Gautam Bauri And Anr vs The State Of Jharkhand

2026:JHHC:31680-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
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Cr. Appeal No. (SJ) 1790 of 2017
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(Against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
dated 13.09.2017 and 15.09.2017 respectively, passed by
learned Additional Sessions Judge-V-cum-F.T.C, Dhanbad in
Sessions Trial No.205 of 2014)

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1.Gautam Bauri, S/o-Late Fatik Chandra Bauri.
2.Chinta Devi W/o Gautam Bauri
Both are Resident of Sakin-Gopinathpur, P.O + P.S.-Nirsa,
District-Dhanbad. …. Appellants
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ….. Respondent

P R E S E N T
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
…..

For the Appellant : Mr. Pratiush Lala, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Bishambhar Shastri, APP
…..
C.A.V. on 14/09/2026 Pronounced on 29/10/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:

1. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the present
appeal was heard analogous to Criminal Appeal (DB) No.
1876 of 2017, preferred by the husband of the deceased,
namely Ratan Bauri, who had been convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code
and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period of ten years.
2. The aforesaid Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 1876 of 2017
has already been disposed of by this Court vide order dated
14.09.2026 as not pressed, in view of the fact that the
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appellant therein, Ratan Bauri, had already undergone and
completed the sentence of ten years imposed upon him by
the learned Trial Court.
3. On the same date, after hearing the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the parties at considerable length, the
present appeal was reserved for judgment.
Prayer
4. The instant appeal has been filed under Section 374
(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 13.09.2017 and
15.09.2017 respectively, passed by learned Additional
Sessions Judge-V-cum-F.T.C, Dhanbad in Sessions Trial
No.205 of 2014 arising out of Nirsa Police Station Case
No.141 of 2012 corresponding to G.R. Case No.2107 of 2012,
by which the appellants have been convicted under section
304(B) of IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for a period of 7
years (seven years).
Prosecution Case:
5. This Court, before proceeding to examine the legality
and propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, deems it fit and proper to refer the background of
institution of prosecution case.
6. The prosecution case, in brief, is based on fardbeyan
of Alta Devi [PW 5] recorded near BGH Mortuary
(postmortem house) by ASI Anjani Kumar Tiwary of Sector-IV
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Police Station Bokaro on 23.05.2012 at about 3:30 P.M. As
per said fardbeyan, daughter of Alta Devi namely Rinku Devi
(Deceased) was married with Ratan Bauri and she was
residing in her matrimonial house with in-laws‟ family. She
was being tortured by committing assault by the accused
persons due to dowry demand of Rs. 50,000/- and a
motorcycle and pressure were putting to bring such dowry
but informant was unable to fulfill the said demand due to
financial problem.
7. It has further been alleged that on 22.05.2012 at
about 7:00 A.M. mother-in-law Bijali Devi and husband
Ratan Bauri with consent of "bhainsur” poured kerosene oil
and set fire by matchstick due to which Rinku Devi burnt
seriously then due to fear of society and legal action accused
persons brought her for treatment at BGH, Bokaro at 10:30
A.M. and after admitting her in-laws family fled away.
8. It is further stated in the fardbeyan that from villagers
she could get information about burning and admitting of
her daughter in hospital then she along with her son Fatik
Bauri went to BGH and saw her daughter Rinku Devi and
then her daughter said that husband, mother-in-law,
bhainsur Gautam Bauri (appellant herein), Nanad Manju
Devi and Gotani Chinta Devi (appellant herein) all poured
kerosene oil and set fire by matchstick. It has also made
specific that mother-in-law has poured kerosene oil and
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husband Ratan Bauri set fire by matchstick. It is further
stated that during treatment she succumb to death.
9. On the basis of said fardbeyan Nirsa P.S. Case No.
141/12 was registered on 28.05.2012. After investigation
charge-sheet has been submitted against all accused
persons u/s. 304(B) of the I.P.C. and later on cognizance was
taken and then case has been committed to the court of
Sessions in which accused Bijali Devi has been shown as
absconder and vide order dated 02.07.2015 and her case
was split up.
10. The charge against the appellants was framed under
section 304B IPC to which they pleaded not guilty and
claimed to be tried.
11. The prosecution in order to bring home charges has
adduced altogether eight witnesses and thereafter
prosecution evidence was closed.
12. The statement of the accused persons has been
recorded under section 313 of the Cr. P.C in which the
accused persons have denied to commit such offence as
alleged by the prosecution.
13. The defence of the accused persons is that they are
innocent and Rinku Devi [deceased] died due to accidental
fire while she was lighting oven.
14. The trial Court, after recording the evidence of
witnesses, examination-in-chief and cross-examination,
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recorded the statement of the accused persons and found the
charges levelled against the appellants under Section 304B
IPC proved beyond all reasonable doubts.
15. Accordingly, the appellants have been held guilty and
convicted and accordingly sentenced as stated above, which
is the subject matter of instant appeal.
Submission on behalf of appellants :
16. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has
assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence on the following grounds:
I. Prosecution has miserably failed in proving the charge
leveled against the appellants and learned trial court has
committed error of law in evaluating and analyzing the
evidence in coming to the conclusion.
II. Submission has been made that there is no
independent witness who has supported the prosecution
case. The appellants are the in-laws of the deceased and
they have nothing to do with the life of the deceased and
her husband as the appellants have their separate mess
and kitchen, but this fact has not been taken into
consideration by learned trial court.
III. Further submission has been made that the
learned trial court has over looked the fact that there
was no complaint regarding any torture or dowry
demand against these appellants but when the deceased
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Rinku Devi got burnt accidently during lighting of oven
then she was brought to hospital for treatment but
unfortunately, she died then under anger the mother of
deceased has lodged this case with false allegation of
dowry demand of Rs.50,000/- and a motorcycle.
IV. Further submission has been made that it is
false to say that the deceased, Rinku Devi, has told her
mother about the specific role of these appellants in
occurrence of pouring kerosene oil or setting fire by
matchstick.
V. Further submission has been made that the
learned trial court has failed to consider that the
prosecution could not produce the materials of
circumstantial evidence as there was no direct evidence.
VI. Further submission has been made that there is
major contradiction in the testimonies of witnesses,
which has not been taken care by the learned Trial
Court in the impugned judgment.
VII. Learned counsel for the appellants, in the
backdrop of aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence since is
not based upon cogent evidence and as such it cannot
be said that the prosecution has been able to prove the
charge beyond all reasonable doubt.
Submission of the learned APP for the State:
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17. P er Contra , learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing
on behalf of State has defended the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence taking the ground that the
impugned judgment has been passed based upon the
testimony of witnesses who have supported the prosecution
version.
18. Submission has been made that it is evident from the
testimony of the witnesses that there was demand of dowry
of Rs.50,000/- and motorcycle and in view of such illegal
demand of dowry and assault, „Panchayati‟ was done.
19. Further submission has been made that the deceased
was completely burnt rather her upper neck, head and hair
was not burnt and even the another accused Ratan Bouri in
his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C has stated
that during treatment his wife was speaking and the
deceased has stated about the role of the present appellants
in alleged commission of crime.

20. Further submission has been made that even if there
are minor discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses
that cannot wash away the case of the prosecution.
21. Learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid
ground, has submitted that the prosecution has been able to
prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt
and as such the impugned judgment requires no interference
by this Court.
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Analysis

22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties,
perused the documents available on record and the
testimony of witnesses as also the finding recorded by
learned trial Court in the impugned order.
23. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect
vis-à-vis argument advanced on behalf of parties, is now
proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
24. However, before proceeding further it needs to refer
herein the testimonies of the witnesses.
25. PW-1 Punam Devi has deposed that since after
marriage Rinku Devi was being tortured by her husband and
in- laws family members. As per this witness accused
persons were demanding Hero Honda Motorcycle and
regarding the said demand and torture panchayati was also
arranged and after panchayati Rinku Devi was sent to
matrimonial home. She has further deposed that on
31.07.2011, information was received regarding torture then
brother of Rinku Devi namely Fatik Bauri had gone to pacify
the said matter. In Para-4 this witness has stated that on
23.05.2012 when she heard about the occurrence and
admission of Rinku Devi in hospital then she went there but
till that time Rinku Devi was died and, in her presence,
panchnama of dead body was made upon which she has put
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signature. On her identification, her signature on the
Panchnama has been marked as Ext.-1.
26. During cross-examination she has deposed that police
had recorded her statement at Bokaro when she had gone to
see Rinku Devi.
27. PW-2 Phatik Bauri is brother of the deceased bride. He
has deposed that Rinku Devi was married and after three to
four months of the marriage demand of Rs. 50,000/- and a
motorcycle was made and she was being assaulted. He also
deposed that he tried to pacify the said matter but on
22.05.2012 all of sudden telephone call was received about
admitting his sister in BGH then he along with other went to
BGH and his sister (deceased) told that due to non-
fulfillment of demand of money all accused sprinkled
kerosene oil and set fire by matchstick. He also deposed that
on the same day she died during treatment. He identified his
signature on the fardbeyan which has been marked as Ext.2.

28. During cross-examination he could not say who
informed by phone but when he arrived at BGH then her
treatment was going on and bandage was up-to neck and
neck and face were not burnt. He also deposed that on that
day people suggested that treatment be continued and
thereafter police will be informed tomorrow. In para 9 he
deposed that mouth and hair was not burnt. He denied the
suggestion of defence that she was not able to speak. He also
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denied the suggestion of defence that it was accidental
reason of death. In para-12 he clarified that what he has
stated before the court that is based on as stated by his
sister (deceased).
29. PW-3 Kajal Devi is villager of parental house of
deceased Rinku Devi. She deposed that after marriage of
deceased, Rs. 50,000/- and motorcycle was being demanded
by husband, mother-in-law, bhainsur, gotani and nanad and
for that she was subjected and killed by setting fire. In para
4 she has deposed that deceased has told at BGH that her
mother-in-law poured kerosene and husband set fire by
matchstick and rest people did not save.
30. During cross-examination in Para-7 she deposed that
she reached hospital then Rinku was weeping and she told
about the occurrence. She also deposed that her mouth and
head was not burnt. She denied the suggestion of defence
that she was fully burnt and she was not able to speak. She
also denied the suggestion of defence that no dowry or
torture was made and it is accidental burning death.
31. PW-4 Ala Devi has deposed that Rinku Devi was
married in 2010 with Ratan Bauri and after 1 to 2 months
dowry demand was being made and for that she was beaten
and Rs. 50,000/- and motorcycle was demanded but that
was not fulfilled. In Para 3 she has specifically stated that on
22.05.2012 deceased told her that her mother-in-law poured
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kerosene oil and Ratan set fire by matchstick. She also
added that "jeth, jethani and nanad” were also involved in
the occurrence. In Para 6 she deposed that she also went to
see her in hospital and she was fully burnt but in speaking
situation. During cross-examination in Para - 9 she deposed
that sometimes Rinku used to comes her parental home and
her husband accompanied her in coming.
32. PW-5 Alta Devi is mother of the deceased bride as well
as informant of this case. She deposed that her daughter
Rinku Devi has been married in 2010 with Ratan Bauri and
after two months her husband and other accused began to
demand dowry of Rs. 50,000/- and motorcycle but she could
not fulfill the said demand then all accused killed her by
setting fire. This witness has also deposed that mother-in-
law poured kerosene oil and husband Ratan Bauri set fire by
matchstick and other accused persons were seeing the
occurrence and they did not save. In Para 4 she deposed that
when she reached hospital then sline was running and
deceased was conscious and talking and she said that all
accused have set fire and no one saved her. Again, she said
that her mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and husband set
fire by matchstick and other accused were involved in the
conspiracy of occurrence and silently they were watching
and they did not save.
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33. During cross-examination in Para-14 she deposed
that her daughter comes and goes to "maike" with her
husband. In Para 15 she deposed that she went to
matrimonial house of her daughter for two to three times due
to reason of disputes. In Para-16 she deposed that she had
not lodged any case prior to this occurrence but -panchayti
was held regarding those disputes. In Para-18 she accepted
that nanad Manju Devi is married lady having children and
her matrimonial home is in West Bengal Lalpur and Nanad
always resides in her "maike". In Para 20 she further
deposed that she had given her daughter coconut water and
she was in light conscious. In Para - 24 she deposed that
head and hair of her daughter was not burnt. She denied the
suggestion of defence that there was no demand of dowry or
torture. She also denied the suggestion of defence that it was
accidental injury but under emotion lodged false case.
34. PW-6 Srimant Bauri has deposed that mother of the
deceased Rinku told on phone that in-laws family killed her
daughter by setting fire then he and his wife and Ram
Prasad Bauri went to see her and when they reached at BGH
till that time Rinku Devi had died. Thereafter they went
sector-IV Police station and statement of mother of Rinku
Devi was recorded upon which he also put his signature. He
identified his signature on the fardbeyan which was marked
as Ext.-2/1. He further deposed that police came and
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postmortem was done. In Para 5 he deposed that in-law‟s
family and husband always tortured Rinku Devi for dowry.
He also deposed that prior to occurrence about 8 to 9
months a panchayati was also conveyed in which he and his
wife who is member of District Board, were also present and
this Panchavati was convened in which husband and
mother-in-law of Rinku Devi had had assured not to commit
any assault and they will keep Rinku Devi happily.

35. During cross-examination he deposed that he cannot
say on which date panchayati was convened. He also
deposed that there was no written complaint for panchayti
rather it was oral request to resolve the dispute and after
pacifying both sides bride was sent to her matrimonial home.
In Para-18 he stated that he and his wife went to hospital
separately in separate vehicle where mother and brother of
deceased were already present in the hospital but from the
side of husband no one was there. He denied the suggestion
of defence that for political gain he is giving false evidence in
favour of adjacent villager.
36. PW-7 Choudhary Mehra retired S.I. is Investigating
Officer of this case. He deposed that he was entrusted with
investigation of Nirsa P.S. Case No. 141/12 on 28.05.2012.
He identified the endorsement upon which it was marked as
Ext.-2/2. He also proved formal F.I.R. as Ext. 3. He further
deposed that during investigation he recorded statement of
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informant Alta Devi and also recorded the statement of Fatik
Bauri, Kajal Bauri, Ala Devi at police station. Thereafter he
inspected the place of occurrence which was bed room of the
deceased Rinku Devi wherefrom smell of kerosene oil was
coming. He also recorded the statement of Suraj Bauri,
Mukesh Bauri, Punam Devi and Srimant Bauri. He further
deposed that he received postmortem report from Sector-IV
Police station and thereafter he submitted charge-sheet
showing the accused persons absconder.
37. During cross-examination in Para-12 he clarified that
at the place of occurrence he recorded the statement of Suraj
Bauri and Mukesh Bauri and he accepted that other
witnesses are of parental village of deceased. In Para - 13 he
deposed that in the case diary he has not mentioned about
smell of kerosene oil coming from the bed room of deceased.
In Para 15 he deposed that no panchayti paper was given to
him but he was said about oral panchayati. In Para 16 he
accepted that he did not visit Bokaro General Hospital, nor
recorded statement of any doctor.
38. PW-8 Dr. Vikash Kumar is a Medical Officer who has
conducted the postmortem of deceased. He had stated that
in general examination he found as follows: (i) Rigor mortis
was present in all four limbs. Eyes closed, mouth partially
opened. Tongue inside. (ii) 100% burn over scalp hair, all
over face, front and back of the neck, front and back of the
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chest both sides, all over abdomen, pelvic region, both sides
of the shoulder, both sides of the arm and forearm, both
sides of the thighs and both sides of the legs.
39. As per this witness cause of death was caused due to
shock leading to Cardio-respiratory failure due to burn
injury. On his identification postmortem report has been
marked as Ext. 4. During cross-examination in para-8 he
deposed that above mentioned burn injuries may be possible
due to accidental fire and it may be homicidal also. In para-9
he deposed that entire body including lips had been burnt.
He accepted that cause of fire has not been mentioned in the
report.
40. As per the prosecution case and testimonies available
on record, it is admitted fact that marriage of the deceased-
Rinku Devi was solemnized with Ratan Bauri in the year
2010 and the deceased-Rinku Devi succumbed to burn
injuries allegedly the mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and
husband Ratan Bauri set fire by matchstick and other
accused persons (appellants) were seeing the occurrence and
they did not save.
41. The prosecution has led evidences to establish that the
deceased-Rinku Devi was burnt by the accused persons,
including the appellants within two years of marriage due to
non-fulfillment of dowry demand.
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42. While the appellant, in his defence, has taken the
ground that the interested persons concocted the story out of
emotion and it was an accidental case of burning.
43. So far, the present appellants are concerned, it is
submitted that none of the witnesses have cited their specific
role rather they have deposed that while the incident
occurred the appellants did not make any effort to save the
deceased. Further, there is no specific demand of dowry
against these appellants. It has further been submitted that
that there is no cogent evidence available against these
appellants.
44. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and on
consideration of the rival submissions and the materials
evidence available on the record, the following points arise
for determination:
(i) Whether the prosecution has established the essential
ingredients of Section 304-B IPC in relation to present
appellants.
(ii) Whether the alleged demand for dowry and cruelty or
harassment soon before the death have been established
by reliable evidence against the present appellants.
(iii) Whether the present appellants are entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt.
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45. This Court before proceeding further needs to refer
herein the provision of law as mentioned under Section 304B
IPC under which they have been convicted:
304B. Dowry death.—
(1)Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or
bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal
circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband
for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative
shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation .— For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2)Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.
46. The implied connotation of Section 304B IPC is that if
a woman dies within seven years of marriage by any
burns or bodily injury or it was revealed that before her
marriage, she was exposed to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any other relative of the husband in
connection to demand dowry then the death of the
woman will be considered as dowry death. Meaning
thereby t he death of a woman must be caused within by
burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal
circumstances. The death must occur within 7 years of
marriage. Further, the w oman [deceased] must have been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or
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his relatives. It further says that c ruelty or harassment
should be in connection with the demand of dowry and
soon before death. Such cruelty or harassment is shown
to have been meted out to the woman soon before her
death. Under the provisions of Section 304-B (2) of
Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) whoever commits dowry
death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than 7 years, but which may
extend to imprisonment for life.
47. Thus, it is evident that there are three conditions in
the aforesaid statute and if those three conditions are
fulfilled then the case will come under the purview of
Section 304-B. Three conditions which culled out from
section 304-B are as follows:
i. The death caused by burn or bodily injury or
occurs otherwise within under normal
circumstance.

ii. Death was occurred within seven years of her
marriage.
iii. It has been shown that soon before her death
she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by
her husband or any relative of her husband in
connection with any demand for dowry.
48. It needs to refer herein that in order to sustain the
conviction under Section 304B of the IPC, it is
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mandatory to establish that soon before death, the victim
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband
or any relative of her husband in connection with any
demand for dowry and death caused by burn or bodily
injury or occurs otherwise within under normal
circumstance within seven years of victim‟s marriage.
49. In the case of Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015)
5 SCC 201 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex
Court has laid down the guideline wherein it has been
specifically observed that in order to sustain the
conviction under Section 304-B IPC, cruelty or
harassment is shown to have been meted out to the
woman soon before her death. For ready reference the
relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being
quoted as under :
“10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the
following essential ingredients are to be established:
(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or
bodily injury or otherwise than under a “normal
circumstance”;
(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years
of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment
by her husband or any relative of her husband;
(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in
connection with demand of dowry; and (v) such
cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted
out to the woman soon before her death.”
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50. It needs to refer herein that the cruelty or harassment
differs from case to case. Cruelty can be mental or it can
be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It
can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or
humiliating a woman. It can be depriving her of economic
resources or essential amenities of life. The list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. 44. Physical cruelty could
be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the
person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and
related harassment has a different impact on the mind of
a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a
lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which
degrade her dignity may remain, etched in her memory
for a long time.
51. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-
B IPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”.
It is a relative term which is required to be considered
under specific circumstances of each case and no
straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-
limit. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances
showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the
deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but
normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may
be spread over a period of time. Proximate and live link
between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and
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the consequential death is required to be proved by the
prosecution.
52. The aforesaid position was emphasized by the Hon‟ble
Apex Court in the case of Satbir Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 wherein it has been held
which reads as under:
“15. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a
strict interpretation would defeat the very object for
which it was enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce
that when the legislature used the words, “soon before”
they did not mean “immediately before”. Rather, they
left its determination in the hands of the courts. The
factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to
case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it
can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This
list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae
can therefore be laid down by this Court to define what
exactly the phrase “soon before” entails.
17. Therefore, courts should use their discretion to
determine if the period between the cruelty or
harassment and the death of the victim would come
within the term “soon before”. What is pivotal to the
above determination, is the establishment of a
“proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the
consequential death of the victim.”
53.
When the prosecution shows that “soon before her
death such woman has been subjected to cruelty or
harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for
dowry”, a presumption of causation arises against the
accused under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.
Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as under:
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“113-B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the
question is whether a person has committed the dowry
death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her
death such woman has been subjected by such person to
cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any
demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such
person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.—For
the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the
same meaning as in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860).”
54. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the word
“shall” has been stipulated therein which provides
mandatory application on the part of the court to
presume that death had been committed by the person
who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in
connection with any demand of dowry and as such onus
lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case
of Section 113-B relatable to Section 304-B IPC, the onus
to prove shifts on the accused.
55. The Hon‟ble Apex Court while relying on the
provisions of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for
short “the Evidence Act”) and Section 304-B IPC, where
the words “soon before her death” find mention, the
following observations have been made in the case of
Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 SCC
129 :
“ 17. Thus, the words “soon before” appear in Section 113-B
of the Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-BIPC. For
the presumptions contemplated under these sections to
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spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or
harassment was caused soon before the death. The
interpretation of the words “soon before” is, therefore,
important. The question is how “soon before”? This would
obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It
relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to
person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental
cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or
emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman.
It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear
ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or
essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her
movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside
world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical
cruelty could be actual beating
or causing pain and harm to
the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and
related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a
woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a lasting
impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity
may remain, etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore,
“soon before” is a relative term. In matters of emotions we
cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case
to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case
of dowry death. 18. In this connection we may refer to the
judgment of this Court in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj
v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935]
where this Court considered the term “soon before”. The
relevant observations are as under : (SCC pp. 222-23, para 15)
„15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which is required to be
considered under specific circumstances of each case and no
straitjacket formula can be laid down by fixing any time-limit.
This expression is pregnant with the idea of proximity test. The
term “soon before” is not synonymous with the term
“immediately before” and is opposite of the expression “soon
after” as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of
the Evidence Act. These words would imply that the interval
should not be too long between the time of making the
23

statement and the death. It contemplates the reasonable time
which, as earlier noticed, has to be understood and determined
under the peculiar circumstances of each case. In relation to
dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of
cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a
particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct.
Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. If the
cruelty or harassment or demand for dowry is shown to have
persisted, it shall be deemed to be “soon before death” if any
other intervening circumstance showing the non existence of
such treatment is not brought on record, before such alleged
treatment and the date of death. It does not, however, mean
that such time can be stretched to any period. Proximate and
live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand
and the consequential death is required to be proved by the
prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment
based upon such demand and the date of death should not be
too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated
as having become stale enough.‟ Thus, there must be a nexus
between the demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment, based
upon such demand and the date of death. The test of proximity
will have to be applied. But, it is not a rigid test. It depends on
the facts and circumstances of each case and calls for a
pragmatic and sensitive approach of the court within the
confines of law.”
(emphasis supplied).

56. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of State of
M.P. v. Jogendra, (2022) 5 SCC 401 has pithily
summarized the law on Section 304-BIPC and Section
113-B of the Evidence. For ready reference the relevant
paragraph is being quoted as under:
“17. In the above context, we may usefully refer to a recent
decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gurmeet Singh
v. State of Punjab [Gurmeet Singh v. State of Punjab, (2021) 6
24

SCC 108 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 771] that has restated (at SCC
pp. 111-12, para 9) the detailed guidelines that have been laid
down in Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana [Satbir Singh v. State
of Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 745] , both
authored by N.V. Ramana, C.J. relating to trial under Section
304-BIPC where the law on Section 304-BIPC and Section 113-
B of the Evidence Act has been pithily summarised in the
following words : (Satbir Singh case [Satbir Singh v. State of
Haryana, (2021) 6 SCC 1 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 745] , SCC p. 13,
para 38)
“38.1. Section 304-B IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind
the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and
dowry demand.
38.2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of
the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under
Section 304-BIPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the
rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section
113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused.
38.3. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304-
BIPC cannot be construed to mean “immediately before”. The
prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live
link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for
dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
38.4. Section 304-BIPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in
categorising death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The
reason for such non-categorisation is due to the fact that death
occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in
cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.”
(emphasis in original and supplied)

57. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law
this Court has again delved into the prosecution case
also the testimonies of the witnesses, in order to
appreciate the aforesaid issues.
58. Alta Devi (P.W.5), the mother of the deceased and the
informant of the case, whose fardbeyan has been
25

recorded by the ASI Anjani Kumar Tiwary of Sector IV
Police Station, Bokaro near Bokaro General Hospital
mortuary [Postmortem House]. As per the statement
made by her, Rinku Devi [deceased] was married with
Ratan Bauri and was residing in the matrimonial house
with in-laws‟ family.
59. It has been alleged that the deceased was being
tortured by committing assault by all accused persons
due to dowry demand of Rs. 50,000/- and a motorcycle
and for this pressure was being put to bring such dowry
but it was not fulfilled due to financial problem and then
on 22.05.2012 at about 7:00 A.M. her mother-in-law
Bijali Devi and husband Ratan Bauri with consent of
"bhainsur” poured kerosene oil and set fire by matchstick
due to which she burnt seriously, but due to fear of
society and legal action accused persons brought her for
treatment at BGH, Bokaro at 10:30 A.M. and after
admitting her in-laws family fled away.
60. It is further stated in the fardbeyan that from villagers
the informant came to know about burning and
admitting in hospital then she along with her son Fatik
Bauri went to BGH and saw her daughter Rinku Devi,
who told that her husband, mother-in-law, bhainsur
namely Gautam Bauri(appellant herein) , Nanad Manju
Devi and Gotani Chinta Devi (appellant herein) all poured
26

kerosene oil and set fire by matchstick. It has also
categorically stated that mother-in-law has poured
kerosene oil and husband Ratan Bauri set fire by
matchstick. It is further stated that during treatment she
succumb to death.
61. On the basis of the testimony of evidences following
admitted fact emerged:
(i) The marriage of the deceased was solemanized with
accused Ratan Bauri in year 2010.
(ii) The death of deceased Rinku Devi was occurred in
2012 i.e. within 7 years of marriage.
(iii) The present appellants are brother and sister-in-law
of the husband of deceased.
(iv) Both these appellants have been convicted under
Section 304 B IPC only and sentenced accordingly.
62. Now coming to the testimony of the witnesses. On
perusal of the testimonies of the witnesses, it is evident
that no specific overt act has been alleged against the
present appellants. Further from perusal of the
testimonies of witnesses, it is evident no specific
allegation of demand of dowry has been made against
these appellants.
63. Thus, so far these appellants are concerned there is
vague and blanket accusation against them. Even if the
testimony of the informant is accepted at face value, the
27

specific allegations are confined to the mother-in-law
having poured kerosene oil and the husband, Ratan
Bauri, having ignited the fire with a matchstick.
64. The role attributed to the appellants herein is merely
that they were present at the scene, witnessed the
occurrence, and failed to intervene or make any effort to
rescue the deceased. Thus, the principal allegation
against them is limited to passive conduct as bystanders
without any active participation in the commission of the
offence.
65. Furthermore, it is manifest from the record that the
learned trial Court did not invoke or apply the provisions
of Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code either at the stage
of framing charges or while delivering the impugned
judgment against the present appellants. In absence of
any reference to or reliance upon Section 34 IPC, the
principle of constructive liability through common
intention has not been fastened upon them.
Consequently, the culpability of these appellants in
respect of the alleged heinous offence cannot be legally
established, as no statutory foundation has been laid to
attribute joint liability for the acts may committed by the
other accused.
66. Moreover, it is evident from the record that no specific
allegation of cruelty has been attributed to these
28

appellants by the prosecution rather the allegation is
general in nature. The evidence on record do not disclose
any overt act or conduct on their part which could
amount to cruelty towards the deceased. It has not been
the specific case of the prosecution that prior to her
death the deceased was subjected to cruelty by these
appellants. Thus, in absence of any distinct or
particularized charge of cruelty, the appellants cannot be
fastened with liability under that head.
67. It needs to refer herein that the Hon‟ble Apex Court in
the case of Monju Roy v. State of W.B. , (2015) 13 SCC
693 while referring the judgment of Kans Raj vs. state
of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 207 has observed that a
tendency has, however, developed for roping in all
relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the
matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is
likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against
the real culprits, for ready reference the relevant
paragraph is being quoted herein which reads as under:
“8. While we do not find any ground to interfere with the
view taken by the courts below that the deceased was
subjected to harassment on account of non-fulfilment of
dowry demand, we do find merit in the submission that
possibility of naming all the family members by way of
exaggeration is not ruled out. In Kans Raj [(2000) 5 SCC
207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] , this Court observed: (SCC p.
215, para 5)
29

“5. … A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all
relations of the in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters
of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect
the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits. In
their overenthusiasm and anxiety to seek conviction for
maximum people, the parents of the deceased have been
found to be making efforts for involving other relations
which ultimately weaken the case of the prosecution even
against the real accused as appears to have happened in
the instant case.”
The court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant
relatives without there being specific material. Only the
husband, his parents or at best close family members may
be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not
distant relations, unless there is tangible material to
support allegations made against such distant relations.
Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon
them in the absence of any specific role and material to
support such role.”
68. In Raja Lal Singh v. State of Jharkhand [(2007) 15
SCC 415 it has been observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court
as follows:
“14. No doubt, some of the witnesses e.g. PW 5 Dashrath
Singh, who is the father of the deceased Gayatri, and PW 3
Santosh Kr. Singh, brother of the deceased, have stated
that the deceased Gayatri told them that dowry was
demanded by not only Raja Lal Singh, but also the
appellants Pradip Singh and his wife Sanjana Devi, but we
are of the opinion that it is possible that the names of
Pradip Singh and Sanjana Devi have been introduced only
to spread the net wide as often happens in cases like
under Sections 498-A and 394 IPC, as has been observed
in several decisions of this Court e.g. in Kamesh Panjiyar v.
State of Bihar [(2005) 2 SCC 388 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 511] ,
etc. Hence, we allow the appeal of Pradip Singh and
Sanjana Devi and set aside the impugned judgments of the
30

High Court and the trial court insofar as it relates to them
and we direct that they be released forthwith unless
required in connection with some other case.”
69. Moreover, ingredient of the offence under Section 304-
B IPC is not mere demand of dowry but “cruelty or

harassment” for or in connection with demand of dowry.
In Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 9 SCC 64 :
it was observed by the Hon‟ble Apex Court as follows:
“29. … What is punishable under Section 498-A or Section
304-B IPC is the act of cruelty or harassment by the
husband or the relative of the husband on the woman. It will
be also clear from Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that
only when it is shown that soon before her death a woman
has been subjected by any person to cruelty or harassment
for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death
within the meaning of Section 304-B IPC. The act of
subjecting a woman to cruelty or harassment for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry by the accused,
therefore, must be established by the prosecution for the
court to presume that the accused has caused the dowry
death.”
70. In the case of Monju Roy v. State of W.B (supra) the
Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed that the court has to
adopt a pragmatic view and when a girl dies an
unnatural death, allegation of demand of dowry or
harassment which follows cannot be weighed in golden
scales. At the same time, omnibus allegation against all
family members particularly against the brothers and
sisters and other relatives do not stand on the same
footing as husband and parents. In such case, apart
31

from general allegation of demand of dowry, the court
has to be satisfied that harassment was also caused by
all the named members .
71. In the totality of circumstances, even if one were to
assume that the appellants were, at some stage, involved
in raising a demand for dowry, the prosecution has failed
to adduce any cogent or reliable evidence to establish
that such demand was accompanied by harassment of
the victim which directly resulted in her death. The
specific case of the prosecution, as borne out from the
record, is confined to the allegation that the appellants
stood by during the occurrence and did not make any
effort to rescue the deceased. Thus, the imputation
against them is essentially one of passive presence rather
than active participation in the alleged ghastly crime, and
in absence of substantive proof of cruelty or harassment,
their culpability cannot be legally sustained.

72. Normally, it is the husband or parents of the husband
who may be benefited by the dowry and may be in a
position to harass and not all other relatives, though no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in that regard. It is
also true that till such an unfortunate event takes place,
the family members may not disclose the demand of
dowry being a private matter and under the hope that the
relationship of the couple may improve. However, having
32

regard to the nature of their relationships, there being
possibility of the appellants' having been named by way
of exaggeration, we are of the view that the appellants
deserve to be given benefit of doubt in that regard in the
facts of the present case.
73. Further ground has been taken by the learned counsel
that there is vital discrepancy in the testimony of the
witnesses.

74. The law in this regard is well settled by Hon‟ble Apex
Court in case of Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa ,
(2002) 8 SCC 381 and Bhargavan v. State of Kerala ,
(2004) 12 SCC 414 , wherein it has been laid down that
material discrepancies are those which are not normal,
and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to
label the category to which a discrepancy may be
categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode
the credibility of a party's case, material discrepancies do
so. Paragraph-15 of judgment of Gangadhar Behera v.
State of Orissa , (supra), is quoted herein below-
75. To the same effect is the decision in State of
Punjab v. Jagir Singh [(1974) 3 SCC 277 : 1973 SCC (Cri)
886 : AIR 1973 SC 2407] and Lehna v. State of
Haryana [(2002) 3 SCC 76 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 526] . Stress
was laid by the accused-appellants on the non-acceptance
of evidence tendered by some witnesses to contend about
desirability to throw out the entire prosecution case. In
essence prayer is to apply the principle of “falsus in uno,
33

falsus in omnibus” (false in one thing, false in everything).
This plea is clearly untenable. Even if a major portion of
the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is
sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, notwithstanding
acquittal of a number of other co-accused persons, his
conviction can be maintained. It is the duty of the court to
separate the grain from the chaff. Where chaff can be
separated from the grain, it would be open to the court to
convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence
has been found to be deficient to prove guilt of other
accused persons. Falsity of a particular material witness
or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning
to end. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” has
no application in India and the witnesses cannot be
branded as liars. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus” has not received general acceptance nor has this
maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely
a rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such
cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must
be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question
of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given
set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a
mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v. State of
U.P. [AIR 1957 SC 366 : 1957 Cri LJ 550] ) Merely because
some of the accused persons have been acquitted, though
evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony
went, was the same does not lead as a necessary
corollary that those who have been convicted must also be
acquitted. It is always open to a court to differentiate the
accused who had been acquitted from those who were
convicted. (See Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR
1956 SC 460 : 1956 Cri LJ 827] ). The doctrine is a
dangerous one specially in India for if a whole body of the
testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was
evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be
feared that administration of criminal justice would come
to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving
embroidery to a story, however, true in the main.
34

Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what
extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely
because in some respects the court considers the same to
be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a
witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law
that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The
evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum
is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes
across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain
of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC
751 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 819] and Ugar Ahir v. State of
Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 256] .) An
attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of
felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth
from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate the
truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are
inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an
absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing
essential details presented by the prosecution completely
from the context and the background against which they
are made, the only available course to be made is to
discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of
M.P. [(1952) 2 SCC 560 : AIR 1954 SC 15 : 1954 Cri LJ
230] and Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab [(1975) 4 SCC
511 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 601 : AIR 1975 SC 1962] .) As
observed by this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Kalki [(1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 593
: AIR 1981 SC 1390] normal discrepancies in evidence are
those which are due to normal errors of observation,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to
mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of
occurrence and those are always there however honest
and truthful a witness may be. Material discrepancies are
those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal
person. Courts have to label the category to which a
discrepancy may be categorized. While normal
discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party's
35

case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were
highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v. State of
Bihar [(2002) 6 SCC 81 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220 : JT (2002) 4
SC 186] . Accusations have been clearly established
against the accused-appellants in the case at hand. The
courts below have categorically indicated the
distinguishing features in evidence so far as the acquitted
and the convicted accused are concerned.
(emphasis supplied)

76. Again, in case of Mohd. Jabbar Ali v. State of
Assam , (2023) 19 SCC 672 , Hon‟ble Apex court
reiterated the same, as to discrepancy of witnesses and
laid down that material discrepancies corrode the
credibility of the prosecution's case while insignificant
discrepancies do not do so. Paragraph-53 of the
judgment is quoted herein below-
“53. Further as already stated above, all the witnesses
have given contradictory versions as to who gave the fatal
blow to deceased Ekkabar Ali and the same amounts to
material contradictions. It is reiterated that the testimony
of PW 6 is inconsistent with the testimonies of PW 1, PW 2
and PW 5. This Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki [State
of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981) 2 SCC 752 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
593] , distinguished between the normal discrepancies
and material discrepancies. This Court held that the
Courts have to label as to which category a discrepancy
can be categorised. The material discrepancies corrode the
credibility of the prosecution's case while insignificant
discrepancies do not do so.”
(emphasis suppled)
77. Hence, in view of the aforesaid proposition of law
concerning discrepancies in the testimony of material
36

witnesses, this Court now proceeds to examine the
evidence of the witnesses.
78. P.W. 1 has stated in Para-4 that when she heard
about the occurrence and admission of deceased in
hospital then she went there but till that time Rinku Devi
had died and, in her presence, "panchnama" of dead
body was made upon which she has put her signature.
79. PW-2 Phatik Bauri who is brother of the deceased had
deposed that on 22.05.2012 all of sudden telephone call
was received about admitting her sister (deceased) in
BGH then he along with other went to BGH and his sister
(deceased) told that due to non-fulfillment of demand of
money all accused sprinkled kerosene oil and set fire by
matchstick. He also deposed that on the same day she
died during treatment.
80. PW-3 Kajal Devi is villager of parental house of
deceased Rinku Devi, who at para 4 she has deposed
that deceased had told that her mother-in-law poured
kerosene and husband set fire by matchstick and rest
people did not save.
81. During cross-examination in Para-7 she deposed that
she reached hospital then Rinku was weeping and she
told about the occurrence. She also deposed that her
mouth and head was not burnt. She denied the
37

suggestion of defence that she was fully burnt and she
was not able to speak.
82. PW-4 Ala Devi has deposed that Rinku Devi was
married in 2010 with Ratan Bauri and after 1 to 2
months dowry demand was being made and for that
Rinku Devi was beaten and demand of Rs. 50,000/- and
motorcycle was made to her but that was not fulfilled. In
Para 3 she has specifically stated that her mother-in-law
poured kerosene oil and Ratan set fire by matchstick.
She also added that "jeth, jethani and nanad were also
involved in the occurrence. In Para 6 she deposed that
she also went to see her in hospital and she was in light
speaking situation.
83. PW-5 Alta Devi is mother of the deceased bride as well
as informant of this case. This witness has also clarified
that mother-in-law poured kerosene oil and husband
Ratan Bauri set fire by matchstick and other accused
persons were seeing the occurrence and they did not
save. In Para 4 she deposed that when she reached
hospital then sline was running and Rinku Devi was
conscious and talking and she said that all accused have
set fire and no one saved her. She has further deposed
that Rinku Devi (deceased) told that her mother-in-law
poured kerosene oil and husband set fire by matchstick
and other accused were involved in the conspiracy of
38

occurrence and silently they were watching and they did
not save her.
84. P.W. 6 has stated that when he reached hospital, the
deceased had died till that time. However, the incidence
was told to him by the mother of the deceased.
85. P.W. 7 the investigating officer of the case at Para - 13
he had deposed that in the case diary he has not
mentioned about smell of kerosene oil coming from the
bed room of deceased. In Para 15 he had deposed that no
panchayti paper was given to him but he was told about
oral panchayati. In Para 16 he accepted that he did not
visit Bokaro General Hospital, nor recorded statement of
any doctor.
86. While the appellants, in his defence, has taken the
ground that the interested persons concocted the story
out of emotion and so far, the present appellants are
concerned, it is submitted that none of the witnesses
have cited their specific role rather they have deposed
that while the incident occurred the appellants did not
make any effort to save the deceased.
87. Thus, in the present case, the fact that Rinku Devi
died as a result of burn injuries is supported by the
testimony of PW-8, Dr. Vikash Kumar, and the post-
mortem report marked as Exhibit 4. The doctor
attributed the cause of death to shock leading to
39

cardiorespiratory failure due to burn injuries. The
unnatural nature of the death is, therefore, established,
however no specific or cogent evidence led against these
appellants by the prosecution in the death of deceased
and it leaves doubt in the mind of the Court.
88. Further it needs to refer herein that the Hon‟ble Apex
Court in catena of decision has propounded the
proposition that in the criminal trial, there cannot be any
conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all
reasonable doubts, therefore, this Court has to see
whether this case falls under the law, as propounded by
Hon‟ble Apex Court, in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh
& Ors. Vrs. State of U.P., [ (2000) 3 SCC 454] or not,
wherein it has been held that a criminal court cannot
afford to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty,
without having at least a reasonable level of certainty
that the appellants were the real culprits. For ready
reference, paragraph-22 of the judgment is quoted as
under:-
“ 22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain
regarding the complicity of the appellants in this case is much
more than the level of reasonable doubt. We are aware that
acquitting the accused in a case of this nature is not a matter
of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time, we remind
ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty
person should be preferred to conviction of an innocent
person. Unless the prosecution establishes the guilt of the
40

accused beyond reasonable doubt a conviction cannot be
A criminal court cannot afford to
passed on the accused.
deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty,
without having at least a reasonable level of certainty
that the appellants were the real culprits. We really
entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the
crime.”
89. Likewise, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of
Krishnegowda & Ors. Vrs. State of Karnataka (2017)
13 SCC 98, has held at paragraph-26 as under: -
“ 26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution
witnesses and the findings recorded by the High Court we
feel that the High Court has failed to understand the fact
that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each
and every stage of the trial, there were lapses on the part of
the investigating agency and the evidence of the witnesses is
not trustworthy which can never be a basis for conviction.
The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that
the accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is proved beyond reasonable doubt. ”
90. Further, the principle of 'benefit of doubt' belongs
exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine
doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there
is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused,
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State
of Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999)
5 SCC 96 , wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as
under: -
41

"7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of
the evidence of the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of
Bhagirath particularly when the High Court found their
evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to
Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution".
Unfortunately, the High Court did not point out the area
where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way of
abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept
of the benefit of doubt. Abundant caution is always
desirable in all spheres of human activity. But the principle
of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal
jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can
be invoked when there is reasonable doubt regarding the
guilt of the accused. It is the reasonable doubt which a
conscientious judicial mind entertains on a conspectus of
the entire evidence that the accused might not have
committed the offence, which affords the benefit to the
accused at the end of the criminal trial. Benefit of doubt is
not a legal dosage to be administered at every segment of
the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the
accused at the final end after consideration of the entire
evidence, if the Judge conscientiously and reasonably
entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the accused."
91. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Krishnegowda v. State of Karnataka (Supra) at
paragraph- 32 and 33 has held as under:-
"32. --- --- The minor variations and contradictions in the
evidence of the eyewitnesses will not tilt the benefit of doubt
in favour of the accused but when the contradictions in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses proves to be fatal to
the prosecution case then those contradictions go to the root
of the matter and in such cases the accused gets the benefit
of doubt.
33. It is the duty of the Court to consider the trustworthiness
of evidence on record. As said by Bentham, "witnesses are
the eyes and ears of justice.--- -
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92. It needs to refer herein that The Hon'ble Apex Court,
Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of
in the case of
Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has laid down the
principle that the golden thread which runs through the
web of administration of justice in criminal case is that if
two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the
case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the
other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to
the accused should be adopted, for reference, paragraph
6 thereof requires to be referred herein which reads
hereunder as :-
"6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of
administration of justice in criminal case is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,
one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. --"
93. It needs to refer herein before laying down the
aforesaid view, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already
laid down the same view at paragraph 163 which is
required to be referred which read hereunder :
"163. We then pass on to another important point which
seems to have been completely missed by the High Court.
It is well settled that where on the evidence two
possibilities are available or open, one which goes in
favour of the prosecution and the other which benefits an
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accused, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to the benefit
of doubt.---"
94. Upon a careful appraisal of the testimonies of P.W.3,
P.W.4 and P.W.5, it emerges that the evidence of these
witnesses is substantially consistent on the specific roles
attributed to the mother-in-law and the husband in the
commission of the act. So far as the present appellants
are concerned, the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses
does not attribute any overt act of pouring kerosene oil or
setting the deceased on fire to them. The allegation
against them is primarily that they were present at the
place of occurrence, did not intervene to rescue the
deceased. However, except for such general allegations,
no specific act or conduct has been brought on record to
demonstrate their active participation in the commission
of the alleged crime.
95. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong,
cannot take the place of legal proof. In the absence of any
clear, cogent and specific evidence establishing active
participation of the present appellants in setting the
deceased ablaze and their conviction cannot be sustained
merely on the basis of their alleged presence at the place
of occurrence or their failure to rescue the deceased.
96. Thus, it is considered view of this Court that the
prosecution has failed to adduce reliable and specific
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evidence sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
direct involvement or shared common intention of the
present appellants in the commission of the alleged
offence.
97. Accordingly, in the absence of any cogent, reliable and
specific evidence establishing the active participation of
the present appellants in the commission of the alleged
offence, this Court is of the considered view that the
prosecution has failed to prove the charges against them
beyond all reasonable doubt. Consequently, the present
appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.
98. This Court, having carefully considered the factual
matrix of the case, the legal principles governing the
field, the evidence available on record, and the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court, is of the considered
view that, insofar as the present appellants are
concerned, the learned Trial Court failed to properly
appreciate the evidence in its correct perspective. The
learned Trial Court, without adverting to the absence of
any specific and cogent evidence establishing the
involvement of the present appellants, erroneously
arrived at the conclusion that the prosecution had
succeeded in proving the charges against them beyond
reasonable doubt.
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99. In consequence thereof, the instant appeal stands
allowed.
100. Since both the appellants are on bail, as such the
appellants are acquitted of their criminal liability and
discharged from the liability of their bail bonds.
101. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand
disposed of.
102. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court
concerned forthwith, along with a copy of this Judgment.

I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

29/10/2026
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Alankar / A.F.R.
Uploaded on 29.10.2026
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