UNIVERSITY OF KERALA vs DR.C.VISWANATHAN
- Court
- Kerala High Court
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
TH
WEDNESDAY, THE 30 DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2026 / 8TH ASWINA, 1948
WA NO. 997 OF 2021
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT DATED 31.03.2021 IN WP(C) NO.39 OF 2019
OF HIGH COURT OF KERALA
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS 2 AND 3:
1 UNIVERSITY OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTRAR,
PRIYADARSHINI HILLS, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695034.
2 THE REGISTRAR, UNIVERSITY OF KERALA,
PRIYADARSHINI HILLS,
THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695034.
BY ADV SMT.GIRIJA K GOPAL
RESPONDENTS/PETITIONER AND RESPONDENTS 1 AND 4:
1 DR.C.VISWANATHAN
AGED 66 YEARS
S/O. LATE K.CHELLAPPAN,
PRINCIPAL (RETD.), S.N.COLLEGE,
ALATHUR, RESIDING AT THAPASYA,
S.L.PURAM P.O., CHERTHALA,
ALAPPUZHA-688524.
2 STATE OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
HIGHER EDUCATION DEPARTMENT,
GOVERNMENT SECRETARIAT,
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THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695001.
3 THE CORPORATE MANAGER,
SREE NARAYANA COLLEGES, P.B.NO.63,
KOLLAM-691003.
BY ADVS.
SHRI.ELVIN PETER P.J. (SR.)
SRI.K.R.GANESH
SRI.CHETHAN KRISHNA R. GOVERNMENT PLEADER
THIS WRIT APPEAL WAS FINALLY HEARD ON 19.08.2026, THE COURT
ON 30.09.2026 PASSED THE FOLLOWING:
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“CR”
JUDGMENT
Muralee Krishna, J.
The respondents 2 and 3 in W.P.(C)No.39 of 2019 filed this
writ appeal under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958,
challenging the judgment dated 31.03.2021 passed by the learned
Single Judge in that writ petition.
st
2. Going by the averments in the writ petition, the 1
respondent-writ petitioner is aggrieved by Ext.P10 order dated
nd
26.03.2018 issued by the 2 appellant, the Registrar, University
st
of Kerala, rejecting the request of the 1 respondent to give
promotion to him to the post of Selection Grade Lecturer with
effect from 25.10.1994 in the light of Ext.P5 Government order
st
dated 27.03.1990. According to the 1 respondent, he entered
service as Lecturer in the Department of Economics in Sree
st
Narayana College, Cherthala, affiliated to the 1 appellant on
st
25.10.1982. His appointment was approved by the 1 appellant
as per Ext.P1 order dated 16.09.1983 with effect from
25.10.1982, and he was promoted as Senior Grade Lecturer on
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25.10.1990. By Ext.P2 proceedings dated 21.01.1999 issued by
st
the Corporate Manager of Sree Narayana College, the 1
respondent was granted placement as Lecturer (Selection Grade)
st
with effect from 25.10.1995. The 1 respondent obtained M.Phil
st
degree in Economics from the 1 appellant University in the
examination held in January 1993 and was issued with Ext.P3
M.Phil degree certificate dated 10.10.1994. Thereafter, he
st
obtained Ph.D degree in Economics from the 1 appellant
University and was awarded Ext.P4 Ph.D degree certificate dated
st
20.06.1998. The 1 respondent contends that as per the terms of
Ext.P5 Government Order dated 27.03.1990, a Lecturer, who,
while in service, acquires M.Phil degree and Ph.D degree, is
entitled to get relaxation of one year and three years, respectively,
for promotion to the post of Lecturer (Selection Grade).
2.1. The University did not accept Ext.P2 proceedings issued
by the Corporate Manager of the College, and Ext.P2 proposal was
st
sent back with remarks that the 1 respondent is eligible for
promotion to the post of Lecturer (Selection Grade) only with
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effect from 25.10.1997 on account of the acquisition of M.Phil
degree, by giving relaxation of one year as provided in Ext.P5
Government Order. Thereafter, the Corporate Manager issued
st
revised proceedings dated 29.06.2000 promoting the 1
respondent as Lecturer (Selection Grade) with effect from
29.10.1997. Consequently, the University approved the promotion
st
of the 1 respondent as Lecturer (Selection Grade) with effect
from 25.10.1997 as per Ext P7 order dated 23.01.2001.
st
2.2. Aggrieved by Ext.P7 order, the 1 respondent submitted
Ext.P8 representation dated 13.09.2017 before the University,
claiming promotion as Lecturer (Selection Grade) with effect from
st
25.10.1994. Thereafter, the 1 respondent approached this Court
by filing W.P.(C)No.40574 of 2017, in which this Court, by Ext.P9
judgment dated 18.12.2017, directed the University to consider
and pass orders on Ext.P8 representation within two months from
the date of receipt of a copy of that judgment. In compliance with
the directions in Ext.P9 judgment, the University issued Ext.P10
order dated 26.03.2018, however rejecting Ext.P8 representation.
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The University, in order to issue Ext.P10 order, called for remarks
from the Audit Department of the Kerala Government (Kerala
University Audit), and the Joint Director of the Audit Department
issued Ext.P11 communication dated 09.02.2018, giving its
st st
opinion against the claim of the 1 respondent. Thereafter, the 1
respondent-writ petitioner filed the present writ petition i.e.,
W.P.(C)No.39 of 2019 under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, seeking the following reliefs;
“i) to issue a writ of certiorari or appropriate writ, order or
direction calling for the records leading to Ext.P10 order and
quash the same.
ii) to issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ,
Order or direction calling for the records leading to Ext.P7
order and quash the same to the extent it approved the
promotion of the petitioner as Selection Grade Lecturer with
effect from 25.10.1997; instead of 25.10.1994.
iii) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate
writ, order or direction directing the respondents 2 and 3 to
approve the promotion of the petitioner to the post of
Selection Grade Lecturer with effect from 25.10.1994 on
account of acquisition of Ph.D. and M.Phil. Degree in the
light of Ext. P5 Government Order and also to grant him all
consequential monitory and other service benefits;
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iv) to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate
th
writ, order or direction directing the 4 respondent to issue
a proposal relating to the promotion of the petitioner to the
category of Selection Grade Lecturer with effect from
nd
25.10.1994 to the 2 respondent within a time fixed by this
Hon’ble Court;
v) to declare that the petitioner is entitled to get promotion
to the post of Selection Grade Lecturer with effect from
25.10.1994 in the light of Ext. P5 Government Order”.
2.3. In the writ petition on behalf of the appellants -
respondents 2 and 3, a statement dated 15.02.2019 was filed
st
opposing the claim raised by the 1 respondent. Paragraphs 4 to
8 of that statement read thus;
“4. Petitioner was awarded Ph.D. only on 07.03.1998.
Relaxation of Ph.D. can be granted only with effect from the
date of award of Ph.D. As such, petitioner is eligible for only
seven months of relaxation on account of Ph.D. as the
benefits extended by virtue of a qualification can never be
with effect from a date prior to the date of attaining such
qualification.
th
5. As per Ext. P2 the 4 Respondent forwarded the
proceedings placing the Petitioner as Lecturer Selection
Grade with effect from 25.10.1995, granting him a
relaxation of 3 years on account of his Ph.D. degree. It may
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be noted that the petitioner was awarded Ph.D. degree only
on 07.03.1998. Hence he cannot be promoted with effect
from 25.10.1995 by virtue of a degree attained only on
07.03.1998, as stated supra.
6. As the Petitioner was eligible to be promoted only with
effect from 25.10.1997, by virtue of his M.Phil. Degree, a
letter was sent to the Principal, SN College, Cherthala, to
revise the proposal. The benefit extended by virtue of a
qualification can never be with effect from a date prior to
the date of attaining such qualification. Consequently, the
Petitioner was given approval by the University with effect
from 25.10.1997 as per Order dated 23.01.2001. Placement
cannot be granted to the Petitioner with effect from
25.10.1994 giving him a relaxation of 3+1= 4 years on
account of Ph.D. and M.Phil. Moreover the teacher cannot
avail relaxation of years cumulatively on account of both
M.Phil. and Ph.D. together. Hence the contention of the
petitioner that he should be granted promotion with effect
from 25.10.1994 availing relaxation on account of a Ph.D.
degree acquired on 07.03.1998 is per se incorrect and
hence denied.
7. In compliance with Exhibit P9 Judgment dated
18.12.2017, the University considered the representation
filed by the Petitioner and rejected the same. The remarks
of the Kerala State Audit Department were also obtained.
The Audit Department also opined that the Petitioner was
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not eligible for 3 years relaxation on account of his Ph.D.
degree since he had obtained the same on a much later date
i.e., 07.03.1998. It was further reported that the placement
to selection grade granted with effect from 25.10.1997
giving a relaxation of one year on account of M.Phil., is in
order.
8. Without prejudice to the contentions supra, it is pertinent
to note that the petitioner has raised such a demand now
after a long gap of 17 years which clearly reveals that the
matter of placement to selection grade from 1994 was never
a concern earlier and is only an afterthought”.
st
2.4. To the statement filed by the appellants, the 1
respondent - writ petitioner filed a reply dated 25.05.2019.
Paragraph 2 of that reply statement reads thus;
“2. The averments contained in paragraph 4 of the
statement that the petitioner acquired Ph.D. only on
07.03.1998 and hence the 3 years relaxation contemplated
under paragraph 5.06 of Ext.P5 order can be granted only
from the date of acquisition of Ph.D. is absolutely incorrect,
misconceived, illegal and hence denied. What is
contemplated under clause 5.06 of Ext.P5 order is a grant
of promotion to the category of Reader in the Selection
Grade to those Lecturers who completes a total period of 16
years of service as on 01.01.1986 or thereafter. The fact
that the petitioner had completed 16 years of service on
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25.10.1998 is not in dispute. Thus, the petitioner became
eligible to be granted promotion to the post of Reader in the
Selection Grade on 25.10.1998 the date on which he
completed 16 years of service. Hence, when the petitioner
acquired eligibility to be promoted as Reader in the Selection
Grade on 25.10.1998 the last limb of clause 5.06 applies
because only those who attain the qualification namely
completion of 16 years of service will be eligible to be
promoted as Reader Selection Grade and it is only those
persons who have completed 16 years of service will be
eligible for relaxation of 3 years of service if they possess
the Ph.D. as on the date of which they had completed the
16 years of service. In other words, the relaxation of 3 years
for promotion as Reader in the Selection Grade has to be
considered with reference to the date of eligibility of the
person to be promoted as Reader. The statements contained
in the reply statement filed by the respondents that a
Teacher should possess Ph.D. even prior to the date on
which he completes the 16 years of service for claiming the
3 years of relaxation is absolutely misconceived and
misreading or rather a misunderstanding of the provision.
Clause 5.06 envisages a promotion as Reader Selection
Grade to those who completes 16 years of service. Thus, the
relaxation of 3 years on possession of Ph.D. has also to be
considered with reference to the date of completion of 16
years. Thus all the statements to the contrary contained in
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the statement is absolutely incorrect, misconceived and
hence denied”.
2.5. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of
materials on record, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned
judgment dated 31.03.2021, allowed the writ petition. After
extracting Clauses 4.04, 5.03, and 5.06 of Ext.P5 Government
Order (mistakenly stated as Ext.P2 in the impugned judgment),
the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 8 of the said judgment,
held thus;
“8. On a cumulative reading of the Clauses, the expression
'as and when they acquire research degrees', as well as
'relaxation in the year of service by 3 years and 1 year
respectively, if holder of Ph.D or M.Phil Degree' would not
mean benefit would be granted from date of acquiring the
Ph.D degree, as Clause 5.06 has to be read as a whole and
in conjunction with clauses 5.03 and 5.04 and not in
isolation. By fixing the date as 1.1.1996 or thereafter
(emphasis supplied) would render a candidate eligible for
the post of Reader which would relate back to the stage
when the petitioner completed the service of 16 years and
only then can claim benefit of relaxation 3+1 ie. Three year
for Ph.D 1 year for M.Phil which is admissible, thus, the
reasons assigned in Ext.P10 granting benefits to the
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petitioner w.e.f 25.10.1997 and not from 25.10.1994 is
wholly atrocious, fallacious, repugnant and hereby set
aside. Mandamus is issued to the respondents to grant the
benefit of Selection Grade to the petitioner w.e.f
25.10.1994 by approving promotion to the post of Reader
from the same date”.
2.6. Being aggrieved, the appellants have filed the present
writ appeal.
3. Heard Smt. Girija K. Gopal, the learned Standing
Counsel for the Kerala University for the appellants, Sri. K. R.
st
Ganesh, the learned counsel for the 1 respondent - writ petitioner
and Sri. Chethan Krishna R, the learned Government Pleader.
4. The argument addressed at the Bar by either side
st
centres around the point whether the claim raised by the 1
respondent-writ petitioner is a stale claim, as he retired from
service on 31.05.2001. When the learned Standing Counsel for the
University and the learned Government Pleader cited various
st
judgments to contend that the claim of the 1 respondent is
hopelessly barred in view of the delay in raising the claim, the
st
contention of the learned counsel for the 1 respondent is that by
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Ext.P9 judgment dated 18.12.2017 in W.P.(C)No. 40574 of 2017,
this Court directed consideration of Ext.P8 representation dated
st
13.09.2017 submitted by the 1 respondent, which was acted
upon by the University, and therefore the appellants cannot raise
such a contention in the present writ petition. It is also the
st
argument of the learned counsel for the 1 respondent that the
st
claim of the 1 respondent has a recurring cause of action and
therefore it cannot be taken as a stale claim.
5. During the course of arguments, the learned Standing
Counsel for the University submitted that in the representation as
st
well as in the writ petitions filed by the 1 respondent, his claim
was for promotion as Lecturer (Selection Grade) in view of Ext.P5
Government Order dated 27.03 1990. It was for the first time in
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, by relying on Clause
5.06 of Ext.P5 Government Order, it was directed to approve the
st
promotion of the 1 respondent in the post of Reader.
6. As already stated, the contention of the parties in the
st
writ appeal centres around the point whether the claim of the 1
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respondent can be entertained at this distant point of time, when
admittedly he retired from service on 31.05.2001 and whereas the
claim for promotion as Lecturer (Selection Grade) was raised for
the first time by Ext.P8 representation dated 13.09.2017
submitted to the University. To answer this point, it is appropriate
to extract the relevant clauses in Ext.P5 Government order and
the relevant portions of the judgments relied by the learned
counsel on either side.
7. Clause 4.04, 5.03, 5.05 and 5.06 of Ext.P5 order read
thus;
“4.04. In order to encourage research, in continuation of
Post Graduate Studies, Candidates who, at the time of their
recruitment as Lecturers possess Ph.D or M. Phil degree will
be sanctioned three and one advance increments
respectively along with the benefit of corresponding years
of service for the purpose of promotion. The existing
Lecturers without research degrees and those similarly
situate, recruited in future will be eligible for a similar
benefit in service for the purpose of promotion as when they
acquire research degrees, but will not be eligible for advance
increments. Existing Lecturers with research degrees will
also be eligible for a similar benefit.
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xxx xxx xxx
5.03. Every Lecturer in the Senior Scale will be eligible for
promotion to the post of Reader in the scale of pay of Rs.
3700-5700 if he/she has-
(a) Completed 8 years of service in the senior scale provided
that the requirement of 8 years will be relaxed if the total
service of the Lecturer not less than 16 years.
(b) Obtained a Ph.D. degree or an equivalent published
work.
(c) Made some mark in the areas of scholarship and
research as evidenced by self-assessment, report of
referees, quality of publications, contribution to educational
renovation, design of new courses and carricula etc.
(d) Participated in two refresher courses/summer institutes
each of approximately 4 weeks duration or engaged in other
appropriate continuing education programmes of
comparable quality as may be specified by the U. G. C. after
placement in the senior Scale and
(e) Consistently good performance appraisal reports.
xxx xxx xxx
5.05 Those Lecturers in the senior scale who do not have
Ph.D degree or equivalent published work and who do not
meet the scholarship and research standards of a Reader,
but fulfil the other criteria mentioned in Para 5.03 and have
a good record in teaching and/or participated in extension
activities, will be placed in the grade of Rs. 3700-5700
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subject to the recommendations of the Committee
mentioned in Para 5.04. They will be designated as Lecturer
in the Selection Grade. Posts in the selection grade will be
created for this purpose by upgrading the posts held by
them by the University or the Director of Collegiate
Education. They could offer themselves for a fresh
assessment after obtaining Ph.D and/or fulfilling other
requirements for promotion as Reader, and, if found
suitable, would be given the designation of Reader.
5.06 Teachers in Universities and affiliated Colleges will be
placed at the appropriate stage in the revised U. G. C. scales
in accordance with the pay Fixation formula under this
scheme. Existing Lecturers who have completed or will
complete a total period of sixteen years of service on
01.01.1986 or thereafter will be eligible for promotion to the
post of Reader in the selection grade as per the provisions
contained in Para 5.03 to 5.05. They will also be entitled to
the relaxation in the years of service by 3 years and one
year respectively if they hold Ph.D or M. Phil degree”.
8. While coming to the judgments relied upon by the
learned Standing Counsel for the University, in Jacob C v.
Director of Geology and Mining [(2008) 10 SCC 115] , The
Apex Court considered the issue of delay of 18 years in submitting
a representation by the petitioner therein, who was terminated
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from service as a Drill Helper. In that judgment, the Apex Court
observed that the Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or dispose
of such applications/petitions (many a time even without notice to
the other side), without examining the matter on merits, with a
direction to consider and dispose of the representation. In that
judgment the Apex Court held that the replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a
stale or dead claim. When an order is passed considering and
rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction
of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale
claim, nor amount to some kind of 'acknowledgment of a jural
relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action. If the
representation is on the face of it is stale, or does not contain
particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should
desist from directing 'consideration' of such claims. Paragraphs 6
to 8 and 10 of that judgment read thus;
“6. The modus of 'representation'
Let us take the hypothetical case of an employee who is
terminated from service in 1980. He does not challenge the
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termination. But nearly two decades later, say in the year
2000, he decides to challenge the termination. He is aware
that any such challenge would be rejected at the threshold
on the ground of delay (if the application is made before
Tribunal) or on the ground of delay and laches (if a writ
petition is filed before a High Court). Therefore, instead of
challenging the termination, he gives a representation
requesting that he may be taken back to service. Normally,
there will be considerable delay in replying such
representations relating to old matters. Taking advantage
of this position, the ex employee files an application/writ
petition before the Tribunal/High Court seeking a direction
to the employer to consider and dispose of his
representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely allow or
dispose of such applications/petitions (many a time even
without notice to the other side), without examining the
matter on merits, with a direction to consider and dispose
of the representation. The courts/tribunals proceed on the
assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his
representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction
to consider and dispose of the representation does not
involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties.
Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction
to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and
accepted, the ex employee gets a relief, which he would not
have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the
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direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered
and rejected, the ex employee files an application/writ
petition, not with reference to the original cause of action
of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation
given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for
quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the
relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High
Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions
ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and
proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In
this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets
obliterated or ignored.
7. Every representation to the government for relief, may
not be replied on merits. Representations relating to
matters which have become stale or barred by limitation,
can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining
the merits of the claim. In regard to representations
unrelated to the department, the reply may be only to
inform that the matter did not concern the department or
to inform the appropriate department. Representations with
incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant
particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot
furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead
claim.
8. When a direction is issued by a court/tribunal to consider
or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person
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directed) examines the matter on merits, being under the
impression that failure to do may amount to disobedience.
When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim
or representation, in compliance with direction of the court
or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim,
nor amount to some kind of 'acknowledgment of a jural
relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
10. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the
issue only to emphasize the need for circumspection and
care in issuing directions for 'consideration'. If the
representation is on the face of it is stale, or does not
contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim,
courts should desist from directing 'consideration' of such
claims”. (Underline supplied)
9. In Union of India v. M. K. Sarkar [(2010) 2 SCC
59] , while considering more than 22 years' delay after retirement
of the respondent therein from railway service for making a
representation requesting that he may be extended the benefit
of the pension scheme, the Apex Court held that a Court or
Tribunal, before directing 'consideration' of a claim or
representation should examine whether the claim or
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representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or whether it is
with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If it is with reference to
a 'dead' or 'state' issue or dispute, the court/Tribunal should put
an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or
reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal decides to direct
'consideration' without itself examining the merits, it should make
it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any
contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the
court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position
and effect. Relevant portions of paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 of the
said judgment read thus;
“14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application
of respondent without examining the merits, and directing
appellants to consider his representation has given rise to
unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill -
effects of such directions have been considered by this Court
in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and Another
[(2008) 10 SCC 115].
xxxx xxxx xxxx
15. When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale'
or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
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compliance with a direction by the Court / Tribunal to do
so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as
furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead'
issue or time - barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with reference to
the original cause of action and not with reference to the
date on which an order is passed in compliance with a
court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a
representation issued without examining the merits, nor
a decision given in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
16. A Court or Tribunal, before directing 'consideration'
of a claim or representation should examine whether the
claim or representation is with reference to a 'live' issue
or whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue.
If it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'state' issue or
dispute, the court/Tribunal should put an end to the
matter and should not direct consideration or
reconsideration. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct
'consideration' without itself examining of the merits, it
should make it clear that such consideration will be
without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation
or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly
say so, that would be the legal position and effect”.
(Underline supplied)
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10. In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh
Bhandari [(2013) 12 SCC 179] , on the issue of a belated claim
raised by the respondents therein for promotion from SAS Group
III to SAS Group II in Subordinate Agricultural Services in the
Department of Agriculture in the undivided State of Uttar Pradesh,
the Apex Court after referring to various judgments on the point
whether a direction for consideration of representation by the
court or tribunal revive a stale or dead claim held that even if the
court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations
relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to
a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like
a phoenix. Relevant portions of Paragraphs 14, 16 to 26 of that
judgment read thus:
“14. The centripodal issue that really warrants to be dwelled
upon is whether the respondents could have been allowed
to maintain a claim petition before the tribunal after a lapse
of almost two decades inasmuch as the said Madhav Singh
Tadagi, a junior employee, was conferred the benefit of ad
hoc promotion from 15.11.1983. It is not in dispute that the
respondents were aware of the same. There is no cavil over
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the fact that they were senior to Madhav Singh Tadagi in
the SAS Group III and all of them were considered for
regular promotion in the year 1989 and after their regular
promotion their seniority position had been maintained. We
have stated so as their inter - se seniority in the promotional
cadre has not been affected. Therefore, the grievance in
singularity is non - conferment of promotional benefit from
the date when the junior was promoted on ad hoc basis on
15.11.1983.
cxxxx xxxx xxxx
16. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could
have challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the
junior employee at the relevant time. They chose not to do
so for six years and the junior employee held the
promotional post for six years till regular promotion took
place. The submission of the learned counsel for the
respondents is that they had given representations at the
relevant time but the same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting
to note that when the regular selection took place, they
accepted the position solely because the seniority was
maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of
the tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noon day that the
cause of action had arisen for assailing the order when the
junior employee was promoted on ad hoc basis on
15.11.1983.
17. In C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and
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Another [(2008) 10 SCC 115], a two - Judge Bench was
dealing with the concept of representations and the
directions issued by the court or tribunal to consider the
representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the court has expressed thus: -
xxxx xxxx xxxx
18. In Union of India and Others v. M.K. Sarkar [(2010) 2
SCC 59] this Court, after referring to C. Jacob (supra) has
ruled that when a belated representation in regard to a
"stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided,
in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do
so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as
furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead"
issue or time - barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with reference to the
original cause of action and not with reference to the date
on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's
direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a
representation issued without examining the merits, nor a
decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend
the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.
19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance
it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead
cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere
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submission of representation to the competent authority
does not arrest time.
20. In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. through its Chairman &
Managing Director v. K. Thangappan and another [(2006) 4
SCC 322], the Court took note of the factual position and
laid down that when nearly for two decades the respondent
- workmen therein had remained silent mere making of
representations could not justify a belated approach.
21. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray [(1977) 3
SCC 396} it has been opined that making of repeated
representations is not a satisfactory explanation of delay.
The said principle was reiterated in State of Orissa v. Arun
Kumar Patnaik [(1976 3 SCC 579].
22. In Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Ghanshyam Dass
(2) and others [(2011) 4 SCC 374], a three - Judge Bench
of this Court reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish Lal v.
State of Haryana [(1997) 6 SCC 538 ] and proceeded to
observe that as the respondents therein preferred to sleep
over their rights and approached the tribunal in 1997, they
would not get the benefit of the order dated 7.7.1992.
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam [(2007) 10 SCC 137],
this Court, testing the equality clause on the bedrock of
delay and laches pertaining to grant of service benefit, has
ruled thus: -
"....filing of representations alone would not save
the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
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factor for a court of law to determine the question
as to whether the claim made by an applicant
deserves consideration. Delay and / or laches on the
part of a government servant may deprive him of
the benefit which had been given to others. Art.14
of the Constitution of India would not, in a situation
of that nature, be attracted as it is well known that
law leans in favour of those who are alert and
vigilant."
24. There can be no cavil over the fact that the claim of
promotion is based on the concept of equality and
equitability, but the said relief has to be claimed within a
reasonable time. The said principle has been stated in
Ghulam Rasool Lone v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and
Another [(2009) 15 SCC 321].
25. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and others
[(2007) 9 SCC 278], the Court has opined that though there
is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition
under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, yet ordinarily a
writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. In the
said case the respondents had filed the writ petition after
seventeen years and the court, as stated earlier, took note
of the delay and laches as relevant factors and set aside the
order passed by the High Court which had exercised the
discretionary jurisdiction.
26. Presently, sitting in a time machine, we may refer to a
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two - Judge Bench decision in P.S. Sadasivasway v. State of
Tamil Nadu [(1975) 1 SCC 152], wherein it has been laid
down that a person aggrieved by an order of promoting a
junior over his head should approach the Court at least
within six months or at the most a year of such promotion.
It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts
to exercise their powers under Art.226 nor is it that there
can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a
matter after the passage of a certain length of time, but it
would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the
Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not
approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and
allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put
forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters”.
(Underline supplied)
11. In Union of India v. Chaman Rana [(2018) 5 SCC
798] , in the two writ appeals arising from a common order
directing retrospective consideration for promotion of the
respondents therein to the post of Second-in-Command and
Commandant respectively, in the Border Security Force from the
date their juniors had been promoted along with all consequential
benefits, the Apex Court held that mere repeated filing of
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representations could not be sufficient explanation for delay in
approaching the Court for grant of relie f and a court or tribunal,
before directing 'consideration' of a claim or representation should
examine whether the claim or representation is with reference to
a 'live' issue or whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale'
issue. If it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue or dispute,
the court / tribunal should put an end to the matter and should
not direct consideration or reconsideration. Relevant portions of
paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 15 and 16 of that judgment read thus;
“10. As far back as in P. S. Sadasivaswamy v. The State of
Tamil Nadu [(1975) 1 SCC 152], considering a claim for
promotion belated by 14 years, this Court had observed that
a period of six months or at the utmost a year would be
reasonable time to approach a court against denial of
promotion and that it would be a sound and wise exercise
of discretion not to entertain such claims by persons who
tried to unsettle the settled matters, which only clog the
work of the court impeding it in considering genuine
grievances within time in the following words :
xxxx xxxx xxxx
11. Mere repeated filing of representations could not be
sufficient explanation for delay in approaching the Court for
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grant of relief, was considered in Gandhinagar Motor
Transport Society v. State of Bombay [AIR 1954 Bombay
202] by Chief Justice Chagla, observing as follows :
"(2)…… Now, we have had occasion to point out that
the only delay which this Court will excuse in
presenting a petition is the delay which is caused by
the petitioner pursuing a legal remedy which is given
to him. In this particular case the petitioner did not
pursue a legal remedy. The remedy he pursued was
extralegal or extra - judicial. Once the final decision of
government is given, a representation is merely an
appeal for mercy or indulgence, but it is not pursuing
a remedy which the law gave to the petitioner…"
12. The appellant, in its counter affidavit before the
High Court, had specifically taken the objection that
the claim was highly belated, and that any direction
for a retrospective consideration would have a
destabilising effect in unsettling the settled position
which would lead to complete chaos apart from other
administrative consequences. The High Court failed to
consider the objection. In Union of India v. M. K.
Sarkar [(2010) 2 SCC 59] this Court observed as
follows:
"16. A court or tribunal, before directing
'consideration' of a claim or representation should
examine whether the claim or representation is with
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reference to a 'live' issue or whether it is with
reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If it is with
reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue or dispute, the
court / tribunal should put an end to the matter and
should not direct consideration or reconsideration…."
xxx xxx xxx
15. A subsequent pronouncement by this Court could not
enthuse a fresh lease of life, or furnish a fresh cause of
action to what was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim.
In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari
[(2013) 12 SCC 179], it was observed that :
"29…. Not for nothing, has it been said that everything
may stop but not the time, for we are all slaves of
time. There may not be any provision providing for
limitation but a grievance relating to promotion
cannot be given a new lease of life at any point of
time."
16. The observations with regard to the modus operandi of
the representation syndrome to revive what are clearly dead
and stale claims as discussed in C. Jacob vs. Director of
Geology and Mining [(2008) 10 SCC 115], and the caution
to be exercised by the Court are also considered apposite in
the facts of the present case”.
(Underline supplied)
12. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu
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[(1975) 1 SCC 152] , which is an appeal filed against the
judgment of the High Court of Madras, wherein the grievance of
nd
the appellant was that the 2 respondent therein who was junior
to him as Assistant Engineer was promoted as Divisional Engineer
in 1957 by relaxing the relevant rules regarding the length of
service necessary for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that
his claim for similar relaxation was not considered at that time,
the Apex Court held that it would be a sound and wise exercise
of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their
extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who
do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and
allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward
stale claims and try to unsettle matters. In that judgment the Apex
Court further held that entertaining such petitions is a waste of
time of the Court and it clogs the work of the Court and impedes
the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also
its normal work. Paragraph 2 of the said judgment reads thus;
“2. The main grievance of the appellant is that the 2nd
respondent who was junior to him as Assistant Engineer
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was promoted as Divisional Engineer in 1957 by relaxing
the relevant rules regarding the length of service necessary
for promotion as Divisional Engineer and that his claim for
a similar relaxation was not considered at that time. The
learned Judge of the Madras High Court who heard the writ
petition was of the view that the relaxation of the rules in
favour of the 2nd respondent without considering the
appellant's case was arbitrary. In view of the statement on
behalf of the Government that such relaxation was given
only in the case of overseas scholars, which statement was
not controverted, it is not possible to agree with the view
of the learned Judge. Be that as it may, if the appellant was
aggrieved by it he should have approached the court in the
year 1957 after the two representations made by him had
failed to produce any result. One cannot sleep over the
matter and come to the Court questioning that relaxation
in the year 1971. There is the further fact that even after
respondents 3 and 4 were promoted as Divisional
Engineers over the head of the appellant he did not come
to the Court questioning it. There was a third opportunity
for him to have come to the Court when respondents 2 to
4 were again promoted as Superintending Engineers over
the head of the appellant. After fourteen long years
because of the tempting prospect of the chief Engineership
he has come to the Court. In effect he wants to unscramble
a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government to
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consider whether any relaxation of the rules should have
been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957. The
conditions that were prevalent in 1957 cannot be
reproduced now. In any case as the Government had
decided as a matter of policy, as they were entitled to do,
not to relax the rules in favour of any except overseas
scholars it will be wholly pointless to direct them to
consider the appellant's case as if nothing had happened
after 1957. Not only respondent 2 but also respondents 3
and 4 who were the appellant's juniors became Divisional
Engineers in 1957 apparently on the ground that their
merits deserved their promotion over the head of the
appellant. He did not question it. Nor did he question the
promotion of his juniors as Superintending Engineers over
his head, he could have come to the Court on every one of
these three occasions. A person aggrieved by an order of
promoting a junior over his head should approach the
Court at least within six months or at the most a year of
such promotion. It is not that there is any period of
limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under
Art.226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the
Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a
certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise
exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise
their extraordinary powers under Art.226 in the case of
persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and
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who stand by and allow things to happen and then
approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to
unsettle matters. The petitioner's petition should,
therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such
petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work
of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in
considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work.
We consider that the High Court was right in dismissing the
appellant's petition as well as the appeal”.
(Underline supplied)
13. In Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha [2025 SCC
Online SC 916] , which is a special leave petition filed challenging
the order of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru dismissing
the writ petition filed by the appellants therein, the Apex Court,
after considering various judgments on the issue of limitation, held
that the representation inviting attention to what the aggrieved
applicant - public servant perceives is deprivation of a legitimate
benefit has to be made expeditiously and before accrual of third -
party rights, if any. Such a representation could be made even
after accrual of third - party rights, but within a reasonable time
of the same coming to the notice of the aggrieved applicant -
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public servant. What would constitute reasonable time would
necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case and
decided accordingly. Paragraphs 34 and 35 of that judgment read
thus;
“34. To summarise the legal position, what assumes
cruciality in cases, such as these, is whether the
representation that has been made and rejected, whereafter
the jurisdiction of the CAT is invoked, is statutorily provided
in the service rules governing the applicant - public servant.
Bare reading of the opening words of Section 20 of the 1985
Act with sub-section (1), which requires exhaustion of other
available remedies as a general precondition for entertaining
original applications under Section 19, refers to remedies
that are available under the relevant service rules as to
redressal of grievances against final orders. If the relevant
service rules do not provide for making of a representation
against final orders, by reason of absence of such a
provision, the remedy of the aggrieved applicant - public
servant would lie directly before the CAT in challenging the
order/action of the authorities adverse or prejudicial to his
interest; and, in such a case, an original application ought
not to be rejected mechanically on the ground that all
"remedies" have not been exhausted. However, it cannot be
gainsaid that if the relevant service rules do provide for
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making of a representation, the remedy made available has
to be exhausted unless an exceptional case is set up.
Provision made in the service rules, if at all, for making of a
statutory representation, timing of such representation and
whether the representation raises a "stale" or "dead" claim
- all these are relevant for deciding the question of limitation
under the 1985 Act. The opening words of S.20 read with
sub-section (2) thereof would, however, call for a nuanced
approach. As observed earlier, a representation though not
provided in the relevant rules governing service could yet be
necessary and imperative when a legitimate service benefit
is not conferred on the aggrieved applicant - public servant
by the employer on his own either due to inaction or
otherwise. In such a case, the representation inviting
attention to what the aggrieved applicant - public servant
perceives is deprivation of a legitimate benefit has to be
made expeditiously and before accrual of third - party rights,
if any. Such a representation could be made even after
accrual of third - party rights, but within a reasonable time
of the same coming to the notice of the aggrieved applicant
- public servant. What would constitute reasonable time
would necessarily depend on the facts of each particular
case and decided accordingly.
35. We hold that except in cases where final orders are
passed on appeals/revisions/memorials/representations
which are statutorily provided, limitation for the purpose of
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filing an original application under S.19 of the 1985 Act, in
view of the above - referred decisions and S.21 and S.20
thereof, has to be reckoned keeping in mind the date of
accrual of the cause of action and the proximity of the date
of the representation, and the period of one year for filing
an original application has to be counted from the date of
expiry of six months from date of such a representation if
no order were passed thereon. Needless to observe, the
cause of action cannot be deferred by making a highly
belated representation and awaiting its outcome. We also
make it clear that different considerations would arise in a
case of a continuous wrong, which has to be decided in the
light of the decision of this Court in Union of India v.
Tarsem Singh [2008 INSC 930 : (2008) 8 SCC 648] ”.
(Underline supplied)
14. While coming to the judgments relied by the learned
Government Pleader, in Union of India v. A. Durairaj [(2012)
1 SCC (civil) 618] on the question of delay and laches in
approaching the Tribunal for necessary reliefs, the Apex Court held
that anyone who feels aggrieved by non - promotion or non -
selection should approach the Court/Tribunal as early as possible.
Even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any belated challenge
would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
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Paragraph 13 of that judgment reads thus;
“13. It is well settled that anyone who feels aggrieved by
non - promotion or non - selection should approach the
Court/Tribunal as early as possible. If a person having a
justifiable grievance allows the matter to become stale and
approaches the Court/Tribunal belatedly, grant of any relief
on the basis of such belated application would lead to
serious administrative complications to the employer and
difficulties to the other employees as it will upset the
settled position regarding seniority and promotions which
has been granted to others over the years. Further, where
a claim is raised beyond a decade or two from the date of
cause of action, the employer will be at a great
disadvantage to effectively contest or counter the claim, as
the officers who dealt with the matter and / or the relevant
records relating to the matter may no longer be available.
Therefore, even if no period of limitation is prescribed, any
belated challenge would be liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay and laches.”
(Underline supplied)
15. In Chairman/Managing Director Uttar Pradesh
Power Corporation Ltd. v Ram Gopal [(2021) 13 SCC 225] ,
which is an appeal filed by Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Ltd.
assailing the order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
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of Judicature at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) upholding the order
passed by the learned Single Judge of that High Court whereby
the writ petition for setting aside the termination of the
respondent was allowed and directed his consequent
reinstatement, the Apex Court held thus;
“9. xxx xxx xxx
iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition
9.4.Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to
have been overlooked or condoned. Services of the
Respondent were terminated within months of his
appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made a
representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in
1982, however such feeble effort does little to fill the gap
between when the cause of action arose and he chose to
seek its redressal (in 1990).
10. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that
the Respondent has shown little concern to the settled legal
tenets. Even a civil suit challenging termination of services,
if filed by the Respondent, would have undoubtedly been
barred by limitation in 1990. In a similar situation where the
appellant belatedly challenged the promotion of his
junior(s), this Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil
Nadu [(1975) 1 SCC 152], held as follows:
xxxx xxxx xxxx
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16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to
proceedings under Art.32 or 226 of the Constitution of India,
nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an
unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained
delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in
writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant
in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those
who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester.
Fence - sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and
cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens
ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On
multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are
implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can
be enforced. In SS Balu v. State of Kerala [(2009) 2 SCC
479], this Court observed thus:
"17. It is also well - settled principle of law that "delay
defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the
writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long
delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on
the around of delay and laches irrespective of the fact
that they are similarly situated to the other
candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."
(Underline supplied)
16. In Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind
Kumar Singh [2026 (2) KHC 517] , in an appeal filed by the
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alleged contemnor against the order of the High Court directing
listing of the contempt petition for framing charges, the Apex
Court held thus;
“13. Facts that we have recounted till now reveal a sad
reflection, not our laws, but the way we practice our laws
and work our judicial remedies . We are not be mistaken as
sermonising, for such episodic disposal could feature even
in the practice of Supreme Court. Our endeavour is to
ensure that we take notice of it and adopt course correction.
14. There is no doubt about the fact that the "consider
jurisprudence", so routinely adopted these days and if we
may use the expression - to throw the ball out of the Court,
is counterproductive and harms the system.
15. When a claim of a right is legal and justified, relief must
follow. The Constitutional or statutory remedies are not
intended for academic discourse. If a case deserves relief,
it must be granted then and there, unflinchingly if need be.
Balancing of equities is not to be confused with avoiding or
postponing the relief. These are not matters of law, but of
its working and practice. Unlike law and its procedures,
good practices that evolve over a period of time are far
more precious than written laws, as it is in this practice that
we see acceptance and internalization of the spirit of law. It
is necessary to recognize, nurture and develop good
practices which become habits. These habits come from the
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shared belief, values and attitudes that breathe vitality into
rule of law. Legal culture integrates collective beliefs,
fostering habits. It is necessary and in fact compelling to
keep our remedies simple, effective and efficient”.
(Underline supplied)
17. In Ramsharan v. the Chairman Indian Oil
Corporation Ltd., [NCN of LPA-
621/2022:2022/DHC/004940] , the High Court of Delhi at New
Delhi, in the matter of LPA 621/2022 & CM Appls.46892-94/2022,
challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge of that
Court, held that delay and laches on the part of the employee
might deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others.
Paragraph 6 of that judgment reads thus;
“6. It is well settled that if a person is denied promotion at
a time when he is entitled to, he has a right to approach the
Court of law to ventilate his grievances, and contend that
there was no legal justification to ignore him and the
employer could not extend promotional benefits to others
while ignoring him. However, it is also equally well settled
that the employees cannot approach the Court belatedly to
raise stale claims by contending that they were waiting for
their representations to be considered. It has been
repeatedly held that filing a representation alone will not
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save the party from limitation, and that delay and laches is
a relevant factor of Courts of law to determine the question
as to whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration or not. It is also settled that delay and laches
on the part of the employee might deprive him of the benefit
which had been given to others. Article 14 of the
Constitution of India would not, in a situation of that nature,
be attracted as it is well known that law leans in favour of
those who are alert and vigilant [Refer: State of T.N. v.
Seshachalam, [(2007) 10 SCC 137]”.
(Underline supplied)
18. From the judgments referred to supra, the principles that
can be summarised, on the point of filing of writ petitions under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, or approaching the Tribunal
for necessary relief under the service jurisprudence are as under;
1.The claim of promotion is based on the concept of equality
and equitability, but the said relief has to be claimed within
a reasonable time.
2. A person aggrieved by non-granting of promotion should
approach the Court within a reasonable time. What
constitutes a reasonable time would depend upon the facts
of each case.
3. The delay which the Court will excuse in approaching the
Court is the delay which is caused by the petitioner pursuing
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a legal remedy which is given to him.
4. One cannot sleep over his right and come to the Court
without taking into account the time elapsed to unsettle the
settled promotion at an unreasonable distance of time, in
effect to unscramble a scrambled egg.
5. It would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for
the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers
under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not
approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and
allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put
forward stale claims and try to unsettle settled matters.
7. Fence - sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and
cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens
ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists
8. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the
Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work
of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its
normal work.
9. If a case deserves relief, it must be granted then and
there, unflinchingly if need be. Balancing of equities is not
to be confused with avoiding or postponing the relief.
10.Merely by submitting a representation, a stale claim
cannot be revived. Life cannot be given to a stale claim by
submission of a mere representation.
11.The representation inviting attention to what the
aggrieved applicant - public servant perceives is deprivation
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of a legitimate benefit has to be made expeditiously and
before accrual of third- party rights, if any. Such a
representation could be made even after accrual of third-
party rights, but within a reasonable time of the same
coming to the notice of the aggrieved applicant - public
servant. What would constitute reasonable time would
necessarily depend on the facts of each particular case and
decided accordingly.
12.A Court or Tribunal, before directing 'consideration' of a
claim or representation should examine whether the claim
or representation is with reference to a 'live' issue or
whether it is with reference to a 'dead' or 'stale' issue. If it
is with reference to a 'dead' or 'state' issue or dispute, the
court / Tribunal should put an end to the matter and should
not direct consideration or reconsideration.
13. If the court or Tribunal deciding to direct 'consideration'
without itself examining it’s merits, it should make it clear
that such consideration will be without prejudice to any
contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if
the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal
position and effect.
14. If the representation is on the face of it is stale, or does
not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live
claim, courts should desist from directing 'consideration' of
such claims.
15. When a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or
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'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the Court / Tribunal to do so,
the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing
a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-
barred dispute.
16. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a
fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. When
an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or
representation, in compliance with direction of the court or
tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor
amount to some kind of 'acknowledgment of a jural
relationship' to give rise to a fresh cause of action.
st
19. The claim of the 1 respondent herein is that his claim
has a recurring cause of action and hence cannot be treated as a
stale claim. Coming to the question what constitutes a continuing
wrong, in S. Tirupathi Rao v. M Lingamaiah [(2024) 20 SCC
188] , the judgment of which is relied by the learned Standing
Counsel for the University, the Apex Court, in the appeals filed
against the common judgment and order of the High Court of
Telangana at Hyderabad, held thus;
“56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a "continuing
wrong/breach/offence" to be accepted as a ground for
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seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party
petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the
phrase actually means but would also be required to show,
from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks
exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy
the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also,
the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt,
camouflaged as a "continuing wrong / breach / offence"
ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative
intent for introducing S.20 in the Act which has been noticed
above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a
particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the
efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of
time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the
stipulated period of one year from such commission no
action is brought before the court on the specious ground
that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be
encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to
approach the court. If the bogey of "continuing
wrong/breach / offence" is mechanically accepted whenever
it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an
applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting
his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought
belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation
and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of
the court that would seem to become a casualty during the
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period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court
is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance its
order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings
after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate
against the legislative intent of inserting S.20 in the Act (a
provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act)
rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to
the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It
is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved
civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with,
including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is
issued to bridge the breach.
xxxx xxxx
60. The question of the contempt petition being barred by
limitation has to be decided keeping S.20 of the Act and
R.21 of the Writ Rules in mind together with what
constitutes a "continuing wrong/breach/offence".
Undisputedly, the contempt petition was instituted on 04th
October, 2014, more than 5 (five) years after the order (of
th
which contempt had been alleged) was passed, i.e., on 05
March, 2009. Notably, the appellant had not carried the
order dated 05th March, 2009 (disposing of the writ
petition) in appeal. Therefore, question of operation of the
said order remaining suspended did not arise and the
principle embodied in S.15 of the 1963 Act was not
attracted. The said order required the appellant to effect
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mutation in terms of the decree of the civil court. No time -
frame for compliance of such order having been stipulated
by the Single Judge, it would stand to reason that the same
required compliance at least by the end of the time - frame
stipulated by R.21.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
69. Despite the absence of any pleading as to "continuing
wrong / breach / offence", the Single Judge by placing
reliance on the decision in Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar
v. Kaiu Ram , [1989 Supp (2) SCC 418] proceeded to
hold that the Tahsildar's inaction constituted a continuing
wrong, thereby saving the petition from being barred by
limitation. The Division Bench (review) approached the
matter in a similar manner, and concluded that the
contumacious conduct alleged was in the nature of a
continuing wrong.
70. While we are not in disagreement with the view
expressed in Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar (supra)
because of the special facts and circumstances obtaining
therein, the decision of the Division Bench (review)
affirming that of the Single Judge is wholly unsustainable in
law for a few other reasons.”
(Underline supplied)
20. In S. Tirupathi Rao [(2024) 20 SCC 188] , on the
point whether Court can consider the facts beyond pleadings to
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find continuing cause of action in the matter, the Apex Court
further held thus;
“71. First, it is trite that the court cannot traverse beyond
the pleadings and make out a case which was never
pleaded, such principle having originated from the
fundamental legal maxim secundum allegata et probate ,
i.e., the court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the
claims and proof led by the parties. The assertion of the
contumacious conduct being in the nature of a "continuing
wrong / breach/ offence" is factual and has to be borne from
the pleadings on record. Law is, again, well - settled that
when a point is not traceable in the pleas set out either in a
plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such
point by the court would be unsustainable as that would
amount to an altogether new case being made out for the
party. Absent such pleading of there being a "continuing
wrong / breach / offence", the finding returned by the
Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench (review),
cannot be sustained in law.
72. Even if a point of "continuing wrong / breach / offence"
is traceable in the pleadings, the court ought not to accept
it mechanically; particularly, in entertaining an action for
contempt, which is quasi - criminal in nature, the court
should be slow and circumspect and be fully satisfied that
there has indeed been a "continuing wrong / breach /
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offence".
xxxx xxxx xxxx
74. While proceeding to examine the nature of the
contumacious conduct in question, it is considered apposite
to commence the discussion with a reference to Halsbury's
Laws of India (Damages; Deeds and Other
Instruments) , Volume 9, First Edition reading thus:
"(115.032) When cause of action is single and continuing -
A cause of action may be either single or continuing. When
an act is final and complete and becomes a cause of action
for injury to the plaintiff, it is single, arises once and for all
and the plaintiff is entitled to sue for compensation at one
time, for all past, present and future consequences of the
wrongful act. But if there is repetition of a wrongful act or
omission, it will comprise a continuing cause of action, and
if an action is brought by the plaintiff, it will be restricted to
recovery of damages which have accrued up to the date of
suit. In such cases the cause of action is said to arise 'de
die in diem' (from day to day). It is inaccurate strictly to
speak of a 'continuing cause of action', but the phrase refers
to a cause of action which arises from the repetition of acts
or omissions of the same kind as that for which the action
was brought."
75. The English Court of Appeals in National Coal Board
v. Galley , (1958) 1 All ER 9 distinguished between the two
scenarios by observing that neither do repeated breaches
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of continuing obligations constitute a continuing wrong nor
intermittent breaches of a continuing obligation; rather
there has to be present an element of continuance in both,
the breach and the obligation.
76. This Court too, as far back as in 1958, with reference to
the Limitation Act of 1908, discussed in Balkrishna
Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj
Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798] , what would constitute a
continuing wrong. The relevant passage reads thus:
"20. xxxx xxxx xxxx
S.23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing
wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it
is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and
renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the
continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an
injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even
though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If,
however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury
caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a
continuing wrong. In this connection it is necessary to draw
a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act
and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.
It is only in regard to acts which can be properly
characterised as continuing wrongs that S.23 can be
invoked.
xxxx xxxx
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As soon as the decree was passed and the appellants were
dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights had
been completely injured, and though their dispossession
continued, it cannot be said that the trustees were
committing wrongful acts or acts of tort from moment to
moment so as to give the appellants a cause of action de
die in diem. We think there can be no doubt that where the
wrongful act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting
injury to the right is complete at the date of the ouster and
so there would be no scope for the application of S.23 in
such a case.
xxxx xxxx "
(emphasis ours)
77. The decision of this Court in Balkrishna Savalram
Pujari (supra) was endorsed by this Court in M. Siddiq
(Ram Janmabhumi Temple - 5 J.) v. Suresh Das
[(2020) 1 SCC 1] wherein, while concluding that the ouster
of shebaitship was a single incident and did not constitute a
continuing wrong, this Court further observed as follows:
"343. The submission of xx xx xx is based on the principle
of continuing wrong as a defence to the plea of limitation.
In assessing the submission, a distinction must be made
between the source of a legal injury and the effect of the
injury. The source of a legal injury is founded in a breach of
an obligation. A continuing wrong arises where there is an
obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to
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continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular
manner. The breach of such an obligation extends beyond a
single completed act or omission. The breach is of a
continuing nature, giving rise to a legal injury which
assumes the nature of a continuing wrong. For a continuing
wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong
which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong,
there can be no continuing wrong. It is when there is a
wrong that a further line of enquiry of whether there is a
continuing wrong would arise. Without a wrong there
cannot be a continuing wrong. A wrong postulates a breach
of an obligation imposed on an individual, where positive or
negative, to act or desist from acting in a particular manner.
The obligation on one individual finds a corresponding
reflection of a right which inheres in another. A continuing
wrong postulates a breach of a continuing duty or a breach
of an obligation which is of a continuing nature”.
(underline supplied)
21. While coming to the judgment relied upon by the
st
learned counsel for the 1 respondent - writ petitioner in Union
of India v. Tarsem Singh [(2008) 8 SCC 648] , in a claim
raised by the respondent who was invalidated out of the Indian
Army, for disability pension, the Apex Court held that normally, a
belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of
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delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition)
or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal) and one of the exceptions to the said rule
is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of that
judgment read thus;
“4. The principles underlying continuing wrongs and
recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service
law disputes. A 'continuing wrong' refers to a single wrongful
act which causes a continuing injury. 'Recurring/successive
wrongs' are those which occur periodically, each wrong
giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This
Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar
Maharaj Sansthan [AIR 1959 SC 798], explained the concept
of continuing wrong (in the context of S.23 of Limitation Act,
1908 corresponding to S.22 of Limitation Act, 1963) :
"It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that
it is an act which creates a continuing source of
injury and renders the doer of the act responsible
and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If
the wrongful act causes an injury which is
complete, there is no continuing wrong even
though the damage resulting from the act may
continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a
character that the injury caused by it itself
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continues, then the act constitutes a continuing
wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw
a distinction between the injury caused by the
wrongful act and what may be described as the
effect of the said injury."
In M. R. Gupta v. Union of India, [(1995) 5 SCC
628], the appellant approached the High Court in
1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay
fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was
rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court
applied the principles of continuing wrong and
recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This
Court held :
"The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation
was not in accordance with the rules, was the
assertion of a continuing wrong against him which
gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time
he was paid a salary which was not computed in
accordance with the rules. So long as the
appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action
arises every month when he is paid his monthly
salary on the basis of a wrong computation made
contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the
appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he
would be entitled to be paid according to the
properly fixed pay scale in the future and the
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question of limitation would arise for recovery of
the arrears for the past period. In other words,
the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of
arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the
pay which has become time barred would not be
recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper
fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to
cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his
claim is justified. Similarly, any other
consequential relief claimed by him, such as,
promotion etc., would also be subject to the
defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those
reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the
basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without
taking into account any other consequential relief
which may be barred by his laches and the bar of
limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay
fixation, the application cannot be treated as time
barred ........."
In Shiv Dass v. Union of India [(2007) 9 SCC 274],
this Court held:
"The High Court does not ordinarily permit a
belated resort to the extraordinary remedy
because it is likely to cause confusion and public
inconvenience and bring in its train new
injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after
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unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of
inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but
also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out
that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained
delay coupled with the creation of third party
rights in the meantime is an important factor
which also weighs with the High Court in deciding
whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
In the case of pension the cause of action actually
continues from month to month. That, however,
cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the
petition. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable
period say three years normally the Court would
reject the same or restrict the relief which could
be granted to a reasonable period of about three
years."
5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim
will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where
remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation
(where remedy is sought by an application to the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said
rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be
granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the continuing wrong
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commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception.
If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative
decision which related to or affected several others also,
and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled
rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained.
For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of
pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it
does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim
involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and
doctrine of laches / limitation will be applied. In so far as
the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past
period, the principles relating to recurring/successive
wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will
restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally
to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition”.
22. It is trite that to treat a claim as one having continuous
cause of action, it has to be established that the said cause of
action was subsisting throughout the period till the representation
st
was filed. In the instant case, as noticed above, the 1 respondent
has made his claim for promotion to the post of Lecturer (Selection
Grade) only on 13.09.2017 when he had retired on 31.05.2001.
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st
In Ext.P9 judgment, the claim of the 1 respondent was not
considered on merits. The learned Single Judge in Ext.P9
judgment only directed the authority concerned to consider Ext.P8
representation, without expressing anything on the merits of the
st
claim raised by the 1 respondent. After considering that
representation, by Ext.P11 communication dated 09.02.2018, the
st
Joint Director of the University rejected the claim of the 1
st
respondent. Merely for the reason that the claim of the 1
respondent was considered in Ext.P10 decision, the life cannot be
st
given to the stale claim made by the 1 respondent after more
than 16 years of retirement. Moreover, it is pertinent to note that
Ext.P10 decision taken by the Registrar of the University in Ext.P8
st
representation of the 1 respondent is not challenged in the writ
st
petition. The claim of the 1 respondent for promotion to the post
of Lecturer (Selection Grade) was finalised with effect from
25.10.1997 by Exts.P6 and P7 orders. Without any objection, the
st
1 respondent worked in the promoted post and retired from
st
service on 31.05.2001. The claim raised by the 1 respondent for
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the first time in Ext.P8 representation cannot be treated as a
subsisting one at that point of time, to say that he has a continuing
cause of action. After several years of retirement, by merely
st
submitting Ext.P8 representation, the 1 respondent cannot
revive a stale claim. For all these reasons we have no hesitation
st
to hold that the 1 respondent is not entitled to the reliefs sought
in the writ petition. The learned single judge failed to consider
these aspects in their proper perspective in the impugned
judgment. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is liable to be set
aside and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
In the result, the writ appeal is allowed by setting aside the
impugned judgment dated 31.03.2021 in W.P.(C)No.39 of 2019
and the writ petition stands dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN, JUDGE
Sd/-
sks MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE