M/S. Levitate Mobile Technologies Pvt. Ltd. vs M/S. Standard Chartered Bank
- Court
- Supreme Court
2026 INSC 674
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. __________________ OF 2026
(Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 13250 of 2026)
M/S. LEVITATE MOBILE
TECHNOLOGIES PVT. LTD. … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M/S. STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Leave granted.
THE APPEAL
1 2
2. The appellant was approached by respondent for the purposes of developing
Signature Not Verified
and managing a mobile application, commonly known as an ‘ app’ . An IT
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
Date: 2026.07.09
12:29:09 IST
Reason:
1
LMT
2
SCB
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Professional Services Agreement was entered into, to that effect on 19 February
2013. The process therefor was undertaken allegedly in earnest, and hours of
laborious effort was put in, culminating in the app being launched across the Android
and iOS systems. Shortly, thereafter, however, the SCB instructed LMT to take down
the said app . This was the beginning of the dispute. Since the Agreement housed a
revenue sharing clause, the latter alleged losses and set the legal process afoot by
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sending a legal notice dated 15 April 2015, asking SCB to pay Rs. 4,46,50,000
along with interest at 18% p.a. Such a claim was denied, leading to the filing of Civil
Suit (OS) No.1705 of 2015 before the High Court of Delhi. Parties completed the
pleadings by filing written statement(s) and replication thereto. Issues were framed
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on 16 November 2016. Thereafter, LMT filed an application seeking to place on
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record additional documents, which was allowed on 30 January 2018. On the same
day, an order was passed renumbering the suit as CS(Comm.) 169 of 2018.
2.1 After some other proceedings, the evidence of one Sunil Jasuja
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who was examined as PW-1 was completed on 9 May 2023.
2.2 LMT sought to file another application being IA No. 24359 of
2023 to bring on record additional documents and recall PW-1 as a witness
for examination. What was sought to be brought on record was (i) e-mails
exchanged between LMT and SCB; (ii) the copy of the agreements entered
into between the LMT and other vendors; and (iii) backend data stored in
servers.
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2.3 The learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 12 February
2025 rejected this application, applying the ‘ reasonable cause ’ test,
holding that there was no reason whatsoever, explained in any manner for
the delay in filing this application. LMT slept over the documents and
sought to produce the same, as mentioned in the application, to fill in the
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gaps in the evidence of PW-1. It was then concluded that allowing the
application would be against the objective of the Commercial Courts Act,
3
2015 .
3. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel appeared for LMT.
Mr. Sanjay Gupta, and Mr. Ateev Mathur, learned counsel represented SCB.
Heard. Perused and considered the written arguments of the parties.
4. What we are required to adjudicate is whether LMT’s prayer denied by the
High Court is in accordance with law.
UNDERSTANDING THE COMMERCIAL COURTS ACT
5. Disputes of this nature, obviously civil, are governed by the Civil Procedure
4
Code, 1908 . Various timelines have been mentioned therein for the procedure of
civil suits. Section 34, CPC describes what a commercial suit is, saying as follows:
34… … … …
Explanation II.—For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a
commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or
business of the party incurring the liability.]
6. The recognition that, in view of the changing landscape of business, the law
must adapt, is more than two decades old now. Under the chairmanship of M.
Jagannadha Rao J., a former Judge of this Court, the Law Commission, in 2003,
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back in 2003 vide its 188 Report, proposed the setting up of Commercial Divisions
in the High Courts. Pursuant thereto, a bill by the name of Commercial Division of
3
CCA
4
CPC
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the High Court Bill, 2009 was introduced. In 2015, the Law Commission once again
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took up this issue and the 253 Report under A.P Shah, CJ (Retd.), was presented in
2015, setting up the enactment of CCA.
7. We are now discussing the Scheme of CCA, which consists of 7 Chapters, 23
Sections and 1 Schedule. It is an Act providing for the constitution of commercial
courts, commercial divisions and commercial appellate divisions in the High Courts
specifically to deal with commercial disputes of specified value. A commercial
dispute is defined under Section 2(1)(c). Specified value is defined in Section 2(1)(i).
Chapter II, Sections 3 to 11, provides for constitution of these Courts, their
jurisdiction, bar against exercise of revisional powers in connection with
interlocutory orders. Chapter III discusses determination of specified value and
Chapter III-A provides for pre-institution mediation and settlement. Chapter IV and
V deal with appeals and transfer of pending suits, respectively. Chapter VI, in
furtherance of the objective, provides for amendment in CPC, in as much as they
apply to commercial suits. The schedule appended thereto deals with these specific
amendments viz., disclosure and discovery of documents; summary judgments; case
management hearings etc. A perusal of the provisions of this Act clearly indicates
the underlying intention of expediency in deciding commercial disputes. Following
is a table of examples:
STAGE PERIOD SECTION NATURE
Pre-institution
mediation
3 months, extendable
by 2 months (with
consent of the
parties)
S.12A
Ins. by s. 11, Act 28
of 2018, (w.e.f. 3-5-
2018).
Mandatory
precondition (subject
to “urgent interim
relief”)
Limitation of filing
suit
Period spent in pre-
institution mediation
is excluded
S.12A(3)
Ins. by s. 11, Act 28
of 2018, (w.e.f. 3-5-
2018).
-
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Filing of written
statement
30 days - 120 days
from service
Order VIII, Rule 1
CPC (Schedule)
Mandatory; right to
file forfeited beyond
120 days.
Appeal from
decree/order
60 days from
judgement/ order
S.13(1A) -
Disposal of appeal 6 months from filing S.14 -
Pronouncement of
judgment
90 days from
conclusion of
arguments
Order XX, Rule 1
CPC (Schedule)
-
If plaintiff seeks to
rely on additional
documents
Additional
documents shall be
filed in court within
thirty days of filing
the suit
Order XI, Rule 1 (4)
CPC (schedule)
-
Inspection of all
documents by parties
Within thirty days of
the date of filing of
the written statement
or written statement
to the counterclaim,
whichever is later
Order XI, Rule 3
CPC (schedule)
-
Production of
documents by parties
upon issuance of
notice to produce
Not less than seven
days and not more
than fifteen days
Order XI, Rule 5
CPC (schedule)
-
Pronouncement of
judgements by
Commercial Court,
Commercial
Appellate Court,
Commercial
Division, or
Commercial
Appellate Division
Within ninety days of
the conclusion of
arguments
Order XX, Rule 1
CPC (schedule)
-
7.1. This Court in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace
5
LLP inter alia expounded on the scope and object of CCA in the
following terms:
(1) “Various provisions of the Act, namely, case management hearing
and other provisions makes the court to adopt a pro-active approach
in resolving the commercial dispute.”
5
(2020) 15 SCC 585
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(2) “A new approach for carrying out case management and strict
guidelines for completion of the process has been introduced so that
the adjudicatory process is not delayed.”
(3) “Various provisions of the Act referred to above and the
amendments inserted to the Civil Procedure Code by the Schedule is
to ensure speedy resolution of the commercial disputes in a time
bound manner.”
(4) “The intent of the legislature seems to be to have a procedure
which expedites the disposal of commercial disputes and thus creates
a positive environment for investment and development and make
India an attractive place to do business.”
(5) “A purposive interpretation of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons and various amendments to the Civil Procedure Code leaves
no room for doubt that the provisions of the Act require to be strictly
construed.”
(6) “If we take a closer look at the Statement of Objects and
Reasons, words such as “early” and “speedy” have been incorporated
and reiterated.”
7.2 Further, this Court, while holding the nature of Section 12-A of the
CCA to be mandatory and granting imprimatur to the rejection of a plaint
for non-compliance therewith observed in Patil Automation (P) Ltd. v.
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Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd. as follows :
“ 70. Timelines are contemplated, both in the matter of pleadings and also
other steps to be taken. They are geared to ensure an expeditious culmination
of the proceedings…
On a conspectus of the Act, as from its birth till the lawgiver stepped in with
the amendment in 2018, the Act read with the Rules represent an economic
experiment as much as it deals more directly with a vital aspect of
administration of justice. Commercial disputes have been clearly identified.
The value has been fixed. Courts, at different stages, have been
contemplated. Timelines are contemplated. The whole object of the law is
clear as daylight. Disputes of a commercial hue, must be extinguished with
the highest level of expedition. The dispute resolution would witness a
6
(2022) 10 SCC 1
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termination of the lis between the feuding parties. But even, more
importantly, it would prepare the ground for the country becoming a
destination attracting capital by enhancing the ease of doing business.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In this background, we move to the issue at hand i.e., leave of the Court to file
additional documents. The application filed by LMT is under Order XI Rule 1 and
Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as amended by the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015) which pertains to Disclosure, Discovery and inspection of documents in
suits before the Commercial Division of a High Court or a Commercial Court and
Order XVIII Rule 17. Paragraph 10 of the application explains the reasons for the
delay to be, (i) large quantum of emails including trail mails with numerous
attachments; (ii) difficulty keeping track thereof, despite due diligence; (iii)
voluminous record over a long timeline; and (iv) Specific averments were made for
the first time in the cross-examination of PW-1, which were hitherto, absent in the
pleaded case of SCB;
9. It is further urged therein that no additional averments are being made and
LMT is only substantiating the existing case.
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10. This Court in Sudhir Kumar vs. Vinay Kumar G.B . , further clarified that
on a combined reading of Order XI Rule 1(4) and (5) it flows that the plaintiff is
obliged to file document in its possession along with the plaint though it can seek
leave to file and rely on file additional documents, if so desired, within 30 days of
filing of the suit and that too after making out a reasonable cause for non-disclosure
thereof. Reasonable cause and justification explaining the subsequent discovery
thereof needs to be well established.
7
(2021) 13 SCC 71
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11. A three-judge Bench of this Court, through R.F Nariman J., in State of
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Maharashtra vs. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. , while discussing
the interplay between the CCA and the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 held
thus on ‘ sufficient cause ’ as under:-
“58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration
Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of
disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover
long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself.
Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea
for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court,
in Basawaraj v. LAO [ Basawaraj v. LAO , (2013) 14 SCC 81] , has held
: (SCC pp. 85-88, paras 9-15)
“ 9 . Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could
not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word
“sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be
necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word
“sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a
platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a
case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable
standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause”
means that the party should not have acted in a negligent
manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of
the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained
inactive” . However, the facts and circumstances of each case
must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to
exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court
exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has
to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a
device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [ Manindra Land &
Building Corpn. v. Bhutnath Banerjee , AIR 1964 SC 1336]
, Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [ Mata Din v. A. Narayanan ,
(1969) 2 SCC 770] , Parimal v. Veena [ Parimal v. Veena ,
(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1] and Maniben
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(2021) 6 SCC 460
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Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [ Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of
Brihan Mumbai , (2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Civ) 24] .)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [ Arjun
Singh v. Mohindra Kumar , AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court
explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause”
is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference
exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is
complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of
“sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
[ Ed. : The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised
in original.] so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona
fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned [ Ed. : The
matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in
original.], whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished,
can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no
straitjacket formula is possible.
Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ Madanlal v. Shyamlal (2002) 1
SCC 535] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao , (2002) 3 SCC 195]).
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no
power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.
‘A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
considers a distress resulting from its operation.’ The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular
party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full
effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in
such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while
interpreting a statute.
… … …
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [ P.
Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka , (2002) 4 SCC 578 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 830] this Court held that judicially engrafting
principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in
the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul
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Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [ Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak , (1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court within
limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want
of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the
case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the
delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. One of the grounds raised by LMT is assailing the impugned order was that
the Court had applied the ‘ sufficient cause’ standard whereas the actual standard to
be applied was ‘ reasonable cause ’. The Court in Sudhir Kumar (supra) said that it
was reasonable cause that was to be shown. On this count, LMT may be correct, but
we still refuse to interfere with the findings of the impugned order. This is for the
reason that when the facts are viewed on the whole, even through the lens of
‘ reasonable cause ’, even on the plaintiff’s pleaded position that the latter rests on a
lower threshold, no justification emerges. The suit is at the stage of plaintiff -
evidence, after the issues were framed in 2016. For whatever reason, the
examination of the first of the plaintiff’s witnesses could take place only in 2023,
and after the evidence of its own witness, the plaintiff wants to produce more
documents, on the ground that certain new facts emerged during cross-examination.
That may not be justified since it is well established that the plaintiff when leading
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evidence, is expected to not only produce all documents but also properly anticipate
the questions that may be put to its witnesses by the other side. What cannot be
countenanced is a stop and go or a piecemeal approach. Voluminous evidence too,
is entirely an uninspiring ground.
13. The conclusion of the above decisions has to be that, evidence, however
voluminous, cannot water down the statutory intent and rigours of the statute. The
force of this proposition alone is sufficient, but when it is understood in the light of
the facts of this case, it becomes clearer. One round of additional evidence was
already allowed to be produced and placed on record. All the documents that are
sought to be produced by way of the present application were in the possession of
LMT, both at the time of filing the plaint and the subsequent additional evidence. If
the present application is allowed, what this Court would be essentially doing is
condoning a piecemeal approach to the proceedings of a commercial suit the
procedure for which has entirely been conceived for promoting the ease of business
and recognising the need for expediency in resolving high stakes disputes.
14. At this stage, it is important for us to consider some of the arguments advanced
by LMT. The first is that the relevance of the documents sought to be produced must
be considered. The second that, the application of the higher threshold to this case
would amount to ‘ piecemeal application ’ of the CCA. We are of the considered view
that both these arguments have to be rejected.
14.1 The rejection of the first argument, we make it clear, is in the
overall facts and circumstances of this case. The suit in question was filed
in 2015. As of 2026, plaintiff’s evidence is ongoing. We may say that even
a snail may question the speed at which this trial is proceeding. When this
reality is juxtaposed with the intent of the legislation and the malady it
sought to cure within civil and specifically business litigation in India, the
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contrast is stark. At the cost of repetition, it be stated that all these
documents were in the possession of LMT and ought to have been
produced at the first instance if not later, during the time when for the first
time a similar application was filed. That apart, when we consider the
reasons for filing of additional documents in the first round, i.e., [IA
NO.12696 of 2017] we find that they are substantially similar to the
grounds raised in the present application. There too, what was sought to
be produced were emails exchanged between the parties that were
apparently discovered during the preparation for the next date of hearing.
One other ground raised was that no prejudice would be caused to any
party by doing so, since ‘ no cross examination of witnesses has begun in
the present case ’. A further reason that according to LMT granted them
reason to file additional documents was that SCB had merely denied the
claims of LMT. Even at that time, it was claimed that there was a huge
volume of records .
14.2 The second argument is that the strict nature of CCA cannot be
applied to the present dispute. This came to be specifically answered by
the impugned judgment holding that the provisions of CCA would apply
even to pending cases. We fail to understand how such an argument could
be advanced. The statute has made its own application abundantly clear.
Section 15 CCA which is under the heading ‘ transfer of pending suits ’
provides that (i) all suits and applications; (ii) of specified value; and (iii)
shall be transferred to Commercial Division/Court as the case may be.
Sub-section (3) provides clearly that upon transfer of such suit or
application the procedures of the CCA shall apply thereto. The intent of
the application of CCA to all pending matters is further elucidated by sub-
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section (5) which provides that if a transfer to the Commercial
Division/Court does not take place as provided, any party may make an
application before the Court to transfer the same. The only exception that
has been provided against such transfer is for those cases where judgment
has been reserved.
15. The collective conclusion for both these arguments is that Order XI of the
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CPC, which was made applicable to commercial suits with effect from 23 October
2015 by Act 4 of 2016, and, particularly Order Rule 1(4) thereof provides an
exception to file additional documents within thirty days of the date of filing the suit,
provided it was urgent, and with the leave of the Court. The same had to be filed
with a declaration that all relevant documents stand produced. Therefore, even at the
time of the first application, this provision was in the books and was applicable.
Secondly , the statute itself provides for its application to pending matters and so
considering the overall picture that emerges, we cannot help but record our
agreement to the view ascribed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
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16. It cannot be disputed that the suit originally initiated on 27 May 2015, was
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renumbered and registered as a commercial suit under the CCA on 30 January 2018,
the very same date on which the appellant’s first application for placing on record
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the additional documents stood allowed and it was only on 18 November 2023 i.e.,
after a period of more than 5 years that a subsequent application taking the very same
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plea was filed which stood rejected on 12 February 2025, finding LMT not to have
furnished any reasonable cause or justifiable explanation.
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17. We in toto agree with the conclusion arrived at by the Court in terms of the
impugned order since no case for interference is made out by the appellant. The
appeal is dismissed with a direction, however, that the suit be decided as
expeditiously as possible. No costs.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
……………………………………………….J.
(SANJAY KAROL)
…………………………………………….….J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)
New Delhi;
July 09, 2026
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