Sanjay Kumar Singh vs The State of Bihar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No.1219 of 2026
======================================================
Sanjay Kumar Singh Son of Dharamraj Singh resident of IE Gomia, Barki
Punu, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand
... ... Petitioner/s
Versus
1. The State of Bihar through the Director General of Police, Bihar
2. The Director General of Police, Bihar
3. The Inspector General of Police (Headquarter), Bihar
4. The Deputy Inspector General of Police (Personnel), Police Headquarter,
Patna, Bihar
5. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Begusarai Range, Begusarai,
6. The Superintendent of Police, Begusarai, Bihar,
7. The Superintendent of Police, Khagaria Cum Enquiry Officer.
... ... Respondent/s
======================================================
Appearance :
For the Petitioner/s : Mr.Siddhartha Prasad, Adv.
Mr.Om Prakash Kumar, Adv.
Mr.Sunit Kumar, Adv.
For the Respondent/s : Mr.Shashank Shekhar, GP6
Mr. Prabhat Kumar, AC to GP6
======================================================
CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DR. ANSHUMAN
ORAL JUDGMENT
Date : 14-05-2026
Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and
learned counsel for the State.
2. The present writ petition has been filed with the
following reliefs:-
a. To issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the order
contained in Memo No. 721 dated
13.05.2022 issued by the DIG, Begusarai

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Range, whereby petitioner's explanation to
the proposed charges has been rejected and
a decision has been taken to initiate
departmental proceeding against the
petitioner. Further it is humbly prayed to
quash the memo of charge by which
Departmental Proceeding No. 07 of 2022
has been initiated against the petitioner and
enquiry officer and presenting officer has
been appointed vide Memo No. 728 dated
14.05.2022 issued under the signature of
DIG, Begusarai Range.
b. To issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the enquiry
report dated 17.04.2023 whereby enquiry
officer has found the charges to be proved
against the petitioner.
c. To issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction for quashing the order of
dismissal passed by the Director General of
Police, Bihar as contained in Memo No. 728
dated 04.09.2025 and in furtherance thereof
be further pleased to quash the
consequential order passed by Deputy
Inspector General of Police, Begusarai
contained in CHETRADESH No. 249
bearing Memo No. 210 dated 17.09.2025
and the subsequent consequential order
passed by the Superintendent of Police,
Begusarai contained in Begusarai

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JILADESH No. 1910/2025 dated
28.09.2025.
d. It is further prayed that after
quashing the aforesaid orders impugned in
the instant writ application, respondents be
directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith
with effect from the date of punishment order
and respondents be further directed to
provide all consequential benefits alongwith
the arrears of salary and backwages.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that,
during the relevant period, the petitioner was working as SHO
of Balia Police Station, and a charge memo was issued vide
letter dated 18.04.2022 alleging that the petitioner was
demanding and accepting money for the release of a vehicle
solely on the basis of a viral video which surfaced, and the same
was subjected to a preliminary enquiry by the SDPO, who
purportedly found the charges to be proved.
4. Counsel further submits that, in response to the said
charge memo, the petitioner submitted his comprehensive reply
on 26.04.2022, categorically denying the charges and
specifically stating that it was highly improbable and inherently
illogical that any demand could have been made either for
submission of a report before the learned Trial Court or for
further release of the seized vehicle. Counsel further submits

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that, before the enquiry officer, he also denied all the charges
and challenged the said video being considered in the absence of
any FSL report, alleging that the said video was fake, doctored,
and edited, with a further prayer that the said viral video be
subjected to forensic and technical examination. He also
requested verification of the authenticity of the contents of the
video, but the enquiry officer did not take care of the said
requests.
5. Counsel further submits that the specific stand
taken by the petitioner was that there was no delay in release of
the vehicle for the reason that the FIR, bearing Balia P.S. Case
No. 310 of 2021, was lodged on 22.09.2021, the application for
release of the vehicle was filed on 29.09.2021, and the driver of
the vehicle was granted bail by the Trial Court on 16.10.2021.
The Trial Court called for a report on the request for release of
the vehicle on 25.10.2021. The I.O. of the said case sent a
requisition to the MVI for preparation of a technical report on
30.10.2021, which was received in the office of the MVI on
01.11.2021. The MVI did not submit the report to the I.O.,
rather, on 29.11.2021, a reminder was issued to the MVI by the
office of the petitioner. Thereafter, the MVI submitted the report
on 19.12.2021 before the Trial Court after the Trial Court had

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passed an order on 17.12.2021. Counsel further submits that the
owner of the vehicle provided the said technical report to the
I.O. on 13.01.2022. The I.O., immediately thereafter, forwarded
the report to the Trial Court on 14.01.2022. On 19.01.2022, the
Trial Court passed an order for release of the said vehicle, and
the said vehicle was released to the owner on 20.01.2022 in
compliance with the Court’s order.
6. Counsel further submits that, from the entire
episode, it becomes clear that no delay took place in release of
the vehicle due to any action or inaction on the part of the
petitioner, as the petitioner was working as SHO and, as soon as
the Trial Court passed the order for release of the vehicle on
19.01.2022, the vehicle was released on the very next day, i.e.,
on 20.01.2022. Counsel further submits that these events have
been categorically stated in paragraph No. 41 of the writ petition
in the form of a tabular chart, which has not been denied by the
State in the counter-affidavit. Counsel further submits that, in
the enquiry report, there is a conclusive finding by the enquiry
officer that, after enquiry, the petitioner was not found to have
demanded or received money and, therefore, the charges of
demanding and receiving money were found not proved,
however, in the conclusive portion, it has been observed that the

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petitioner was negligent, and therefore the charge was held to be
proved.
7. Counsel further submits that, in relation to the
delayed release of the vehicle, the petitioner was merely found
to be negligent. Counsel further submits that the disciplinary
authority issued a second show-cause notice directing the
petitioner to submit his explanation on the ground that the
enquiry officer had found him guilty. Counsel further submits
that the said second show-cause notice, issued vide Memo No.
1095 dated 30.06.2023, is not in proper observance of the
enquiry report, inasmuch as no charge relating to demand or
receipt of money was found proved in the enquiry report, and
the only observation made was that the petitioner was negligent
in relation to the delayed release of the vehicle. Therefore, he
submits that the said second show-cause notice has been issued
in gross violation of Rules 18(3) and 18(4) of the Bihar
Government Servants (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “Bihar CCA Rules,
2005”).
8. Counsel further submits that, treating the petitioner
as guilty on the basis of the enquiry report, the disciplinary
authority did not pass any order, rather, he referred the matter

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before the DGP, who is the appellate authority for the petitioner
under the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, and the said appellate
authority passed the punishment order of dismissal. Counsel
further submits that such decisions of the disciplinary authority
as well as of the DIG and the appellate authority, i.e., the DGP,
are in gross violation of the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, and
therefore neither the second show-cause notice nor the final
order passed by the DGP is sustainable in the eye of law.
9. He further submits that the basis of the punishment
is the viral video, which cannot be accepted without a certificate
issued under Section 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act. In
support of his contention, counsel relied upon a judgment
passed by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Srikant Prasad vs.
The State of Bihar & Ors. along with Bipin Kumar vs. The
State of Bihar & Ors. , passed in CWJC No. 1208 of 2021 with
CWJC No. 1528 of 2021 on 22.08.2025, wherein the petitioner
has placed emphasis on paragraph Nos. 14, 17, and 24 to 31,
and submits that the viral video clip has not been proved in the
mode and manner required under law, despite the fact that the
petitioner had raised objection before the enquiry officer and, at
every stage while filing his reply, had taken the plea that the
video recording may not be treated as proof and an FSL report

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be called for.
10. In this view of the matter, counsel submits that the
second show-cause notice and the punishment order be set
aside, and the petitioner be directed to be reinstated with all
consequential benefits.
11. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand,
submits that there are no discrepancies in the departmental
proceedings. He further submits that neither the charge memo is
defective, nor the enquiry proceeding, nor the issuance of the
show-cause notice, nor the final order. Every step in the
departmental proceedings has been taken, following the
principles of natural justice.
12. Counsel further submits that the Deputy Inspector
General of Police (DIG) rejected the explanation of the
petitioner and directed initiation of departmental proceedings
under the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, followed by issuance of
Memo No. 728 dated 14.05.2022, whereby the Enquiry Officer
and the Presenting Officer were appointed. The departmental
enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer, i.e., the
Superintendent of Police, who submitted his report and found
that although there was no direct evidence of demand and
acceptance of money by the petitioner in the viral video, the

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material on record clearly established that demand of money
was made through the Chowkidar, who wrote the demanded
amount on a piece of paper and received the same from the
vehicle owner, and the petitioner was present, as he admitted his
presence, thereby showing negligence in proper supervision.
Accordingly, the charge was held to be proved on the principle
of preponderance of probability.
13. He further submits that the Disciplinary Authority
called for a second show-cause and, considering the seriousness
of the charge, forwarded the matter to the Police Headquarters
and, upon review, the Police Headquarters found that the
petitioner had acted in an improper manner and proposed
dismissal. He further submits that the dismissal order was
passed by the DGP after considering the charges to be proved,
holding the video to be genuine, and observing that the
petitioner had failed to maintain dignity and proper supervision.
In that view of the matter, he submits that there is no infirmity in
the final order and the present writ petition is liable to be
dismissed.
14. After hearing the parties and upon perusal of the
documents, there are two aspects involved in the matter. The
first is the factual aspect and the second is the legal aspect. This

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Court is quite surprised that the Disciplinary Authority, who is
competent to pass the final order under Rules 17 and 18 of the
Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, has not passed final order, instead
thereof referred the matter to the Appellate Authority under the
Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, and the Appellate Authority, assuming
the role of the Original Authority, passed the final order. In this
way, gross injustice has caused to petitioner as he failed to avail
legal remedy.
15. The other surprising aspect is that the Enquiry
Officer has categorically reached the conclusion that neither
demand of money was made by the petitioner nor was any
money accepted by the petitioner, even then, on presumption, he
has arrived at the conclusion holding that the petitioner was
negligent. In the enquiry report, negligence has been alleged on
the ground of delay in release of the vehicle, but from paragraph
41 of the writ petition, it transpires to this Court that the release
order was passed by the Court on 19.01.2022 and the vehicle
was released on 20.01.2022, i.e., just one day thereafter, and any
delay, if at all, has been held to be, only due to non-availability
of the report of the MVI in this case. This aspect has been
completely ignored and not even answered in the counter-
affidavit. Therefore, this Court has no option but to accept the

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pleading made in paragraph 41 of the writ petition, and this
Court reaches the conclusion, after going through paragraph 41,
that there was no delay caused by the petitioner in the release of
the vehicle.
16. Similarly, the issuance of the second show-cause
notice is in complete contradiction with the findings of the
Enquiry Officer. The Bihar CCA Rules, 2005 clearly provide
that the Disciplinary Authority may differ from the findings of
the Enquiry Officer, but while doing so, the Disciplinary
Authority is required to assign reasons as to under what
circumstances he has not agreed with the findings of the
Enquiry Officer.
17. Here in the present case, there is an absolute lack
of reasoning in the letters issued vide Memo No. 1095 dated
30.06.2023. This Court observes another infirmity in the final
order that, though the final order ought to have been passed by
the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority has usurped
the powers of the Original Authority and passed the order. In the
final order, as per the Bihar CCA Rules, 2005, there is a specific
mandate under Rule 18(4) that the second show-cause notice
prior to passing the punishment order shall be duly considered,
however, only a one-line statement has been made that the

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defence statement is not acceptable. Such observation is
absolutely perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law.
18. On the point of law, the petitioner has relied upon
the judgment passed by this Hon’ble Court in the case of
Srikant Prasad vs. The State of Bihar & Ors. (supra) , relevant
paragraphs Nos. 14, 17, and 24 to 31 of which are as follows:-
“14. There is no dispute with regard to the facts
that on 10.10.2019, a Whatsapp video went viral, which led
to enquiry and submission of the enquiry report on
12.10.2019, disclosing that one Manoj Kumar Singh along
with railway employee were taking some liquor like
substance in a room where both the petitioners were
present. The aforesaid incidence led to institution of the FIR
against the petitioners and others. In course of enquiry, it
has been found that the incidence was of 3- 4 months ago,
when a female liquor trafficker was apprehended and
remanded to judicial custody, after institution of the FIR. It
is also admitted in the report that the viral video did not
show that both the petitioners were consuming the liquor
and in fact, all of them have submitted their respective
explanation that on the said date, one Manoj Kumar Singh,
DPC.- 334 and Bhushan Kumar Nirmal, Mechanical
Engineer of Railway were taking cold drinks. Neither the
maker of the video nor the person who had produced or
who had made it viral have been enquired upon. The blood
and urine sample were collected on 12.10.2019 and sent to
the FSL on 14.10.2019. The report was submitted under
Memo No. R.F.S.L. No. 759/19 dated 04.01.2020. It is
reported that ethyl alcohol was detected in exhibits marked
B2, B3, B4 and B5, and ethyl alcohol could not be detected
in exhibits marked A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and B1. It is only this
report, which has made the basis of punishment.
17. Notwithstanding the aforesaid fact, the
presence of the petitioners in the said room was found
suspicious. Albeit, the Enquiry Officer came to the definite
conclusion that in course of enquiry, the witnesses could not
be able to prove the evidence of consuming liquor by the
petitioners, however, as the petitioners have been made
accused, based upon a viral video and in course of

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investigation, the ethyl alcohol is found in the urine sample
and the supervising officers of the investigation has found
the petitioners guilty of consuming liquor and, therefore,
returned the finding of guilt against the petitioners.
24. Now coming to the evidentiary value of the
viral video, it would be pertinent to refer to a decision
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Arjun
Panditrao Khotkar Vs. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal &
Ors., (2020) 7 SCC 1 , wherein the Court underscored the
requirement of certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the
Evidence Act before placing reliance upon the electronic
evidence. To appreciate the legal position of the evidentiary
value of electronic evidence, this Court thinks it apt and
proper to encapsulate paragraph nos. 60, 61 and 84,
hereinbelow:-
"60. It may also be seen that the person who
gives this certificate can be anyone out of several persons
who occupy a "responsible official position" in relation to
the operation of the relevant device, as also the person who
may otherwise be in the "management of relevant activities"
spoken of in sub-section (4) of Section 65-B. Considering
that such certificate may also be given long after the
electronic record has actually been produced by the
computer, Section 65-B(4) makes it clear that it is sufficient
that such person gives the requisite certificate to the "best
of his knowledge and belief". [Obviously, the word "and"
between knowledge and belief in Section 65-B(4) must be
read as "or", as a person cannot testify to the best of his
knowledge and belief at the same time.]
61. We may reiterate, therefore, that the
certificate required under Section 65- B(4) is a condition
precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way of
electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (Anvar PV.
v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473: (2015) 1 SCC (Civ)
27: (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 24 (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 108), and
incorrectly "clarified" in Shafhi Mohammad [Shashi
Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801: (2018) 2
SCC 807: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 346: (2018) 2 SCC (Civ)
351: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 860: (2018) | SCC (Cri) 865].
Oral evidence in the place of such certificate cannot
possibly suffice as Section 65-B(4) is a inandatory
requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in
Taylor v. Taylor [Taylor v. Taylor, (1875) LR 1 Ch D 426].
which has been followed in a number of the judgments of
this Court, can also be applied. Section 65-B(4) of the

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Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is
admissible only if led in the manner stated and not
otherwise. To hold otherwise would render Section 65-B(4)
otiose.
84. But Section 65-B(1) starts with a non
obstante clause excluding the application of the other
provisions and it makes the certification, a precondition for
admissibility. While doing so, it does not talk about
relevancy. In a way, Sections 65-A and 65-B, if read
together, mix up both proof and admissibility, but not talk
about relevancy. Section 65-A refers to the procedure
prescribed in Section 65-B, for the purpose of proving the
contents of electronic records, but Section 65-B speaks
entirely about the preconditions for admissibility. As a
result, Section 65-B places admissibility as the first or the
outermost checkpost, capable of turning away even at the
border, any electronic evidence, without any enquiry, if the
conditions stipulated therein are not fulfilled."
25. In the case of Sonu Kumar (supra), learned
co- ordinate Bench of this Court while setting-aside the
order of dismissal, which was culminated upon a
departmental proceeding based upon a viral video, where
the delinquent was seeing consuming liquor, the learned
Court has placed reliance upon a Bench decision of this
Court in the case of Bharat Prasad Yadav Vs. The State of
Bihar & Ors. , CWJC No. 18331 of 2019. In case of Bharat
Prasad Yadav (supra), the learned Single Judge also
placing reliance upon the Arjun Panditrao Khotkar
(supra), has observed that since the viral video clip
containing in CD has not been proved during the course of
enquiry by resorting to the procedure established by law, as
such, is inadmissible by way of evidence, as per the
Evidence Act, 1892. The Court, in aforenoted case, besides
aforesaid observation, further held that neither the maker of
the video clip was examined, as a witness nor the mobile
through which the video was made viral has been
recovered, much less exhibited and, moreover, no
eyewitness to the alleged incidence has been examined by
the prosecution in the aforesaid departmental enquiry,
resulted in the entire enquiry proceedings having been
rendered nugatory on account of no evidence being
available on record to substantiate the allegations leveled
against the petitioner.
26. Similar is the finding in the case of Sonu
Kumar (supra) where the learned co-ordinate Bench having

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taken note of the fact that no evidence was led before the
Enquiring Authority that there was alcohol in the said
bottle and what the delinquent was drinking was alcohol.
Moreover, in the said case, neither there was any breath
analyzer test nor the blood sample of the delinquent was
taken for chemical examination, apart from the procedure
not been followed to substantiate the electronic evidence
held the impugned decision of the disciplinary authority,
based upon no evidence and a perfunctory and thereby, set-
aside the impugned order of dismissal.
27. This Court is conscious of the limitation
while exercising the power of judicial review in a matter
relating to departmental enquiry/proceeding, which
obviously caution the Court to re-examine or re-appraise
the evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of
the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer or the
disciplinary authority on that evidence.
28. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Kuldeep Singh Vs. Commissioner of Police & Ors., (1999)
2 SCC 10, has held that, true it is that the Court cannot sit
in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the
appellate authority. But this does not mean that in no
circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial
review available to the High Court as also to the Apex
Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic
enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions
reached therein, if there was no evidence to support the
findings or the findings recorded were such as could not
have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the
findings were perverse or made at the dictates of the
superior authority. It would be worth benefiting to
encapsulate paragraph nos. 7, 8, 9 and 10:-
"7. In Nand Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar
[(1978) 3 SCC 366: 1978 SCC (L&S) 458: AIR 1978 SC
1277: (1978) 3 SCR 708] it was held that the disciplinary
proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of quasi-judicial
character and, therefore, it is necessary that the Tribunal
should arrive at its conclusions on the basis of some
evidence. that is to say, such evidence which and that too,
with some degree of definiteness, points to the guilt of the
delinquent and does not leave the matter in a suspicious
state as mere suspicion cannot take the place of proof even
in domestic enquiries. If, therefore, there is no evidence to
sustain the charges framed against the delinquent, he

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cannot be held to be guilty as in that event, the findings
recorded by the enquiry officer would be perverse.
8. The findings recorded in a domestic enquiry
can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such
findings are not supported by any evidence on record or are
not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no
reasonable person could have come to those findings on the
basis of that evidence. This principle was laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. Rama Rao [(1964) 2 LLJ 150 : AIR
1963 SC 1723: (1964) 3 SCR 25] in which the question was
whether the High Court under Article 226 could interfere
with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This
decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v.
Prakash Chand Jain [(1969) 2 LLJ 377: AIR 1969 SC 983]
and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel
[(1976) 1 SCC 518: 1976 SCC (L&S) 92: 1976 Leb IC 4
AIR 1976 SC 98 (1976) 2 SCR 280J. In Rajinder Kumar
Kindra v. Delhi Admn. [(1984) 4 SCC 635: 1985 SCC
(L&S) 131: AIR 1984 SC 1805: (1985) 1 SCR 866] it was
laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based
on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no
reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as
perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial
tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and
the findings are its mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures
and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional
infirmity of non- application of mind and stands vitiated.
9. Normally the High Court and this Court
would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded at the
domestic enquiry but if the finding of "guilt" is based on no
evidence, it would be a perverse finding and would be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be
maintained between the decisions which are perverse and
those which are not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no
reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever
compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be
treated as perverse and the findings would not be interjered
with."
29. In the light of the aforenoted settled legal
position, this Court on careful consideration of the enquiry
report as well as the impugned order of punishment finds

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that the very charge is based upon suspicion, regarding the
presence of the petitioners in the room, where two persons
were seen consuming liquor. There is a specific finding of
the Enquiry Officer that none of the witnesses and the
documentary evidence have supported the charge of
consumption of liquor by the petitioners. Notwithstanding,
the aforesaid fact, placing reliance upon the FSL report
showing ethyl alcohol in the urine samples collected during
the course of investigation, that too with respect to Rail
Samastipur (Hasanpur) P.S. Case No. 179 of 2019, the copy
of which has also not been supplied to the petitioners nor
any witnesses have been produced to prove the same and,
as such, it cannot be held to be admissible, based upon
which the finding has been returned by the Enquiry Officer.
However, this fatal flaws has been completely overlooked
by the disciplinary authority.
30. This Court before moving further also
notices that the Presenting Officer did not perform any role
by presenting the case of the department before the enquiry
authority and, prima facie, it seems that the Enquiry Officer
himself assumed the role of the Presenting Officer. The
Court on number of occasions highlighted the role of
Presenting Officer viz-a-viz the Enquiry Officer. Reference
may be taken to the decisions in case of State of Uttar
Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Saroj Kumar Sinha, ( 2010) 2 SCC
772; and Panchanan Kumar Vs. The Bihar State
Electricity Board & Ors., (1196) 1 PLJR 401 .
31. Coming to the impugned order passed by
the disciplinary authority inflicting the punishment of
dismissal, the same is only found to be based upon the FSL
report, which has been duly deliberated and discussed by
this Court in the aforenoted paragraphs, that the same
cannot be said to be in relation to an incidence which led to
initiation of the present departmental proceeding. Besides
other infirmities noted hereinabove, neither the FSL report
nor the viral video clip have been proved in the mode and
manner required under the law and, as such, the order of
the disciplinary authority, which is based on the finding of
the enquiry authority is also without no evidence and
perfunctory one, wholly unjust, illegal and unsustainable.
19. Upon perusal of the provisions of law laid down
in the said judgment and after going through the enquiry report

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and the order of punishment, by which the punishment of
dismissal has been inflicted, this Court finds that the same is not
based on any FSL report. This Court further finds that neither
the FSL report nor the viral video clip has been proved in the
mode and manner required under law. As such, the findings of
the Enquiry Authority as well as the order of dismissal passed
by the DGP are without any evidence and are perfunctory,
wholly unjust, illegal, and unsustainable.
20. This Court is of the firm view that the
departmental proceeding is completely without application of
the proper law and established rules. In the present matter, the
Disciplinary Authority and the Enquiry Authority have been
completely ignored and overlooked the provisions of the Bihar
Government Servant (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,
2005.
21. Accordingly, the impugned orders, i.e., the
enquiry report dated 17.04.2023, the dismissal order passed by
the DGP, Bihar contained in Memo No. 728 dated 04.09.2025
(Annexure- P/15), and the consequential orders passed by the
Deputy Inspector General of Police, Begusarai Range vide
Chetradesh No. 249 bearing Memo No. 210 dated 17.09.2025
(Annexure-P/16), as well as the order passed by the

Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2026 dt.14-05-2026
19/19
Superintendent of Police, Begusarai contained in Begusarai
Jiladesh No. 1910 of 2025 dated 28.09.2025 (Annexure-P/17),
are hereby set aside.
22. The concerned authority is hereby directed to
reinstate the petitioner forthwith, and all consequential benefits
shall be paid within a period of three months from the date of
receipt/production of a copy of this order.
23. With the aforesaid directions and observations,
the present writ application stands allowed.

(Dr. Anshuman, J.)
Aman Kumar/-
AFR/NAFR NAFR
CAV DATE NA
Uploading Date 18.05.2026
Transmission Date NA