to me.”
28. A cumulative reading of PW-1’s testimony, her statement under
Section 164 CrPC, and the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 reveals a consistent
account of the material events: the appellant’s identity, the manner in which
she was taken away, the repeated sexual assaults, and the circumstances in
which she was prevented from contacting her parents. The defence cross-
examination has not elicited any material contradiction in her account. The
suggestion of tutoring remains unsubstantiated, while the circumstances
relied upon by the defence do not, by themselves, establish voluntary
accompaniment or consent. The evidence, read as a whole, thus retains its
consistency on material particulars and inspires confidence.
Medical evidence and pregnancy
29. The medical evidence provides corroboration of pregnancy, although
its limits must be recognised. PW-5, Medical Record Technician at AIIMS,
produced MLC No. 1696/15 dated 13.02.2015, prepared by Dr. Devender
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 17 of 30

Shiva Karthik, and proved the relevant medical record as Ex. PW-5/B and
Ex. PW-5/C.
30. PW-9, proved the radiology report and ultrasound report prepared by
Dr. Biswajit, as Ex. PW-9/A and Ex. PW-9/B. PW-9 Deposed as under:
“…The report shows that there was single intra
uterine gestational sac with live fetus showing
perceptible cardiac activity. The age of fetus was
described as 8 weeks 5 days.”
31. PW-6, ASI Kirpal Singh, deposed that on 20.02.2015, while posted
as a duty constable at AIIMS, he received information from the hospital
regarding the medical examination and abortion of the victim, whereupon
he informed the Investigating Officer and recorded DD No. 27A. His
testimony finds support in the deposition of PW-13, the Investigating
Officer, who also stated that he had received information regarding the
medical termination of the victim’s pregnancy and had collected a sealed
exhibit from the hospital. PW-13, however, admitted that the documents
pertaining to the medical termination of pregnancy (MTP) could not be
collected, as he was subsequently suspended and thereafter retired from
service. The non-production of the said documents, though a lapse in the
investigation, does not dislodge the medical evidence establishing the
victim’s pregnancy or the testimony of PW-6 and PW-13 regarding its
subsequent termination.
32. PW-10, HC Rekha, further corroborated the medical examination of
the victim by deposing that she had accompanied the victim and her mother
to AIIMS, where the victim was medically examined and the sealed
samples obtained from the hospital were handed over to the Investigating
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 18 of 30

Officer. Although PW-10 mentioned the date of examination as
13.05.2015, whereas PW-5 proved the MLC dated 13.02.2015 and PW-13
also referred to the medical examination conducted on 13.02.2015, the said
discrepancy does not affect the substantive medical evidence regarding the
pregnancy of the victim. Her testimony, read with the depositions of the
other prosecution witnesses, lends further support to the fact that the victim
had undergone medical examination at AIIMS.
33. A cumulative appreciation of the aforesaid evidence, particularly the
ultrasound examination which revealed a pregnancy of approximately eight
weeks and five days, establishes that the victim was pregnant at the time of
her medical examination. The subsequent information received from
AIIMS regarding the termination of her pregnancy, as deposed to by PW-6
and PW-13, further supports the prosecution case that the victim had
undergone an abortion. The pregnancy assumes significance as a
corroborative circumstance when examined alongside the testimony of the
victim, who consistently identified the appellant as the person who
subjected her to repeated sexual assaults during the period she remained
away from her family. Although the medical evidence, by itself, cannot
conclusively establish the identity of the person responsible for the
pregnancy, it materially corroborates the victim’s account of having been
subjected to sexual intercourse during the relevant period. Thus, the
evidence regarding the victim’s pregnancy and its subsequent medical
termination lends substantial corroborative support to her testimony
concerning the sexual assaults committed upon her by the appellant.
FSL Report
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 19 of 30

34. The appellant relies upon FSL report Ex. Z-1 to contend that the
prosecution failed to connect him with the pregnancy. The report does not
record a positive DNA match. It records that the relevant alleles could not
be compared because a complete DNA profile was unavailable from the
specified exhibits. The result is inconclusive; it is neither a positive
identification of the appellant nor a conclusive exclusion of him. The
relevant portion is reproduced herein:
“Result of Examination
The alleles from the source of exhibit '1'(Cotton
wool swab of victim) & '5'(Blood in gauze of
accused) could not be compared due to non
availability of complete DNA profile from the
source of exhibit '4a'(yellowish crusty material) &
'4b'(Blackish crusty material).”
35. PW-7, Ct. Dinesh, deposed that he accompanied the appellant for
medical examination on 13.02.2015 and for a potency test on 14.02.2015,
and thereafter handed over the sealed samples to the Investigating Officer.
PW-13 also deposed regarding the collection and deposit of the samples,
but admitted that the exhibits could not be sent to the FSL through him, as
he was subsequently suspended and retired. PW-14, SI Madhuri, stated that
she prepared the supplementary charge-sheet upon receipt of the FSL report
dated 30.07.2021. However, the FSL report remained inconclusive, as a
complete DNA profile could not be obtained for comparison. Thus, while
the report does not establish the appellant’s identity as the biological father,
it equally does not exonerate him. The question of his involvement must,
therefore, be determined on the basis of the remaining oral and
circumstantial evidence.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 20 of 30

36. As regards the appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to
establish that the sexual acts were forceful, it is pertinent to note that the
FSL report cannot determine whether sexual intercourse was consensual or
otherwise. PW-1 categorically deposed that the appellant rendered her
unconscious, subjected her to sexual acts while she was asleep, and despite
her resistance and requests to stop, continued to assault her. She further
stated that the appellant beat her and covered her mouth whenever she cried
or sought to contact her parents. These assertions directly establish the
manner in which the alleged acts occurred and remain unaffected by the
inconclusive FSL report.
37. It is a settled principle that the burden of proving the offence beyond
reasonable doubt rests upon the prosecution, and the appellant cannot be
required to establish his innocence. The presumptions under Sections 29
and 30 of the POCSO Act arise only upon the prosecution establishing the
requisite foundational facts. In the present case, the testimony of the victim,
read with the medical and other corroborative evidence, forms the basis for
determining the appellant’s culpability. Furthermore, once the victim is
established to have been below eighteen years of age, her alleged consent
to sexual intercourse is legally immaterial for the purposes of the POCSO
Act. Her willingness, if any, to accompany the appellant cannot, by itself,
constitute a defence to the charge of penetrative sexual assault.
Recovery of the victim
38. PW-2, the father of the victim, deposed that on 05.12.2014, the
victim left for school but did not return, whereupon he lodged a complaint
with the police, as corroborated by PW-11, SI Chandra Shekhar. He further
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 21 of 30

stated that the appellant, who resided in their neighbourhood, was also
found missing. After approximately two months and eight days, the
appellant was apprehended at a railway station in Akbarpur, and the victim
was subsequently recovered from a jhuggi. PW-13, the Investigating
Officer, corroborated that, upon receiving information from PW-2
regarding the victim’s presence at Akbarpur, PW-8 was deputed along with
the complainant, and the victim and the appellant were brought to Delhi on
13.02.2015.
39. PW-8, ASI Dharmender, also deposed that the appellant was found
at the railway station in Akbarpur and the victim was thereafter recovered
from a jhuggi. However, during cross-examination, he admitted that no
independent public witness was examined, no separate recovery memo was
prepared, and no woman police official accompanied the recovery team.
His relevant testimony reads as under:
“It is wrong to suggest that no departure entry was
made in PS. I do not remember how we reached at
Akbarpur. But we went in a car. The car was
arranged by SI Suraj. I do not remember the exact
name of said Railway Station. No lady constable
was with us nor any lady police official was taken
from local police station. We did not go to any local
police station in Akbarpur. No public person was
examined from the nearby jhuggies, where the girl
M was recovered. No recovery memo of the victim
was prepared. Victim girl M was not medically
examined in any hospital in Akbarpur. No
information was given in the local court in Akbarpur
regarding apprehension of accused and recovery of
victim girl M.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 22 of 30

40. Although PW-2 stated that the appellant’s wife led the police to the
jhuggi, whereas PW-8 stated that the complainant and the appellant
proceeded there, the discrepancy does not affect the factum of recovery.
Significantly, PW-1 herself deposed that she was kept at Akbarpur, from
where she managed to contact her father, who subsequently arrived with
the appellant’s wife, police officials and his friend Javed, and brought her
back to Delhi. Her testimony thus independently corroborates the place and
circumstances of her recovery.
41. PW-13 was also confronted with a reference to Faizabad in a letter
addressed to the CMO, despite having stated that the victim was recovered
from Akbarpur. He explained the discrepancy during his cross-examination
as under:
“In this letter, you had written to the CMO that the
victim was brought for Faizabad whereas during
your examination in chief, you had stated that victim
was brought from Akbarpur. Which of these
statement is correct ?
Ans. The letter shown to me was written for
conducting of Potency test of accused. The victim
was brought from Akbarpur only.
I had not verified as the complainant & accused
stated that they both are relatives and the accused
is residing in their house on rent and I never
confirmed it and investigated it that the accused is
residing in the same house. The father of the victim
approached me and said that the girl is found and
her present location is in Akbarpur and further 1
requested the SHO concerned that the girl was
found in Akbarpur and later on one person from the
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 23 of 30

case concerned went with the complainant for the
recovery of the girl from Akbarpur. It is wrong to
suggest that 1 am deposing falsely”
42. The non-examination of independent witnesses and the discrepancies
regarding the manner of recovery undoubtedly constitute shortcomings in
the investigation. PW-12, the appellant’s former wife, also did not support
the prosecution regarding the alleged abduction, and her testimony cannot
be relied upon as corroboration thereof. Nevertheless, these circumstances
do not displace the consistent testimony of PW-1, PW-2, PW-8 and PW-13
regarding the victim’s recovery from Akbarpur. The depositions establish
that the victim was recovered from a jhuggi at Akbarpur on 13.02.2015 and
subsequently brought to Delhi. The discrepancies and investigative
omissions, though relevant to assessing the manner of recovery, do not
undermine the factum of recovery itself.
Conclusion on Conviction
43. Having considered the evidence in its entirety, this Court is of the
view that the prosecution has established the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt. The school record, the affidavit proved through PW-4
and the depositions of PW-2 and PW-3 establish that the victim was below
eighteen years of age at the time of the incident. Her testimony regarding
the manner in which she was taken away, the places where she was kept
and the repeated sexual assaults committed upon her by the appellant has
remained consistent on material particulars. The medical evidence
establishes that the victim was pregnant, with the gestational age being
consistent with the broad period of occurrence described by her. The
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 24 of 30

subsequent termination of her pregnancy also finds support in the
depositions of PW-6 and PW-13.
44. The victim's recovery from Akbarpur stands corroborated by the
testimonies of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-8. Furthermore, the appellant's plea of
a consensual relationship is inconsistent with PW-1's categorical deposition
that she was rendered unconscious, subjected to repeated sexual assaults
despite her resistance, and beaten whenever she cried or sought to contact
her parents. In any event, the victim being a minor, her alleged consent to
sexual intercourse would be immaterial for the purposes of the POCSO Act.
45. Insofar as the conviction under Section 363 IPC is concerned, the
testimony of PW-1, read with the deposition of PW-2 regarding her
disappearance on 05.12.2014, establishes that she was taken away from the
lawful guardianship of her parents. Similarly, the evidence regarding the
intimidation and physical coercion exercised by the appellant to prevent the
victim from resisting or seeking assistance supports the findings recorded
by the learned Trial Court under Section 506 IPC.
46. Thus, upon a cumulative appreciation of the oral, documentary and
medical evidence, this Court finds that the learned Trial Court has rightly
convicted the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and
506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.
Proportionality and Quantum of Sentence
47. Having upheld the conviction, the question which remains for
consideration is whether the sentence of thirty years' simple imprisonment
imposed upon the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 25 of 30

proportionate to the offence and the circumstances of the present case.
48. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the offences in the present case
were committed during the period from December 2014 to February 2015.
Section 6 of the POCSO Act, as it stood at the relevant time, prescribed the
following punishment:
“Whoever, commits aggravated penetrative sexual
assault, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than ten years but
which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also
be liable to fine.”
49. The minimum punishment under Section 6 was subsequently enhanced
from ten years to twenty years' rigorous imprisonment by the 2019
amendment. In Satauram Mandavi v. State of Chhattisgarh ,
MANU/SC/0983/2025 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the
enhanced punishment cannot be applied retrospectively, having regard to the
constitutional prohibition contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution.
Accordingly, the punishment prescribed under the unamended Section 6 of
the POCSO Act would govern the sentence in the present case.
50. It is a settled principle that the quantum of sentence must be determined
upon consideration of the gravity of the offence as well as the circumstances
of the offender. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , (2013) 7 SCC 545 ,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasised the principle of proportionality
between crime and punishment and observed that the sentencing discretion
must be exercised upon consideration of the nature of culpability, age,
antecedents, possibility of reformation and other attending circumstances.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 26 of 30

The Court further held that there can be no rigid formula for determining the
appropriate sentence, which must depend upon the facts of each case and the
rational exercise of judicial discretion.
51. In Vipul Rasikbhai Koli Jankher v. State of Gujarat , 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 2446 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while modifying the sentence
of life imprisonment to fifteen years, considered the age of the offender, the
period of incarceration and the reformative object of punishment.
52. Similarly, in Satish Kumar Dhruv v. State of Chhattisgarh , 2023 SCC
OnLine Chh 3631 , the Chhattisgarh High Court, relying upon the principles
enunciated in Vipul Rasikbhai Koli Jankher (supra) , modified the sentence
of life imprisonment imposed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act to fourteen
years' rigorous imprisonment, having regard to the age of the appellant, the
period of incarceration and his conduct during custody.
53. The scope of appellate interference with the sentence must also be
examined in light of Section 386(b)(iii) Cr.P.C, which empowers the
Appellate Court to alter the nature or extent, or both the nature and extent, of
the sentence, subject to the prohibition against enhancement. In Phool
Kumari v. Office of the Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar , (2012) 8 SCC
183 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the distinction between simple and
rigorous imprisonment.
“9. Section 53 IPC defines five kinds of punishment
which includes punishment for life and two other kinds
of imprisonment i.e. rigorous and simple imprisonment.
Rigorous imprisonment is one which is required by law
to be completed with hard labour. Section 36 of the
Delhi Prisons Act, 2000 prescribes that the convicts
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 27 of 30

sentenced to simple imprisonment shall be employed
only so long as they desire but cannot be punished for
neglect of work.
10. A person sentenced to simple imprisonment cannot
be required to work unless he volunteers himself to do
the work . But the Jail Officer who requires a prisoner
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment to do hard labour
would be doing so as enjoined by law and mandated by
the court (vide State of Gujarat v. High Court of
1
Gujarat.) Thus, while a person sentenced to simple
imprisonment has the option of choosing to work, a
person sentenced to rigorous imprisonment is required
by law to undergo hard labour. The undertrials are not
required to work in jail.”
54. In the present case, the sentence of simple imprisonment awarded by
the learned Trial Court does not conform to the punishment prescribed under
Section 6 of the POCSO Act, which expressly mandates rigorous
imprisonment. The proposed modification must, therefore, be considered not
merely as a reduction in the duration of imprisonment, but also as an alteration
of its nature to bring the sentence into conformity with the statutory provision
applicable at the time of the offence.
55. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the aggravating circumstances
are undoubtedly substantial. The repeated acts of sexual assault committed
upon a minor and their consequences upon the victim cannot be overlooked.
At the same time, the mitigating circumstances also merit consideration. The
Appellant was approximately twenty-five years of age at the time of the
offence, had no previous involvement in a similar case and has remained in
1
(1998) 7 SCC 392
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 28 of 30

custody since 13.02.2015. These circumstances, though not diminishing the
gravity of the offence, are relevant to determining a proportionate sentence.
56. A perusal of the order on sentence reveals that although the learned
Trial Court considered the mitigating circumstances concerning the
Appellant, it did not sufficiently explain why a sentence of thirty years, as
opposed to a substantial but shorter term of imprisonment, was warranted.
The determination of an appropriate sentence requires a balance between the
gravity of the offence, the circumstances of the offender and the possibility of
reformation. The seriousness of the offence, while an important consideration,
cannot be the sole determinant of the quantum of punishment.
57. Having considered the totality of the circumstances and the principles
governing proportionality in sentencing, this Court is of the considered view
that the sentence awarded by the learned Trial Court warrants modification.
A sentence of 15 years' rigorous imprisonment falls within the punishment
prescribed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act as it stood at the relevant time.
Such a sentence adequately reflects the gravity of the repeated sexual assaults
and their consequences upon the victim, while also taking into account the
Appellant's age, antecedents and prolonged incarceration.
58. Accordingly, the sentence of thirty years' simple imprisonment
awarded by the learned Trial Court under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is
modified to 15 years' rigorous imprisonment. The modification reduces the
substantive period of incarceration by 15 years while bringing the nature of
imprisonment into conformity with the statutory prescription applicable at the
time of commission of the offence. This Court is satisfied that the sentence,
as modified, would meet the ends of justice.
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 29 of 30

Conclusion
59. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant under Sections 363 and
506 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act is upheld. However, the sentence
of thirty years' simple imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is
modified to 15 years' rigorous imprisonment. The fine of Rs. 25,000/- and
the default sentence shall remain unaltered.
60. The sentences imposed under Sections 363 and 506 IPC, including
the respective fines and default sentences, shall remain unaltered. All
substantive sentences shall continue to run concurrently. The appellant
shall be entitled to set-off for the period of detention already undergone in
accordance with law. The statutory provisions governing remission and
commutation shall remain applicable.
61. The present appeal is accordingly partly allowed to the extent of
modification of sentence, while the conviction is affirmed.
62. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.
63. A copy of this judgment be communicated to the learned Trial Court
and the concerned Jail Superintendent for necessary compliance.
64. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith .
MADHU JAIN
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 2, 2026/YT
Signature Not Verified
Signed By:BHARTI
Signing Date:02.11.2026
18:32:09
CRL.A. 276/2025 Page 30 of 30