MUNICIPAL COUNCIL PUSAD, THR. CHIEF OFFICER, YAVATMAL vs ASSISTANT PROVIDENT FUND, COMMISSIONER, AKOLA AND ANR.

2026:BHC-NAG:4562
0503WP7975-25.odt 1 Judgment
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
WRIT PETITION NO. 7975 OF 2025
Municipal Council, Pusad, Through its Chief Officer,
Tahsil Pusad, District Yavatmal. PETITIONER

VERSUS
1. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner,
Akola, Sub Regional Office, 15-B, Raghuraj Arcade,
Civil Lines, Akola.
2. Recovery Officer, Regional Provident Fund Office,
15-B, Raghuraj Arcade, Civil Lines, Akola. RESPONDENTS
______________________________________________________________
Shri M.I. Dhatrak, counsel for the petitioner.
Shri A.R. Prasad, counsel for the respondents.
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CORAM : PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J.
DATE : MARCH 05, 2026
ORAL JUDGMENT
RULE. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally with consent
of the learned counsel for the parties.
2. By seeking indulgence under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India, the petitioner-Municipal Council, Pusad has assailed the order dated
08.12.2025 passed by the respondent no.2-Recovery Officer, Regional
Provident Fund Office, Akola purportedly under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the
Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (for
short, ‘the Act’).
3. The background facts leading to the instant petition are succinctly
put below:-
i. The respondent no.1-Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner had
issued a summons under Section 7-A of the Act on 12.04.2023 to the

0503WP7975-25.odt 2 Judgment
petitioner-Municipal Council to appear and submit details of record
for conducting enquiry regarding payment of dues of provident fund
to their employees for the period from 08.01.2011 to March-2013.
ii. The show cause notices dated 06.02.2016 and 19.05.2016 also
came to be issued calling upon the petitioner to appear for hearing
in the matter.
iii. On 04.05.2017, the respondent no.1 passed an order under
Section 7-A of the Act and held that the petitioner-Municipal Council
is liable for payment of the provident fund dues of the employees for
the period from 08.01.2011 to August-2016, to the tune of
Rs.8,52,33,497/-.
iv. On 14.06.2017, a notice under Section 8-F of the Act came to be
issued.
v. The petitioner challenged the order of imposition of liability vide
Writ Petition no.4014 of 2017 before this Court in which this Court
passed an interim order dated 29.06.2017 and granted stay to the
impugned order.
vi. By order dated 04.07.2022, the writ petition came to be disposed
of with liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal under Section 7-I of
the Act within six weeks and the interim order was directed to be
continued for six weeks.
vii.On 18.08.2022, the petitioner filed an appeal before the
Employees Provident Fund Tribunal, Nagpur alongwith a separate
application under Section 7-D of the Act for stay alongwith a
separate application under Section 7-O of the Act for exemption to
deposit as per the liberty granted by the High Court.

0503WP7975-25.odt 3 Judgment
viii. The appeal was heard by the Tribunal on 23.01.2023 and
thereafter it was adjourned for several dates.
ix. On 15.10.2025, the appeal came to be dismissed in default.
x. On 24.11.2025, the petitioner attempted to file an
application for restoration of the appeal but it was not filed, as
alleged by the petitioner.
xi. On 08.12.2025, the respondent no.2 passed an order
under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the Act seeking recovery of the amount.
xii. On 09.12.2025, an amount of Rs.3,65,86,242/- came to be
withdrawn from the accounts of the petitioner-Municipal Council
held in State Bank of India and the Punjab National Bank, allegedly
for recovery of provident fund dues.
xiii. The petitioner has alleged that on the same day, i.e.
09.12.2025, the petitioner appeared before the Tribunal by filing an
application for restoration alongwith condonation of delay and it is
alleged that the said application was not accepted.
xiv. On 10.12.2025, the application for restoration filed by the
petitioner-Municipal Council was accepted by the Tribunal and it
was directed to be registered with an order to issue notice to the
other side. The said application for restoration is pending.
xv. On 11.12.2025, the petitioner-Municipal Council filed the
instant petition challenging the order dated 08.12.2025 passed by
the respondent no.1 under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the Act and also the
order dated 15.10.2025 passed by the Tribunal by which the
petitioner’s appeal was dismissed in default.

0503WP7975-25.odt 4 Judgment
4. In the backdrop of these factual events, Shri M.I. Dhatrak, learned
counsel for the petitioner-Municipal Council submitted that the impugned

order under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the Act is grossly illegal and unsustainable
in law being passed without any notice or opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner-Municipal Council. His further submission is that the impugned
order having stringent consequences is passed by the respondent no.1
despite pendency of the application for restoration of the appeal and the
order being passed in great haste is unsustainable on this count also. He
also submitted that the impugned order dated 08.12.2025 under Section
8-F of the Act of is unwarranted since it is passed despite there being an
earlier order under Section 8-F of the Act passed on 14.06.2017 imposing
the same liability upon the petitioner i.e. for a sum of Rs.8,52,34,097/-
and this apparent discrepancy demonstrates gross non-application of
mind. On the basis of these submissions, he pressed for orders on a civil
application filed on behalf of the petitioner-Municipal Council being
C.A.W. no.412 of 2026 by which the petitioner-Municipal Council has
prayed for amendment to incorporate a prayer in the petition to claim
refund of Rs.3,65,86,242/- which was recovered from the petitioner-
Municipal Council and by way of this application he prayed for
appropriate directions to refund the said amount.
5. In support of his submissions, he relied on the judgments of the
Principal Seat of this Court in B.T. Kadlag Constructions Versus
Employees Provident Fund Organization & Others [2025 SCC OnLine Bom
4547] and Kulgaon Badlapur Nagar Parishad & Others Versus Regional

0503WP7975-25.odt 5 Judgment
Provident Fund Commissioner II [2022 DGLS (Bom.) 1184]. By relying
upon the position of law in B.T. Kadlag Constructions (supra), he
strenuously submitted that the order passed under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the
Act is having drastic consequences and it being passed without any notice
or opportunity of hearing is unsustainable in law. He submitted that the
proceedings before the respondent no.2 are in the nature of quasi judicial
determination and required observance of principles of natural justice and
in view of infraction of statutory mandate, the order under Section 8-F(3)
(i) of the Act is wholly unsustainable. He also invited attention to the
directions issued by this Court in Kulgaon Badlapur Nagar Parishad &
Others (supra) to the respondent-Authorities by which the Authorities
were directed in all matters under Section 7-A of the Act, to restrain them
from taking steps under Section 8-F of the Act until the appeal period as
prescribed in 7-I of the Act is exhausted.
6. Per contra, Shri Amit Prasad, learned counsel for the respondents
strenuously opposed the petition and submitted that in view of the overall
conduct on the part of the petitioner-Municipal Council in making
persistent default to pay the provident fund dues of the employees, the
impugned order is justified. He submitted that the petitioner-Municipal
Council has even failed to prosecute the appeal which demonstrates its
delaying tactics. He submitted that the petitioner-Municipal Council is
liable to pay the statutory dues as decided by the Authorities under
Section 7-A of the Act to the tune of Rs.8,52,33,497/-. He also submitted
that the orders under Section 8-F(3)(i) of the Act are passed by giving a

0503WP7975-25.odt 6 Judgment
prior notice to the petitioner, which was given on 14.06.2017 itself and on
failure of the petitioner to comply with the said notice, the respondents
have rightly passed the impugned order. By inviting attention to the order
passed by the Authorities under Section 7-A of the Act, he pointed out that
the petitioner has failed to appear before the Authorities on about forty
four dates and due opportunity of hearing was therefore afforded to the
petitioner before passing the order under Section 7-A of the Act. By
relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Regional P.F.
Commissioner Versus Hooghly Mills Company Limited & Others [(2012)
2 SCC 489], he submitted that the Employees Provident Fund and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 is a social welfare legislation and
considering the object of the Act, the employers are duty bound to strictly
comply with the orders passed by the Authorities.
7. Rival contentions thus fall for my consideration.
8. It has to be noted that the order dated 08.12.2025 under Section 8-
F(3)(i) of the Act, which is impugned herein, does not make reference to
any notice issued to the petitioner prior to passing of the said order. The
order records that it is passed on the basis of information available on
record and it is inferred that on the basis of information available on
record the Recovery Officer of the Regional Office Akola had a reason to
believe that the establishment has committed default attracting action
under Section 8-F(3)(x) of the Act. Further, it has to be noted that the
Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner had earlier passed an order dated

0503WP7975-25.odt 7 Judgment
14.06.2017 which was also an order under Section 8-F of the Act ordering
the petitioner to pay an amount of Rs.8,52,33,497/-. This order was
challenged by the petitioner vide appeal before the Tribunal which is
pending as on today. It is thus apparent that the Authorities have passed
orders under Section 8-F of the Act on two occasions i.e. on 14.06.2017
and again on 08.12.2025. On a specific query to the counsel for the
respondents in this regard, there is no explanation as to why the order
dated 08.12.2025 impugned herein is passed by the Authority for the
second time.
9. Further, to controvert the arguments about passing of impugned
order without notice, reliance is placed on the notice dated 14.06.2017
which was allegedly issued prior to eight years. Pertinent to note, on the
basis of the notice dated 14.06.2017 first order under Section 8-F of the
Act was passed on the same day i.e. on 14.06.2017 and the respondents
have failed to clarify this discrepancy.
10. While giving anxious consideration to the contentions canvassed on
behalf of the petitioner and the respondent about absence of notice and
violation of principles of natural justice, it becomes clear that the order
dated 08.12.2025 under Section 8-F of the Act is passed without giving
any prior reasonable notice and opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It
has to be noted that the notice dated 14.06.2017 issued prior to eight
years cannot be considered as a reasonable notice before passing the order
dated 08.12.2025 under Section 8-F of the Act. As such, the impugned

0503WP7975-25.odt 8 Judgment
order dated 08.12.2025 based on the notice dated 14.06.2017 is
unsustainable on this count.
11. A statutory provision mandating requirement to give notice inheres
in itself the requirement to give reasonable notice. It is trite law that the
notice should give sufficient time to the person concerned to reply to the
cause and at the same time, the notice should be in reasonable proximity
with the final order, meaning thereby that the issuance of notice,
submission of explanation and consideration of the cause should have
coherence with respect to time period as well. A stale notice issued prior
to eight years, cannot be made the basis to pass final order having serious
and drastic consequences to the extent of freezing all the bank accounts of
the Municipal Council (25 Bank Accounts) and unilaterally recovering an
amount of more than Rupees Three Crores from some of the accounts.
12. It is fruitful to refer here and rely upon the elucidation of legal
position by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority
Versus Ram Prakash [(2011) 4 SCC 180], about reasonableness of notice,
from which paragraphs 21 and 22 are reproduced below:-
“21. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of DDA
and by the respondent appearing in person, and also having
considered the reasoning of the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench in repudiating the claim of misuser charges by
DDA, we are unable to convince ourselves that the decisions
rendered by the High Court, both by the learned Single Judge as
also the Division Bench, require any interference in these
proceedings. The materials on record will show that the
respondent took prompt steps against the tenants for their

0503WP7975-25.odt 9 Judgment
transgression. During arguments it was indicated that, in fact, one
of the tenants had already vacated the portion of the premises
occupied by him. It is also very clear that after issuing the show-
cause notices, the petitioner did not take any follow-up action
thereupon. Instead, after a lapse of 25 years, the petitioner set up
a claim on account of charges for the entire period. It would be
inequitable to allow the petition which had sat over the matter to
take advantage of its inaction in claiming misuser charges.
22. Even as to the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner
that there was no limitation prescribed for making a demand of
arrear charges, the Division Bench relying on the decision of this
Court in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers
Union Ltd., observed that even where no period of limitation is
indicated, the statutory authority is required to act within a
reasonable time. In our view, what would construe a reasonable
time, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, but it
would not be fair to the respondent if such demand is allowed to
be raised after 25 years, on account of the inaction of the
petitioner.”
13. It has to be noted that based on the impugned order under Section
8-F(3)(x) of the Act, the drastic action of freezing twenty five accounts of
the petitioner-Municipal Council is already taken and in that process an
amount of Rs.3,65,86,242/- is already recovered from the accounts of the
petitioner-Municipal Council. In view of my inference that the impugned
order under Section 8-F of the Act is unsustainable being passed without
prior notice and any opportunity of hearing, the consequent action of
freezing the accounts of the petitioner-Municipal Council is apparently
arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
14. The contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioner-Municipal
Council that the respondents have straightway resorted to the action of
freezing of the accounts of the petitioner-Municipal Council for recovering

0503WP7975-25.odt 10 Judgment
the alleged dues of the employees also needs due consideration. It has to
be noted that the Recovery Officer has invoked the enabling provision
contained in Section 8-F of the Act titled ‘other modes of recovery’ and
straightway directed freezing of the accounts of the petitioner-Municipal
Council. It has to be noted that Section 8-F(3)(i) of the Act requires
notice to be issued upon the debtor of employer providing an opportunity
to contest the notice and these proceedings being of quasi judicial in
nature, the requirement to afford an opportunity of hearing is apparently
mandatory. In the instant case, the impugned order under Section 8-F of
the Act being passed without any reasonable notice and opportunity of
hearing is thus grossly unsustainable in law. In this context, it is beneficial
to refer to the judgment of the Principal Seat of this Court in B.T. Kadlag
Constructions (supra) in which while dealing with an identical situation,
this Court has clarified the legal position in paragraph 41, which is
reproduced below:-
“41. On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the
case, it becomes abundantly clear that the Respondent No.1 has
straightaway issued the prohibitory order to the debtor of the
employer not to pay the amount due to the employer and instead
credit the same with the Provident Fund Commissioner without
given a notice as envisaged by Clause (i) of sub-Section (3) of
Section 8-F and also without providing an opportunity to meet the
said demand by filing a statement on oath under Clause (vi) of
sub-Section (3) of Section 8-F. The Recovery Officer is enjoined to
first give a notice and then consider the statement on oath filed by
the debtor of the employer and take a decision in observance of
the principles of natural justice. Clearly there is infraction of the
statutory mandate. Mere reference to the provisions contained in
Section 8-B and 17-B of the EPF Act, 1952 without following the
procedure prescribed under Section 8-F of the EPF Act, 1952

0503WP7975-25.odt 11 Judgment
would not lend legality and validity to the prohibitory order.”
15. It is also crucial to note that the petitioner has already filed an
appeal challenging the order under Section 7-A of the Act and the appeal
although dismissed in default, the application for restoration is pending
before the Tribunal. The petitioner has specifically averred in the petition

that the application for restoration alongwith an application for condonation
of delay was not even accepted by the Tribunal on few dates and
ultimately on 10.12.2025 the application for restoration was ordered to be
registered. It is thus clear that the application for restoration in the appeal
is pending and the contentions on behalf of the petitioner challenging the
order under Section 7-A of the Act would be subject matter of adjudication
in the appeal. Thus, the legality of action of recovery of Rs.3,65,86,242/-
would be decided after the contentions of the petitioner/appellant in the
appeal are decided. Thus, the action of the respondents to recover the
amount of more than Rupees Three Crores Fifty Lakhs from the bank
accounts of the petitioner-Municipal Council also appears hasty. Hence,
the petitioner is entitled to apply for refund of Rs.3,65,86,242/- by filing
appropriate application before the Tribunal in the pending appeal. As
such, the C.A.W.No.412 of 2026 filed by the petitioner-Municipal Council
in this petition seeking amendment to claim refund of the said amount is
disposed of with liberty to the petitioner to file a separate application
before the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Nagpur.
16. Having regard to the above mentioned factual and legal aspects, the

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impugned order passed by the respondents under Section 8-F of the Act
deserves to be quashed and set aside. However, it is clarified that the
liability of the petitioner-Municipal Council for payment of provident fund
dues of the employees being subject matter of adjudication in the appeal
before the Tribunal the same shall be adjudicated by the Tribunal based on
the grounds raised in the said appeal. This petition is decided by
considering the limited issue about challenge to the order under Section 8-
F of the Act on the contention of it being passed without notice or
opportunity of hearing.
17. In view of above, the following order is passed:-
I. The writ petition is allowed.
II. The impugned order dated 08.12.2025 passed by the respondent
no.1-Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Akola under Section
8-F of the Act is quashed and set aside.
III. The petitioner-Municipal Council is entitled to prosecute the
application for restoration of appeal before the Tribunal and hence,
no orders are passed with respect to Prayer Clause (b) of the
petition.
18. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
(PRAFULLA S. KHUBALKAR, J.)
APTE
Signed by: Apte
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 18/03/2026 19:59:03