SMT. MANJULA RATHI vs UNION OF INDIA

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CGHC010137952019 2026:CGHC:44439
NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WPC No. 1485 of 2019
SHYNA
AJAY
Smt. Manjula Rathi W/o Ajay Rathi, Aged About 45 Years, R/o Ward No. 15, Urla
Abhanpur, Tahsil Abhanpur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
Digitally signed
by SHYNA AJAY
Date:
2026.10.16
19:53:01 +0530
--- Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - Union Of India Through its Ministry Of Road, Transport and High Ways,
Department Of Road, Transport And High- Ways, Transport Bhawan, 1, Parliament
Street, New Delhi-110075
2 - National Highways Authority Of India Through Project Director, Project
Implementation Unit, Shankar Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3 - Court Of Additional Collector Cum Arbitrator (National Highways Authority Of
India), Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Sub Divisional Officer, (Revenue) And
Competent Authority Under the National Highways Act, 1956, Abhanpur, District
Raipur Chhattisgarh.
5 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue )/ Land Acquisition Officer Abhanpur, Tahsil
Abhanpur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 2850 of 2020
Shrimati Pushpa Rathi W/o Harish Rathi Aged About 54 Years R/o Village -
Abhanpur, Tehsil - Abhanpur District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus

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1 - Union Of India Through - its Ministry of Road, Transport and High Ways,
Department Of Road, Transport and High-Ways, Transport Bhavan, 1, Parliament
Street, New Delhi - 110075
2 - National Highways Authority Of India Through - Project Director, Project
Implementation Unit, Shankar Nagar, Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
3 - Court Of Additional Collector Cum Arbitrator (National Highways Authority Of
India) Raipur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) and
Competent Authority Under The National Highways Act, 1956, Abhanpur, District -
Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
5 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue)/Land Acquisition Officer, Abhanpur Tehsil -
Abhanpur, District - Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
--- Respondent(s)
WPC No. 2849 of 2020
Shrimati Mamta Rathi W/o Prafull Rathi, Aged About 45 Years, R/o Ward No. -15,
Urla, Abhanpur, Tehsil- Abhanpur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh
--- Petitioner(s)
Versus
1 - Union Of India Through its Ministry Of Road, Transport and High Ways,
Department Of Road, Transport and High-Ways, Transport Bhavan, 1, Parliament
Street, New Delhi- 110075
2 - National Highways Authority Of India, Through Project Director, Project
Implementation Unit, Shankar Nagar, Raipur, Chhattisgarh
3 - Court Of Additional Collector Cum Arbitrator ( National Highways Authority Of
India), Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh
4 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Sub Divisional Officer ( Revenue) and
Competent Authority Under The National Highways Act, 1956, Abhanpur, District-
Raipur, Chhattisgarh
5 - Sub Divisional Officer ( Revenue) / Land Acquisition Officer, Abhanpur, Tehsil-
Abhanpur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh

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--- Respondent(s)
(Cause Title downloaded from CIS Periphery)
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ramakant Mishra, DSGI with Mr. Sagar Soni,
Advocate, Mr. Sangharsh Pandey, Govt. Advocate,
Mr. Dheeraj Wankhede, Advocate.

SB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad
Order on Board
14/10/2026

1.
Since all the captioned writ petitions involve a common question
of law and are founded on similar facts and circumstances, they
have been clubbed together, heard analogously and are being
disposed of by this common order.
2. For the sake of convenience and clarity, WPC No.1485/2019 has
been treated as the lead case and the facts of the said petition
are being referred to for the purpose of adjudication. The decision
rendered herein shall, however, govern the connected writ
petitions as well, as the issues raised therein are identical in
nature. The petitioner has prayed for the following relief(s) in
:-
WPC No.1485/2019
10.1) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to
issue appropriate writ and quash/set-aside the
impugned order dated 10/1/19 (Annexure P/5) and
other merged orders and appropriate writ/ direction
for paying the petitioner compensation at the rate of
Rs 4, 700 per square meter rate as awarded for
other similarly situated lands owners along with

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interest at the rate of 12% p.a. till the date of
payment or remand the matter back to the arbitrator
for passing a reasoned and speaking order in
accordance with law in the interest of justice.
10.2) This Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to
call for the entire records of the instant case, for kind
perusal of this Hon'ble Court.
10.3) Any other relief which this Hon'ble Court deem
fit and proper may also kindly be granted to the
petitioner in the interest of justice along with the cost
of the instant petition.
3.
Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner challenges the
arbitrary acquisition of her land bearing Khasra No.484/4 total
area admeasuring 0.298 hectares, out of which an area
admeasuring 1168 square meters (situated at Village Abhanpur,
Nagar Panchayat Abhanpur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh) was
acquired for the construction of the Raipur–Dhamtari National
Highway (NH-30) under Notifications issued in 2015–2016. A
grossly inadequate compensation of Rs.7,40,124/- was awarded
by Respondent No. 5 based on an unscientific classification
treating land above and below 1000 sq. meters differently despite
identical location and commercial value. Aggrieved by this
undervaluation and the discriminatory application of per hectare
rates instead of per square foot rates applied to similarly situated
owners, the petitioner filed an arbitration claim under Section

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3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (in short “the Act of
1956”) seeking enhancement to Rs.1,10,68,435/-. However, after
hearing arguments,, Respondent No. 3 arbitrarily terminated the
proceedings on 10.01.2019 without deciding the merits, solely on
the erroneous technical ground of failure to lead evidence,
leaving the petitioner with no efficacious remedy other than
approaching this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that it is the
duty of the Arbitrator to proceed in accordance with the provisions
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which has not been done in
the present case. Hence, the impugned order(s)/award(s) is liable
to be set-aside.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents would oppose the prayer.
6. Mr. Wankhede, learned counsel appearing for NHAI would submit
that the Writ Petitions against the order passed by the authority
while deciding an application filed under Section 3(G)(5) is not
maintainable. He would further submit that the petitioner(s) ought
to have approached the District Judge under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, the Act of 1996).
In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment passed by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bhaven
Construction v. Executive Engineer, Sardar Sarovar Narmada
Nigam Limited and another [(2022) 1 SCC 75].

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7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents placed on the file.
8. Admittedly, the petitioner's land was acquired for the
construction/widening of the Raipur–Dhamtari National Highway
(NH-30) pursuant to Notifications issued under the relevant
provisions of the Act of 1956. Being aggrieved by the
determination of inadequate compensation awarded by
Respondent No. 5, which was evaluated on a per-hectare basis
rather than a per-square-foot basis, the petitioner preferred an
arbitration application under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956
before Respondent No. 3 (the designated Arbitrator/Additional
Collector, Raipur), seeking enhancement of compensation to
Rs.1,10,68,435/-. However, vide impugned order dated
10.01.2019, the learned Arbitrator summarily terminated/rejected
the arbitral proceedings solely on the technical ground of failure
to lead evidence, without adjudicating upon the merits of the
statutory claim.
9. In the matter of Bhaven Construction ( supra ), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court took note of Section 5 of the Act, 1996, which
deals with judicial intervention. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
further held that under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India,
the interference is not permissible by the High Court and
discretion cannot be exercised to allow the judicial interference
beyond procedure established under the Act, 1996. Para-12, 13,
18 and 19 are reproduced hereinbelow:-

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12. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in
itself. This phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has
definite legal consequences. One such consequence is
spelled out under :
“ 5. Extent of judicial intervention. --
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, in
matters governed by this Part, no judicial
authority shall intervene except where so
provided in this Part.”
(emphasis supplied)
The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the
intention of the legislature as provided in the Preamble to
adopt UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules, to reduce
excessive judicial interference which is not contemplated
under the Arbitration Act.
13. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures and
forums to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. The
framework clearly portrays an intention to address most of
the issues within the ambit of the Act itself, without there
being scope for any extra statutory mechanism to provide
just and fair solutions.
18. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework,
mandates that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a
Constitutional right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular
Operators Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this
Court referred to several judgments and held:
“11. We have considered the respective
arguments/submissions. There cannot be any
dispute that the power of the High Courts to issue
directions, orders or writs including writs in the
nature of habeas corpus, certiorari, mandamus,
quo warranto and prohibition under Article 226 of
the Constitution is a basic feature of the

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Constitution and cannot be curtailed by
parliamentary legislation - L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261. However, it is
one thing to say that in exercise of the power
vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution,
the High Court can entertain a writ petition
against any order passed by or action taken by
the State and/or its agency/ instrumentality or any
public authority or order passed by a quasi-
judicial body/authority, and it is an altogether
different thing to say that each and every petition
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution must be
entertained by the High Court as a matter of
course ignoring the fact that the aggrieved person
has an effective alternative remedy. Rather, it is
settled law that when a statutory forum is created
by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition
should not be entertained ignoring the statutory
dispensation. (emphasis supplied)
It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise
discretion to allow judicial interference beyond the
procedure established under the enactment. This power
needs to be exercised in exceptional rarity, wherein one
party is left remediless under the statute or a clear ‘bad
faith’ shown by one of the parties. This high standard set
by this Court is in terms of the legislative intention to make
the arbitration fair and efficient.
19. In this context we may observe M/s. Deep Industries
Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, (2019)
SCC Online SC 1602, wherein interplay of Section 5 of the
Arbitration Act and Article 227 of the Constitution was
analyzed as under (para-16 & 17):
“16. Most significant of all is the non- obstante
clause contained in Section 5 which states that
notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law, in matters that arise under Part I of the

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Arbitration Act, no judicial authority shall intervene
except where so provided in this Part. Section 37
grants a constricted right of first appeal against
certain judgments and orders and no others.
Further, the statutory mandate also provides for
one bite at the cherry, and interdicts a second
appeal being filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act) .
17. This being the case, there is no doubt
whatsoever that if petitions were to be filed under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution against orders
passed in appeals under Section 37, the entire
arbitral process would be derailed and would not
come to fruition for many years. At the same time,
we cannot forget that Article 227 is a constitutional
provision which remains untouched by the non-
obstante clause of Section 5 of the Act. In these
circumstances, what is important to note is that
though petitions can be filed under Article 227
against judgments allowing or dismissing first
appeals under Section 37 of the Act, yet the High
Court would be extremely circumspect in
interfering with the same, taking into account the
statutory policy as adumbrated by us herein above
so that interference is restricted to orders that are
passed which are patently lacking in inherent
jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and in
light of the principles laid down in the aforesaid judgment, this Court is
of the view that the Writ Court should not interfere with the findings
recorded by the Arbitrator, as the petitioners ought to have availed the
remedies available to them under the Act of 1996 before the
competent statutory forum. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, all

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the writ petitions challenging the impugned award(s)/order(s) passed
by the Arbitrator are not maintainable and are hereby dismissed.
11. However, liberty is reserved to the petitioners to challenge the
orders/awards passed by the Arbitrator in accordance with the
provisions of the Act of 1996, before the competent statutory forum, if
so advised.
12. Consequently, all the Writ Petitions are dismissed.
Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Shyna Ajay