STATE vs SAROJ KU.NAYAK

THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
CRLLP No.153 of 2013

CNR No. ODHC010307142013
(In the matter of an application under Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 )

State of Orissa Petitioner
…….

-Versus-
Saroj Kumar Nayak Opposite Party
…….

For the Petitioner : Mr. Sangram Das, SC (Vigilance)

For the Opposite Party : Mr. M.K. Chand, Advocate

CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA

Date of Hearing: 01.10.2026 : Date of Judgment: 31.10.2026

S.S. Mishra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
acquittal dated 12.08.2013 passed by the learned Special Judge
(Vigilance), Sambalpur, in T.R. Case No. 07 of 2002, whereby the
opposite party was acquitted of the charges under Section 7 and Section

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988.

2. Heard Mr. Sangram Das, learned Standing Counsel (Vigilance) for
the petitioner and Mr. M.K. Chand, learned counsel for the opposite-
party.
3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Saroj Kumar Nayak,
formerly working as a Junior Engineer under the Block Development
Officer, Nuagaon, had placed an order for the supply of 25 iron windows
and 23 iron doors with M/s. Mahalaya Welding and Fabrication Industry,
Koelnagar, belonging to Khirod Sahu. The complainant, Laxmikanta
Sahu, who was the brother of the proprietor and was looking after the
management and supply of materials, delivered the articles at the Block
Office on 20.09.2001. The opposite party, who was then serving as the
Junior Engineer, checked the quality and weight of the supplied articles.
It was alleged that when the complainant sought payment of the bill
amounting to Rs.66,378/-, the opposite party demanded illegal
gratification calculated at ten per cent of the bill amount for facilitating
payment. As the complainant was allegedly unable to meet the demand,

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he approached the opposite party on subsequent occasions, but the latter
allegedly insisted upon payment of Rs.6,000/- as a condition for
releasing the cheque.
4. The complainant approached the Block Development Officer
regarding the non-release of payment and was informed by the cashier
that the cheque could not be issued without clearance from the opposite
party. Having allegedly agreed to pay the demanded amount, the
complainant approached the Vigilance authorities and submitted a
written report to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, through the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Rourkela. On the basis of
the complaint, a trap was arranged on 04.10.2001. The currency notes
produced by the complainant were treated with phenolphthalein powder,
and the requisite demonstration was conducted in the presence of the
accompanying witnesses. As the opposite party was not present at the
Block Office, the trap party proceeded to Kadalibahal Upper Primary
School, where he was stated to be performing official duties. At
approximately 11.15 A.M., the complainant approached the opposite
party in the presence of the accompanying witness, Harekrushna Ojha

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(P.W.1), and allegedly handed over the tainted currency notes pursuant
to the demand. Upon receipt of the pre-arranged signal, the Vigilance
officials apprehended the opposite party, recovered the tainted money,
and conducted washes of his hands and shirt pocket in sodium carbonate
solution, which reportedly turned pink. Following investigation,
including chemical examination and obtaining sanction for prosecution,
the investigating agency submitted the charge-sheet.
5. The prosecution examined five witnesses to establish the charges.
P.W.1, Harekrushna Ojha, was the accompanying witness who was
allegedly deputed to overhear the conversation between the complainant
and the opposite party and witness the transaction. P.W.2, Surei Chandra
Hembrum, was the official witness who participated in the trap
proceedings and verified the serial numbers of the currency notes.
P.W.3, Laxmikanta Sahu, was the complainant. P.W.4, Nabakishore
Pattnaik, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Rourkela,
was the Trap Laying Officer, and P.W.5, Akshaya Kumar Sahu, was the
Investigating Officer. The prosecution also relied upon the complaint,
trap preparation report, detection report, seizure lists, chemical

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examination report, sanction order and the relevant office records. The
defence examined Ranjan Rashmi Nayak, the then Assistant Engineer, as
D.W.1, who was present with the opposite party at the place of
occurrence.
6. Upon appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held that
the prosecution had failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
essential ingredient of demand of illegal gratification. The learned trial
Court noticed discrepancie
s between the complainant’s statement in the
F.I.R. and his deposition before the Court regarding the occasions on
which the alleged demand had been made. It further found that P.W.1,
the accompanying witness, had given a version in Court that the
complainant thrust the tainted currency notes into the hands and shirt
pocket of the opposite party despite his refusal, and that the evidence of
D.W.1 supported such version. The learned trial Court also relied upon
the office records indicating that the opposite party had already furnished
the requisite certificate regarding the supplied materials and that the bill
had been processed for payment. Although the recovery of the tainted
currency notes and the positive chemical reaction of the hand and shirt-

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pocket washes were noticed, the learned trial Court held that those
circumstances, in the absence of reliable proof of demand and voluntary
acceptance, were insufficient to establish the charges. Accordingly,
extending the benefit of doubt, the opposite party was acquitted of the
offences under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of
the P.C. Act. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced
herein for ready reference:-
22. So far the evidence as placed by prosecution is
“
concerned, it is not established beyond doubt that on
20.09.2001, after the informant gave delivery of the
ordered iron doors and windows at the Block Office
concerned, the accused, who was J.E. of the Block,
made any demand of bribe to pass the cheque, which
was not his duty so far his official work is concerned.
Further, it is not established beyond doubt that the
amount recovered from the accused during the trap
was the amount paid to him by the informant as per
his demand. It is not either established from the
evidence that the accused during the trap at the spot,
made any demand of bribe to do any undue official
work for the informant. So the allegation of
misconduct abusing his official position or obtaining
any pecuniary advantage or gratification of
Rs.6000/- for himself as brought against the accused,
is not established. The accused, in the circumstance,
is entitled to benefit of doubt and consequently an
acquittal from the charges brought against him.


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23. In the result, the accused is found not guilty of the
offences U/S.13(2) r/w Sec.13(1)(d) and U/S.7 of the
P.C. Act, 1988 and is acquitted thereof U/S.248(1),
Cr.P.C. He be set at liberty forthwith and bail-bond
furnished by him be discharged. ”

7. Assailing the aforesaid judgment, learned counsel appearing
for the State submitted that the learned trial Court erred in treating
the complainant as an accomplice and in requiring corroboration of
his evidence in material particulars. It was contended that the
complainant’s testimony, when read with the surrounding
circumstances, the recovery of the tainted currency notes and the
positive hand wash and shirt-pocket wash tests, was sufficient to
support the prosecution case. The learned State counsel further
submitted that the learned trial Court failed to draw the appropriate
inference from the proved circumstances and ought to have
considered the evidentiary principle under Section 114 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, while evaluating the recovery and the
explanation offered by the opposite party.
8. The learned State counsel further contended that, upon
establishment of the foundational facts, the learned trial Court ought

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to have raised the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the P.C.
Act and examined whether the opposite party had rebutted the same
by acceptable evidence. Reliance was placed on T. Shankar Prasad
v. State of Andhra Pradesh , AIR 2004 SC 1242 . It was submitted
that the evidence of D.W.1 did not satisfactorily rebut the
prosecution case and that the passing of the bill before registration of
the F.I.R. did not explain the recovery of the tainted money during
the trap. The learned State counsel also challenged the reliance
placed on the testimony of P.W.1 despite his being declared hostile
and contended that the statements elicited from him by the
prosecution, together with the evidence of the Trap Laying Officer,
had not been properly appreciated. On these grounds, the State
sought leave to challenge the judgment of acquittal.
9. This Court has carefully examined the judgment passed by the
learned trial Court, the reasons assigned therein, and the evidence
adduced by both the prosecution and the defence during trial. This
Court has also considered the grounds urged in the present appeal
and heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-State as

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well as the learned counsel for the respondent at length. The rival
submissions have been duly considered in the light of the materials
available on record.
10. Before interfering with an order of acquittal, this Court is also
required to bear in mind the well-settled principles governing an
appeal against acquittal. In Tulasareddi @ Mudakappa & Anr. v.
State of Karnataka & Ors. , reported in 2026 INSC 67 , the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has reiterated that where two reasonable conclusions
are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate
Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court. It has further been held that if the view taken by the trial
Court is a possible view based on the evidence available on record,
the appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal merely
because another view is also possible. Interference is warranted only
when the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity, is
based on misreading or omission of material evidence, or where
compelling and substantial reasons exist showing that the acquittal is

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clearly unreasonable. The relevant part of the aforesaid judgment is
reproduced herein for ready reference:-
“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this
Court, it can be said that if two reasonable
conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court.
Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the
Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible. The following principles have to be kept in
mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the
appeals against an order of acquittal:
(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission
to consider the material evidence on record;
(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when
there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing
so. If th
e order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a
compelling reason for interference.
(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a
possible view which could have been taken on the basis of
the evidence on record;
(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion
was possible.
”


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Equally, in Mallappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka , reported in
2024 INSC 104
, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
presumption of innocence, which every accused enjoys during trial, gets
strengthened and concretized once the trial culminates in an order of
acquittal. Consequently, while exercising appellate jurisdiction against
an acquittal, a higher threshold is required to rebut such reinforced
presumption. Unless the findings recorded by the trial Court are
manifestly unsustainable or perverse, the appellate Court ought to
exercise great restraint in upsetting the acquittal. It was held thus:-
“24. We may firstly discuss the position of law
regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal
appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal
jurisprudence that there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven
guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of
the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the
case ends in acquittal. The presumption of
innocence gets concretized when the case ends in
acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on
appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that
the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets
strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to

rebut the same in appeal.”


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11. The appellate jurisdiction against an order of acquittal is,
therefore, not intended to facilitate a fresh substitution of the opinion of
the trial Court merely because a different view on the evidence is
conceivable. As reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulasareddi
@ Mudakappa & Anr. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (supra) , the
appellate Court must first satisfy itself that the judgment of acquittal is
vitiated by patent perversity, misreading or non-consideration of material
evidence, or is so unreasonable that no prudent person could have
arrived at such a conclusion. Equally, as held in Mallappa & Ors. v.
State of Karnataka (supra) , the reinforced presumption of innocence
following an acquittal places a higher threshold upon the appellate Court
before upsetting the findings recorded by the trial Court. Thus, unless the
conclusions reached by the trial Court are wholly unsustainable on the
evidence available on record, judicial restraint rather than substitution of
views remains the governing principle in an appeal against acquittal.
Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the appreciation of evidence by the learned trial Court
cannot be said to be either perverse or wholly unreasonable. Merely

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because another view may also be possible, the same cannot furnish a
ground to reverse the acquittal in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

12. At this distant point in time, the absence of compelling and
substantial reasons warranting interference, reversal of the acquittal
would itself occasion serious prejudice and would be a travesty of
justice. At this belated stage, presumption of innocence prevailed in
favour of the opposite party for more than 13 years, as he was acquitted
by the Court below. Reversing such presumption at this stage would not
only be harsh, but it would be against the cardinal principle of
reformatory criminal jurisprudence. This Court, therefore, finds no legal
or factual justification to unsettle the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal
passed by the learned trial Court. In view of the aforementioned, this
Court is not inclined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal
impugned herein.
13. Accordingly, the CRLLP stands dismissed.
(S.S. Mishra)
Judge

The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack
st
Dated the 31 October, 2026/Ashok
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB
MOHAPATRA
Reason: Authentication
Location: High Court of Orissa
Date: 05-Nov-2026 19:59:15

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