State Of U.P vs Anjuman Ishaat-E-Taleem Trust

2026 INSC 597
REPORTABLE


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
INHERENT JURISDICTION


REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) DIARY NO.53434/2025
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1385/2025


STATE OF U.P. …PETITIONER

VERSUS


ANJUMAN ISHAAT-E-TALEEM TRUST & ORS. …RESPONDENTS




WITH

Diary No.55957/2025, Diary No.56384/2025,
Diary No.56582/2025, Diary No.56589/2025,
Diary No.56602/2025, Diary No.56741/2025,
Diary No.56808/2025, Diary No.57161/2025,
Diary No.58339/2025, Diary No.59156/2025,
Diary No.59489/2025, Diary No.60992/2025,
Diary No.61041/2025, Diary No.61173/2025,
Diary No.61181/2025, Diary No.61887/2025,
Diary No.61917/2025, Diary No.62248/2025,
Diary No.64833/2025, Diary No.65035/2025,
Diary No.65057/2025, Diary No.66125/2025,
Diary No.67283/2025, Diary No.68800/2025,
Diary No.66034/2025, Diary No.70291/2025,
Diary No.71164/2025, Diary No.248/2026,
Diary No.282/2026, Diary No.1576/2026,
Diary No.2626/2026, Diary No.2700/2026,
Diary No.5215/2026, Diary No.6716/2026,
Diary No.7690/2026, Diary No.69416/2025,
Diary No.56647/2025, Diary No.56792/2025,
Diary No.58244/2025, Diary No.59344/2025,
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
JATINDER KAUR
Date: 2026.05.29
17:49:42 IST
Reason:
1

Diary No.60483/2025, Diary No.60485/2025,
Diary No.60486/2025, Diary No.60488/2025,
Diary No.60491/2025, Diary No.60493/2025,
Diary No.60497/2025, Diary No.60501/2025,
Diary No.60528/2025, Diary No.60529/2025,
Diary No.60533/2025, Diary No.60534/2025,
Diary No.60539/2025, Diary No.65262/2025,
Diary No.9261/2026, Diary No.12697/2026,
Diary No.12820/2026, Diary No.14435/2026,
Diary No.15376/2026, Diary No.17253/2026,
Diary No.20018/2026, Diary No.23484/2026,
Diary No.25604/2026, Diary No.25730/2026,
Diary No.26320/2026, Diary No.56443/2025,
Diary No.24377/2026, Diary No.27488/2026,
AND
Diary No.28296/2026.



J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
P ROEM
1. We are tasked to consider and decide a batch of review petitions (initially
in excess of 65 and some subsequently), that are presented with a common
1
grievance that the judgment and order passed by us in Anjuman Ishaat-
2
e-Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra erroneously interprets the
3
Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 . Premised
on the multi-fold grounds urged in the petitions, it is claimed that the order
under review has caused immense injustice to the petitioners and, thus,

1
order under review
2
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1912
3
RTE Act
2

ought to be reviewed upon extending opportunity of hearing in open court
proceedings. Vide the order under review, inter alia , in-service teachers
imparting lessons to students recruited prior to enactment of the RTE Act,
and having more than 5 (five) years to retire on superannuation, were held
4
to be under an obligation to qualify the Teacher Eligibility Test within 2
st
(two) years from 1 September, 2025. In the interest of justice, we directed
the review petitions to be placed for open court hearing.
2. Petitioners – various States, teachers’ associations/organisations,
individual teachers – are not aggrieved by the entirety of what we held in
Anjuman (supra); rather, they are aggrieved by only a part of it which we
have noticed in the preceding paragraph.
3. However, for the sake of completeness, we may record that upon
threadbare examination of the Constitution, Article 21-A, and the relevant
statutory provisions, we held [from paragraph 192 onwards of Anjuman
(supra)] that the requirement of qualifying the TET applies equally to in-
service teachers as a mandatory eligibility condition for continuation in
service and is, a fortiori , mandatory for promotion. Invoking our powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution, we granted a period of 2 (two) years
to those teachers who had more than 5 (five) years of service remaining to
qualify the TET, failing which they would not be entitled to continue in
service. We further clarified that, irrespective of the length of service

4
TET
3

remaining, any teacher aspiring for promotion would necessarily be
required to qualify the TET.
4. It is primarily these observations/directions that the petitioners claim to be
premised on an incorrect interpretation of the RTE Act and is, thus,
erroneous on the face of the record.
5. This Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. State (UT of
5
Delhi) , speaking through the illustrious voice of Hon’ble Krishna Iyer, J.,
had expressed the limited scope of review as:
“ A plea for review, unless the first judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like
asking for the moon. A forensic defeat cannot be avenged by an invitation to
have a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws and reversal of result .”

6
6. Yet again, recently, this Court in Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. A.S. Raghavendra
had the occasion to hold as follows:
16. The gist of the aforestated decisions is that:
16.1. A judgment is open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error
apparent on the face of the record.
16.2. A judgment pronounced by the court is final, and departure from that
principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling
character make it necessary to do so.
16.3. An error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process
of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record
justifying the court to exercise its power of review.
16.4. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1CPC, it is not
permissible for an erroneous decision to be “reheard and corrected”.
16.5. A review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be “an
appeal in disguise”.
16.6. Under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
reagitate and reargue the questions which have already been addressed and
decided.

5
(1980) 2 SCC 167
6
(2024) 6 SCC 418
4

16.7. An error on the face of record must be such an error which, mere looking
at the record should strike and it should not require any long-drawn process
of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
16.8. Even the change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a coordinate
or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review.


7. The above-referred decisions are only two out of multiple precedents which
emphatically lay down the law that a review petition cannot, by any
plausible standard, be an appeal in disguise.
8. Though in the garb of seeking a review the Court cannot be invited to rehear
and redecide an issue which stands finally decided, unless the parameters
envisaged in Section 114 read with Order XLVII of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 are satisfied, we permitted learned senior counsel/counsel
to argue as if we are tasked to decide the issue anew taking into account
another grievance of the petitioners of breach of the audi alteram partem
rule.
9. We had the good fortune of the able and erudite assistance of the cream of
the Supreme Court bar, viz. Mr. Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor
General; Mr. Dwivedi, Dr. Singhvi, Mr. Rohatgi, Mr. Gupta, Mr. Patwalia, Mr.
Giri, Mr. Khurshid, Mr. Jha, Ms. Mohana, Mr. Naidu, Mr. Rahim, and Ms.
Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel, in that order as well as other learned
counsel appearing for the respective petitioner(s). We have also had the
benefit of being addressed by Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel and
other learned counsel of the Calcutta High Court bar.

5

C ONTENTIONS /O BJECTIONS
10. Having heard submissions advanced by all the learned senior
counsel/counsel, the contentions/objections can be narrowed down to five
crisp points:
st
a. The provisions of the RTE Act, which came into force from 1 April, 2010
together with the amendment introduced by the Amendment Act of
7
2017 , cannot be applied retrospectively to teachers who had been
appointed prior to the said date.
b. The first proviso to section 12A of the National Council for Teacher
8
Education Act, 1993 was pressed into service to contend that the
teachers who were recruited prior to the commencement of the NCTE
Amendment Act, 2011 cannot be removed solely on the ground of non-
fulfilment of such qualifications as may be prescribed by the NCTE.
c. Insistence upon qualification of the TET for in-service teachers is
arbitrary, unreasonable and unjustified, inasmuch as such teachers had
been appointed in accordance with the prevailing service rules and
regulations and, at a point of time, when qualifying the TET was not
prescribed as an essential condition. Additionally, in certain States,
teachers were expressly exempted from such requirement. The
subsequent imposition of the TET as a mandatory qualification by an

7
2017 Amendment Act
8
NCTE Act
6

erroneous judicial interpretation of the RTE Act in general and Section
23 thereof in particular, and that too midway in the career of the
teachers, is claimed to violate a fundamental principle of service
jurisprudence, viz. change in conditions of service after appointment
causing serious prejudice to the employee cannot be effected.
rd
d. Paragraph 4 (c) of the notification dated 23 August, 2010 issued by the
9
National Council for Teacher Education exempted teachers appointed
for Classes I to VIII prior to the date of the notification from the
requirement of possessing the minimum qualifications stipulated in
paragraph 1 thereof, including qualification of the TET.
e. Finally, and without prejudice to the other contentions, some of the
petitioners contended that the time granted by this Court in paragraph
217 of Anjuman (supra), i.e., 2 (two) years to acquire the TET, is too
short. Thus, they seek a suitable extension of time to acquire the
qualification.
A NALYSIS AND D ECISION
11. We have heard the petitioners at length on their objections to the order
under review. Any grievance that they were not heard stands dispelled. We
now propose to explain why their objections do not hold good in law.


9
NCTE
7

A. A PPLICABILITY OF THE RTE A CT : W HETHER R ETROSPECTIVE ?
12. One of the principal contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners was
that neither the provisions of the RTE Act nor the 2017 Amendment Act
introduced in 2017, insofar as they relate to the requirement of qualifying
the TET, could be construed to operate retrospectively and by judicial
interpretation be made applicable to in-service teachers. The submission,
in sum, was that the in-service teachers, whose appointments stood validly
made in accordance with the prevailing recruitment rules at the relevant
point of time, could not subsequently be met with disqualification for want
of TET qualification.
13. Buttressing the aforesaid contention, considerable reliance was placed on
rd
paragraph 4, read with paragraph 1, of the Notification dated 23 August,
2010 issued by the NCTE which, according to learned counsel for the
petitioners, expressly exempted teachers appointed prior to the issuance of
the notification from acquiring the minimum qualifications prescribed
therein.
14. This contention fails to impress us. Even if certain exemptions are traceable
in the subordinate legislation, including any notification, governing the
stipulation of minimum qualifications, such subordinate legislation cannot
override the parent statute. The enquiry must, therefore, be anchored to
the statute itself, the meaning of which is clear and admits of no real
ambiguity.
8

15. Though we had the occasion to read Section 23 of the RTE Act multiple
times prior to rendering our opinion in Anjuman (supra) and the said
provision has been read to us over and over again in course of hearing, we
need to read it one final time. Section 23 reads:
23. Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service
of teachers .—
(1) Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an
academic authority, authorised by the Central Government, by notification,
shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher.
(2) Where a State does not have adequate institutions offering courses or
training in teacher education, or teachers possessing minimum qualifications
as laid down under sub-section (1) are not available in sufficient numbers, the
Central Government may, if it deems necessary, by notification, relax the
minimum qualifications required for appointment as a teacher, for such period,
not exceeding five years, as may be specified in that notification:
Provided that a teacher who, at the commencement of this Act, does not
possess minimum qualifications as laid down under sub-section (1), shall
acquire such minimum qualifications within a period of five years:
Provided further that every teacher appointed or in position as on the
31st March, 2015 , who does not possess minimum qualifications as laid down
under sub-section (1), shall acquire such minimum qualifications within a
period of four years from the date of commencement of the Right of Children
to Free and Compulsory Education (Amendment) Act, 2017 (24 of 2017).
(3) The salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of
service of, teachers shall be such as may be prescribed.
(emphasis ours)


16. Significantly, sub-section (1) starts with the word “Any person” , while the
two provisos to sub-section (2) refer either to “a teacher” or “every
teacher” . Upon plain reading, the different words used by the legislature, in
our understanding, are not without good reason.
9

17. For the present, we may profitably leave aside the second proviso
introduced vide the 2017 Amendment Act. Simpliciter , what is required of
now, is a plain reading of Section 23 as it stood at the commencement of
the RTE Act. The key element of the legislative ordainment in sub-section
(1) (by use of word “any person”), therefore, indubitably concerns future
appointments, being prospective in nature. As a significant departure from
the provision, the first proviso to sub-section (2) employs a markedly
different expression. Instead of “Any person” , the proviso refers to “a
teacher” who, at the commencement of the RTE Act, did not possess the
minimum qualifications contemplated under sub-section (1). Such teacher
was granted a period of 5 (five) years to acquire the prescribed
qualifications. The distinction in phraseology employed by the Parliament is
neither accidental nor inconsequential. While sub-section (1) governs
eligibility for appointment of any person as a teacher prospectively, the first
proviso to sub-section (2) specifically deals with teachers already borne in
service on the date of commencement of the RTE Act and safeguards their
continuance by affording them time to acquire the requisite qualifications.
In other words, the usage of the word “teacher” and not “person” in the
first proviso makes it clear that from the very inception of the RTE Act as it
stood in 2009, the legislature intended the in-service teachers to also meet
the prescribed minimum threshold.
10

18. Turning to the second proviso, inserted by the 2017 Amendment Act with
st
retrospective effect from 1 April 2015, it only fortifies the aforesaid
legislative scheme. It extends the benefit of time to those teachers who
st
were appointed or continued in service as on 31 March 2015, despite not
possessing the prescribed minimum qualifications. Far from introducing
retrospectivity, the amendment recognizes the existing status of such
teachers and provides a further statutory window for compliance.
19. The reason behind the amendment is not far to seek. There could well be
teachers who were not able to acquire the qualification in the first instance,
st st
the time for which ended on 31 March, 2015 (5 years since 1 April, 2010,
when the RTE Act came to be notified). Thus, a further period of four years
st
was granted from 1 April, 2015 [effectively 2(two) years] to every teacher
st
in position as on 31 March to acquire the qualification.
20. Viewed in this prism, the submission grounded on alleged retrospective
application of the RTE Act regime by judicial interpretation does not merit
acceptance. The statutory framework in itself is plain: it neither invalidates
past appointments retrospectively nor visits existing teachers with
immediate disqualification. On the contrary, both the original enactment
and its amendment are premised upon legislative recognition of existing
appointments while simultaneously stipulating a time-bound mechanism for
securing minimum qualifications in the larger interest of maintaining
standards in elementary education.
11

B. NCTE A CT VIS - À - VIS RTE A CT
21. Apropos the submission made qua section 12A of the NCTE Act, it may be
relevant to reproduce the provision coupled with the following provisos as
follows:
12A. Power of Council to determine minimum standards of education
of school teachers. —For the purpose of maintaining standards of education
in schools, the Council may, by regulations, determine the qualifications of
persons for being recruited as teachers in any pre-primary, primary, upper
primary, secondary, senior secondary or intermediate school or college, by
whatever name called, established, run, aided or recognised by the Central
Government or a State Government or a local or other authority:
Provided that nothing in this section shall adversely affect the continuance of
any person recruited in any pre-primary, primary, upper primary, secondary,
senior secondary or intermediate schools or colleges, under any rule,
regulation or order made by the Central Government, a State Government, a
local or other authority, immediately before the commencement of the
National Council for Teacher Education(Amendment)Act, 2011 (18 of 2011)
solelyon the ground of non-fulfilment of such qualifications as may be specified
by the Council:
Provided further that the minimum qualifications of a teacher referred to in the
first proviso shall be acquired within the period specified in this Act or under
the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (35 of
2009).
(emphasis ours)


22. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the review petitioners
heavily relied upon the first proviso to contend that the requirement of
minimum qualifications would not be applicable to any person prior to the
commencement of the NCTE Act. It is germane to observe that while
referring to the first proviso, learned counsel lost sight of the second
proviso, which reinforces the requirement under the RTE Act that the
minimum qualifications be acquired within the stipulated period therein.
12

C. C HANGE OF S ERVICE C ONDITIONS
23. The further contention that the TET imposes a retrospective application of
a new service condition also falters in light of the undisputed factual position
that neither the first proviso nor the second proviso to sub-section (2) of
Section 23 has been under a direct challenge in any original legal
proceeding prior to and/or post Anjuman (supra).
24. We sympathize with the teachers who figure as review petitioners, in as
much, they could face difficulties highlighted by them. However, a
perceived sense of insecurity is not a sufficient reason for this Court to take
a re-look at the matter again. That “ TET is not only a mandatory eligibility
requirement but it is a constitutional necessity flowing from the right to
10
quality education under Article 21A ” and “we are alive to the settled legal
11
position that operation of a statute can never be seen as an evil ” are
observations made by us in Anjuman (supra) which need reiteration.
25. In view of the reasoning hereinabove qua the retrospectivity of the
legislation and the amendment, and since the provision and the proviso
extend the compliance window for teachers to equip themselves to improve
the quality of teaching for children of impressionable age, in our considered
opinion, the provisions of Section 23 cannot be seen as resulting in
imposition of a new condition of service.

10
see paragraph 169 of the judgment in Anjuman (supra)
11
see paragraph 215 of the judgment in Anjuman (supra)
13

D. P UBLIC I NTEREST R AMIFICATIONS OF D ISPLACEMENT OF T EACHERS
26. It was further contended on behalf of the various States that making TET
qualification mandatory for in-service teachers, aligned with the stipulated
two-year period of compliance, could potentially lead to a large number of
teachers being rendered ineligible to continue in service. According to the
States, such a consequence would not merely imperil the employment of
concerned teachers but would also have serious ramifications on the edifice
of public education, particularly the interests of school-going children who
may suffer disruption in the continuity and quality of education.
27. Today, we stand nearly a decade away from the window granted by the
2017 Amendment Act and in excess of a decade-and-a-half since the RTE
Act was enforced. The period of 15 (fifteen) years could be considered more
than sufficient time for a teacher to acquire the TET qualification. In
Anjuman (supra), we noted the practical realities and granted a further
time of 2 (two) years to the teachers in service to acquire the TET
qualification, exercising our power under Article 142 of the Constitution.
This too, according to the review petitioners, is not sufficient.
28. To make the verdict in Anjuman (supra) inoperative based on the
contention that several thousands of teachers would be rendered out of
service as a consequence thereof would mean that teachers who do not
possess the TET qualification would continue in service, impacting the
educational future of generations to come. The RTE Act is a child centric
14

legislation and must be read so. Service of teachers cannot come at the
cost of educational future of the children.
F INDING
29. We, therefore, do not find any error in the order under review, much less
palpable error apparent on the face of the record, as warranting review.
The review petitioners, it would seem, are not entitled to any relief as
prayed for.

HE ONUNDRUM
T C
30. It may, at this point, be relevant to remind ourselves that law must also
strive to be pragmatic. Reference can profitably be made to the decision of
12
this Court in State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO wherein it was held that in
cases where substantial justice and a technical approach were pitted
against each other, a pragmatic approach should be taken with the former
being preferred. Though this observation was with regard to condonation
of delay, we need to consider whether it would be appropriate as well to
bear such principle in mind, in light of the difficulties brought to the fore by
learned counsel.
31. Does the concern that teachers could likely get displaced and the interests
of children being rendered a casualty, merit consideration to any extent?
Whilst the requirement of qualifying TET cannot be diluted in its rigour, we

12
(2005) 3 SCC 752

15

cannot remain oblivious to the practical repercussions that may ensue if a
substantial number of in-service teachers are put in jeopardy, due to the
possible loss of their employment within a truncated time-frame, thereby
adversely affecting the functioning of schools and, more importantly, the
educational welfare of children at large.
T HE R ELIEF
32. Having regard to the paramountcy of ensuring continuity in elementary
education of children, we deem it appropriate to grant limited relief by
extending the period earlier stipulated for acquiring the TET qualification,
again, in exercise of our power under Article 142 of the Constitution.
33. Appreciating that the TET examination must be conducted by the relevant
authorities expeditiously as well as the time and resources required for the
same are limited, we alter and extend the timeline granted in paragraph
217 of Anjuman (supra) for in-service teachers to acquire the TET
qualification from 2 (two) to 3 (three) years, i.e., the qualification has to
st st
be obtained by 31 August, 2028 instead of 31 August, 2027, as originally
directed.
34. Needless to observe, it shall also be the endeavour of the respective States
and the competent authorities to conduct the TET periodically, and
preferably twice every year, interspersed with an approximate period of six
months between the successive examinations, so as to afford eligible
16

teachers a reasonable opportunity to comply with the statutory
requirement.
35. We make it abundantly clear that no further prayer for extension of time
shall be entertained.

C ONCLUSION

36. With the aforesaid modification of the order under review, all the petitions
stand dismissed.


……………..…………….J.
(DIPANKAR DATTA)



……………………………J.
(MANMOHAN)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 29, 2026.


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