Mr. Puneet Sachdeva vs Induslnd Bank And 3 Others

A.F.R.

Judgment Reserved on- 30.03.2026
Judgment Delivered on- 07.04.2026
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:74533
Court No. - 39
Case :- FIRST APPEAL No. - 273 of 2026
Appellant :- Mr. Puneet Sachdeva
Respondent :- Induslnd Bank And 3 Others
Counsel for Appellant :- Anshul Kumar Singhal
Counsel for Respondent :- Mayank Awasthi, Saurabh Raj Srivastava
Hon'ble Sandeep Jain, J.
1. The instant appeal has been filed by the plaintiff under Section 96
CPC against the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.7.2023
passed by Additional Civil Judge(Senior Division) Court No. 16,
Allahabad in O.S. no. 180 of 2015 Puneet Sachdeva vs.IndusInd
Bank and others, whereby the plaintiff 's suit has been dismissed on
the ground that the Court lacks inherent jurisdiction to try and decide
the suit.
Plaint case
2. The plaintiff filed O.S.no.180 of 2015 against the defendants who
are IndusInd Bank and its officials, with the averments that he
joined the Bank on 21.8.2008 as Senior Relationship Manager at its
Barakhamba Branch, New Delhi and by his dedication, devotion,
hard work, excellent performance and appraisal, was promoted as
Branch Manager and was transferred to Allahabad Branch of the
defendant Bank in June 2011,where he worked there till 9.5.2013. It
was further averred that during his tenure of 6 years with the bank, he
received commendations, appreciation letter for his work and his
appraisal ratings in 4 years from 2008 – 2009 to 2011 – 12 remained
outstanding and excellent and he earned promotions from the rank of
Deputy Manager to Asst. Vice President on the basis of his hard
work, commitment and devotion.
3. It was further averred that in the financial year 2011 – 12 he
received appreciation for detecting fraud of 5 lakhs on account of ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
Mr.Shobhit Srivastava and recovery of 3 lakhs was effected against ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
the outstanding of 5 lakhs. ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
4. It was further averred that as Branch Manager he was not dealing
with disbursement/receipt of cash/cheque etc. but was required to
examine transactions of 5 lakhs and above from the daily reports ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
that were brought by the staff to his notice apart from his other
1

routine duties and as Branch Manager, he was required to counter
sign the vouchers of 5 lakhs and above which were initially signed ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
by operation of staff and Manager – Customer Service and
Operations(MCSOP). It was further averred that the defendant Bank
had given MCSOP the discretionary power to authorise all
transactions and to counter sign the voucher for the transaction up to
₹ 5 lakhs on account of 5 lakh and vouchers of transaction of 5 lakh and above were to be ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
signed by the operational staff, MCSOP and Branch Manager. At the
relevant time Mr. Neeraj Verma was the MCSOP.
5. It was further averred that the prime responsibility of cash officer
Mr. Sachin Yadav of the defendant Bank at Allahabad was receipt and
payment of cash to ensure cash management is within retention limit,
maintenance of cash registers, joint custodian of vault and ATM. The
clearing officer Mrs.Amba Lakshmi of defendant Bank was overall in
charge of inward/outward clearing, reconciliation of accounts with
banks, lodgment of outward cheques, all work related to ECS credits,
reporting, returns and effective closure of complaints/issues related to
it.
6. It was further averred that the prime responsibility of remittance
officer Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati of the defendant Bank was issuance,
revalidation, cancellation of demand draft and pay orders to
customers, transfer entries,RTGS, arrangement of vouchers, daily
reconciliation of FD suspense accounts, daily report checking and
arrangement and verifying the vouchers which are incomplete,
dispatching a voucher to VVU and responding to their querries.
7. It was further averred that the Branch Monitoring Unit (BMU)
audit was done on quarterly basis in each Branch and the audit of the
defendant Banks' Allahabad Branch was reviewed by Mr. Anurag
Chaudhary on 14.3.2013 which was for the period 27.8.2012 to
13.3.2013 and certain observations were made in the audit, which
were resolved during course of the report submission and Mr. Neeraj
Verma MCSOP mentioned his feedback on various points highlighted
in the audit report .The plaintiff has specifically averred that in the
above audit there was no mention of missing vouchers and none of
the fraudulent transactions could be traced and detected. It was
further averred that in the internal audit conducted by the Bank the
performance of the Branch was found satisfactory and no fraud of any
kind was found in the Branch.
8. The plaintiff has mentioned relevant details in the plaint to point
out that Mr. Neeraj Verma was not performing properly, which was
also in the notice of higher officials of the Bank. The plaintiff has also
averred that Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati who was reporting to Mr. Neeraj
Verma MCSOP, was also not deliberately preparing the vouchers of
2

fraudulent transactions and had been showing wrong POD. Mr.
Neeraj Verma was also providing wrong and false information to him
regarding sending of pending vouchers and this fact was brought to
his notice by VVU(voucher verification unit). It is the case of the
plaintiff that if transfer vouchers would have been sent to the VVU
promptly by Mr. Neeraj Verma then the fraud in regard to
unauthorised transactions would have been traced.
9. It was further averred that on 1.5.2013 the plaintiff received a
transfer order from the defendant bank that he had been transferred to
his home town Delhi at Naraina Branch of the defendant Bank. The
plaintiff handed over the charge of his branch to Mr. Vishwaneet
Khosla on 9.5.2013, and the plaintiff was relieved on 13.5.2013. The
plaintiff was later on directed by the defendant Bank to join
Gujranwala Branch on 18.5.2013, to which he complied.
10. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that on 30.5.2013 he came to
know that Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati has committed fraud in internal
accounts and misappropriated funds in several customer accounts and
the BMU team of the Bank was locating fraudulent entries done by
her. The plaintiff was also informed that fraudulent entries beyond her
power were authorised by using ID of Mr. Neeraj Verma MSCOP and
Mr. Vineet Gupta , Authoriser. The plaintiff was further informed that
Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati has confessed to committing fraud amounting
to 41 lakhs consisting of 17.77 lakhs during the tenure of plaintiff ₹ 5 lakhs on account of ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
and the remaining 23.23 lakhs in the period of his successor. The ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
plaintiff was also informed that the Bank has recovered most of the
amount. Subsequently,Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati denied that the fraud
was committed by her. She also lodged a case of sexual harassment
against all the officials of the defendant bank, who persuaded her for
depositing back the amount of fraud, with police authorities and to
higher authorities of the Bank.
11. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that the fraud committed by
Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati was due to sheer negligence of Mr. Neeraj
Verma MCSOP, which was detected by Mr. Gautam Singh of the
Branch Monitoring Unit( BMU) who visited the Branch on
27.5.2013 to take stock of the situation and checked the transactions
for missing vouchers along with Mr. Neeraj Verma MCSOP.
12. The plaintiff has further averred that due to the above fraud
committed by Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati he was suspended by the Bank
on 30.9.2013, a disciplinary enquiry was instituted by the Bank
regarding the above fraud in which the chargesheet was served on
Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati on 9.10.2013, Mr. Neeraj Verma and on him
on 18.2.2014, but the disciplinary enquiry was only conducting
enquiry for the charges levelled against Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati in the
3

chargesheet given to her whereas, the same should have been done
for all the employees to whom the chargesheet was served. According
to the plaintiff, it was strange that for one offence different
chargesheets were issued. It is the case of the plaintiff that the higher
officials of the defendant Bank intimated to him that the fraud had
been committed by Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati but to make it appear as
serious action, they had also suspended plaintiff for the brief period.
It was further averred that on 22.6.2013 the defendant Bank lodged
FIR against Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati for committing fraud of ₹ 5 lakhs on account of 41
lakhs, in which there was no mention of his involvement, in any
manner whatsoever, which is still pending for investigation, in which
no chargesheet has been filed till date.
13. It was further averred by the plaintiff that he was suspended by
the defendant Bank on 7.10.2013, chargesheet was served on him on
18.2.2014, on 19.2.2014 he was served with the fresh chargesheet on
the same grounds in Delhi, on which enquiry was already held in
Allahabad. It was further averred that the plaintiff was not given
proper opportunity of submitting his reply, since he had to collect and
peruse the relevant records for negating the charges, the opportunity
given to him was too short, due to which he could not prepare his
proper defence statement, the defendant Bank also failed to comply
with the principles of natural justice. The plaintiff has further averred
that in the meanwhile the higher officials of the Bank were sending
clear signal to him that he would be exonerated in the enquiry since
he was not part of the fraud as such, he need not raise all those
objections.
14. The following charges were levelled against the plaintiff in the
disciplinary enquiry conducted by the defendant Bank :-
“(i)Despite mails from BMU, the charged executive and the Manager
Customer Service and Operations(MCSOP) failed to reconcile internal
account.
(ii)The charged executive and the MCSOP failed to send the vouchers to
VVU despite follow-up by BMU. No proper tracking was done at the
branch by the charged executive and the MCSOP.
(iii)Daily report was not checked by the charged executive and the
MCSOP.
(iv)Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati had not prepared the vouchers and ensured that
the vouchers were not sent to VVU, to avoid detection of unauthorised
entries by VVU Hub.
(v)The MCSOP Mr.Neeraj Verma has allegedly shared the password to
Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati which was done by her with his authority and used
in the transaction undertaken by her.”
15. It was further averred by the plaintiff that a 2nd domestic enquiry
on 25.2.2014 was conducted against him at the corporate office of the
defendant Bank at Mumbai by Mr. Sachin Pandey, who was junior to
4

him. It was further averred that the plaintiff came to know from the
BMU team that Mr. Neeraj Verma has been reinstated in the job with
some punishment. The plaintiff was ultimately dismissed on
19.5.2014 by the defendant no. 2 Mr.Ashok Nair, Head Human
Relations of the defendant Bank, on the basis of the report of the
disciplinary enquiry, which according to the plaintiff was grossly
disproportionate and unwarranted, since there was no evidence
against him. According to the plaintiff, the fraud was committed by
Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati and Mr. Neeraj Verma, MCSOP but he was
wrongly punished. It has been specifically averred by the plaintiff that
he has never made any admission of his guilt in the disciplinary
enquiry before any official of the Bank or of his wrongdoing in any
manner whatsoever. It was specifically averred by the plaintiff that
his password was not used in committing fraud nor he had authorised
any fraudulent transaction undertaken by Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati and
Mr. Neeraj Verma MCSOP.
16. It has been further averred by the plaintiff that for filing Appeal
against his dismissal order, he demanded the relevant documents from
the Bank which were not provided to him on the ground that they
were not relevant. The plaintiff submitted his Appeal against the order
of disciplinary authority to defendant no. 2 on 19.6.2014.
17. It was further averred that the Appellate Authority added 2
additional charges on 7.10.2014 against him, which were not before
the disciplinary authority in the chargesheet dated 18.2.2014, which
was against the principles of natural justice, which read as under :-
“(i) There has been many lapses on your part such as debiting dormant
accounts and booking life insurance policies in dummy names and
allowing free hand to Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati to undertake transactions to
inflate business.
(ii)Password sharing too seems to have been done under your pressure
since Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati was managing with some of the customers
by selling life insurance policies as also making the MCSOP and the
authorisers move out for business.”
18. It was further averred that the Appellate Authority failed to
conduct impartial enquiry, which failed to properly examine the
material on record, who has illegally upheld his termination from the
Bank. The plaintiff further averred that due to the illegal
termination,he has suffered a loss of about 26,49,663/-which he is ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
entitled to get with interest @ 18% per annum from the defendant
Bank and its officials.
19. In the above backdrop ,the plaintiff claimed the following reliefs
in his plaint:-
5

“(A) Pass a decree of declaration to the effect that the Appellate order
dated 8.10.2014 passed by defendant no. 3 and order dated 19.5.2014
passed by defendant no. 2 is illegal and is nullity;
(B) Pass a decree of permanent injunction against the defendant no.1
Bank injuncting the defendant No. 1 Bank to terminate the plaintiff;
(C)Pass a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled
to his back wages with interest and all employment benefits;
(D)Pass a decree of mandatory injunction directing defendant No. 1
Bank to reinstate the plaintiff forthwith with full back wages and
employment benefits;
(E)Award cost of the suit in favour of plaintiff and against the
defendants;
(F)Pass any such order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit proper in the facts
and circumstances of the present case.”
Written statement of the defendants
20. All the defendants filed their joint written statement before the
trial court,in which the plaint averments were denied. It was averred
that the relief claimed by the plaintiff cannot be granted in original
suit, which was not maintainable for the reliefs claimed by him. It
was further averred that the plaintiff was directly responsible for the
fraud which was committed in his Branch for which appropriate
disciplinary proceedings were drawn against him and in pursuance of
that, the plaintiff has been rightly dismissed from service of the Bank.
It was further averred that the plaintiff, being the Branch Manager,
was responsible for all high-value transactions, he was supposed to
check and sign the vouchers, being the custodian and overall incharge
of the Branch.
21. It was further averred by the defendants that during enquiry
several transactions above 5 lakhs were found, which were not duly ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
checked by the plaintiff, on account of which fraud was committed,
which caused serious financial and reputational loss to the Bank. It
was further averred that MCSOP worked under the supervision of the
plaintiff and it was his duty to ensure that MCSOP worked in a fair
and error free manner, in which the plaintiff failed. It was further
averred that on account of several supervisory and controlling lapses
committed by the plaintiff, Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati, a subordinate
employee of the plaintiff, was able to commit fraud amounting to ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
40 lakhs. The defendants in their written statement have justified the
dismissal of the plaintiff, for the alleged lapses committed by him
during his tenure as a Branch Manager.
22. It was further averred by the defendants that after disciplinary
enquiry Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati has also been dismissed from service.
It was further averred that plaintiff was charged for his negligence
and dereliction of duties towards the Bank and because the plaintiff
6

was negligent, the fraud was perpetuated in the Branch, during his
tenure as Branch Manager. It was further averred that the plaintiff
was given full opportunity to defend himself in the enquiry
proceedings in which chargesheet was given to him, and thereafter,
final order of dismissal was passed. It was further averred that the
plaintiff has not pointed out any procedural irregularity in the
disciplinary proceedings conducted by the defendant Bank, and has
only pressed upon the factual aspects of the matter, which have
already been dealt with in the enquiry proceedings, hence the
dismissal as well as the appellate orders, does not warrant any
interference by this Court. It was further averred that Mr. Neeraj
Verma was also punished in the disciplinary enquiry.
23. It was further averred by the defendants that the relief of re-
instatement in service cannot be granted by the Court. Further, the
order of dismissal from service cannot be challenged by way of civil
suit. It was further averred that the plaintiff was suspended on
30.9.2013, a chargesheet was served on him on 18.2.2014 for breach
of the Executive Staff Service Rules,1994 and the Code of Conduct,
as applicable to him. It was further averred that the appeal preferred
by the plaintiff before the Appellate Authority was dismissed by a
reasoned order on 8.10.2014. It was averred by the defendants that no
illegality has been committed by the Bank in dismissing the plaintiff,
in view of this, the suit was liable to be dismissed with costs.
Issues framed by the trial court
24. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed
the following issues:-
“(i)Whether the plaintiff had been unlawfully suspended from service by
the defendants ?
(ii)Whether the plaintiff suffered any economic loss due to unlawful and
arbitrary act of defendant no.1 ?
(iii)Whether the suit is under valued ?
(iv)Whether the court fees paid by the plaintiff is insufficient ?
(v)Whether the court has jurisdiction to try the suit ?
(vi)Whether any cause of action has arisen to the plaintiff ?
(vii)Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed by him ?”
25. It is evident from the record of the trial court that the plaintiff
examined himself as PW-1 before the trial court, but he was not
cross-examined by the defendants, inspite of numerous opportunities
provided by the trial court, as such, the opportunity of the defendants
to cross-examine plaintiff was closed on 29.10.2021. No further
evidence was adduced by the plaintiff. The case was proceeded ex-
parte against the defendants on 11.11.2022 and after the closure of
plaintiffs evidence, the case was fixed for hearing ex-parte arguments,
7

the arguments of the plaintiff were heard on 04.7.2023 and thereafter,
the suit was dismissed on 10.7.2023.
Reasoning of the trial court
26. The trial court considered Section 9 and Order 39 Rule 2(2) CPC,
as well as the amendment made by Section 13 of the Uttar Pradesh
Act 57 of 1976, and from their combined reading, concluded that the
trial court lacked inherent jurisdiction to try the suit since the plaintiff
was seeking the relief of declaration and mandatory injunction against
the order of termination of service, which was specifically barred by
Section 13 of the Uttar Pradesh Act 57 of 1976. In the light of the
above conclusion, issue no. 5 relating to jurisdiction was decided
against the plaintiff. The trial court did not examine the controversy
on merit. The plaintiff 's suit was dismissed on the ground of being
barred by jurisdiction, aggrieved against which, the plaintiff has filed
the instant appeal under Section 96 of the CPC.
Submissions made by the learned counsel of the parties
27. Sri Anshul Kumar Singhal learned counsel for the plaintiff
appellant submitted that the defendant IndusInd Bank is a private
bank, which is not owned by the Government, the employees of
which are not governed by any statutory rules, but only governed by
the private rules and Code of Conduct framed by the Bank. It was
further submitted that the Bank does not fall in the definition of State
or other authorities, so as to attract the provisions of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, as such, the Bank is not amenable to Writ
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Courts, meaning thereby, that the
employee cannot challenge his illegal dismissal from service by
invoking the Writ jurisdiction of the Constitutional Courts. It was
further submitted by the learned counsel that the plaintiffs service
was not governed by any statutory rules but by Executive Staff
Service Rules,1994 of the defendant Bank and the plaintiff was also
bound by the Code of Conduct applicable to him.
28. It was further submitted that since the plaintiff appellant has
exhausted the departmental remedy of Appeal provided by the
defendant Bank, as such, since no other remedy was available to him,
hence, he can very well challenge his illegal termination from the
service of the Bank by filing the instant suit, and can also claim the
relief that his illegal termination from service be set aside, he be
reinstated in service and he be also paid back wages for the illegal
duration of termination. Learned counsel further submitted that the
plaintiff can also claim damages for his illegal termination from the
defendants.
8

29. It was further submitted that the provisions of Section 13 of
U.P.Act 57 of 1976, were inapplicable and the trial court has misread
the above provision. It was further submitted that the jurisdiction of
civil court was not barred in this matter, as such the trial court has
committed material illegality in rejecting the plaintiff 's suit on this
ground, which is liable to be set aside. With these submissions, it was
prayed that the appeal be allowed, the impugned order be set aside
and the matter be remanded back to the trial court for deciding it on
merits. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied on
the following case law :-
“(i)Shivdhesar Singh vs.Union of India 2010 SCC OnLine All 1820.
(ii)Ramendra Kishore Biswas vs.State of Tripura and ors.
(1999)1SCC472(By 3 Judges).
(iii)Saurabh Kumar Pandey vs. Reserve Bank of India and ors.Writ 'A'
no.7140 of 2021 decided on 01.10.2021 by Allahabad High Court.
(iv)Dhruv Green Field Ltd. vs.Hukum Singh and others AIR 2002 SC
2841.
(v)Sitaram Kashiram Konda vs.Pigment Cakes &Chemicals Mfg.Co.
(1979)4SCC 12.”
30. Per contra,Sri Saurabh Raj Srivastava learned counsel for the
defendant respondent Bank submitted that the plaintiff committed
certain serious lapses during his tenure as Branch Manager of the
Allahabad Branch of the defendant Bank, due to which the bank
suffered financial loss of 41 lakhs and the reputation of the Bank ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
was also tarnished, for which disciplinary enquiry was conducted as
per the rules and regulations of the bank against responsible
employees, by following the principles of natural justice and
affording full opportunity to the plaintiff to submit his defence, in
which he was found guilty, as a result of which, he was dismissed
from the services of the Bank, which was challenged by the plaintiff
by filing appeal, which was also dismissed on merits by the Bank.
31. Learned counsel further submitted that the dismissal of the
plaintiff has attained finality, which neither can be set aside by the
civil court nor it can order plaintiffs reinstatement in the service of
the defendant Bank. It was further submitted that at the most,if the
plaintiffs termination was found illegal by the Court, it can only
award damages to the plaintiff for his illegal termination, but the
plaintiff has not claimed any damages as such, even the damages
cannot be awarded to the plaintiff.
32. It was further submitted that the plaintiff has sought the relief of
declaration that his termination from the service of the Bank was
illegal,the relief of permanent injunction for restraining the Bank
from terminating him from the service of the Bank,back wages with
interest and all employment benefits and mandatory injunction for
9

his reinstatment with full back wages and employment benefits,
which cannot be granted by the Court. It was further submitted that
since the plaintiff has already been terminated from the service of the
Bank as such, the relief of permanent injunction cannot be granted to
the plaintiff. With these submissions, it was prayed that the appeal is
meritless and is liable to be rejected. Learned counsel has relied upon
the decision of the Apex Court in State Bank of India and ors. vs.
S.N.Goyal (2008)8 SCC 92.
33. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned judgment and the record of the trial court. Appeal is
admitted.
34. The following issues arises for determination in this appeal :-
“(A)Whether the civil court lacked inherent jurisdiction to examine
whether plaintiffs termination from the service of the defendant Bank
was illegal ?
(B)What relief could have been granted by the Court to the plaintiff in
the suit?”
Analysis of case law submitted by the learned counsel
35. This Court in the case of Shivdhesar Singh (supra) was
considering a case where the services of Constable employed in the
Central Reserve Police Force was terminated and he had challenged it
by filing civil suit. It was contended by the respondents that an
alternative remedy under the Central Administrative Tribunal Act was
available to the plaintiff, as such, the suit was not legally
maintainable, but the submission was rejected by this Court, on the
ground that, the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court in view
of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act or even on account of the fact
that the Central Reserve Police Force Act provides for a complete
mechanism for redressal of the grievance of the plaintiff appellant,
cannot be inferred. It was further held that where the relevant service
rules neither expressly nor by implication takes away, the jurisdiction
of the civil court to deal with the service matter, it was not proper to
hold that the civil court had no jurisdiction.
36. The Apex Court in the case of Ramendra Kishore Biswas (supra)
was considering a case where the employee of the Central
Government had challenged his dismissal from service as void and
illegal and had filed civil suit claiming reinstatement. The High Court
held that under Rule 24 of the CCS(CCA)Rules,1965 the jurisdiction
of the civil court was barred, and only in the writ petition the
termination order could have been challenged. In these
circumstances,it was held by the Apex Court as under:-
10

“5. The opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge to the effect that
in view of the CCA Rules, the jurisdiction of the civil court is ousted
from dealing with an order passed by the disciplinary authority which
can be questioned under the Service Rules and that even after recourse is
had to the departmental proceedings, recourse can only be to file a writ
petition is palpably erroneous. The learned Single Judge readily accepted
the ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts to deal with service matters
without proper consideration of the matter. Indeed, it is appropriate to
relegate a person to exhaust departmental remedies when he approaches
the court without exhausting departmental remedies under the Service
Rules but to hold that the civil court had no jurisdiction while hearing a
second appeal, after the matter has been litigated in civil courts for more
than five years was, to say the least, not proper. The learned Single
Judge ought to have decided the case on its own merits and not made a
short-cut of it. The appellant could not have been non-suited on the
ground that he had failed to take recourse to proceedings under the CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965 against the order of dismissal.
6. Again the opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge to the effect:
“It is my firm conviction that in the present case, the civil court cannot
make a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 as
its jurisdiction has been taken away by the special rules, i.e., the CCS
(CCA) Rules, 1965. Under the circumstances, it means a civil court does
not have jurisdiction in respect of matters which are entertained and
decided by the statutory tribunal in conformity with the powers
conferred by the enactment.”
is clearly erroneous and cannot be sustained. Service Rules, neither
expressly nor by implication, have taken away the jurisdiction of the
civil courts to deal with service matters. The opinion of the learned
Single Judge does violence both to the Code of Civil Procedure, the
Specific Relief Act and the Service Rules. As a matter of fact it appears
to us that the learned Single Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction
vested in him while non-suiting the appellant. It, therefore, appears
appropriate to us to allow this appeal, set aside the order of the learned
Single Judge and remit the matter to the High Court for a fresh decision
of the regular second appeal and the cross-objections on their own
merits. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The RSA and
cross-objections are remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal on
merits in accordance with law.”
37. This Court in Saurabh Kumar Pandey (supra) was considering a
case where the service of an employee of IndusInd Bank Ltd. was
terminated, and the employee challenged the termination order by
filing writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The
learned counsel of the Bank had specifically submitted that writ
petition against the employer, a private Bank, was not maintainable
since the service contract of a private bank employee cannot be
enforced in writ jurisdiction. This Court after considering the various
precedents of the Apex Court, held as under:-
“6.It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner that
respondent bank is a private sector Bank duly incorporated and having
licence under Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Reserve Bank of India is
11

entrusted with the full responsibility for supervising and regulating the
banks, including, private banks. Under Section 22 of the Act, 1949,
private banks are required to obtain license from RBI to carry out the
banking business in India. On specific query, learned counsel for
petitioner is unable to show that service conditions of the petitioner is
governed under any statutory Rules applicable to the employees of a
private bank.
7.The private banks would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction for breach
of any of the statutory provision under which it is incorporated or bound
to be governed, but the services of the employee of a private bank is
contractual and governed as per the Rules framed by the Bank/employer.
In the instant case, petitioner is governed by Discipline and Appeal Rules,
and the Code of Conduct, as applicable on the employees of the Bank.
8. Whether a private company engaged in banking business performs
public function, in other words, does banking business as a scheduled
bank involve public law element was considered by the Supreme Court in
Federal Bank Ltd vs. Sagar Thomas and others (2003)10 SCC 733, the
Court held that a private company carrying on banking business as a
scheduled bank, cannot be termed as an institution or company carrying
on any statutory or public function. A private body or a person may be
amenable to writ jurisdiction only where it may become necessary to
compel such body or association to enforce any statutory obligations or
such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. The
statutory provisions governing a private bank is merely regulatory. To put
it differently a company engaged in banking business is not required to
perform public function, nor essential governmental function is placed
upon it.
*
14. The private bank, as held in Federal Bank Ltd.(supra) is not imparting
public duty. Even if it is assumed that a private bank is imparting public
duty, the act complained of must have direct nexus with the discharge of
public duty. It is undisputedly a public law action which confers a right
upon the aggrieved to invoke extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article
226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breach of mutual
contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be
rectified through petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have
intervened in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service
conditions were regulated by statutory provisions or the employer had the
status of 'State' within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was
found that the action complained of has public law element.
15. On specific query, learned counsel for the petitioner does not dispute
that the conditions of service governing the petitioner are not statutory.
The terms and conditions of employment are purely contractual governed
under rules framed by the Bank.
16. In view thereof, the preliminary objection raised by learned counsel
for the respondent that the writ petition against the impugned termination
order would not lie within the domain of writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India is sustained and upheld.''
38. The Apex Court in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. (supra)
12

was considering the jurisdiction of the civil courts and when it can be
barred. It was held as under:-
“8. The jurisdiction of the courts to try all suits of civil nature is very
expansive as is evident from the plain language of Section 9 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. This is because of the principle ubi jus ibi
remedium . It is only where cognizance of a specified type of suit is
barred by a statute either expressly or impliedly that the jurisdiction of
the civil court would be ousted to entertain such a suit. The general
principle is that a statute excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts should
be construed strictly.
9. The question, when and in what circumstances, can a suit of civil
nature be said to be barred by a special statute, is no longer res integra.
In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [AIR 1965 SC 1942] a seven-
Judge Bench of this Court laid down the principle thus:
“The question about the exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil courts
either expressly or by necessary implication must be considered, in
every case, in the light of the words used in the statutory provision on
which the plea is rested, the scheme of the relevant provisions, their
object and their purpose.
Whenever a plea is raised before a civil court that its jurisdiction is
excluded either expressly or by necessary implication to entertain claims
of a civil nature, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether
the remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by a special
statute is sufficient or adequate. Where the exclusion of the civil court's
jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme
of the statute in question and the adequacy or the sufficiency of remedies
provided for by it may be relevant, it cannot, however, be decisive.
But when exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication, such
considerations would be very important, and, in conceivable
circumstances, might even become decisive. If a statute creates a special
right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right and
liability to be dealt with by tribunals specially constituted in that behalf,
and it further lays down that all questions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, it is pertinent
to enquire whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil
courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.”
That judgment was followed in Ram Swarup v. Shikar Chand [AIR 1966
SC 893 : (1966) 2 SCR 553 (sub nom Lala Ram Swarup v. Shikar
Chand)]. There Gajendragadkar, C.J. speaking for a Constitution Bench
of this Court formulated the following tests:
“The two tests, which are often considered relevant in dealing with the
question about the exclusion of civil courts' jurisdiction are (a) whether
the special statute which excludes such jurisdiction has used clear and
unambiguous words indicating that intention; and (b) does that statute
provide for an adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party
that may be aggrieved by the relevant order under its material
provisions. Applying these tests the inference is inescapable that the
13

jurisdiction of the civil courts is intended to be excluded.
The bar excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts cannot operate in cases
where the plea raised before the civil court goes to the root of the matter
and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a
nullity.”
10. In the light of the above discussion, the following principles may be
restated:
(1) If there is express provision in any special Act barring the
jurisdiction of a civil court to deal with matters specified thereunder the
jurisdiction of an ordinary civil court shall stand excluded.
(2) If there is no express provision in the Act but an examination of the
provisions contained therein leads to a conclusion in regard to exclusion
of jurisdiction of a civil court, the court would then inquire whether any
adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is provided under the Act; if
the answer is in the affirmative, it can safely be concluded that the
jurisdiction of the civil court is barred. If, however, no such adequate
and effective alternative remedy is provided then exclusion of the
jurisdiction of the civil court cannot be inferred.
(3) Even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil court is barred
expressly or impliedly, the court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction
to entertain and adjudicate the suit provided the order complained of is a
nullity.”
39. The Apex Court in the case of Sitaram Kashiram Konda (supra)
was considering a case where the plaintiff instituted a suit against
employer claiming various reliefs, including a declaration that he had
been removed from service illegally, asking for reinstatement and in
the alternative compensation. The trial court dismissed the suit,
holding that it had no jurisdiction to try as the dispute was in the
nature of an industrial dispute. The 1st Appellate Court allowed the
plaintiff's appeal, holding that the dispute raised was of a civil nature.
In the 2nd appeal filed by the defendant employer the High Court
upheld the view of the trial court and held that the plaintiff had not
claimed damages by pleading wrongful dismissal in breach of
contract of service. The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court by
certificate. Allowing the appeal and remanding the matter to the trial
court for decision in the light of the Courts judgment, it was held:-
“3. The Court is obliged to Mr K. Jayaram for assisting it as amicus
curiae in this case. After having appreciated the entire facts and the
circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it is not quite
correct to say that the suit filed by the appellant is not maintainable at all
in a civil court. The correct position of law is that the main reliefs asked
for by him which when granted will amount to specific performance of
the contract of service and therefore they cannot be granted. There are a
number of decisions of this Court to that effect; to wit — S.B. Dutt (Dr)
v. University of Delhi [AIR 1958 SC 1050 : 1959 SCR 1236 : 1959 SCJ
14

78] ; S.R. Tiwari v. District Board Agra [AIR 1964 SC 1680 : (1964) 3
SCR 55 : (1964) 1 LLJ 1] and Indian Airlines Corporation v. Sukhdeo
Rai [(1971) 2 SCC 192 : 1971 SCR (Supp) 510 : AIR 1971 SC 1828 :
(1971) 1 LLJ 557] . Reference may also be made in this connection to
the decision of this Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamleker
Shantaram Wadke [(1976) 1 SCC 496 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 70 : (1976) 1
SCR 427 : (1975) 2 LLJ 445] .
4. But then in the alternative, the appellant had also prayed for awarding
compensation to him. And reading the plaint as a whole, it can
legitimately be culled out that he had made out a case, whether it was
right on facts or not, that is a different question, that he was wrongfully
dismissed from service. This relief could be granted by the civil court if
it found that the plaintiff's case was true. The High Court, in our opinion,
is not right in saying that no such case had at all been made out in the
plaint. In our opinion, as we have earlier said, reading the plaint as a
whole, such case can be spelt out. That being so to this limited extent,
the matter could be examined by the civil court.”
40. The Apex Court in the case of S.N.Goyal (supra) was considering
a case where the respondent employee of the Bank was dismissed
from the service of the Bank after holding disciplinary enquiry under
the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, which was challenged
by the employee by filing civil suit. It was held as under :-
“17. Where the relationship of master and servant is purely contractual, it
is well settled that a contract of personal service is not specifically
enforceable, having regard to the bar contained in Section 14 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. Even if the termination of the contract of
employment (by dismissal or otherwise) is found to be illegal or in
breach, the remedy of the employee is only to seek damages and not
specific performance. Courts will neither declare such termination to be a
nullity nor declare that the contract of employment subsists nor grant the
consequential relief of reinstatement. The three well-recognised
exceptions to this rule are:
(i) where a civil servant is removed from service in contravention of the
provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India (or any law made
under Article 309);
(ii) where a workman having the protection of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 is wrongly terminated from service; and
(iii) where an employee of a statutory body is terminated from service in
breach or violation of any mandatory provision of a statute or statutory
rules.
There is thus a clear distinction between public employment governed by
statutory rules and private employment governed purely by contract. The
test for deciding the nature of relief—damages or reinstatement with
consequential reliefs—is whether the employment is governed purely by
contract or by a statute or statutory rules. Even where the employer is a
statutory body, where the relationship is purely governed by contract with
no element of statutory governance, the contract of personal service will
not be specifically enforceable. Conversely, where the employer is a non-
15

statutory body, but the employment is governed by a statute or statutory
rules, a declaration that the termination is null and void and that the
employee should be reinstated can be granted by courts. (Vide S.B. Dutt
(Dr.) v. University of Delhi [AIR 1958 SC 1050] , U.P. Warehousing
Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi [(1969) 2 SCC 838 : (1970) 2 SCR 250] ,
Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis [(1973) 1 SCC 409 :
1973 SCC (L&S) 207 : (1973) 3 SCR 348] , Vaish Degree College v.
Lakshmi Narain [(1976) 2 SCC 58 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 176 : (1976) 2
SCR 1006] , J. Tiwari v. Jwala Devi Vidya Mandir [(1979) 4 SCC 160 :
1979 SCC (L&S) 356 : AIR 1981 SC 122] and Dipak Kumar Biswas v.
Director of Public Instruction [(1987) 2 SCC 252 : (1987) 3 ATC 505 :
AIR 1987 SC 1422] .)
18. In this case the appellant is a statutory body established under the
State Bank of India Act, 1955 and the contract of employment was
governed by the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, which are
statutory rules framed under Section 43(1) of the said Act. The
respondent approached the civil court alleging that his removal from
service was in violation of the said statutory rules. When an employee of
a statutory body whose service is terminated pleads that such termination
is in violation of statutory rules governing his employment, an action for
declaration that the termination is invalid and that he is deemed to
continue in service is maintainable and will not be barred by Section 14
of the Specific Relief Act.”
41. The Apex Court in the case of Kailash Singh vs. Managing
Committee, Mayo College, Ajmer and Others (2018) 18 SCC 216
where in respect of dispute related to termination of an employee of
Mayo College, Court held that employment was governed by simple
contract of employment and, hence, no relief of reinstatement can be
granted, but employee, if wrongfully terminated, may claim damages.
It is quoted as under:-
“22. We may refer to Vidya Ram Misra v. Shri Jai Narain College [Vidya
Ram Misra v. Shri Jai Narain College, (1972) 1 SCC 623] , where in para
4, it was observed as under: (SCC pp. 624-25)
“4. It is well settled that, when there is a purported termination of a
contract of service, a declaration that the contract of service still subsisted
would not be made in the absence of special circumstances, because of
the principle that courts do not ordinarily enforce specific performance of
contracts of service (see U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra KiranTyagi
[U.P. Warehousing Corpn. v. Chandra Kiran Tyagi, (1969) 2 SCC 838]
and Indian Airlines Corpn. v. Sukhdeo Rai [Indian Airlines Corpn. v.
Sukhdeo Rai, (1971) 2 SCC 192] ). If the master rightfully ends the
contract, there can be no complaint. If the master wrongfully ends the
contract, then the servant can pursue a claim for damages. So even if the
master wrongfully dismisses the servant in breach of the contract, the
employment is effectively terminated. In Ridge v. Baldwin [Ridge v.
Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR 935 (HL)] Lord Reid said in his
speech: (Ridge case [Ridge v. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR 935
(HL)] , WLR p. 940)
16

‘The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be
specific performance of a contract of service and the master can terminate
the contract with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none.
But if he does so in a manner not warranted by the contract he must pay
damages for breach of contract. So the question in a pure case of master
and servant does not at all depend on whether the master has heard the
servant in his own defence: it depends on whether the facts emerging at
the trial prove breach of contract. But this kind of case can resemble
dismissal from an office where the body employing the man is under
some statutory or other restriction as to the kind of contract which it can
make with its servants, or the grounds on which it can dismiss them.’”
23. The aforesaid view is also adopted by the Constitution Bench in Sirsi
Municipality v. Cecelia Kom Francis Tellis [Sirsi Municipality v. Cecelia
Kom Francis Tellis, (1973) 1 SCC 409 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 207] . We may
usefully extract the observations in the following paras: (SCC p. 413,
paras 15-19)
“15. The cases of dismissal of a servant fall under three broad heads. The
first head relates to relationship of master and servant governed purely by
contract of employment. Any breach of contract in such a case is enforced
by a suit for wrongful dismissal and damages. Just as a contract of
employment is not capable of specific performance similarly breach of
contract of employment is not capable of finding a declaratory judgment
of subsistence of employment. A declaration of unlawful termination and
restoration to service in such a case of contract of employment would be
indirectly an instance of specific performance of contract for personal
services. Such a declaration is not permissible under the Law of Specific
Relief Act.
16. The second type of cases of master and servant arises under Industrial
Law. Under that branch of law a servant who is wrongfully dismissed
may be reinstated. This is a special provision under Industrial Law. This
relief is a departure from the reliefs available under the Indian Contract
Act and the Specific Relief Act which do not provide for reinstatement of
a servant.
17. The third category of cases of master and servant arises in regard to
the servant in the employment of the State or of other public or local
authorities or bodies created under statute.
18. Termination or dismissal of what is described as a pure contract of
master and servant is not declared to be a nullity however wrongful or
illegal it may be. The reason is that dismissal in breach of contract is
remedied by damages. It (sic.) [ To be read as “In”.] the case of servant of
the State or of local authorities or statutory bodies, courts have declared
in appropriate cases the dismissal to be invalid if the dismissal is contrary
to rules of natural justice or if the dismissal is in violation of the
provisions of the statute. Apart from the intervention of statute there
would not be a declaration of nullity in the case of termination or
dismissal of a servant of the State or of other local authorities or statutory
bodies.
19. The courts keep the State and the public authorities within the limits
of their statutory powers. Where a State or a public authority dismisses an
17

employee in violation of the mandatory procedural requirements or on
grounds which are not sanctioned or supported by statute the courts may
exercise jurisdiction to declare the act of dismissal to be a nullity. Such
implication of public employment is thus distinguished from private
employment in pure cases of master and servant.”
24. The facts of the present case are covered by the master-servant
relationship i.e. the first category. There is no adjudication by invocation
of a reference to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Thus, the remedy
would only be in damages.”
Conclusion of this Court
42. From the above law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of
Dhruv Green Field Ltd. (supra), Ramendra Kishore Biswas (supra)
and this Court in Shivdhesar Singh (supra) it is apparent that there
should be express provision in any Act barring the jurisdiction of the
civil court and even if there is a express bar in any Act, but no
adequate and efficacious remedy is provided, then exclusion of the
jurisdiction of civil court cannot be inferred. From the law laid down
by this Court in the case of Saurabh Kumar Pandey (supra) it is
evident that where the terms and conditions of service governing the
petitioner are not statutory, but are purely contractual governed under
the Rules framed by a private Bank, the employee of the Bank cannot
challenge his termination by filing Writ Petition under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.
43. From the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Sitaram
Kashiram Konda (supra), S.N.Goyal (supra) and Kailash Singh
(supra) it is evident that when the service conditions of the employee
are not governed by statutory rules and the employer does not fall
within the category of 'State' as defined in Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, if an employee is terminated by the employer
after conducting disciplinary proceedings, the employee cannot claim
the relief of reinstatement. The employee can only show that his
termination from service was illegal, against Rules and principles of
natural justice, where due procedure as prescribed was not followed,
he was not provided with due opportunity of hearing, which has
caused him grave prejudice, and if, the contention of the employee is
upheld by the Court, that he was wrongfully dismissed from service,
in that situation, the Court can only grant him damages for his illegal
termination but the Court cannot reinstate him. In such situation, the
employee cannot specifically enforce his contract of personal service,
which is barred under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act.
44. It is apparent that the above law is not applicable on a civil
servant who is removed from service in contravention of the
provisions of Article 311 or any law made under Article 309 of the
18

Constitution of India. Similarly, it is also not applicable where a
workman covered under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 and an employee of a statutory body is terminated from service
in breach or violation of any mandatory provision of a statute or
statutory rules. It is further apparent that even where the employer is a
statutory body, but the relationship is purely governed by contract
with no element of statutory governance, the contract of personal
service will not be specifically enforceable.
45. It is apparent that in the instant case the plaintiff was posted as
Branch Manager of the Allahabad Branch of the defendant Bank,
then, according to the Bank, due to his lax supervision a fraud of ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
41 lakhs was committed by an employee Mrs. Suchitra Prajapati,
who was subordinate of the plaintiff, for which he was initially
suspended on 30.9.2013, thereafter, as per the Executive Staff Service
Rules,1994 of the Bank and the Code of Conduct applicable on the
plaintiff, charges were framed against him and in the disciplinary
enquiry he was found guilty and accordingly, he was dismissed from
service by defendant No. 2 on 19.5.2014, which was challenged by
plaintiff by filing Appeal, as provided under the above Rules of the
Bank, which was also dismissed by defendant No. 3 on 08.10.2014,
and thereafter, the plaintiff has challenged his above dismissal by
filing the instant suit, in which, he has claimed the following reliefs:-
“(A) Pass a decree of declaration to the effect that the Appellate order
dated 8.10.2014 passed by defendant no. 3 and order dated 19.5.2014
passed by defendant no. 2 is illegal and is nullity;
(B) Pass a decree of permanent injunction against the defendant no.1
Bank injuncting the defendant No.1 Bank to terminate the plaintiff;
(C)Pass a decree of declaration to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled
to his back wages with interest and all employment benefits;
(D)Pass a decree of mandatory injunction directing defendant No. 1
Bank to reinstate the plaintiff forthwith with full back wages and
employment benefits;
(E)Award cost of the suit in favour of plaintiff and against the
defendants;
(F)Pass any such order as this Hon'ble Court deems fit proper in the
facts and circumstances of the present case.”
46. It is apparent that the defendant Bank, is a private Bank, and the
plaintiffs employment was purely contractual, which is apparent from
the letter of offer filed by the plaintiff, which was governed by the
Executive Staff Service Rules,1994 of the Bank and the plaintiff was
bound by the Code of Conduct applicable on him, which are not
statutory. Neither the defendants fall in the definition of 'State' as
mentioned in Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor the service
conditions of the plaintiff were governed by the statutory rules. It is
further apparent that the provisions of Article 309 and 311 of the
Constitution of India and the Labour Laws were not applicable on the
19

plaintiff. There is no express provision in any contract or Rule, which
bars the remedy of civil suit to the plaintiff. It is apparent that in the
above circumstances, the plaintiff could not have challenged his
dismissal by filing Writ Petition before the Constitutional Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India or by filing petition before the
Service Tribunals, which was available to the employees of the
Central or State Government. It is apparent that the plaintiff could
have only approached one judicial forum to redress his grievance,
where he could have challenged his alleged illegal dismissal by the
Bank, which was the Civil Court.
47. Order 39 Rule 2(2) CPC has been amended in the State of U.P.
vide Section 13 of U.P.Act No. 57 of 1976, w.e.f. 1.1.1977, whereby
the following proviso has been inserted, which reads as under:-
''Provided that no such injunction shall be granted –
(a) where no perpetual injunction could be granted in view of the
provisions of Section 38 and Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act,1963,
(Act47of1963),or
(b) to stay the operation of an order for transfer, suspension, reduction
in rank, compulsory retirement, dismissal, removal or otherwise
termination of service of, or taking charge from, any employee
including any employee of the Government, or
(c)to stay, any disciplinary proceeding pending or intended or, the effect
of any adverse entry, against any employee of the Government, or

and any order for injunction granted in contravention of these
provisions shall be void.......''
48. It is apparent from the impugned judgment that the trial court has
considered the above Proviso of Order 39 Rule 2(2) CPC and
concluded that the relief of declaration and mandatory injunction
against the order of termination of service is specifically barred in the
State of Uttar Pradesh by the above amending Act, as such, the trial
court does not have the jurisdiction to try the suit.
49. In the light of the above discussion, it is true that the civil court
cannot grant any relief of permanent and mandatory injunction in this
matter but the plaintiff can show that his dismissal by the defendant
Bank was wrong and he can also claim damages for his wrongful
dismissal from the Bank. It is true that he cannot be reinstated in the
service of the defendant Bank and his only remedy is to claim
damages from the Bank, for which, the civil court has the jurisdiction.
In view of this, the civil court had the jurisdiction for examining the
above facts and for awarding the relief of damages, as such, the trial
court has erred by concluding that the civil court lacked inherent
jurisdiction in this matter.
50. From the perusal of the plaint it is evident that the plaintiff has not
20

claimed damages from the defendants, but has claimed back wages
with interest and all consequential employment benefits. From the
perusal of the record of the lower court, it is evident that the plaintiff
moved an amendment application 37-A under Order VI Rule 17 CPC
on 28.7.2022 claiming decree for damages @ 5,000/- per month ₹ 5 lakhs on account of
from 19.5.2014 till the date of filing of the suit, pendentilite and
future till realisation, against which no objection has been filed by the
defendants, which remained undisposed by the trial court, till the suit
was dismissed on 10.7.2023, which shows the carelessness of the trial
court. It is further apparent that under Section 40 of the Specific
Relief Act,1963, the plaintiff can always demand damages in lieu of,
or in addition to, injunction and such amendment can be allowed by
the Court at any stage of the proceedings.
51. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned judgment and decree
passed by the trial court is erroneous and legally unsustainable, which
is liable to be set aside. Consequently, the appeal deserves to be
allowed with costs.
52. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The
impugned judgment and decree dated 10.7.2023 is set aside and
consequently, O.S.no.180 of 2015 stands restored on its original
number. The finding of trial court on issue no. 5 is set aside and it is
held that the trial court has jurisdiction to try the suit.
53. The trial court is directed to decide the suit expeditiously
preferably within a period of 6(six) months from the date a certified
copy of this order is received by it, without affording unnecessary
adjournment to either of the parties, on merits, in accordance with
law.
54. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion as to
the legality of the dismissal of the plaintiff by the defendant Bank.
The trial court is at liberty to arrive at a just conclusion on the basis
of pleadings and evidence on record, in accordance with law.
55. Office is directed to send back the record of the trial court,
forthwith.
Order Date:- 07.04.2026
Jitendra/Himanshu/Mayank
(Sandeep Jain, J.)

21
Digitally signed by :-
HIMANSHU YADAV
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad