THE MANAGING DIRECTOR vs SRI GOVINDAPPA

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


TH
RESERVED ON 29 SEPTEMBER 2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

TH
DATED THIS THE 30 DAY OF OCTOBER, 2026

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU, CHIEF JUSTICE

AND









THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA


WRIT APPEAL NO.1446 OF 2025 (GM-KEB)


BETWEEN:

1. THE MANAGING DIRECTOR,
BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED (BESCOM), BELAKU BHAVANA,
K.R. CIRCLE, BENGALURU – 560 001

2. THE CHIEF ENGINEER,
BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED (BESCOM), KOLAR DISTRICT,
KOLAR – 563 101.

3. EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED, BANGARPET DIVISION,
KOLAR – 563 101.

4. ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED, KGF SUB DIVISION, KGF TALUK,
KOLAR – 563 101.

5. JUNIOR ENGINEER,
BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED, BANGARPET DIVISION,
BANGARPET, KOLAR – 563 101.

6. SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER (ELEC.),
COMMERCIAL, O & M CIRCLE OFFICE,









Digitally signed by
MAHALAKSHMI B M
Location: High Court
of Karnataka

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


BANGALORE ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY
LIMITED, M B ROAD,
OPP. YAMAHA SHOWROOM,
KOLAR – 563 101.
…APPELLANTS

(BY SRI. LIKITH R.P., ADVOCATE)

AND:

1. SRI GOVINDAPPA
S/O. SEETHAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT DODRAHALLI VILLAGE,
KASABA HOBLI, BANGARPET TALUK,
KOLAR – 563 101.

2. THE CHIEF SECRETARY,
THE GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BENGALURU – 560 001.

3. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT OFFICER,
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
OFFICE AT K R CIRCLE,
BENGALURU – 560 001.
…RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI. H. PAVANA CHANDRA SHETTY, ADVOCATE FOR R-1;
SRI. K.S. HARISH, GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR R-2 & R-3)

THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DATED 12.02.2025 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE
JUDGE IN W.P.NO.11558/2024 AND CONSEQUENTLY DISMISS
W.P.NO.11558/2024 AND ETC.

THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY,
JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. VIBHU BAKHRU ,CHIEF JUSTICE
and
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


C.A.V. JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA )

1. The appellants, the Bengaluru Electricity Supply Company
Limited [ the BESCOM ] have preferred this intra-court appeal
assailing the order dated 12.02.2025 [ the impugned order ]
passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.11558/2024 [GM-
KEB], whereby the writ petition preferred by respondent No.1 was
allowed and the appellants were directed to pay compensation of
` 27,88,925/- with interest at 6% per annum, after deducting the
amount already paid on account of electrical injuries resulting in
amputation of respondent No.1’s left hand.

Prefatory facts
2. On 09.06.2015, respondent No.1, Sri. Govindappa, sustained
severe electrical injuries when he allegedly came in contact with a
live electric wire near a transformer situated on a private property in
Bangarpet, Kolar District. The injuries ultimately resulted in
amputation of his left hand.
3. Respondent No.1 submitted representations dated
12.09.2022 to the BESCOM seeking compensation. As the said
representations were not considered, he approached this Court in

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


W.P.No.21650/2022. By order dated 24.11.2022, this Court directed
the Superintending Engineer, BESCOM to consider the

representations in accordance with law.
4. Pursuant thereto, the BESCOM considered the claim and
rejected the same by endorsement dated 24.02.2023. Aggrieved
thereby, respondent No.1 preferred W.P.No.8076/2023. This Court
vide order dated 20.12.2023, quashed the rejection endorsement

and directed reconsideration of the claim.
5. In compliance with the said direction, the BESCOM issued
the official memorandum dated 29.02.2024, sanctioning
`
compensation of 1,20,000/- in accordance with the applicable
administrative circular governing compensation/ex-gratia payable in
cases of electrical accidents.
6. Dissatisfied with the amount sanctioned, respondent No.1
preferred the aforesaid writ petition seeking compensation of
` 32,00,000/- on the basis of principles governing determination of
compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [ the MV Act ].

Findings of the learned Single Judge [impugned order]
7. The learned Single Judge placing reliance upon the
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Karnataka Power

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


Transmission Corporation Limited (KPTCL) v. Mrs. Rekha and
1
Others , proceeded on the premise that the victims of electrical
accidents are entitled to compensation in the same manner as
victims of motor vehicle accidents under the MV Act and that the
methodology prescribed for assessing compensation under the MV
Act could be adopted.
8. The learned Single Judge noticed that respondent No.1 was
aged about 37 years on the date of accident and was stated to be
working as a coolie. In the absence of documentary proof of
income, the notional monthly income was assessed at ` 9,000/- in
accordance with the Karnataka State Legal Services Authority [ the
KSLSA ] guidelines applicable to accidents of the year 2015.
9. Taking into consideration the disability certificate indicating
80% disability, the learned Single Judge assessed the functional
disability at 80%, added 40% towards future prospects and applied
multiplier 15. Accordingly, ` 18,14,400/- was awarded towards loss
of future earnings. The learned Single Judge further awarded
` 4,45,525/- towards medical expenses, ` 54,000/- towards loss of
`
income during laid-up period, 75,000/- towards conveyance,

1
W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals D.D 23.01.2025

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


`
nourishment and nutritious foods, 2,00,000/- towards pain and
suffering and ` 2,00,000/- towards loss of amenities in life.
10. Thus, the total compensation of ` 27,88,925/- was awarded
together with interest at 6% per annum from the date of
presentation of the writ petition until payment, subject to deduction
of the amount already paid. Aggrieved by the said order, the
BESCOM has preferred the present appeal.

Contentions
11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants would contend
that the learned Single Judge was not justified in entertaining the
writ petition and determining compensation in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India particularly when the liability
of the BESCOM and the circumstances surrounding the accident
were seriously disputed. It is submitted that the accident occurred
on 09.06.2015, whereas the claim for compensation was initiated
several years thereafter. According to the appellants, the question
of limitation was a material consideration which ought to have been
examined before entertaining the claim. It is further contended that
the accident occurred on a private property, where respondent
No.1 allegedly approached the transformer and came in contact

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


with the live electric wires. Whether the accident occurred on
account of any defect in electrical installation, failure to maintain
the equipment, unauthorized interference with the installation or the
conduct of the injured person are disputed questions requiring
examination of evidence.
12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that neither the
Electricity Act, 2003 [ the Act ] nor the applicable safety regulations
impose absolute liability upon the BESCOM for every electrical
accident, irrespective of its cause. It is contended that the principle
of strict liability is subject to recognized exceptions and that
circumstances necessary to determine whether any such exception
is attracted cannot be conclusively decided in writ proceedings,
where material facts are disputed. It is further submitted that, the
learned Single Judge erred in mechanically adopting the principles
governing assessment of compensation under the MV Act, which
constitute a distinct statutory framework. The assessment of
income, functional disability, future prospects and multiplier,
according to the appellants, ought to have been made on the basis
of evidence.
13. Learned counsel for the appellants particularly places
reliance upon the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


Court in Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v.
2
Rekha and Others , whereby the judgment of the Division Bench
in W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals was set aside. It is
contended that the very legal foundation upon which the learned
Single Judge proceeded no longer survives in view of the law
declared by the Supreme Court. He also relies upon the KPTCL
corporate order dated 05.11.2013, prescribing compensation/ x-
gratia for fatal and non-fatal electrical accidents. It is submitted that
the amount of ` 1,20,000/- sanctioned to respondent No.1 was in
terms of the administrative compensation scheme and cannot be
construed as an unequivocal admission of a tortious liability or an
acceptance of the higher compensation claimed by him.
14. It is further submitted that the criminal proceedings initiated
against the concerned BESCOM officials culminated in their
acquittal, as the prosecution failed to establish the charges beyond
reasonable doubt. The appellants therefore contend that the liability
could not have been presumed without independent adjudication.
15. Per contra , learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1
would submit that the transmission and distribution of electricity
constitute inherently dangerous activities and that an electricity

2
2026 INSC 847

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


undertaking owes a duty to ensure safety of persons who come in
contact with its installation. He relies upon the principles laid down
3
in M. C. Mehta and Another v. Union of India and Others . He
further relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court
in W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals, wherein the
compensation was awarded in cases of electrocution.
16. It is further contended that the BESCOM having itself
`
sanctioned compensation of 1,20,000/- cannot now dispute its
liability altogether. According to respondent No.1, the dispute is
essentially confined to the adequacy of compensation and
therefore there is no justification for relegating respondent No.1 to
civil Court after the lapse of several years as contended by the
learned counsel for the appellants.
Reasons and conclusion
Principles governing negligence, strict liability and absolute
liability
17. Liability in tort arise on account of intentional wrongdoing,
negligence, or independently of negligence under the principles of
strict or absolute liability. In an action founded upon negligence, the
claimant is ordinarily required to establish the existence of a duty of

3
(1987) 1 SCC 395

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


care, breach of that duty and damage resulting from such breach.
Strict liability, on the other hand, does not require proof of
negligence, although the person sought to be made liable may
invoke recognized exceptions.
18. The foundational principle of strict liability was laid down in
4
Rylands v. Fletcher . Under the said rule, a person who for his
own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his
peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the
damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
19. The rule proceeds on the principle that a person who creates
an unusual or dangerous condition by accumulating a potentially
harmful substance or thing must bear responsibility for
consequences of its escape, even in the absence of negligence.
However, the liability so imposed is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions include an act of God, an act of stranger, the injured
person's own default, consent and statutory authority, subject to the
requirements governing their application. The doctrine of absolute
liability was subsequently evolved by the Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta ( supra ), arising out of the

4
(1868) LR 3 HL 330

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


Oleum gas leak incident. The Hon'ble Supreme Court considered
th
whether the traditional rule in Rylands ( supra ), developed in 19
century, adequately addressed the risk created by modern
hazardous industries.
20. The Constitution Bench held that an enterprise engaged in
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and
non-delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm
results from such activity. Where harm results from hazardous
activity, the enterprise is liable to compensate those affected,
irrespective of whether reasonable care was exercised. It was
explained that the traditional exceptions to the rule in Rylands
( supra ) would not apply to the doctrine of absolute liability. It also
emphasized that compensation should bear a relationship to the
magnitude and financial capacity of the enterprise so as to have
deterrent effect.
21. The distinction between the two doctrines is therefore
significant. Neither strict liability nor absolute liability necessarily
requires proof of negligence. However, strict liability permits the
recognized defences, while absolute liability, in the class of
hazardous activities to which the doctrine applies, excludes such
defences.

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22. In Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal
5
Nakum , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the principles
governing liability in tort, including the nature of duty of care,
foreseeability of harm, breach of statutory duty and circumstances
in which liability may arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court explained
that mere occurrence of an accident or existence of a statutory
obligation does not, by itself, establish actionable negligence. The
nature of duty and the applicable standard of liability must be
examined in the context of relevant facts and statutory framework.
6
23. In M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari and Others , the
Hon’ble Supreme Court considered a case where a person died
upon coming into contact with a live electric wire which had fallen
on a public road. The Electricity Board sought to avoid liability by
contending that the accident was attributable to unauthorized
intervention of a third party.
24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that supply of electricity is
inherently dangerous activity and applied the principle of strict
liability. It was further held that an electricity undertaking cannot
escape liability merely by attributing the dangerous condition to
third party. The defence based upon act of stranger cannot

5
(1997) 9 SCC 552
6
(2002) 2 SCC 162

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WA No. 1446 of 2025


succeed where interference was reasonably foreseeable and
precautions could have been taken to prevent the resulting harm.
25. The principles laid down in aforesaid decision make it clear
that absence of negligence does not necessarily absolve an
electricity undertaking of liability. Equally, the mere fact that an
injury was caused by electricity does not dispense with the need to
examine the circumstances of accident and the applicability of the
recognized exceptions to the doctrine of strict liability.
Subsequent decision of the Supreme Court in the Rekha
( supra )
26. The question concerning the nature of liability of electricity
transmission and distribution undertakings has now been
considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rekha (supra).
27. The said decision arose from the judgment of this Court in
W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals, wherein the Division
Bench had affirmed the award of compensation in writ proceedings
arising from electrical accidents. The Division Bench had
proceeded upon the principles of absolute liability and applicability
of the methodology adopted for assessment of compensation
under the MV Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the
decisions in Rylands ( supra ), M.C.Mehta ( supra ) and

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M.P.Electricity Board ( supra ), clarified that the principle applicable
to electricity transmission and distribution undertakings is that of
strict liability, subject to the recognized exceptions and not absolute
liability.
28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recognized that transmission of
electricity is undoubtedly an inherently dangerous activity and that
an undertaking engaged in such activity bears a high degree of
responsibility. The State and its instrumentalities are not exempt
from the operation of the principle of strict liability merely because
electricity is supplied as an essential public service. At the same
time, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified that it would not be
correct to proceed on the assumption that electricity undertaking is
invariably liable for every accident involving electricity, regardless
of the circumstances. The recognized exemptions to strict liability
remain relevant and their applicability must be determined upon
examination of the facts of the particular case. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court further held that where material questions
concerning the manner of occurrence of the accident, responsibility
for dangerous conditions, the conduct of the injured person or
involvement of third parties are seriously disputed, adjudication of
such questions may require oral and documentary evidence. In

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such circumstances, the remedy of a writ petition under Article 226
would ordinarily be inappropriate for determining contested claims
for compensation.
29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, following Raman v. Uttar
7
Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. , also held that the multiplier
method cannot be applied to determine compensation in cases of
electrocution, and that the computation under the MV Act could not
have been applied mutatis mutandis to such claims. It was clarified
that the statutory framework governing motor accident
compensation cannot be mechanically imported into claims
involving electrical accident. The compensation where liability is
established must be determined in accordance with the applicable
legal principles and evidence relevant to the claim. The judgment of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rekha ( supra ) thus directly governs
the legal questions arising in the present appeal. The learned
Single Judge had relied upon the Division Bench judgment in
W.A.No.861/2022 and connected appeals, which, insofar as
W.A.No.861/2022 and W.A.No.865/2022 are concerned, has since
been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rekha ( supra ).
Therefore, the principles upon which the impugned order was

7
(2014) 15 SCC 1

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founded, insofar as they relate to absolute liability and automatic
application of the MV Act methodology, cannot be sustained.
Maintainability of the writ petition and disputed questions of
fact
30. In Chairman Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) v.
8
Sukamani Das , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where the
claim for compensation on account of electrocution involves
disputed questions of fact concerning the cause of the accident and
negligence or responsibility of the electricity undertaking such
questions cannot ordinarily be adjudicated in proceedings under
Article 226. The appropriate remedy would be to institute
proceedings before the competent civil Court.
31. Similarly in S.D.O. Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. and
9
Others v. Timudu Oram , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated
that claims for compensation arising from electrical accidents
where material facts are disputed and evidence is necessary to
determine the liability are ordinarily required to be adjudicated
before the competent civil Court.
32. It is equally necessary to observe that existence of disputed
facts does not operate as an absolute bar to the exercise of

8
(1999) 7 SCC 298
9
(2005) 6 SCC 156

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jurisdiction. However, where dispute goes to the very foundation of
liability and cannot satisfactorily be resolved on admitted or
incontrovertible material the writ Court would ordinarily decline to
undertake an adjudication requiring a trial. In the present case,
although the factum of electrical accident and the serious injuries
suffered by respondent No.1 are not in dispute, several material
questions bearing upon the liability of the BESCOM remain
contested.
33. The learned Single Judge proceeded to determine
compensation principally on the basis of the earlier Division Bench
decision. In view of the subsequent declaration of law by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Rekha ( supra ), such an approach
cannot be sustained.
Effect of payment under KPTCL Circular
34. Learned counsel for respondent No.1 has contended that the
BESCOM having sanctioned compensation of ` 1,20,000/- must be
deemed to have admitted liability and respondent No.1 ought not to
be relegated to a civil Court merely for determination of enhanced
compensation.

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35. The said contention cannot be accepted in the broad manner
suggested. The KPTCL Corporate order dated 05.11.2013 provides
an administrative mechanism for payment of compensation/ex-
gratia in cases of fatal and non-fatal electrical accidents involving
non-departmental persons. It prescribes specified amounts,
percentage of loss of earning capacity and conditions governing
payment.
36. The sanction of compensation under such an administrative
scheme cannot, without more, be equated with an unequivocal
admission of liability in tort for all consequential damages claimed
by the injured person. The nature and effect of the sanction must
be determined with reference to the terms of the circular and
circumstances in which the payment is made.
`
37. In the present case, the amount of 1,20,000/- was
sanctioned under the administrative scheme applicable to the
electrical accident.
38. The entitlement to any further compensation, if established,
must be determined by the competent forum in accordance with
law.

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Effect of acquittal in criminal proceedings
39. The appellants have also placed reliance upon the acquittal
of the concerned BESCOM officials in criminal proceedings arising
from the accident. The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is
proof beyond reasonable doubt, whereas liability in civil
proceedings is ordinarily determined upon the preponderance of
probabilities. Moreover, a strict liability does not depend upon proof
of negligence. Therefore, acquittal in criminal proceedings does not
by itself establish that the BESCOM is free from civil liability.
Determination
40. Respondent No.1 has undoubtedly suffered grievous injuries
resulting in permanent disability. The hardship caused by such
injuries cannot be overlooked. However, sympathy for the injured
person, however justified, cannot substitute the legal requirements
governing determination of liability and assessment of
compensation. The question is not whether respondent No.1 is
necessarily disentitled to compensation beyond the amount already
sanctioned. The question is whether liability of the BESCOM, and
quantum of compensation could have been conclusively
determined in the writ proceedings, notwithstanding the material

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dispute concerning the cause of accident and the responsibility of
the parties.
41. Having regard to the principles laid down in Sukamani Das
( supra ), S.D.O. Grid Corporation ( supra ) and more particularly,
the subsequent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rekha
( supra ), we are of the considered view that the learned Single
Judge was not justified in determining compensation when
adjudication of the disputed questions bearing upon liability was
involved. In the circumstances, the impugned order needs to be set
aside while reserving liberty to respondent No.1 to pursue such
remedy as may be available before the competent forum for
determination of his claim for compensation.
42. For the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal is allowed. The
order dated 12.02.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.11558/2024 [GM-KEB] is hereby set aside and
W.P.No.11558/2024 is dismissed, reserving liberty to respondent
No.1 to approach the competent civil Court or the other competent
forum as may be permissible in law seeking compensation on
account of the injuries suffered in the electrical accident dated
09.06.2015. All contentions are kept open.

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43. In the event respondent No.1 initiates appropriate
proceedings, the competent forum shall consider the claim
independently and in accordance with law, uninfluenced by any of
the observations made herein.
44. No order as to costs.
45. Pending interlocutory applications stand disposed of.


Sd/-
(VIBHU BAKHRU)
CHIEF JUSTICE



Sd/-
(K.S. HEMALEKHA)
JUDGE


AT