Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd. vs Sumitomo Chemical Company Ltd. & Anr.
- Court
- Delhi High Court
- Case type
- Regular First Appeal Original Side Commercial
- Decided on
- 18-03-2026
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 22.01.2026
Judgment pronounced on:18.03.2026
+ RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 & CM APPL. 45700/2025
COROMANDEL INDAG
PRODUCTS INDIA LTD. .....Appellant
Through: Mr. J Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. Shravan Kumar Bansal and Mr. Pankaj
Kumar, Advs.
versus
SUMITOMO CHEMICAL
COMPANY LTD. & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv
with Mr. Prashant Gupta, Mr. Aadhar
Nautiyal, Mr. Karan Singh, Ms. Shivangi
Kohli and Mr. Anirudh Vats, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
% 18.03.2026
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
1. The Appellant challenges the impugned judgment dated
03.07.2025 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, wherein
the application filed by the Respondents seeking rejection of the plaint
1
under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(“CPC”), was allowed. The learned Judge held that the Appellant had
failed to establish a cause of action to maintain the suit, deeming the
same to be purely illusory.
2. Parties are referred to as they stood before the learned Single
1
“CPC” hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 1 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
Judge for ease of reference in these proceedings.
BRIEF FACTS
3. The factual position in a nutshell, as averred in the plaint, is that
the Plaintiff, incorporated in 1983, is an Indian agro-chemical
company and the parent entity of the Coromandel Group, which
2
comprises of Agrimas Chemicals Ltd. and Coromandel Agrico Pvt.
3
Ltd. (under liquidation). The Plaintiff asserts that under an
Agreement dated 27.01.2000, CAPL was appointed as the marketing
agent for the Plaintiff’s products. Subsequently, an Agreement dated
06.12.2004 was executed between the Plaintiff and CAPL, wherein
CAPL was granted a royalty-based license to use the Plaintiff’s
trademarks, including “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”.
4
4. The Plaintiff contends that Takeda Chemical Industries Ltd.
(predecessor of Defendant No.1), which later became Sumitomo
5
Chemical Takeda Agro Co. Ltd. (a Joint Venture with Sumitomo
Chemical Co. Ltd.), and eventually absorbed by Defendant No. 1,
holds the registration for the word mark “PADAN” and the device
mark “
” under Class 05, dated 18.05.1970 and 25.03.2010
respectively, on a proposed-to-be-used basis. The Plaintiff claims that
the non-use of the registration by the Defendants in India renders it
liable to be cancelled under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
2
“Agrimas” hereinafter
3
“CAPL” hereinafter
4
“Takeda” hereinafter
5
“Sumitomo JV” hereinafter
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 2 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
5. The Plaintiff avers that it entered into an agreement with
Takeda for the procurement of Cartap Hydrochloride and was granted
6
a non-exclusive and royalty-free license to use the mark “PADAN” in
India with respect to insecticides and pesticides.
6. The Plaintiff asserts that it had been using the trademark
“PADAN” continuously in India since 1988. In 2006, it independently
designed the artistic work for the packaging and labelling of the
product bearing the impugned mark, i.e., “
”
which it claims is protected under Section 14 of the Copyright Act,
1957. It is further asserted that the Plaintiff has developed substantial
goodwill through extensive sales, promotion, and quality control
which has resulted in the acquisition of secondary meaning and
exclusive association of the “PADAN” mark with the Plaintiff.
7. The Plaintiff alleges that neither Takeda nor the Defendants or
their alleged licensees have used the impugned mark in India. The
Plaintiff claims exclusive use of the mark “PADAN” and its
associated goodwill.
8. The Plaintiff states that in 2007, upon the compound becoming
public, the Defendant ceased its supply and granted the Plaintiff a
temporary license vide email dated 24.12.2007 to source the product
6
Alternatively referred to as “impugned mark”
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 3 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
from other suppliers during 2008 or till resumption of supply by the
Defendant. However, the Plaintiff avers that the supply did not resume
and the Plaintiff continued use with Defendant’s knowledge. The
Plaintiff further contends that Defendant No. 2 manufactured similar
insecticide/pesticide under the marks “SANVEX” and “SUMI TAZ”,
i.e., “
” in India but in May 2023, the
Plaintiff claims to have discovered that Defendant No. 2 launched a
similar insecticide/pesticide using the same compound with
deceptively similar packaging to that of the Plaintiff’s. The
comparison of the Plaintiff’s packaging and Defendant No.2’s
packaging and Defendant No.2’s packaging is as follows:
Plaintiff
Defendant No. 2
9. Aggrieved by the alleged dishonest adoption and imitation of its
mark, the Plaintiff instituted the present suit seeking a decree of
permanent injunction restraining the Defendants from dealing in the
trademark “PADAN” or any other identical or deceptively similar
trademark/packaging/artwork in relation to insecticides and agro-
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 4 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
chemicals on grounds of copyright infringement, passing off and
dilution of goodwill, along with rendition of account or damages of
Rs. 2,00,01,000/- with costs. The Plaintiff also sought an injunction
against interference with its business under the “PADAN” mark, along
with declaration that Plaintiff is the owner and proprietor of the
trademark/packaging “PADAN”, with goodwill and reputation
acquired thereunder in India.
10. Thereafter, the Defendants preferred an application under Order
VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC praying for rejection of the plaint on the
ground that the Plaintiff failed to disclose any cause of action. They
contended that the Plaintiff’s claims were illusory, baseless, and did
not meet the threshold required for the maintainability of the suit.
IMPUGNED JUDGMENT
11. The learned Single Judge rejected the plaint relying on the
7
principles laid down in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. and
8
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. UOI by holding that the
Plaintiff could not maintain the suit on behalf of CAPL since it was a
distinct legal entity and Defendant No. 1’s non-exclusive licensee and
the communications referred to by the Plaintiff were between
Defendant No. 1 and CAPL, not directly with the Plaintiff.
Furthermore, since CAPL was undergoing liquidation, its affairs were
under the control of the Resolution Professional, leaving the Plaintiff
without a valid claim on behalf of CAPL.
7
[1897] AC 22: (1895-99) All ER Rep 33 (HL)
8
(2012) 6 SCC 613
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 5 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
12. The learned Single Judge further observed that certain material
documents were deliberately withheld by the Plaintiff, including the
non-exclusive license granted by Takeda to CAPL and the
9
Distribution Agreement (“DA”) dated 26.12.2005. Relying on the
judgment in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Education
10
Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust and Dahiben
11
v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhansali , the learned Judge opined that
since the DA was mentioned in the plaint, it became incorporated by
reference therein. Hence, the Court was entitled to examine the
contents of the DA, even if it was filed by the Defendants. Upon
reviewing the DA, the learned Single Judge found that it was between
CAPL and Defendant No. 1, not between the Plaintiff and Defendant
No.1. This agreement granted CAPL a non-exclusive license to use
the impugned mark but did not assign any rights to CAPL regarding
the mark. Further, by relying on Hilton Roulunds Ltd. v.
12
Commissioner of Income Tax , it was reasoned that any use of the
impugned mark by CAPL, as a licensee, would inure to Defendant No.
1, the registered proprietor.
13. Regarding the claim of copyright infringement, the learned
Single Judge noted that the Assignment Deed dated 04.04.2006
between Mr. Uttam Sharma and CAPL lacked a specific period for
assignment. Therefore, as per Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act,
1957, the Agreement was deemed to be valid for five years, and as the
five-year period had since expired, the Plaintiff’s claim for copyright
9
“DA”, hereinafter
10
(2012) 8 SCC 706
11
(2020) 7 SCC 366
12
2018 SCC OnLine Del 8556
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 6 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
infringement became time barred. Thus, no cause of action arose in
favour of the plaintiff under copyright law. On the issue of passing
off, the Court observed that the invoices and promotional expenditure
figures relied upon by the Plaintiff pertained to CAPL and Agrimas,
not the Plaintiff. It was held that the Plaintiff failed to establish a link
between these figures and itself, thereby failing to prove any goodwill
associated with the mark “PADAN”. Hence, no cause of action for
passing off could be sustained.
14. The learned Single Judge further noted that Defendant No. 1 not
only was the registered proprietor of the impugned mark and but also,
based on the Formulation Guideline dated 23.05.1983, was also the
prior user of the impugned mark in India. It was found that the
impugned packaging bore the name of Sumitomo JV, which was
associated with Defendant No. 1 and acted as a source identifier. In
reference to the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 (between CAPL and the
Plaintiff), the learned Single Judge observed that the Plaintiff had
failed to substantiate its claim that it was registered proprietor of
certain marks including “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”. In fact,
on the contrary, it was admitted that Defendant No. 1 was the
registered proprietor of these marks. Consequently, the learned Single
Judge opined that the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 (between Plaintiff
and CAPL) appeared to be fabricated and unsupported by any
evidence.
15. The learned Single Judge concluded that a holistic reading of
the plaint demonstrated that the suit was vexatious and malicious. It
was held that it was legally untenable for the Plaintiff to file the suit
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 7 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
on behalf of CAPL, since CAPL was a distinct legal entity, and also
since the Plaintiff had failed to place certain material documents on
record. Further that the non-exclusive license granted to CAPL did not
confer any right to the Plaintiff and also that the Plaintiff could not
establish its own sales figures for the impugned mark. The learned
Judge, therefore, held that, “there is no cause of action whatsoever in
favour of the plaintiff to institute the present suit against the
defendants and the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff is purely
illusory.”
16. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the Plaintiff approached
this Court by way of the present appeal, assailing the findings of the
learned Single Judge.
SUBMISSIONS
17. Mr. J. Sai Deepak, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiff,
submitted that the learned Single Judge erred in rejecting the plaint at
the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(a) of CPC. It was contended
that the learned Judge had improperly delved into the merits of the
case, which is beyond the scope of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. It was
submitted that the impugned judgment suffered from various
infirmities, including a failure to appreciate the distinction between
the non-disclosure of a cause of action in the plaint and the absence of
a cause of action for the suit. It was urged that the learned Single
Judge conducted a mini-trial by recording a finding that, “the plaintiff
has not even made out a case for passing off in its favour.”, which is
clearly beyond the purview of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. The plaint
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 8 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
must, therefore, be read as a whole, and all averments made therein be
presumed to be true. Reliance was placed on the following judgments
to support this position, Bhupendrabhai Hasmukhbhai Dalwadi v.
13
Deceased Savitriben Ganumal Krishnani , M.V. “Sea Success I” v.
Liverpool and London Steamship Protection and Indemnity
14 15
Association Ltd. , Jageshwari Devi & Ors. v. Shatrughan Ram
and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. & Ors. v. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V.
16
Fortune Express & Ors.
18. It was argued that the learned Single Judge failed to consider
material documents such as the Notice of Assignment dated
29.10.2002 and the letter dated 31.10.2002, which clearly established
the subsisting relationship between the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1.
The denial of these documents by the Defendants was, according to
the Senior Counsel, contrary to the material on record and amounted
to perjury. Therefore, the non-consideration of these documents led to
an erroneous conclusion by the learned Single Judge.
19. Learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the Plaintiff, being
the parent company of CAPL and Agrimas, had granted CAPL a
royalty-based license under the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 to use
the marks “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50 SP”, and CAPL had
undertaken the Plaintiff’s marketing operations under the Agreement
dated 27.01.2000. Learned Senior Counsel relied on Section 48(2) of
the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides that the use of a trademark
13
AIR 2011 Guj 42
14
2001 SCC OnLine Bom 1019
15
(2007) 15 SCC 52
16
(2006) 3 SCC 100
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 9 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
by a licensee would inure to the benefit of the licensor. Therefore, the
finding that Plaintiff did not have locus standi was erroneous. Further,
it was contended that the finding of concealment of the DA was
misplaced because it was not in the Plaintiff’s possession and, in any
case, the Agreement was never acted upon. Thus, reliance on the DA
to conclude that the use of the mark by CAPL would inure to
Defendant No. 2 was a misreading of the facts.
20. It was asserted that the learned Single Judge gravely erred in
characterising the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 as fabricated without
conducting a trial. Such a finding, it was argued, necessarily involves
the adjudication of disputed questions of fact, which require evidence
and cannot be decided merely at the threshold. It was pointed out that
CAPL had in fact enforced the royalty-based license by filing
C.S.(OS) No. 89 of 2005, which resulted in an temporary injunction
restraining the Plaintiff from using the licensed marks until the suit
was dismissed for default in 2017.
21. It was submitted that the learned Single Judge failed to
appreciate the commercial relationship between the entities by placing
17
reliance on various precedents . Under the Agreement dated
27.01.2000, CAPL undertook the marketing of the Plaintiff’s
products, and therefore, communications between CAPL and
Sumitomo JV were consistent with this arrangement and did not
negate Plaintiff’s rights. The promotional support provided by
17
George V. Records, SARL v. Kiran Jogani & Anr., CS(OS) 739 of 2003; 2004 (28) PTC 347 (Del.);
Mahendra and Mahendra Seeds Pvt. Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., MANU/GJ/0427/2002: AIR 2002 SC
117; Nuvoco Vistas Corp. Ltd. v. J.K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. & Anr., Order dated 15.04.2019 in CO(Comm)
256/2014
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 10 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
Defendant No. 1 was minimal, only lasting for a year, and the supply
of the technical compound was not forthcoming.
22. The learned Senior Counsel further highlighted that the Plaintiff
held valid registrations under Section 9(3) of the Insecticides Act,
1968, for “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50 SP”, as evidenced by the
Formulation Guides dated 23.05.1983 and April 1988 issued by
Takeda. This further substantiated the Plaintiff’s entitlement to use the
impugned marks.
23. It was submitted that the Plaintiff enjoyed a royalty-free
permission to use the mark “PADAN”, and neither Takeda nor the
defendants had used the mark in India. The Plaintiff’s exclusive use
was substantiated by the Notice of Assignment dated 29.10.2002 and
Takeda’s letter dated 31.10.2002 to the Central Insecticide Board and
Registration Committee, mentioning the Plaintiff and Agrimas as the
one of the authorised entities to import Cartap Hydochloride
Technical . It was pointed out that the other two companies named in
this letter did not import the compound. Thus, it was argued that while
the license was non-exclusive, the absence of any other licensees and
the lack of supervisory control, as evidenced by the email dated
24.12.2007, amounted to a naked license, which evolved into goodwill
over time.
24. It was further contended that since 2000, Defendant No. 2 had
manufactured the same product in India under the marks “SANVEX”
and “SUMI TAZ” but did not use the mark “PADAN. This further
evidenced the non-use by the Defendants. The Plaintiff alone had used
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 11 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
“PADAN” in India since 1988 and continued to do so in its own right
since 2012. Sales documents and promotional materials from 2005
were relied upon to assert the Plaintiff’s long-standing commercial use
and the acquisition of goodwill.
25. It was submitted that Defendant’s letter dated 04.01.2011
terminated the naked license since it referred to the DA dated
26.12.2005 which indicated that Defendant No. 1 was ready to supply
the technical compound in April 2011, however, the supply did not
resume, and the Plaintiff continued to use the impugned mark with the
Defendants’ knowledge. It was further submitted that in June 2023,
the Defendant No. 2 allegedly launched a product with deceptively
similar packaging, thereby violating the Plaintiff’s copyright in the
packaging for the same product. The Defendants’ non-use of the
impugned mark was argued to amount to abandonment, rendering
their registration liable to be cancelled. A cancellation petition had
already been filed by the Plaintiff. In support, Tractors & Farm
18
Equipment Ltd. v. Massey Ferguson Corpn. , was cited.
26. Per contra, Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, learned Senior Counsel for the
defendants, strongly supported the impugned judgment and submitted
that the plaint was liable to be rejected as it failed to disclose any
enforceable legal right in favour of the Plaintiff. According to Mr.
Rao, even assuming the Plaintiff’s claim of proprietorship over the
mark “PADAN” based on use by its sister concern (CAPL), the
agreement with CAPL had been terminated, and therefore no
enforceable right survived in favour of the Plaintiff.
18
2025 SCC OnLine Mad 864
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 12 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
27. Mr. Rao argued that the Plaintiff could not sue on behalf of
CAPL, as CAPL was merely a licensee of Defendant No. 1, and a
licensee cannot assert proprietary rights to the detriment of the
licensor. Any such claim, it was contended, would be contrary to
settled law. In support of this argument, reliance was placed on Sant
19
Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh , Motorpresse International
Verlagsgeselischaft Holding mbH & Co. v. Mistrale Publishing Pvt.
20
Ltd. and Viridian Development Managers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. RPS
21
Infrastructure Ltd. . Mr. Rao further referred to the Agreement dated
21.05.2004 between Takeda and CAPL, along with various
communications dated 28.03.2005, 14.06.2005, 07.02.2006, and
11.06.2007, filed by the Plaintiff. These documents demonstrated that
Defendant No. 1 played a role in advertising and promoting the
“PADAN” products. It was also pointed out that the Plaintiff’s
packaging mentioned “ In Association With Sumitomo Chemicals
Takeda Agrico Company Limited, Japan”, which, according to the
Defendants, negated any independent claim of proprietorship by the
Plaintiff.
28. Mr. Rao further contended that under the DA dated 26.12.2005,
the non-exclusive license to use the impugned mark in India was
granted to CAPL, and not to the Plaintiff. The corporate distinction
between the Plaintiff and CAPL, both of which are independent legal
entities, could not be ignored to create an illusory locus for the
Plaintiff . Also, no documents were provided by the Plaintiff to show
19
(1985) 2 SCC 332
20
2005 SCC OnLine Del 346
21
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7134
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 13 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
any independent sales or promotional figures. Furthermore, it was
emphasized that CAPL was undergoing insolvency proceedings,
therefore, the suit ought to have been instituted by the Resolution
Professional of CAPL, not by the Plaintiff. Mr. Rao also pointed out
that the plea of naked licensing was an afterthought since it was not
raised in the plaint but only introduced in the grounds of appeal.
29. On the issue of copyright infringement, Mr. Rao submitted that
the Assignment Deed dated 04.04.2006 between Mr. Uttam Sharma
and CAPL did not specify a duration for the assignment. Under
Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act, 1957, the assignment was deemed
to have expired after five years. Furthermore, the DA required CAPL
to obtain Defendant No. 1’s approval for any new packaging of
“PADAN” products, which indicated that the rights in artistic work
were vested in Defendant No. 1 and not the Plaintiff. Therefore, any
claim of copyright infringement in the Plaintiff’s favour was
untenable.
30. Mr. Rao argued that the Plaintiff had suppressed material
documents, including the Trade Mark Agreement dated 15.03.2003
between Takeda and CAPL, (not the plaintiff) and the DA dated
26.12.2005. These documents unequivocally established that CAPL
was only a licensee and was subject to quality checks for the
impugned products, in line with Defendant No. 1’s Formulation Guide
for the manufacture of these impugned products. Mr. Rao also pointed
out that the Plaintiff’s contention regarding the non-use of the
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 14 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
PADAN logo “
” was belied by the Plaintiff’s own packaging,
which bore the said mark, thereby undermining its claim.
31. The learned Senior Counsel vehemently disputed the purported
license agreement between the Plaintiff and CAPL, particularly since
it mentioned the Plaintiff as “registered trademark holder” of
“PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”. This claim was contradicted by
the admitted trademark registrations in the name of Defendant No. 1.
Reliance was also placed on the following precedents to demonstrate
the importance of truthful disclosure of material facts: S.P.
22
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v.
23 24
Jagannath , S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath , Satish
25
Khosla v. Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. , Raj Kumari Garg v. S.M. Ezaz &
26 27
Ors. , Babita Pal & Ors. v. Jagdish Bansal and Sandip Singh v.
28
MIS Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
32. Lastly, Mr. Rao opposed the Plaintiff’s application under Order
XLI Rule 27 of CPC to introduce additional evidence, arguing that
such evidence could not be adduced at this stage as it would gravely
prejudice the Defendants. Furthermore, he argued that Order XLI Rule
33 could not be invoked to circumvent the requirements of Order XLI
Rule 27. It was also urged that conditions under Order XLI Rule 27
were not met as the Plaintiff had knowledge of the documents for over
22
(1994) 1 SCC 1
23
(1994) 1 SCC 1
24
(1994) 1 SCC 1
25
1998 (44) DRJ (DB)
26
2012 (132) DRJ 108 (DB)
27
2013 (133) DRJ 332 (DB)
28
2022 SCC OnLine Del 2913
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 15 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
two years and had failed to produce them at an earlier stage. It was
submitted that these documents were not required to be disclosed at
the appellate stage in a matter governed by Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC.
To support this, Mr. Rao relied on paragraph 10 of Natha Singh v.
29
Financial Commr., Taxation, Punjab , UOI v. Ibrahim Uddin &
30 31
Ors. and paragraph 19 of N. Kamalam v. Ayyasamy .
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
33. We have heard the arguments advanced on behalf of both
parties and perused the material placed on record. The present dispute
emanates from the Plaintiff’s suit against the defendants for copyright
infringement, passing off, and dilution of goodwill.
34. At the outset, it is important to note that the Plaintiff instituted
the suit based on its claim of exclusive use of the impugned mark
“PADAN” in India. According to the Plaintiff’s pleadings, under the
Agreement dated 06.12.2004, CAPL was the Plaintiff’s licensee and
vide another agreement, also a non-exclusive licensee of Takeda. The
Plaintiff alleges that despite the defendants holding registrations of the
impugned word and device marks, they have failed to use the
impugned mark or authorize its use by any other licensee in India,
thereby allowing the Plaintiff to exclusively use the mark. The
Plaintiff claims that in 2006, it devised its own packaging for the
product and continued to use the mark “PADAN” with the knowledge
and acquiescence of the defendants. The plaint further asserts that
CAPL’s sales figures between 2013-2022 were approximately Rs.
29
(1976) 3 SCC 28
30
(2012) 8 SCC 148
31
(2001) 7 SCC 503
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 16 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
913.68 crores, while sales by Agrimas in 2022-23 amounted to Rs.
5.15 crores, and that CAPL incurred Rs. 49.75 crores in promotional
expenses from 2013-2022. On this basis, the Plaintiff asserts that it
has acquired goodwill and reputation in the mark and claims that the
Defendants’ use of a deceptively similar packaging is likely to cause
confusion and harm the Plaintiff’s business.
35. Thus, the central issue before this Court is whether the learned
Single Judge’s rejection of the plaint on the ground that the cause of
action disclosed in the plaint was illusory, is sustainable in the context
of the material facts and applicable law. This issue must be evaluated
within the narrow confines of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, which
governs the rejection of a plaint for non-disclosure of cause of action.
36. For convenience, Order VII Rule 11 CPC reads as follows:
“11. Rejection of plaint.— The plaint shall be rejected in the
following cases:—
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time
to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is
returned upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on
being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper
within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be
barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the
valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be
extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied
that the plaintiff was prevented by any cause of an exceptional
nature from correcting the valuation or supplying the requisite
stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 17 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to
the plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC is a special
remedy available to a defendant to challenge the maintainability of a
suit. The term ‘ shall’ in the provision clearly indicates that the Court
is required to reject the plaint if it suffers from any of the infirmities
specified under the said Rule. One such infirmity is the non-disclosure
of cause of action.
38. The concept of “cause of action” has been well-defined in
Indian jurisprudence. We deem it fit to delve into a brief inquiry to
understand its contours in the present case.
39. Cause of action was defined in ABC Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P.
32
Agencies , as follows:
“12. A cause of action means every fact, which if traversed, it
would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support
his right to a judgment of the court . In other words, it is a bundle
of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the
plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant . It must include
some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an
act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the
actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the
material facts on which it is founded . It does not comprise
evidence necessary to prove such facts, but every fact necessary for
the plaintiff to prove to enable him to obtain a decree. Everything
which if not proved would give the defendant a right to immediate
judgment must be part of the cause of action. But it has no relation
whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant nor
does it depend upon the character of the relief prayed for by the
plaintiff.”
(emphasis supplied)
32
(1989) 2 SCC 163
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 18 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
40. In Mayar (supra) , the Supreme Court defined cause of action
and further clarified as follows:
“12. … A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required
to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the
material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence
except in certain cases where the pleadings relied on are in regard
to misrepresentation, fraud, wilful default, undue influence or of
the same nature. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of
action which requires determination by the court, the mere fact
that in the opinion of the Judge the plaintiff may not succeed
cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint …”
(emphasis supplied)
33
41. In Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India , the Supreme
Court carved out the meaning of cause of action in detail, as follows:
“9. By “cause of action” it is meant every fact, which, if
traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order
to support his right to a judgment of the Court. In other words, a
bundle of facts, which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove in
order to succeed in the suit. (See Bloom Dekor Ltd. v. Subhash
Himatlal Desai [(1994) 6 SCC 322].)
10. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908) “cause of action” means every fact, which
it is necessary to establish to support a right to obtain a judgment.
(See Sadanandan Bhadran v. Madhavan Sunil Kumar [(1998) 6
SCC 514 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1471].)
11. It is settled law that “cause of action” consists of a bundle
of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in
a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken
with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim
relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the
defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action
would possibly accrue or would arise. [See South East Asia
Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat Enterprises (P) Ltd. [(1996) 3
SCC 443] ]
12. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially
33
(2006) 6 SCC 207 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 24 : 2006 SCC OnLine SC 758
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 19 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of action” means
the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means
the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including
not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled
with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression
means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to
prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of
the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as
distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to
prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”. (See Rajasthan
High Court Advocates' Assn. v. Union of India [(2001) 2 SCC
294].)
13. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been
employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances
which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and
no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been
used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff
must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts
without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit.
(See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh [(1977) 1 SCC 791] .)
14. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood
to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain
an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving
rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles
one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person
(see Black's Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a
“cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives
rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact,
which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain
judgment. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed
to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is
existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial
interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State
of Maharashtra [(2000) 7 SCC 640 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 215] .)
15. In Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated
as follows:
“ ‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning
simply a factual situation, the existence of which
entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy
against another person. The phrase has been held from
earliest time to include every fact which is material to
be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every
fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse.
‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that a
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 20 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
particular act on the part of the defendant which gives
the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-
matter of grievance founding the action, not merely the
technical cause of action.”
*
17. It would be appropriate to quote para 61 of the said
judgment, which reads as follows : (Mohd. Khalil Khan
case [(1947-48) 75 IA 121 : AIR 1949 PC 78] , AIR p. 86)
“61. …(2) The cause of action means every fact which will be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to support
his right to the judgment. (Read v. Brown [(1888) 22 QBD 128 : 58
LJQB 120 : 60 LT 250 (CA)] )
(3) If the evidence to support the two claims is different, then the
causes of action are also different. (Brunsden v. Humphrey [(1884)
14 QBD 141 : (1881-85) All ER Rep 357 : 53 LJQB 476 : 51 LT
529 (CA)] )
(4) The causes of action in the two suits may be considered to be
the same if in substance they are identical.
(Brunsden v. Humphrey [(1884) 14 QBD 141 : (1881-85) All ER
Rep 357 : 53 LJQB 476 : 51 LT 529 (CA)] )
(5) The cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence that
may be set up by the defendant nor does it depend upon the
character of the relief prayed for by the plaintiff. It refers … to the
media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a
conclusion in his favour. (Chand Kour v. Partab Singh [(1887-88)
15 IA 156 : ILR 16 Cal 98 (PC)] ) This observation was made by
Lord Watson in a case under Section 43 of the Act of 1882
(corresponding to Order 2 Rule 2) where plaintiff made various
claims in the same suit.” (IA pp. 139-40)”
42. The principle established in the above-mentioned cases is that a
cause of action consists of a set of material facts that may, if proved
entitle the plaintiff to seek relief and that it must include some act by
the defendant; in absence thereof, no cause of action shall lie. Further,
a court should not reject a plaint on the mere ground that the plaintiff
may not succeed in proving its case, as long as the plaint discloses
facts sufficient to support such a claim. Cause of action is a broad
concept and must include all material facts, but not evidence, required
for a suit to be maintainable.
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 21 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
43. Having outlined the principles governing cause of action, we
now turn to the statutory provisions regulating pleadings and
documents in a plaint.
44. Order VI Rule 2(1) of the CPC stipulates that pleadings must
state material facts and not the evidence. Material facts constitute the
cause of action, their omission would render the cause of action
34
incomplete and result in rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule
11(a).
45. Order VII Rule 14 of the CPC provides for the production of
documents relied upon by the plaintiff in the plaint. These documents
must be considered at the stage of deciding an application under Order
35
VII Rule 11(a) of CPC .
46. In light of the foregoing statutory framework, we now briefly
examine the scope of jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC,
before addressing the present factual scenario and submissions of both
parties.
47. It is well-settled that for adjudication under Order VII Rule
36
11(a) CPC, the averments in the plaint alone are relevant , and the
37
averments in the written statement are wholly irrelevant .
Furthermore, considering the consequences of outright rejection of a
34
Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association , (2005) 7 SCC 510; Church of
North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, (2005) 10 SCC 760; Mayar (supra); Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar
Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC 487
35
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali , (2020) 7 SCC 366
36
D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman , (1999) 3 SCC 267; Raptakos Brett & Co. v. Ganesh Property,
(1998) 7 SCC 184; Mayar (supra); Central Provident Fund Commissioner v. Lala J.R. Education Society,
(2016) 14 SCC 679
37
Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra , (2003) 1 SCC 557
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 22 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
38
plaint, this jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly . It is also trite that
39
the plaint must be viewed in its entirety and cannot be segregated . If
the allegations in the plaint prima facie reveal a cause of action, the
40
court cannot inquire into veracity of the allegations at this stage.
48. In Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea
41
Success I , the Supreme Court laid down the test for exercising
power under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, as follows:
“ 139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is
essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must
be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose,
the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be
correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the
plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be
passed.”
(emphasis supplied)
42
49. In Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal , the
Supreme Court articulated the ambit of Order VII Rule 11 as follows:
“7. The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if conditions
enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled. It is needless to
observe that the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be
exercised by the court at any stage of the suit. The relevant facts
which need to be looked into for deciding the application are the
averments of the plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful
reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly
vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to
sue, the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC .
Since the power conferred on the court to terminate civil action
at the threshold is drastic, the conditions enumerated under
38
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhansali , (2020) 7 SCC 366
39
Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Association , (2005) 7 SCC 510; Hardesh Ores
(P) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. , (2007) 5 SCC 614
40
Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali , (2020) 7 SCC 366 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 128 : 2020 SCC
OnLine SC 562; D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman , (1999) 3 SCC 267; Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh
Haran Nath Singh , AIR 1962 SC 941
41
(2004) 9 SCC 512
42
(2017) 13 SCC 174 : (2017) 5 SCC (Civ) 602
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 23 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of power of rejection of
plaint have to be strictly adhered to . The averments of the plaint
have to be read as a whole to find out whether the averments
disclose a cause of action or whether the suit is barred by any law.
It is needless to observe that the question as to whether the suit is
barred by any law, would always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The averments in the written
statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are wholly
immaterial while considering the prayer of the defendant for
rejection of the plaint. Even when the allegations made in the
plaint are taken to be correct as a whole on their face value, if they
show that the suit is barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of
action, the application for rejection of plaint can be entertained
and the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If
clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of
action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus
litigation will end at the earlier stage .”
(emphasis supplied)
50. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Inspiration Clothes & U. v.
43
Colby International Ltd. , held thus:
“ … The plea of the defendant that there is no cause of action
does not amount to the plea that the plaint does not disclose any
cause of action. A distinction must always be drawn between a
plea that plaint does not disclose a cause of action and the plea
that the plaintiff has no cause of action to sue. The grounds on
which plaint can be rejected are enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of
Rule 11 of Order 7 CPC The first ground on which plaint can be
rejected is that it does not disclose a cause of action. While
considering the prayer to reject the plaint on ground (a) of Order 7
Rule 11 CPC that the plaint discloses no cause of action, which is
essentially a demurrer, the defendant must be taken to admit for
the sake of argument that the allegations of the plaintiff in the
plaint are true in manner and form. The power to reject the
plaint on this can be exercised only if the Court comes to the
conclusion that even if all the allegations are taken to be proved,
the plaintiff would not be entitled to any relief whatsoever. A
distinction must always be drawn between a case where the plaint
on the face of it discloses no cause of action and another in which
after considering the entire material on the record the Court comes
43
2000 SCC OnLine Del 813
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 24 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
to the conclusion that there is no cause of action. In the first case
the plaint can be rejected but in the letter (sic) case the plaint
cannot be rejected. The suit has to be dismissed. Learned Single
Judge adopted the second approach. This was not the stage where
the Court was expected to enter into this controversy that whether
there was a cause of action to the plaintiff against the defendant or
not. No doubt that where the plaint is based on a document, the
Court will be entitled to consider the said document also and
ascertain if a cause of action is disclosed in the plaint, but
validity of the document cannot be considered at this stage . To
enable a Court to reject a plaint on the ground that it does not
disclose a cause of action, it should look at the plaint and
documents accompanying the plaint only and nothing else . The
Court, however, cannot look at the defence of the defendant or
the documents relied upon by the defendant. See D.
Ramchandran v. R.V. Janakiraman (1999) 3 SCC 267…The effect
of dismissal of suit is altogether different and district from the
effect of rejection of the plaint. In case plaint is rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC filing of a fresh plaint in respect of the same
cause of is specifically permitted under Rule 13 of Order 7. C.P. C.
Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal
of suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff to file a fresh
suit on the same cause of action. Rejection of plaint takes away the
very basis of the suit rendering as if there was no suit at all or that
no suit was instituted. Order of dismissal of suit while recognizing
the existence of a suit indicates its termination. While deciding the
application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC learned Single Judge
ought not and could not have dismissed the suit. Even in the
decision of the Supreme Court in T. Arivandandam's case (supra)
relied upon by learned counsel for the appellant, it was held that if
on a meaningful-not formal- reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right
to sue, the trial court should exercise his power under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein
is fulfilled. In order to fulfill that ground bare allegation made in
the plaint and documents filed therewith were required to be
looked into, which in the instant case clearly disclosed at least a
cause of action against the defendant that defendant was liable for
damages for its acts of omission and commission. It would be an
altogether different situation that the plaintiff might not
ultimately succeed in obtaining a decree against the defendant or
that Court might come to the conclusion that suit would not be
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 25 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
maintainable against the defendant and that plaintiff had a cause
of action only against defendnat's principal and its parent unit in
Hong Kong, but such aspect could not have been gone into at this
stage. Three paragraphs of the plaint quoted above in our view do
clearly disclose cause of action for the plaintiff to claim damages.”
(emphasis supplied)
51. This Court, speaking through one of us (C. Hari Shankar, J.) in
44
Westend Green Farms Society v. Vicky Kakkar , observed as
follows:
“15.2.6 …This decision is of significance, as it rules, clearly, that a
plaint must disclose material facts which give rise to the cause of
action. In a suit for trade mark infringement or passing off,
therefore, the plaint must not merely aver that infringement or
passing off has taken place, but must disclose the facts on the
basis of which the allegation is made .
*
15.3.4 While examining whether a case for rejecting the plaint
under Order VII Rule 11(a) on the ground of non-existence of a
cause of action does, or does not, exist, the plaint has to be read
holistically . It is only where a complete reading of the plaint,
juxtaposing one para with the other and harmonising the plaint
as a whole, does not disclose the existence of a cause of action on
the basis of which the plaintiff can sue, that the plaint can be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a). The Court has to be
conscious of the fact that plaints may not always be artistically, or
even, at times, elegantly drafted, and has to carefully scrutinize the
assertions in the plaint before satisfying itself that no cause of
action, within the meaning of Order VII Rule 11(a), is made out
from the averments contained therein.
*
15.4.2 Applying this principle on a suit alleging infringement or
passing off of trade mark, for example, the plaint must not merely
allege infringement or passing off, must also plead the existence of
the necessary ingredients which make out a case of infringement or
passing off.
*
16.1.11 There is a fundamental difference between pleading the
existence of the basis for a material fact and disclosing the
evidence on the basis of which such existence is pleaded. Any
44
2025 SCC OnLine Del 10701
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 26 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
plaint must plead the former, but not the latter. Expressed
otherwise, all ingredients of the cause of action – meaning the
facts which the plaintiff would have to establish to entitle it to a
decree – must be pleaded. ”
(emphasis supplied)
52. Therefore, the primary question is whether a real cause of
45
action is set out in the plaint or not . As emphasized by the Supreme
46
Court in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal , courts must remain
vigilant against clever drafting that creates the illusion of a cause of
action and curb such attempts at its nascent stage. However, it is
equally essential for courts to refrain from engaging in an evaluative
exercise to examine the probable success of a claim at this stage.
53. The averments in the plaint alone are germane when deciding
an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. To recapitulate, a
plaint must be viewed as a whole along with its annexed documents,
47
and it must disclose a clear right to sue .
54. The Court, at the stage of Order VII Rule 11(a), proceeds on a
demurrer, allegations in the plaint are presumed to be true, as
recognised, inter alia, in Mayar (supra) and followed in Inspiration
Clothes (supra) .
55. At the cost of repetition, the issue before this Court is whether
the plaint discloses a cause of action in order to survive the scrutiny of
Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. This question must be examined in light of
the statutory framework and relevant precedents.
45
ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Apellate Tribunal , (1998) 2 SCC 70
46
(1997) 4 SCC 467
47
T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal , (1977) 4 SCC 467
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 27 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
56. The Supreme Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra
Murthy (supra), Mayar (supra), Popat and Kotecha Property (supra)
and T. Arivandandam (supra) held that the plaint must be read in its
entirety and given a meaningful reading to ascertain whether it
discloses a cause of action, i.e., a clear right to sue. Additionally, as
per Om Prakash Srivastava (supra) , Mayar (supra) and ABC
Laminart (P) Ltd. (supra) , a cause of action must disclose material
facts that entitle a person to approach a court for relief. This includes
the existence of a legal right, an act by the defendant that affects this
right, and consequential legal injury caused by this act. In Roop Lal
Sathi (supra) , material facts were defined as the facts necessary to
formulate a complete cause of action, omission of even a single
material fact would render the cause of action incomplete and the
plaint liable to be rejected.
57. In the present case, the Plaintiff claims that it has exclusive and
continuous use of the impugned mark “PADAN” in India, having
developed and marketed the product since 1988. The Plaintiff asserts
that it has substantial sales and promotional expenses, thereby
acquiring goodwill in the said mark. It further claims that Defendant
No. 2 has launched a product using deceptively similar packaging,
thereby causing confusion and damaging the Plaintiff’s reputation.
58. The plaint discloses the cause of action in paragraph 36 as
follows:
“36. That in the above facts and circumstances, cause of action to
file the present suit has arisen in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants. Cause of action for the first time arose in favour of
the plaintiff and against the defendants in the last week of May,
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 28 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
2023, when plaintiff came across a leaf let of defendant no.2 which
showed that it is going to launch pesticide based on CARTAP
HYDROCLORIDE technical under the trademark PADAN. Cause
st
of action thereafter arose in the 1 week of June, 2023 when
plaintiff procured one such product from the market. Cause of
action thereafter arose when the plaintiff filed cancellation petition
against the trademark PADAN registered in favour of defendants.
The cause of action is continuous one and is accruing every day
and shall continue to so accrue till the defendants cease with
use/claim in any manner over the impugned trademark/packaging
or any other trademark identical with or deceptively similar to the
plaintiff’s said trade mark/packaging in relation to impugned
goods.”
59. Applying the aforesaid principles and reading the plaint
holistically within the scope of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, we are of
the view that the plaint discloses sufficient material facts to establish a
cause of action. The facts delineated sufficiently establish the
Plaintiff’s right to sue based on the royalty-based license agreement
dated 06.12.2004 between CAPL and the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff
pleads its right in the impugned mark and packaging based on license
arrangements, prior and exclusive use, sales, promotional expenses
and accrued goodwill thereof. It is specifically pleaded that the
Plaintiff designed the impugned packaging and that Defendant No.2
adopted deceptively similar packaging for identical goods, and that
such use has caused confusion, dilution and injury to the Plaintiff.
These averments must be presumed true at this stage, and if proven,
would entitle the Plaintiff to relief, thereby satisfying the test laid
down in Liverpool & London S.P. (supra) . The correctness or
ultimate sustainability of these averments will necessarily require
evidentiary inquiry, which is impermissible at the stage of Order VII
Rule 11(a) CPC.
60. The learned Single Judge, by relying on Ponniamman
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 29 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
Educational Trust (supra) , held that the since the DA was referred to
in the plaint but not annexed, it could be incorporated by such
reference in the plaint. We deem it fit to reproduce the relevant
excerpt as follows of the impugned judgment below:
“21. … 18. In the light of the controversy, we have gone through all
the averments in the plaint. In Para 4 of the plaint, it is alleged that the
second defendant as agreement-holder of the first defendant and also as
the registered power-of-attorney holder of the first defendant executed
the agreement of sale. In spite of our best efforts, we could not find any
particulars showing as to the documents which are referred to as
“agreement-holder”. We are satisfied that neither the documents were
filed along with the plaint nor the terms thereof have been set out in the
plaint. The abovementioned two documents were to be treated as part of
the plaint as being the part of the cause of action. It is settled law that
where a document is sued upon and its terms are not set out in the
plaint but referred to in the plaint, the said document gets incorporated
by reference in the plaint. This position has been reiterated in U.S.
Sasidharan v. K. Karunakaran [(1989) 4 SCC 482] and Manohar
48
Joshiv. Nitin Bhaurao Patil [(1996) 1 SCC 169]
[emphasis supplied]
23. Therefore, since the aforesaid agreement has been relied upon in
the plaint, the Court can look into it even though it has been filed on
behalf of the defendants along with the written statement. It appears that
the plaintiff has deliberately not filed the said agreement as it would
show that the said agreement has been entered by and between the
defendant no.1 and CAPL and the plaintiff was not a party to the said
agreement.
24. As per the Distribution Agreement dated 26th December 2005,
the terms of trade mark license granted by the defendant no.1 in favour
of CAPL are detailed in Article 8 of the said agreement dated 26th
December 2005. Article 8.1 and 8.2 of the said agreement is set out
below:
“8.1 During the term of this Agreement and subject to
the terms and conditions herein, STA grants to
Distributor a non-exclusive, royalty fee non-
transferrable license to use the Trademarks on the
Products as indicated in Exhibit D for distribution of the
Products for the Field in the Territory with a right to
48
Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Education Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust,
(2012) 8 SCC 706
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 30 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
sub-license to its affiliates; provided that, Distributor
shall cause its affiliates to abide by and carry out the
duties and obligations imposed upon Distributor
hereunder mutatis mutandis.
8.2 Distributor acknowledges STA’s right, title and
interest in and to the Trademarks and will not at any
time do or cause to be done any action or inaction
which in any way may impair or intend to impair any
part of said right, title and interest. Distributor shall not
question the validity of any of the Trademarks. Neither
Distributor nor any of its dealers nor other sales network
entities shall use or attempt to use any advertising or
promotional materials tending to dilute or harm the
reputation or goodwill attached to STA or the
Trademarks. Distributor shall use the Trademarks
applicable hereto in connection solely with the sale of the
Products in the manner and form in which they have
hereto before been used by STA and in no other manner
or form except as expressly authorized by STA in
advance in writing. All advertising and promotional
materials prepared or placed by Distributor and/or any
of its dealers or other sales network entities, as well as
the format of any of the Trademarks, shall be consistent
with STA standards with regard to Product attributes
and performance.”
[emphasis supplied]
25. These clauses demonstrate that CAPL was only given a license
on a non-exclusive basis to use the mark PADAN and there was no
assignment of the said mark in its favour. Therefore, under the terms of
the aforesaid agreement, even CAPL could not have claimed any
ownership/ proprietary right over the mark PADAN.”
61. It is evident from the above that the learned Single Judge relied
upon a document filed by the Defendants. This approach adopted by
the learned Single Judge is alien to the vast jurisprudence of Order VII
Rule 11(a) CPC, as reiterated in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra
Murthy (supra) . The principle emerging from Ponniamman
Educational Trust (supra) is that when a document is relied upon in
the plaint, but not filed along with it or its contents are not set out in
the plaint, it becomes incorporated in the plaint by reference. This
principle, however, does not permit the court to rely on documents
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 31 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
furnished by the defendant at the Order VII Rule 11(a) stage. Further,
the expression “gets incorporated by reference” pertains to a
document “sued upon”, i.e., forming the very foundation of the cause
of action. The DA in the present case is not a document “sued upon”
or the source of the Plaintiff’s claim but is invoked to defeat it. Its
legal effect, scope and inter se consequences between the parties are
disputed and require adjudication, therefore, cannot be considered at
the threshold. Thus, incorporation by reference cannot be stretched to
permit rejection of the plaint based on material furnished by a
defendant.
62. The learned Single Judge held that no cause of action arose for
copyright infringement on the premise that the Copyright Assignment
Deed dated 04.04.2006 was silent as to its duration, and thus, by virtue
of Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act, 1957, it must be deemed to
have expired after five years.
63. The Deed placed on record pertains to artwork used for
“PADAN 4G” (Cartap Hydrochlorside 4% Granule), whereas the
present dispute purportedly concerns other trademarks “PADAN” and
“PADAN 50SP” as well. The Deed, therefore, does not ex facie cover
all works involved in the dispute. Additionally, while the Deed refers
to annexed artwork, this annexure does not form part of the record,
making its precise scope unclear. It is well-settled that registration is
not a pre-requisite for the existence of copyright under the Copyright
Act, 1957. Even assuming that the Deed has expired, such expiry does
not, ipso facto, extinguish the copyright but may result in the
reversion of rights to the assignor. Thus, the effect of the Deed is
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 32 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
essentially a triable issue.
64. The plaint in the present case specifically avers the Plaintiff’s
authorship in 2006, its continuous use thereafter, and the adoption of
deceptively similar packaging for identical goods by Defendant No. 2
for identical goods. The legal effect of the Deed, including whether
the rights reverted or whether the Plaintiff retained ownership,
requires evidentiary inquiry and cannot be conclusively determined at
this stage. Hence, the learned Judge erred in undertaking an evaluation
beyond the limited ambit of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC.
65. The learned Single Judge also held that no cause of action arose
for passing off by citing the Plaintiff’s failure to prove goodwill and
the sales and promotional expenses of its sister concerns, as opposed
to its own. We agree with the submission of Mr. J. Sai Deepak that a
conclusive finding on goodwill is unwarranted at the Order VII Rule
11(a) stage, especially considering the averment that CAPL is the
sister concern and licensee of the Plaintiff. At this stage, the Court is
required to examine only whether the plaint discloses the essential
ingredients of passing off, including goodwill, misrepresentation, and
damage or likelihood thereof to the plaintiff, rather than determining
whether goodwill has been conclusively proven.
66. It is well-settled that confusion is to be assessed from the
perspective of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect
recollection, and that actual proof of confusion is not required; the
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 33 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
49
likelihood of such confusion suffices . In light of the decision in
Westend Green Farms Society (supra) , it is sufficient if the plaint
discloses material facts constituting the allegation of passing off.
67. In the present case, the plaint alleges adoption of deceptively
similar packaging by Defendant No. 2 in respect of identical goods,
thereby increasing the likelihood of confusion. The plaint contains
categorical averments of continuous use and goodwill in relation to
the impugned mark, the Agreement dated 29.01.2000 for CAPL
undertaking Plaintiff’s marketing, and the royalty-based license deed
dated 06.12.2004 granted in favour of CAPL by the Plaintiff. In view
of the aforesaid license deed and the Plaintiff being the parent
company of Agrimas and CAPL, assuming these averments to be true
at face value at the Order VII Rule 11(a) stage, it can be reasonably
inferred that the use by CAPL as the licensee and Agrimas as the sister
concern may inure to the benefit of the Plaintiff. The existence of the
license agreement suggests that the Plaintiff was entitled to sue in its
own right and could not be non-suited merely because CAPL is under
liquidation.
68. Moreover, the questions such as whether group of companies
doctrine applies or whether only the Resolution Professional could sue
on behalf of CAPL, are triable issues requiring evidence to be led and
cannot be conclusively decided at this stage.
49
Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v. Borden Inc., (1990) 1 All ER 873 (HL); Satyam Infoway Ltd v.
Siffynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd ., (2004) 6 SCC 145; Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt Ltd v. Yashwantrao
Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, (2024) 2 SCC 577
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 34 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
69. The learned Single Judge opined that Defendant No. 1 was the
registered proprietor, as also conceded in the plaint, and that it was the
prior user of the impugned mark on the strength of the Formulation
Guideline dated 23.05.1983, and that the impugned packaging, by
mentioning Sumitomo JV, functioned as a source identifier for the
Defendants. In our opinion, these findings are misplaced. As per
settled principles, this Court must proceed on the assumption that the
averments in the plaint are true. The mere existence of a registration
does not extinguish the Plaintiff’s common law remedies or benefits
arising from the license agreements. These are triable issues, including
the effect of ‘Sumitomo JV’ on the impugned packaging, which
require evidentiary consideration and are impermissible at the Order
VII Rule 11(a) CPC stage. Further, the finding in the learned Single
Judge’s decision regarding the Agreement dated 06.12.2004 being
fabricated and that the Plaintiff falsely claimed to be the registered
proprietor of “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”, followed by the
overall rejection of the plaint based on these grounds is premature and
erroneous. Such a conclusion necessitates an adjudication of disputed
questions of fact and evidentiary inquiry; the validity of documents
cannot be determined at this stage, as held in Inspiration Clothes
(supra) . The questions of validity and ownership under the
agreement, as well as the Plaintiff’s right to describe itself as the
proprietor of the mark “PADAN 4G” and “PADAN 50SP”, are
manifestly triable issues and their resolution cannot be prematurely
foreclosed under Order VII Rule 11(a).
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 35 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
70. The learned Single Judge’s conclusion that the cause of action
was “illusory” also appears premature, as it is not for the Court at this
stage to assess the merits of the Plaintiff’s case. Under Order VII Rule
11(a), a court is only concerned with whether the plaint, assuming its
averments to be true, discloses a cause of action, i.e., material facts
that, if proved, would entitle the Plaintiff to relief. Thus, the enquiry is
not about whether the Plaintiff will ultimately succeed but whether the
cause of action is pleaded at all.
71. The concept of an “illusory” cause of action, as cautioned in T.
Arivandandam (supra) , applies where clever drafting creates a
semblance of a right without pleading the material facts constituting
that right. In the present case, the Plaintiff has adequately pleaded
facts that, if proven, would entitle it to a remedy. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge’s conclusion that the cause of action is illusory is
erroneous.
72. Further, the finding of “illusory” is conceptually akin to the
50
standard under Order XIII-A Rule 3 governing summary judgments,
which contemplates summary disposal in situations where a party has
no real prospect of succeeding in its claim. This assessment involves
evaluating the legal effect of documents and competing claims, which
is impermissible at the stage of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC. In the
present case, the plaint pleads proprietary rights, prior use, license
arrangements, adoption of deceptively similar work by the defendants,
50
“ 3. Grounds for summary judgment.— The Court may give a summary judgment against a plaintiff
or defendant on a claim if it considers that––
( a ) the plaintiff has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or the defendant has no real prospect of successfully
defending the claim, as the case may be; and
( b ) there is no other compelling reason why the claim should not be disposed of before recording of oral evidence.”
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 36 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
and the resultant injury. These averments, taken to be true, constitute
material facts which may entitle the Plaintiff to relief. Thus, the
conclusions reached by the learned Single Judge go beyond the
limited scope of an Order VII Rule 11(a) enquiry. Therefore, we find
that the rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) was not
warranted, and the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
73. The contentions of the Defendants regarding the Plaintiff’s
locus and the allegation that the plaint fails to disclose a cause of
action have been answered in the above discussion. The contention
that even presuming Plaintiff’s proprietorship over “PADAN” based
on use by its sister concern, no enforceable right exists because the
Agreement with CAPL is terminated, overlooks the common law
remedies available to the Plaintiff and the fact that copyright may exist
even without registration. The specific pleading regarding the License
Agreement dated 06.12.2004 between CAPL and the Plaintiff,
presumed to be true at this stage, establishes that CAPL’s sales and
promotional expenses will inure to the benefit of the Plaintiff.
74. The contention that the Plaintiff, on behalf of CAPL, cannot
assert proprietary rights in the impugned mark requires interpretation
of contractual terms and evidence to be led, which is a matter for trial
and cannot be conclusively determined at the Order VII Rule 11(a)
stage. The contention that the communications on record are between
CAPL and the Defendants, not the Plaintiff, were reasonably
explained by the Plaintiff, who submitted that under Agreement dated
27.01.2000, CAPL undertook the marketing of the Plaintiff’s products
and that under the License Agreement dated 06.12.2004, CAPL acted
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 37 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
as the Plaintiff’s licensee. Hence, communications involving CAPL,
not the plaintiff, cannot undermine the Plaintiff’s pleaded case at this
stage.
75. The Defendants’ allegation of suppression of the Trademark
Agreement dated 15.03.2003 and the DA dated 26.12.2005 by the
Plaintiff is not persuasive. A suppressed fact must be material in the
51
sense that its disclosure would effectively alter the Court’s decision .
In the present case, the aforesaid documents, are invoked to portray
CAPL as a mere licensee of Defendant No. 1; it is conceded in the
plaint that CAPL was a non-exclusive licensee of Takeda. Further,
since these documents do not form part of the plaint, they cannot be
considered under Order VII Rule 11(a). Further, the effect of these
arrangements is a triable issue and cannot be addressed at this stage.
CONCLUSION
76. It is well settled that a plaint must disclose material facts
constituting the foundation of a legal right to sue; in the absence of
such facts, no real cause of action arises. In the present case, we find
that the plaint contains specific averments regarding the Plaintiff’s
continuous and exclusive use of the impugned mark in India, the
License Agreement between the Plaintiff and Takeda, as well as
substantial sales and goodwill acquired by the Plaintiff. The plaint
further alleges the adoption of deceptively similar packaging by
Defendant No. 2 in relation to the same goods, thereby amounting to
copyright infringement and passing off. These averments, which must
be presumed true at Order VII Rule 11 (a) stage, disclose the existence
51
S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar , (2004) 7 SCC 166
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 38 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26
of a cause of action.
77. Whether the plaintiff ultimately succeeds is extraneous to the
inquiry under Order VII Rule 11(a) and cannot justify the rejection of
the plaint at the threshold by characterising the cause of action as
“purely illusory”.
78. The sequitur of the foregoing discussion is that the learned
Single Judge erred in rejecting the plaint at the outset, thereby
transgressing the settled parameters of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC,
which require a court to limit its inquiry solely to the averments in the
plaint and its annexures.
79. In light of the above, the appeal is accordingly allowed.
80. The suit filed by the Appellant is restored to its original number
and shall proceed in accordance with law. The learned Single Judge
shall now adjudicate the suit uninfluenced by any observation made in
this judgment.
81. Parties are directed to appear before the learned Single Judge
(Roster Bench) on 30.03.2026 for further proceedings.
82. Pending applications, if any, are disposed of. No order as to
costs.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 18, 2026 /gunn/ss / pa
Signature Not Verified
RFA(OS)(COMM) 22/2025 Page 39 of 39
Signed By:GUNN
Signing Date:18.03.2026
16:09:26