Ranjana Mittal vs Manish

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 09.04.2026
Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

+ MAT.APP.(F.C.) 162/2025 & CM APPL. 25766/2025
RANJANA MITTAL .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Ankit Gupta, Adv.

versus

MANISH .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Annu Sharma, Adv.
( through VC)
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
J U D G M E N T
1. The present appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts
Act, 1984 (hereinafter „Act‟), is directed against the judgment and
decree dated 18.03.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court,
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi (hereinafter „Family Court‟)
in HMA No. 1568/2024, whereby the marriage between the parties
has been dissolved.
2. The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeal are as
follows:
a. The marriage between the appellant-wife and the
respondent-husband was solemnized on 26.01.2023 at
Bahadurgarh, Haryana according to Hindu rites and ceremonies.
No child was born from the wedlock. The parties started
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residing separately from January, 2024.
b. The respondent instituted HMA No. 1568/2024 before
the Family Court seeking dissolution of marriage under Section
13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter „HMA‟)
on the ground of cruelty. The appellant entered appearance in
the said proceedings and filed her written statement.
c. Along with the written statement, the appellant also filed
a counter claim under Section 23A of the HMA seeking
dissolution of marriage on the ground that the respondent had
subjected her to cruelty.
d. On 18.03.2025, the Family Court took the written
statement and counter-claim on record and, on the same date,
proceeded to dissolve the marriage between the parties under
Section 13B of the HMA.
e. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred the
present appeal, contending that the Family Court could not have
converted contested proceedings under Section 13(1)(ia) of the
HMA into a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
3. Mr. Ankit Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant submits that the Family Court acted wholly without
jurisdiction in passing a decree under Section 13B of the HMA in
proceedings which were admittedly instituted and contested under
Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA.
4. It is submitted that the essential preconditions for a decree
under Section 13B of the HMA were absent. It is further submitted
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that there was neither a first motion jointly presented before the Court
nor any second motion after the statutory interregnum. It is submitted
that the Family Court could not have presumed consent merely
because both parties had, in separate pleadings, sought divorce on
allegations against each other.
5. It is submitted that the reliance placed by the Family Court on
its powers under Section 10(3) of the Act is misplaced. It is argued
that while the Court may devise its own procedure, such power does
not extend to bypassing or overriding substantive statutory
requirements under the HMA.
6. It is submitted that the impugned judgment proceeds on
generalized considerations such as bringing quietus to matrimonial
disputes and avoiding further litigation, which cannot substitute
compliance with statutory provisions.
7. It is submitted that no effort towards reconciliation was
undertaken, nor were the parties afforded an opportunity to lead
evidence or contest the allegations levelled against each other.

8. It is submitted that the impugned judgment has the effect of
depriving the appellant of her statutory entitlements, including reliefs
under Section 25 of the HMA, since the proceedings were concluded
without any consideration of ancillary reliefs.
9. On the basis of the aforesaid grounds, it is prayed that the
impugned judgment be set aside and the matter be remanded back to
the Family Court for adjudication on merits.
10. Per Contra , Ms. Annu Sharma, learned counsel appearing on
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behalf of the respondent, submitted that the present appeal is devoid of
merits and the impugned judgment does not contain any infirmity
which requires appellate interference by this Court.
11. It is submitted that the Family Court has recorded that both
parties were living separately since January, 2024 and that there was
no subsisting matrimonial relationship between them. It is submitted
that in such circumstances, where both parties were seeking divorce
and there was no possibility of reconciliation, the Family Court was
justified in bringing quietus to the matrimonial dispute rather than
prolonging the litigation.
12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
13. The controversy in the present appeal lies in a narrow compass.
The difficulty with the impugned order does not arise from the fact
that both parties had sought dissolution of marriage. It arises from the
manner in which such dissolution was granted.
14. The respondent had approached the Family Court under Section
13(1)(ia) of the HMA alleging cruelty, and the appellant, while
contesting the said petition, had also preferred a counter-claim on the
same ground. Thus, the pleadings disclosed rival allegations of
matrimonial fault. They did not disclose a joint request for divorce by
mutual consent under Section 13B of the HMA.
15. The legal question which arises for consideration is whether, in
a contested proceeding is instituted under Section 13(1)(ia) of the
HMA, where the opposite party has also filed a counter claim seeking
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divorce on the ground of cruelty, the Family Court could treat the rival
contentions for dissolution of marriage as mutual consent and, without
a joint petition or compliance with the statutory requirements of
Section 13B, dissolve the marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual
consent.
16. The answer to the aforesaid question must be located in the
statutory scheme of the HMA, which gives us two distinct and
independent routes for dissolution of marriage. Section 13 deals with
fault-based divorce, where one spouse alleges a matrimonial wrong
against the other, and the Court is required to adjudicate upon such
allegations. Section 13B, on the other hand, deals with divorce by
mutual consent, where the basis of the decree is not fault, but the
agreement of both parties to bring the marriage to an end.
17. At this stage, it would be useful to extract Sections 13(1)(ia)
and 13B of the HMA. The same are reproduced hereinbelow:
“ 13. Divorce. —(1) Any marriage solemnized,
whether before or after the commencement of
this Act, may, on a petition presented by either
the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a
decree of divorce on the ground that the other
party—
[(i) has, after the solemnization of the
marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse
with any person other than his or her spouse;
or
(ia) has, after the solemnization of the
marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty;
or…
*
13B. Divorce by mutual consent .—(1) Subject
to the provisions of this Act a petition for
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dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce
may be presented to the district court by both
the parties to a marriage together, whether
such marriage was solemnized before or after
the commencement of the Marriage Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the
ground that they have been living separately
for a period of one year or more, that they
have not been able to live together and that
they have mutually agreed that the marriage
should be dissolved.

(2) On the motion of both the parties made not
earlier than six months after the date of the
presentation of the petition referred to in sub-
section (1) and not later than eighteen months
after the said date, if the petition is not
withdrawn in the meantime, the court shall, on
being satisfied, after hearing the parties and
after making such inquiry as it thinks fit, that a
marriage has been solemnized and that the
averments in the petition are true, pass a
decree of divorce declaring the marriage to be
dissolved with effect from the date of the
decree.]”

18. A reading of these provisions shows that they operate in
different fields. Section 13 permits a petition by either spouse,
whereas Section 13B requires a petition to be presented by both
parties together. The use of expressions “ either the husband or the
wife ” in Section 13 and “ by both the parties to a marriage together ” in
Section 13B clearly indicates that the two provisions are not
interchangeable.
19. A closer look at the Section 13B shows that both parties must
come together with a common decision to dissolve the marriage, and
second, that such consent must continue even at the stage when the
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Court is called upon to pass the decree. The requirement of a joint
petition and a subsequent motion is meant to ensure that the consent is
real, voluntary, and continues till the end, when the second motion is
passed between the parties.

20. The scheme of Section 13 and 13B of the HMA itself draws a
clear distinction between a fault-based petition for divorce and a
petition for divorce by mutual consent. A proceeding under Section 13
proceeds on allegations of matrimonial fault by one spouse against the
other and requires adjudication by the Court. On the other hand, a
petition under Section 13B is founded not on accusations, but on
consensus. The jurisdiction of the Court under Section 13B arises only
when both parties jointly approach the Court with a common and pre-
existing decision that the marriage should be dissolved.
21. In that case, the parties settle all their other claims like
maintenance, permanent alimony, custody of children, bifurcation of
properties as a way to put quietus to pending litigation between the
parties and the like and make binding promises regarding their
uninterrupted separate future life, only thereafter with their thoughtful
agreement comes to the Court under Section 13 B of the HMA to seek
divorce but all this goes missing in the conversion of separate divorce
petitions of the parties into mutual divorce petition by the Court.
22. Merely because both spouses separately seek dissolution of
marriage does not, by itself, amount to mutual consent within the
meaning of Section 13B. A spouse may seek divorce on the ground of
cruelty while simultaneously disputing the allegations, conduct or
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entitlement asserted by the other spouse. Such rival claims continue to
retain their adversarial character, even though the ultimate relief
sought by both parties may be dissolution of marriage. Treating
separate and independent assertions of matrimonial faults as a joint
petition under Section 13B would fundamentally alter the nature of the
proceedings contemplated by the statute.
23. The requirement under Section 13B that the petition be
presented “ by both the parties to a marriage together ” and they have
“ mutually agreed ” to dissolve the marriage is not an incidental
formality. The provision requires clear meeting of minds before the
jurisdiction under Section 13B can be invoked. The requirement of a
joint petition at the initial stage, followed by a second motion after the
statutory period, is intended to ensure that the consent is voluntary,
informed and continues till the stage of decree.
24. The expressions “ together ” and “ mutually agreed ” cannot be
ignored merely because the Court forms an opinion that continuation
of the marriage would serve no practical purpose. Separate prayers for
divorce may show that the parties no longer wish to continue the
marriage, but that is not the same as a joint and mutual decision to
seek divorce under Section 13B of the HMA.
25. The reliance placed on Section 10(3) of the Act is also
misplaced. The said provision undoubtedly grants procedural
flexibility to the Family Court and enables it to evolve its own
procedure to facilitate settlement and ascertain the truth of the dispute.
However, such procedural flexibility cannot override substantive
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statutory requirements. Section 10 of the Act deals with procedure; it
does not empower the Family Court to alter, dilute, or substitute the
conditions prescribed under the HMA for grant of a decree of divorce
by mutual consent.

26. In the present case, admittedly there was no joint petition under
Section 13B of the HMA, no first motion jointly presented by the
parties, no second motion after the statutory period and no satisfaction
recorded by the Family Court regarding the continuance of mutual
consent in the manner contemplated under Section 13B(2).
27. The proceedings before the Family Court arose out of a petition
under Section 13(1)(ia) alleging cruelty, to which the appellant
responded by filing a written statement and a counter-claim under
Section 23A of the HMA on the same ground. The proceedings,
therefore, remained adversarial in nature and could not have been
converted into a decree of divorce by mutual consent merely because
both parties were seeking dissolution of marriage.
28. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Jain
v. Maya Jain , (2009) 10 SCC 415 noted that the power to convert a
proceeding under Section 13 into one under Section 13B, in order to
do complete justice, is not available even to High Courts. Such power
has been conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court and is
traceable to Article 142 of the Constitution. A Family Court,
therefore, cannot assume such jurisdiction merely because it considers
dissolution of marriage to be the most practical course. The relevant
portion of the judgment is reproduced below:
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“ 30. The second proposition is that although the
Supreme Court can, in exercise of its extraordinary
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution,
convert a proceeding under Section 13 of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, into one under Section
13-B and pass a decree for mutual divorce, without
waiting for the statutory period of six months, none
of the other courts can exercise such powers. The
other courts are not competent to pass a decree for
mutual divorce if one of the consenting parties
withdraws his/her consent before the decree is
passed. Under the existing laws, the consent given
by the parties at the time of filing of the joint
petition for divorce by mutual consent has to
subsist till the second stage when the petition
comes up for orders and a decree for divorce is
finally passed and it is only the Supreme Court,
which, in exercise of its extraordinary powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution, can pass
orders to do complete justice to the parties”.

29. The view which we have taken also stands reinforced by the
decision of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Upinder Kaur
Malhotra v. Teghjeet Singh Malhotra , 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6165 ,
where, in materially similar circumstances, it was held that separate
and independent fault-based claims for divorce cannot be treated as a
petition under Section 13B merely because both parties seek
dissolution of marriage. The Court also held that the requirements of
Section 13B are substantive in nature and cannot be diluted by
invoking the procedural flexibility available to the Family Court under
Section 10 of the Act. The Division Bench has observed as follows:-
“31. Each party is entitled to determine the terms
and manner of separation. While the ultimate
object may be the dissolution of marriage, the path
toward such dissolution may differ in accordance
with the personal expectations and priorities of the
parties. Since marriage itself is not a mere
ministerial act, its dissolution too cannot be
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reduced to the fulfillment of certain statutory
ingredients without the presence of genuine and
continuing mutual consent as envisaged under
Section 13B of the HMA.

32. In the present case, the very fact that the
parties have filed separate petitions for divorce
demonstrates the absence of consensus on the
manner and terms of dissolution. This in itself
undermines the essential requirement of ―mutual
consent‖, which constitutes the foundational basis
of Section 13B of the HMA. Mutual consent cannot
be inferred from the mere filing of separate divorce
petitions, nor can it be substituted by the
independent desire of each party to end the
marriage in their individual way. It is only when
both parties consciously and jointly agree to
dissolve the marriage that the jurisdiction of the
court under Section 13B of the HMA is validly
invoked.”
30. Tested on the aforesaid legal position, the impugned order
cannot be sustained. The respondent‟s petition was not one under
Section 13B of the HMA, but under Section 13(1)(ia), alleging cruelty
against the appellant. The appellant, while contesting the said petition,
filed a written statement and a counter-claim also alleging cruelty
against the respondent. Thus, the pleadings before the Family Court
disclosed rival allegations of matrimonial fault, and not a joint
decision to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent.
31. The reasoning of the Family Court, that continuing the
proceedings would prolong acrimony and that dissolution of marriage
would bring quietus to the dispute, may be well-intentioned. However,
such considerations cannot override the clear mandate of the statute.
Where the law prescribes a particular mode for dissolution of marriage
by mutual consent, the Court cannot adopt an alternative route merely
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because it appears to be more practical or expedient.
32. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and decree dated
18.03.2025 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside.
33. Consequently, the petition/counterclaim filed by the parties
under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA, along with the written statement
and rejoinder, if any, are restored to their original number for
adjudication in accordance with law. The Family Court shall proceed
to frame issues, permit the parties to lead evidence, and decide the
matter on its own merits. The parties are directed to appear before the
Family Court on 14.07.2026.
34. It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the rival allegations made by the parties, and all
contentions in that regard are left open to be adjudicated by the Family
Court.



VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)



RENU BHATNAGAR
(JUDGE)
ka/kp
MAY 29, 2026/
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