ABDUL KADER vs UNION OF INDIA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K. NARENDRAN
&
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURALEE KRISHNA S.
ST
MONDAY, THE 31 DAY OF AUGUST 2026 / 9TH BHADRA, 1948
CRL.A NO. 1749 OF 2025
AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 09.09.2025 IN CRMP.NO.381 OF 2025 IN SC
NO.2 OF 2023 OF SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM
(CRIME NO.RC 02/2022 OF NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, KOCHI)
APPELLANTs/PETITIONERS/ACCUSED NOS.19 AND 20:

1 ABDUL KADER, AGED 37 YEARS
S/O MUHAMMED, MUNDOOR,
PALAKKAD DISTRICT, PIN - 678592

2 FIROZ, AGED 36 YEARS
S/O.MUTHALEEF, 13/574, KAMMANTHARA,
KAVILPAD (VILLAGE /POST), PUDUPPARIYARAM,
PALAKKAD DISTRICT, PIN - 678006

BY ADVS.
SHRI.E.A.HARIS
SRI.P.P.HARRIS
SRI.RENJITH B. MARAR


RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/COMPLAINANT:

1 UNION OF INDIA
REPRESENTED BY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, NATIONAL
INVESTIGATION AGENCY, KOCHI, PIN - 682020

2 INSPECTOR OF POLICE
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY, NIA KOCHI UNIT,
KOCHI, PIN - 682020

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BY ADVS.
SHRI.SREENATH SASIDHARAN
SHRI.SASTHAMANGALAM S. AJITHKUMAR (SR.), SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, NIA


THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 10.06.2026,
THE COURT ON 31.08.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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INDEX

Sl.No. Heading Page Nos. Para Nos.
A Factual Matrix 5 - 19 2 - 16
B Arguments on behalf of the appellants –
19 - 22 17 – 17.2
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19 and 20 accused
C Arguments on behalf of the respondents 22 - 24 18 – 18.2
D No written grounds of arrest 24 - 60 19 - 42
E Proviso to Section 43-D(5) of the UA(P) Act
60 - 89 43 - 59
– prima facie materials
F Claim for parity in bail 89 - 116 60 - 82
G Bail – long incarceration and inordinate
117 - 200 83 - 157
delay in completion of the trial

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“C.R”
JUDGMENT
Anil K. Narendran, J.
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The appellants - Abdul Kader and Firoz – are the 19 and
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20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 on the file of the Special Court
for the Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam, and the petitioners in
Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025, a bail application filed under Section 439
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.PC). The appellants
have filed this criminal appeal, invoking the provisions under
Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA
Act), to set aside the order dated 09.09.2025 of the Special Court
in Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023 (Annexure A10),
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and to grant them regular bail. The 1 appellant-19 accused was
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arrested on 24.04.2022, and the 2 appellant-20 accused was
arrested on 26.04.2022, in crime No.318 of 2022 of Palakkad Town
South Police Station. After the National Investigation Agency took
over the investigation of the said case as a connected offence, the
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19 and 20 accused were produced before the Special Court on
production warrants, and the National Investigation Agency

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recorded their formal arrest on 10.02.2023.
2. Factual Matrix:- Crime No.318 of 2022 of Palakkad
Town South Police Station was registered on the allegation that
Popular Front of India (PFI) leaders and members conspired
together with the intention to create terror and communal divide
in the society, conducted intense recce of several Hindu leaders of
that locality, whom they had shortlisted using their ‘Reporter Wing’
and subsequently selected and brutally murdered one
Sreenivasan, who was available, on 16.04.2022, at Palakkad. The
Kerala Police filed a charge sheet in that case against 44 persons
for offences under Sections 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143,
144, 147, 148, 449, 341, 201, 212, 302 read with Section 149 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 3(a)(b)(d) read
with Section 7 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse)
Act, 1988.
3. It is alleged that the PFI, a society registered under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860, was formed in the year 2006,
merging the three radical organisations with extremist ideologies,
namely, National Democratic Front (NDF) from Kerala, Manitha

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Neethi Pasarai (MNP) from Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Forum for
Dignity (KFD) from Karnataka. The founder leaders of PFI were
former cadres and leaders of the Students Islamic Movement of
India (SIMI), an organisation proscribed by the Government of
India in 2001. PFI has the strongest presence in Kerala, where it
has been repeatedly involved in cases of murder, rioting,
intimidation, and having links with terrorist organisations.
4. PFI has frontal organisations like Rehab India
Foundation (RIF), Campus Front of India (CFI), All India Imams
Council (AIIC), National Confederation of Human Rights
Organisation (NCHRO), National Women’s Front (NWF), Junior
Front, Empower India Foundation and Rehab Foundation, in
addition to their political wing, Social Democratic Party of India
(SDPI). On 28.09.2022, the Government of India declared the
Popular Front of India and its affiliates/frontal organisations as an
Unlawful Association, as per the provisions of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, for brevity ‘the UA (P) Act’.
5. The Central Government received credible information
that the office bearers, members and cadres of PFI and its

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affiliates in Kerala have conspired to instigate communal violence
and radicalise its cadres to commit terrorist acts in the State of
Kerala and various other parts of the country. PFI members and
office bearers based in Kerala having earlier association with the
proscribed terrorist organisation, SIMI, maintain operational
nexus with other proscribed international terrorist organisations
like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS)/Daesh and Al-Qaida.
6. Some of the members of PFI cadres are also members
of the above proscribed terrorist organisations. PFI has created an
organisational web, which is stretched to recruit vulnerable Muslim
youths into proscribed international terrorist organisations to
commit terrorist acts. PFI and its members are also indulging in
activities prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony by creating
feelings of enmity between people of different religions and groups
through violent speeches, publications, articles, social media
posts, etc., with the intention to disrupt public tranquility and
organised movements intending that the participants be trained
to use criminal force against people of other religions and groups

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so as to cause terror, fear and alarm, besides the feeling of
insecurity among members of other religions and groups. In the
last few years, they have been responsible for many violent
incidents and murders in Kerala that have created terror in the
minds of the general public. PFI, its members and office bearers
also indulged in unlawful activities with the intention to cause
disaffection against India by inciting people and innocent Muslims
to defy the Government and institutions established by law and
thereby commit disruption of the sovereignty and integrity of
India.
7. The Central Government formed an opinion that the
aforesaid activities of PFI are offences under Sections 120B, 153A
of the IPC and Sections 13, 18, 18B, 38 and 39 of the UA (P) Act,
which are scheduled offences under the NIA Act. Considering the
gravity of the offence and its repercussions on national security,
the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, CTCR Division,
vide order No.11011/82/2022-NIA dated 16.09.2022, directed the
NIA to take up investigation of Crime No.318 of 2022 of Palakkad
Town South Police Station. Accordingly, the case was registered as

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RC 02/2022/NIA/KOC at NIA Police Station, Kochi, on 19.09.2022,
under Sections 120B, 153A of the IPC and Sections 13, 18, 18B,
38 and 39 of the UA (P) Act.
8. The investigation revealed that Crime No.318 of 2022
of Palakkad Town South Police Station, i.e., Sreenivasan murder
case, is a connected offence in terms of Section 8 of the NIA Act.
Therefore, the Government of India, vide its order No.11011/82/
2022/NIA (Part) dated 19.12.2022, directed the National
Investigation Agency (NIA) to investigate Crime No.318 of 2022
of Palakkad Town South Police Station, as per Section 8 of the NIA
Act. In pursuance of that order and subsequent orders of the High
Court and the jurisdictional Court, the case records and materials
relating to that case were transferred to the Special Court for Trial
of NIA Cases, on 30.01.2023.
9. It is alleged that in pursuance of its larger conspiracy,
PFI had established 3 Wings - Reporters Wing, Physical and Arms
Training Wing/PE Wing and Service Wing/Hit Teams. Through its
Reporters Wing, a quasi-intelligence division, PFI collected private
and personal information about prominent personalities in the

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society, besides the leaders of other communities, especially the
Hindu Community, including their day-to-day activities. The data
is compiled at the district level and communicated to the State
hierarchy of PFI. The details are regularly updated and utilised to
‘target’ the individuals as and when required by the terrorist gang.
PFI trained its cadres for collection of such data and stored them,
besides providing the same to its assault teams in the Service
Wing for attack, as and when decided by its leadership. In
furtherance of its agenda, PFI, through its Arms Training Wing,
prepared master trainers to impart uniform physical and arms
training under a common syllabus with a set course to its cadres
in various stages under the guise of yoga training programs,
rescue and relief activities, martial arts and other physical
development activities. PFI devised a program to filter the cadres
through various stages and gave arms and explosives training to
selected cadres through these stages. PFI used its facilities and
affiliated institutions, including institutions run in the name of
Trusts, besides other places, to conduct such training camps and
secret meetings. PFI used these trained cadres to eliminate

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shortlisted targets, as and when required, based on the decision
of its leadership. PFI also used such selected cadres as
executioners of the decisions of its pseudo court, ‘Darul Qaza’.
10. It is alleged that PFI used its ‘Reporters’ and ‘Service
Wing’ to eliminate many targeted personalities in Kerala. PFI, its
office bearers and cadres, had conspired to commit terrorist acts
by killing many targeted persons of other religions/sections of the
society to create terror in the minds of other communities and the
public at large. In furtherance of that, PFI leaders and cadres
carried out intensive recce on the members of other religions,
particularly the Hindu community, and compiled the same for
targeting through its ‘Service Wing/Hit Teams’. PFI, its leaders and
cadres, had on many occasions conspired to target innocent
persons merely for them being prominent members of other
communities. They do recce of several persons of the other
communities listed through their ‘Reporter Wing’ and search for
their presence on the intended day of elimination, and the
available person is executed by their ‘Service Wing/Hit Team’. The
whole process has created terror and fear in the minds of the

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public at large. Fearing such targeting, people stay away from
their homes for long periods.
11. In murder cases involving PFI cadres, including the one
in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station,
none of the accused had any personal enmity with the deceased.
The victims have been selected solely because of their
leadership/membership in a particular community and were killed
to create terror in the society. PFI has been targeting people from
different communities as part of its larger plan to achieve its
objective to strike terror among the members of such
organisations and communities. PFI, through such acts, intended
to disturb harmony within the society and to terrorise people with
a view to create a sense of fear and insecurity in their minds. PFI
also intended to instil confidence among its cadres by executing
such acts. The plans so made were executed to prevent any
defiance of its command in future. In one such specific incident in
pursuance of its larger conspiracy, leaders and accused persons
being members of PFI conducted conspiracy at various places in
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Palakkad on 15 and 16 of April, 2022, conducted

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reconnaissance of residences belonging to several leaders of the
Hindu community, who appear in their target list, and chose and
decided to eliminate one prominent Hindu leader named S.K.
Sreenivasan of Palakkad. They, in furtherance of the conspiracy,
set out to commit that terrorist act on 16.04.2022, for which 5
accused persons (A-17 to A-21) came on 3 two-wheelers, 3 of
whom criminally trespassed into SKS Autos, situated at Melamuri,
Pallippuram, Palakkad, run by Sreenivasan, and inflicted grievous
injuries on Sreenivasan and killed him by hacking his head and
other parts of his body with choppers, which the assailants were
carrying with the sole intention and purpose to brutally murder
him, so as to create terror in the minds of other communities and
the public at large. The above act of murder is in furtherance of
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the larger conspiracy of the 1 accused to create terror. Kerala
Police filed a final report against 44 persons regarding the incident
in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station,
under Sections 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143, 144, 147, 148,
449, 341, 201, 212, 302, read with Section 149 of IPC and Section
3(a)(b)(d) read with 7 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of

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Misuse) Act, 1988.
12. The investigation revealed that the leaders of PFI had
justified the activities of cadres in support of the proscribed
terrorist organisation ISIS and were found in possession of ISIS
propaganda videos and documents for propagation, and that some
cadres of PFI, who joined ISIS, were also arrested and convicted
for those offences. PFI was involved in various unlawful activities,
including delivery of alternate justice. PFI, its leaders and cadres
have incited the people through provocative speeches and
slogans, causing communal disharmony. The activities and veiled
objectives of PFI have a strong communal and anti-national
agenda to establish an Islamic Rule in India. To achieve this, PFI
conducted stage-wise radicalisation of Muslim youths, mainly
through its ‘Tharbiyath classes’, showing videos, taking lectures
and ensuring allegiance through Bayath (oath) to PFI in the name
of Allah. During their Tharbiyath classes, PFI radicalised vulnerable
youths by communalising and magnifying stray incidents against
Muslims with the intention to undermine democracy and establish
Islamic Rule in India by subverting the Constitution. The gullible

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Muslim youths were radicalised and motivated against the so-
called kafirs or non-believers and all who were opposed to their
ideology, including the members of the Muslim community, the
Government and leaders of the Hindu organisations, by repeatedly
showing videos and photos of incidents such as Babri Masjid
demolition, Gujarat riots, mob lynching, etc., to portray that the
whole Muslim community in India are being targeted and
oppressed by the entire State machinery and the Government
agencies.
13. In furtherance of the larger conspiracy, the accused in
the case conspired at various places to indulge in unlawful
activities for creating enmity between members of different
religions and groups prejudicial to maintenance of harmony with
the intention to disrupt public tranquillity and cause disaffection
against India, propagating an alternative justice delivery system
and justifying the use of criminal force causing alarm and fear
amongst the general public. The accused have also encouraged
vulnerable youths to join terrorist organisation - ISIS/Daesh for
furthering its activities. They, being a part of a terrorist gang

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formed by PFI, caused the recruitment of cadres of PFI to that
terrorist gang, and collected the details of various leaders of the
Hindu community and the members of its organisations through
their ‘Reporter Wing’. They have attended, conducted, supervised
and imparted physical and arms training to the cadres of PFI,
planned to stock weapons and explosives, possessed arms for
preparing them to commit terrorist acts with the intention to
establish Islamic Rule in India. In furtherance of the larger
conspiracy, accused in this case knowingly and intentionally took
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part in the conspiracy hatched at Palakkad on 15 and 16 of
April, 2022, for committing the terrorist act of murdering any
prominent leader of the Hindu community or its organisations, to
create terror in the minds of the Hindu community and the public
at large, which has resulted in the murder of S.K. Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022 at Palakkad. The accused also committed the offence
of destruction of evidence and knowingly harboured the accused
in this case after the commission of the terrorist act.
14. On completion of investigation against A1 to A14, A16
to A19, A21 to A26, A29 to A40, and A42 to A63 and A66, final

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report was filed against them on 17.03.2023, for the offence under
Sections 120B, 34, 109, 115, 118, 119, 143, 144, 147, 148, 449,
153A, 341, 302, 201, 212, read with Sections 149, 120B read with
Section 302 of IPC, Section 3(a)(b)(d), read with Section 7 of the
Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, and Sections 13,
16, 18, 18A, 18B, 20, 22C, 23, 38 and 39 of the UA (P) Act and
Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, 1959. Supplementary final
reports were filed against some of the other accused.
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15. The appellants-19 and 20 accused filed
Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023, an application for bail
under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C., before the Special Court for Trial
of NIA Cases, Ernakulam. NIA opposed the application by filing
detailed objections. After considering the rival contentions, the
Special Court, by Annexure A10 order dated 09.09.2025,
dismissed Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025, for the reasons stated therein.
The Special Court found that, apart from the statement of
witnesses, there are materials which prima facie suggest that the
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petitioners-19 and 20 accused had an active role in the
commission of the offence. The materials placed before the court

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prima facie make out the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P)
Act. In order to make out a ‘terrorist act’ as defined in Section 15
of the UA (P) Act, the person need not be a member of the terrorist
organisation. In the case at hand, there is a specific allegation that
the accused have hatched a conspiracy to further their target of
‘India 2047’, allegedly, to establish Islamic rule in India. It is
further alleged that the murder of Sreenivasan is part of their
attempt to further such activities, and part of the larger
conspiracy. There are materials that prima facie show the
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involvement of the 19 and 20 accused in the conspiracy and
destruction of evidence. The Special Court noted that, while
considering an application for bail, the court need not go deep into
the evidence, as held by the Apex Court in Jagjeet Singh v.
Ashish Mishra @ Monu [(2022) 9 SCC 321] . The Special Court
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further noted that the 19 and 20 accused have criminal
antecedents and are accused in other cases. Therefore, the fact
that some of the other accused have been released on bail is not
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a ground for releasing the 19 and 20 accused on bail. On
scrutiny of the materials on record, the Special Court found

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reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation against the 19
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and 20 accused is prima facie true. The allegations against them
are serious. The proviso to Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act
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applies to the 19 and 20 accused, and they are not entitled to
be released on bail at this stage. After referring to the law laid
down by a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Union of India
v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 731] and other precedents on the
point, the Special Court observed that only the constitutional
courts can relax the rigour of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act,
when there is violation of Part-III of the Constitution of India.
Accordingly, by Annexure A10 order dated 09.09.2025, the Special
Court dismissed the bail application.
16. On 10.06.2026, we heard detailed arguments of Sri
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Renjith B. Marar, the learned counsel for the appellants-19 and
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20 accused and Sri Sasthamangalam S. Ajithkumar, the learned
Senior Counsel and Special Public Prosecutor for NIA. Both sides
have submitted written submissions on 15.06.2026.
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17. Arguments on behalf of the appellants-19 and
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20 accused:- The learned counsel for the appellants-19 and

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20 accused contended that no written grounds of arrest have
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been served on the 1 appellant-19 accused, who was arrested
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on 24.04.2022, and the 2 appellant-20 accused, who was
arrested on 26.04.2022, in crime No.318 of 2022 of Palakkad Town
South Police Station. After NIA took over the investigation of the
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said case as a connected offence, the 19 and 20 accused were
produced before the Special Court on production warrants, and
NIA recorded their formal arrest on 10.02.2023. The arrest of the
appellants is illegal in view of the decision of the Apex Court in
Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [(2024) 7 SCC 576] . The
materials placed before the Special Court do not make out a prima
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facie case against the 19 and 20 accused for the alleged
offences, including the offences under the UA (P) Act.
17.1. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that
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the 19 accused, who was arrested on 24.04.2022, and the 20
accused, who was arrested on 26.04.2022, in crime No.318 of
2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station, have undergone more
than 4 years and 1 month of actual custody. Certain accused in
S.C.No.2 of 2023, who are alleged to have taken active part in the

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alleged ‘terrorist act’ of murdering Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022,
have been granted bail by the decision of a Division Bench of this
Court in Muhammed Bilal v. Union of India [2025 KHC
OnLine 2006] . There is no possibility that the trial in S.C.No.2 of
2023 would either commence or conclude in the near future. There
are 71 accused, 937 witnesses, 60 protected witnesses and 4
approvers (total 1001); 1634 documents and 54 protected
documents (total 1688); 692 material objects; and 10 Terabytes
(TB) of FSL reports. Out of 71 accused, 4 are absconding, 10 are
in judicial custody, 55 are on bail, 4 approvers are on bail, and 1
accused is dead. Therefore, the appellants are entitled to be
released on bail.
17.2. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
a challenge made to the power of NIA to register a fresh FIR and
the subsequent transfer of the case to NIA was repelled by this
Court, vide the judgment dated 01.12.2023 in W.P.(Crl.)1044 of
2023 and Crl.M.C.No.8198 of 2023. Challenging the said
judgment, SLP(Crl.)Nos.3658 of 2024 and 4384 of 2024 were filed
before the Apex Court. By the interim order dated 06.05.2024, the

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Apex Court ordered that charge shall not be framed in S.C.No.2 of
2023. The said interim order was vacated by Annexure A17 order
dated 19.05.2026. By that order, NIA would be at liberty to
proceed with the trial, in accordance with law, without prejudice
to the rights of the petitioners therein, subject to the final outcome
of the Crl.Appeals pending before the Apex Court.
18. Arguments on behalf of the respondents:- The
learned Special Public Prosecutor for NIA contended that the
decision of the Apex Court in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC
576] was rendered only on 03.10.2023, much after the arrest of
the appellants, who were arrested on 24.04.2022 and 26.04.2022
respectively, in Crime No.318 of 2022 of Palakkad Town South
Police Station. After NIA took over the investigation of the said
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case as a connected offence, the 19 and 20 accused were
produced before the Special Court on production warrants, and
NIA recorded their formal arrest on 10.02.2023. As rightly found
by the Special Court in the impugned order dated 09.09.2025, the
materials placed before the court make out a prima facie case
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against the 19 and 20 accused for the alleged offences,

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including the offences under the UA (P) Act. The final report in
S.C.No.2 of 2023, along with the evidence collected, discloses a
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prima facie case for commission of offences by the 19 and 20
accused.
18.1. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for NIA
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contended that the 19 and 20 accused are not entitled to be
released on bail on the ground of any delay in the trial of S.C.No.2
of 2023. The gravity of the offence, the legislative context, and
the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely
because the trial has taken time. No claim for parity in granting
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bail can be applied with regard to the grant of bail to the 19 and
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20 accused, considering their active role in the commission of
the offence.
18.2. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for NIA pointed
out that, in murder cases involving PFI cadres, including the one
in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station,
none of the accused had any personal enmity with the deceased.
The victims have been selected solely because of their
leadership/membership in a particular community and were killed

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to create terror in the society. On an application made by the co-
accused, the Apex Court stayed the framing of charges in S.C.No.2
of 2023, vide the order dated 06.05.2024. The said interim order
restraining the framing of charges was vacated by the Apex Court
only on 19.05.2026, and ordered that NIA would be at liberty to
proceed with the trial in accordance with law. Hence, there is no
delay on the part of the prosecution in commencing the trial. In
compliance with the order of the Apex Court dated 08.05.2026 in
Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl.)No.1 of 2026, the Government of
Kerala accorded sanction for the establishment of two exclusive
NIA Special Courts in Ernakulam. Hence, there will be a speedy
trial of the case.
19. No written grounds of arrest:- Article 22 of the
Constitution of India provides for protection against arrest and
detention in certain cases. As per Article 22(1), no person who is
arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as
soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be
denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal
practitioner of his choice.

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20. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] , a Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court noted that Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India provides, inter alia , that no person who is
arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as
soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest. This being the
fundamental right guaranteed to the arrested person, the mode of
conveying information of the grounds of arrest must necessarily
be meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. It may be
noted that Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act,
2002 (PML Act), enables the person arrested under Section 19
thereof to seek release on bail, but it postulates that unless the
‘twin conditions’ prescribed thereunder are satisfied, such a
person would not be entitled to the grant of bail. The twin
conditions set out in the provision are that, firstly, the court must
be satisfied, after giving an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor
to oppose the application for release, that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the arrested person is not guilty of the
offence and, secondly, that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail. To meet this requirement, it would be essential for

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the arrested person to be aware of the grounds on which the
authorised officer arrested him under Section 19 of the PML Act
and the basis for the officer's ‘reason to believe’ that he is guilty
of an offence punishable under the said Act. It is only if the
arrested person has knowledge of these facts that he would be in
a position to plead and prove before the Special Court that there
are grounds to believe that he is not guilty of such offence, so as
to avail the relief of bail. Therefore, the Apex Court held that
communication of the grounds of arrest, as mandated by Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19 of the PML Act,
is meant to serve this higher purpose and must be given due
importance.
21. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that the language of Section 19 of the PML Act
puts it beyond doubt that the authorised officer has to record in
writing the reasons for forming the belief that the person proposed
to be arrested is guilty of an offence punishable under the said
Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 19 requires the authorised officer
to forward a copy of the order of arrest along with the material in

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his possession, referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 19, to the
adjudicating authority in a sealed envelope. Though it is not
necessary for the arrested person to be supplied with all the
material that is forwarded to the adjudicating authority under sub-
section (2) of Section 19, he has a constitutional and statutory
right to be ‘informed’ of the grounds of arrest, which are
compulsorily recorded in writing by the authorised officer in
keeping with the mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the
PML Act.
22. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that the mode of informing the grounds of
arrest to the persons arrested is left to the option of authorised
officers of the Enforcement Directorate in different parts of the
country, i.e., to either furnish such grounds of arrest in writing or
to allow such grounds to be read by the arrested person or be read
over and explained to such person. That apart, Rule 6 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering (the Forms and the Manner of
Forwarding a Copy of Order of Arrest of a Person along with the
Material to the Adjudicating Authority and its Period of Retention)

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Rules, 2005, titled ‘Forms of Records’, provides that the arresting
officer while exercising powers under sub-section (1) of Section
19 of the PML Act, shall sign the arrest order in Form III appended
to those Rules [reproduced in Para.40 @ Page 596 of SCC],
wherein the authorised officer has to state that the person
arrested has been informed of the grounds for such arrest. The
said format is being followed all over the country by the authorised
officers, who exercise the power of arrest under sub-section (1) of
Section 19, but, in certain parts of the country, the authorised
officer would inform the arrested person of the grounds of arrest
by furnishing the same in writing, while in other parts of the
country, on the basis of the very same prescribed format, the
authorised officer would only read out or permit reading of the
contents of the grounds of arrest. The Two-Judge Bench found that
this dual and disparate procedure to convey the grounds of arrest
to the arrested person cannot be countenanced on the strength of
the very same arrest order, in the prescribed format.
23. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] , the Two-
Judge Bench found that there is no valid reason as to why a copy

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of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the
arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.
There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the
advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle.
Firstly, in the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out to
the arrested person or read by such person with nothing further,
and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down to the
word of the arrested person against the word of the authorised
officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in
this regard. The second reason as to why this would be the proper
course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying such
information being given to the arrested person. The very purpose
of the constitutional and statutory protection would be rendered
nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned to merely read
out or permit reading of the grounds of arrest, irrespective of their
length and detail, and claim due compliance with the constitutional
requirement under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and
the statutory mandate under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the
PML Act. The grounds of arrest recorded by the authorised officer,

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in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 19, would be personal to the
person who is arrested and there should ordinarily be no risk of
sensitive material being divulged therefrom, compromising the
sanctity and integrity of the investigation. In the event any such
sensitive material finds mention in such grounds of arrest recorded
by the authorised officer, it would always be open to him to redact
such sensitive portions in the document and furnish the edited
copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person, so as to
safeguard the sanctity of the investigation. Paragraphs 42 to 44 of
the said judgment read thus;
“42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy
of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to
the arrested person as a matter of course and without
exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this
would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a
matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of
arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by
such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in
a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested
person against the word of the authorised officer as to
whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this
regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as
Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims that

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witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of
arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is
neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non-
compliance in this regard would entail release of the
arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji v.
State [(2024) 3 SCC 51]. Such a precarious situation is
easily avoided, and the consequence thereof can be
obviated very simply by furnishing the written grounds of
arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer in terms of
Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person under due
acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse
dixit of the authorised officer.
43. The second reason as to why this would be the proper
course to adopt is the constitutional objective underlying
such information being given to the arrested person.
Conveyance of this information is not only to apprise the
arrested person of why he/she is being arrested but also to
enable such person to seek legal counsel and, thereafter,
present a case before the court under Section 45 to seek
release on bail, if he/she so chooses. In this regard, the
grounds of arrest in V. Senthil Balaji v. State [(2024) 3 SCC
51] are placed on record, and we find that the same run into
as many as six pages. The grounds of arrest recorded in the
case on hand in relation to Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal
have not been produced before this Court, but it was
contended that they were produced at the time of remand.
However, as already noted earlier, this did not serve the
intended purpose. Further, in the event their grounds of

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arrest were equally voluminous, it would be well-nigh
impossible for either Pankaj Bansal or Basant Bansal to
record and remember all that they had read or heard being
read out for future recall so as to avail legal remedies. More
so, as a person who has just been arrested would not be in
a calm and collected frame of mind and may be utterly
incapable of remembering the contents of the grounds of
arrest read by or read out to him/her. The very purpose of
this constitutional and statutory protection would be
rendered nugatory by permitting the authorities concerned
to merely read out or permit reading of the grounds of
arrest, irrespective of their length and detail, and claim due
compliance with the constitutional requirement under Article
22(1) and the statutory mandate under Section 19(1) PMLA.
44. We may also note that the grounds of arrest recorded
by the authorised officer, in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA,
would be personal to the person who is arrested and there
should, ordinarily, be no risk of sensitive material being
divulged therefrom, compromising the sanctity and integrity
of the investigation. In the event any such sensitive material
finds mention in such grounds of arrest recorded by the
authorised officer, it would always be open to him to redact
such sensitive portions in the document and furnish the
edited copy of the grounds of arrest to the arrested person,
so as to safeguard the sanctity of the investigation.”
(underline supplied)
24. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] , the Two-

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Judge Bench held that, in order to give true meaning and purpose
to the constitutional requirement of Article 22(1) and the statutory
mandate of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the PML Act, of
informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, it would
be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of
arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course
and without exception. On the facts of the case at hand, the Two-
Judge Bench found that the admitted position is that the
investigating officer of the Enforcement Directorate merely read
out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants
and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this
form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil
compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution
and sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the PML Act, the Two-Judge
Bench held that the arrest of the appellants was not in keeping
with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the said Act.
In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their
remand to the custody of the Enforcement Directorate and,
thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained. Paragraphs 45

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and 46 of the said judgment dated 03.10.2023 read thus;
“45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and
purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of
Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of the
grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is
furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and
without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court
in Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India [2017 SCC OnLine
Del 12108] and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan
Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India [2016 SCC OnLine
Bom 9938], which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the
correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is
that ED's investigating officer merely read out or permitted
the reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and
left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As
this form of communication is not found to be adequate to
fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution and Section 19(1) PMLA, we have no hesitation
in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the
provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA. Further, as already noted
supra, the clandestine conduct of ED in proceeding against
the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately
after they secured interim protection in relation to the first
ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary
exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and,
in consequence, their remand to the custody of ED and,

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thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.
46. The appeals are accordingly allowed, setting aside the
impugned orders - Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India [2023
SCC OnLine P&H 2028] - passed by the Division Bench of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court as well as the impugned
arrest orders and arrest memos along with the orders of
remand passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional
Sessions Judge, Panchkula, and all orders consequential
thereto.” (underline supplied)
25. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India
[(2023) 12 SCC 1] , a Three-Judge Bench, while upholding the
validity of Section 19 PML Act, held that the said provision has
reasonable nexus with the purposes and objects sought to be
achieved by the PML Act. The Three-Judge Bench noted that the
safeguards provided in the PML Act and the preconditions to be
fulfilled by the authorised officer before effecting arrest, as
contained in Section 19, are equally stringent and of a higher
standard. Those safeguards ensure that the authorised officers do
not act arbitrarily, but make them accountable for their judgment
about the necessity to arrest any person as being involved in the
commission of an offence of money laundering even before filing
of the complaint before the Special Court under Section 44(1)(b)

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of the PML Act in that regard. If the action of the authorised officer
is found to be vexatious, he can be proceeded with and punished
as specified under Section 62 of the PML Act. Considering the
above, the Three-Judge Bench upheld the validity of Section 19 of
the PML Act and rejected the grounds pressed into service to
declare Section 19 of the PML Act as unconstitutional. The Three-
Judge Bench held that Section 19 has reasonable nexus with the
purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the PML Act of
prevention of money laundering and confiscation of proceeds of
crime involved in money laundering, including to prosecute
persons involved in the process or activity connected with the
proceeds of crime so as to ensure that the proceeds of crime are
not dealt with in any manner which may result in frustrating any
proceedings relating to confiscation thereof.
26. In Ram Kishor Arora v. Directorate of
Enforcement [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , before a Two-Judge Bench
of the Apex Court, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant,
placing heavy reliance on the decision in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7
SCC 576], argued that mere informing the accused orally about

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the grounds of arrest and making him read the same and obtaining
his signature thereon, and not furnishing in writing the grounds of
arrest to the accused, has been held to be not in consonance with
the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the
PML Act. Taking note of the inconsistent practice being followed by
the officers of the Enforcement Directorate, it has been directed
that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written
grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter
of course and without exception. According to the learned Senior
Counsel, the said direction was the reiteration of the principle or
doctrine already existing and also stated in V. Senthil Balaji
v. State [(2024) 3 SCC 51] and, therefore, the decision
in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] is required to be applied
retrospectively though the word ‘henceforth’ has been used. To
buttress the said argument, the learned Senior Counsel relied on
the decision in Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax v.
Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange Ltd. [(2008) 14 SCC
171] , in which it was opined that a judicial decision acts
retrospectively. Per contra, the learned Additional Solicitor General

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for India argued that the decision in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC
576] was per incuriam, as the Two-Judge Bench in the said case
had deviated from the position of law settled by the prior Three-
Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1] with
respect to the compliance with the provisions of Section 19 of the
PML Act. It was contended that a Two-Judge Bench cannot
overlook or ignore a binding precedent of a larger or even co-equal
Bench dealing with the issue; otherwise, the decision of the Two-
Judge Bench would fall in the category of per incuriam , in view of
the decision in Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of
Maharashtra [(2014) 16 SCC 623] . Further, at the most, the
direction contained in paragraph 35 of the decision in Pankaj
Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] to furnish the grounds of arrest in
writing would be applicable ‘henceforth’ as mentioned therein,
meaning thereby it would have the prospective effect and not the
retrospective effect, as sought to be argued on behalf of the
appellant.
27. In Ram Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that the validity of the various provisions,

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including Section 19 of the PML Act, was examined by the Three-
Judge Bench in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1], in
which the Bench while upholding the validity of Section 19 of the
PML Act held that the said provision has reasonable nexus with
the purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the PML
Act. Further, while dealing with the issue as to whether it was
necessary to furnish a copy of Enforcement Case Information
Report (ECIR) to the person concerned apprehending the arrest or
at least after his arrest, the Three-Judge Bench noted that sub-
section (1) of Section 19 of the PML Act postulates that after
arrest, as soon as may be, the person should be informed about
the grounds for such arrest. This stipulation is compliant with the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Being special
legislation, and considering the complexity of the inquiry/
investigation both for the purposes of initiating civil action as well
as prosecution, non-supply of ECIR in a given case cannot be
faulted. So long as the person has been informed about the
grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance with the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The Three-Judge

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Bench observed that non-supply of ECIR, which is essentially an
internal document of the Enforcement Directorate, cannot be cited
as a violation of a constitutional right. Concededly, the person
arrested, in terms of Section 19 of the PML Act, is
contemporaneously made aware of the grounds of his arrest. This
is compliant with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution.
28. In Ram Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that it is in order to guard against the
possibility of inconsistent decisions on the points of law by
different Division Benches that the rule of precedent has been
evolved, in order to promote the consistency and certainty in the
development of law, and its contemporary status that the
statement of law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a
Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. After
referring to the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decisions
in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 754] and
Chandra Prakash v. State of U.P. [(2002) 4 SCC 234] , the
Two-Judge Bench observed that there remains no shadow of doubt
that in view of the law laid down by the Three-Judge Bench in Vijay

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Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1] that sub-section (1) of
Section 19 of the PML Act has a reasonable nexus with the
purposes and objects sought to be achieved by the PML Act and
that the said provision is also compliant with the mandate of
Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, any observation made or
any finding recorded by the Two-Judge Bench, with lesser number
of Judges, contrary to the ratio laid down in Vijay Madanlal
Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1], would be not in consonance with
the jurisprudential wisdom expounded by the Constitution
Benches in the cases referred to above. The three-Judge Bench in
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1], having already
examined in detail the constitutional validity of Section 19 of the
PML Act on the touchstone of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and
upheld the same, it holds the field as on the date.
29. In Ram Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that the expression ‘as soon as may be’ in sub-
section (1) of Section 19 of the PML Act has not been specifically
explained in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1]. Even
the said expression has not been interpreted either in V. Senthil

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Balaji [(2024) 3 SCC 51] or in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576].
In V. Senthil Balaji [(2024) 3 SCC 51], it was held, inter alia , that
after forming a reason to believe that the person has been guilty
of an offence punishable under the PML Act, the officer concerned
is at liberty to arrest him, while performing his mandatory duty of
recording the reasons, and that the said exercise has to be
followed by way of an information being served on the arrestee of
the grounds of arrest. In Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576], the
Court, after highlighting the inconsistent practice being followed
by the Enforcement Directorate about the mode of informing the
person arrested, held that it would be necessary, henceforth, that
a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the
arrested person as a matter of course and without exception.
30. In Ram Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Two-
Judge Bench, after referring to the Constitution Bench decision in
Abdul Jabar Butt v. State of J&K [AIR 1957 SC 281] and
Durga Pada Ghosh v. State of W.B. [(1972) 2 SCC 656] held
that the expression ‘as soon as may be’ contained in Section 19
PML Act is required to be construed as - ‘as early as possible

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without avoidable delay’ or within ‘reasonably convenient’ or
‘reasonably requisite’ period of time. Since, by way of safeguard,
a duty is cast upon the officer concerned to forward a copy of the
order along with the material in his possession to the adjudicating
authority immediately after the arrest of the person, and to take
the person arrested to the court concerned within 24 hours of the
arrest, the reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite time to
inform the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would be
twenty-four hours of the arrest.
31. In Ram Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Two-
Judge Bench found that, noticing the inconsistent practice being
followed by the officers arresting persons under Section 19 of the
PML Act, the Two-Judge Bench in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC
576] directed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing as a
matter of course, ‘henceforth’, meaning thereby from the date of
the pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of the word
‘henceforth’ by the Two-Judge Bench implied that the said
requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing to the
arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not mandatory or

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obligatory till the date of the said judgment [i.e., till 03.10.2023].
Hence, non-furnishing of the grounds of arrest in writing till the
date of pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7
SCC 576] could neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the
officer concerned in not furnishing the same in writing could be
faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person arrested
about the grounds of his arrest is sufficient compliance of Section
19 of the PML Act as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India,
as held in Vijay Madanlal [(2023) 12 SCC 1]. Paragraphs 22 and
23 of the said decision of the Two-Judge Bench read thus;
“22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [(2023) 12 SCC 1], it has
been categorically held that so long as the person has been
informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient
compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person,
before being produced before the Special Court within
twenty-four hours or for the purposes of remand on each
occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records
made available by the authority about the involvement of
the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering.
Therefore, in our opinion the person arrested, if he is
informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest
at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written

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communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may
be, i.e., as early as possible and within reasonably
convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his
arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only
Section 19 of the PML Act but also of Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India.
23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj Bansal
[(2024) 7 SCC 576], also noticing the inconsistent practice
being followed by the officers arresting the persons under
Section 19 of the PML Act, directed to furnish the grounds
of arrest in writing as a matter of course, ‘henceforth’,
meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement of the
judgment. The very use of the word ‘henceforth’ implied
that the said requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest in
writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest
was not mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said
judgment. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr
Singhvi for the appellant that the said judgment was
required to be given effect retrospectively cannot be
accepted when the judgment itself states that it would be
necessary ‘henceforth’ that a copy of such written grounds
of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of
course and without exception. Hence, non-furnishing of
grounds of arrest in writing till the date of pronouncement
of judgment in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] could
neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the officer
concerned in not furnishing the same in writing could be
faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person

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arrested about the grounds of his arrest is sufficient
compliance of Section 19 of the PML Act as also Article 22(1)
of the Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal
[(2023) 12 SCC 1].” (underline supplied)
32. In Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
[(2024) 8 SCC 254] , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court, after
referring to the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 19 of
the PML Act and sub-section (1) of Section 43-B of the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UA (P) Act), which provides that
any officer arresting a person under Section 43-A shall, as soon
as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest, [reproduced
in Paras.15.1 and 15.2 @ Pages 274 and 275 of SCC], found that
there is no significant difference in the language employed in sub-
section (1) of Section 19 of the PML Act and sub-section (1) of
Section 43-B of the UA (P) Act, which can persuade the Court to
take a view that the interpretation of the phrase ‘inform him of the
grounds for such arrest’ made in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC
576] should not be applied to an accused arrested under the
provisions of the UA (P) Act.
33. In Prabir Purkayastha [(2024) 8 SCC 254] , the
Two-Judge Bench found that the provision regarding the

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communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested
contained in sub-section (1) of Section 43-B of the UA (P) Act is
verbatim the same as that in sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the
PML Act. The contention advanced by the learned Additional
Solicitor General for India that there are some variations in the
overall provisions contained in Section 19 of the PML Act and
Sections 43-A and 43-B of the UA (P) Act would not have any
impact on the statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to
inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under sub-
section (1) of Section 43-B UA (P) Act at the earliest, because, as
stated above, the requirement to communicate the grounds of
arrest is the same in both the statutes. As a matter of fact, both
the provisions find their source from the constitutional safeguard
provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. Hence,
applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which
lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person
arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PML
Act or under the UA (P) Act, have to be uniformly construed and
applied.

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34. In Prabir Purkayastha [(2024) 8 SCC 254] , before
the Two-Judge Bench, the learned Additional Solicitor General for
India referred to the language of Article 22(5) of the Constitution
of India and urged that even in a case of preventive detention, the
constitutional scheme does not require that the grounds on which
the order of detention has been passed should be communicated
to the detenue in writing. The Two-Judge Bench delved deeper into
the issue as to whether it is mandatory to communicate the
grounds of arrest or detention in writing to the accused or the
detenue, as the case may be, even though the constitutional
mandate under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution does
not explicitly require that the grounds should be communicated in
writing. The Two-Judge Bench, after referring to the Constitution
Bench decision in Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra [1962
SCC OnLine SC 117] and that of a Two-Judge Bench in Lallubhai
Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India [(1981) 2 SCC 427] , found
that, it has been the consistent view of the Court that the grounds
on which the liberty of a citizen is curtailed, must be
communicated in writing so as to enable him to seek remedial

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measures against the deprivation of liberty. Therefore, the Two-
Judge Bench reiterated that the requirement to communicate the
grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person
arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under
preventive detention, as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5)
of the Constitution of India, is sacrosanct and cannot be breached
under any situation. Non-compliance with this constitutional
requirement and statutory mandate would render the custody or
detention, as the case may be, illegal.
35. In Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana [(2025) 5
SCC 799] , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that as
far as Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India is concerned,
compliance can be made by communicating sufficient knowledge
of the basic facts constituting the grounds of arrest to the person
arrested. The grounds of arrest should be effectively and fully
communicated to the arrestee in a manner that he will fully
understand. Therefore, it follows that the grounds of arrest must
be informed in a language which the arrestee understands. That
is how, in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576], the Court held that

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the mode of conveying the grounds of arrest must necessarily be
meaningful so as to serve the intended purpose. However, under
Article 22(1), there is no requirement of communicating the
grounds of arrest in writing. Article 22(1) also incorporates the
right of every person arrested to consult an advocate of his choice
and the right to be defended by an advocate. If the grounds of
arrest are not communicated to the arrestee, as soon as may be,
he will not be able to effectively exercise the right to consult an
advocate. This requirement incorporated in Article 22(1) also
ensures that the grounds for arresting the person without a
warrant exist. Once a person is arrested, his right to liberty under
Article 21 is curtailed. When such an important fundamental right
is curtailed, it is necessary that the person concerned must
understand on what grounds he has been arrested. That is why
the mode of conveying information of the grounds must be
meaningful so as to serve the objects stated above.
36. In Vihaan Kumar [(2025) 5 SCC 799] , the Two-
Judge Bench observed that the requirement of informing the
person arrested of the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a

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mandatory constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in
Part III of the Constitution of India under the heading of
Fundamental Rights. Thus, it is the fundamental right of every
person arrested and detained in custody to be informed of the
grounds of arrest as soon as possible. If the grounds of arrest are
not informed as soon as may be after the arrest, it would amount
to a violation of the fundamental right of the arrestee guaranteed
under Article 22(1). It will also amount to depriving the arrestee
of his liberty. The reason is that, as provided in Article 21, no
person can be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with
the procedure established by law. The procedure established by
law also includes what is provided in Article 22(1). Therefore,
when a person is arrested without a warrant, and the grounds of
arrest are not informed to him as soon as may be, after the arrest,
it will amount to a violation of his fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 21 as well. In a given case, if the mandate of Article
22 is not followed while arresting a person or after arresting a
person, it will also violate the fundamental right to liberty
guaranteed under Article 21, and the arrest will be rendered

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illegal. On the failure to comply with the requirement of informing
the grounds of arrest as soon as may be after the arrest, the arrest
is vitiated. Once the arrest is held to be vitiated, the person
arrested cannot remain in custody even for a second.
37. In Vihaan Kumar [(2025) 5 SCC 799] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that, in paras 42 and 43 of the decision
in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576], the Court suggested that
the proper and ideal course of communicating the grounds of
arrest is to provide the grounds of arrest in writing. Obviously,
before a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the
grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, if the grounds
of arrest are communicated in writing, there is no harm. Although
there is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in
writing, what is stated in paras 42 and 43 of the decision in Pankaj
Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] are suggestions that merit
consideration. In every case, it may not be practicable to
implement what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is
followed, the controversy about the non-compliance will not arise
at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person arrested

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with the interests of society. Therefore, the police should always
scrupulously comply with the requirements of Article 22 of the
Constitution of India.
38. In Vihaan Kumar [(2025) 5 SCC 799] , the Two-
Judge Bench concluded that the information of the grounds of
arrest must be provided to the arrested person in such a manner
that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested person
effectively in the language which he understands. The mode and
method of communication must be such that the object of the
constitutional safeguard is achieved. The conclusions of the Two-
Judge Bench in para 26 of the said decision read thus;
“26. Therefore, we conclude:
26.1. The requirement of informing a person arrested of
grounds of arrest is a mandatory requirement of Article
22(1);
26.2. The information of the grounds of arrest must be
provided to the arrested person in such a manner that
sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the
grounds is imparted and communicated to the arrested
person effectively in the language which he understands.
The mode and method of communication must be such that
the object of the constitutional safeguard is achieved;

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26.3. When an arrested accused alleges non-compliance
with the requirements of Article 22(1), the burden will
always be on the investigating officer/agency to prove
compliance with the requirements of Article 22(1);
26.4. Non-compliance with Article 22(1) will be a violation
of the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed by the
said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a violation of the
right to personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution. Therefore, non-compliance with the
requirements of Article 22(1) vitiates the arrest of the
accused. Hence, further orders passed by a criminal court
of remand are also vitiated. Needless to add that it will not
vitiate the investigation, charge-sheet and trial. But, at the
same time, filing of charge-sheet will not validate a breach
of constitutional mandate under Article 22(1);
26.5. When an arrested person is produced before a Judicial
Magistrate for remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to
ascertain whether compliance with Article 22(1) and other
mandatory safeguards has been made; and
26.6. When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is
the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the
accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory
restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory
restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail
when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution
is established.” (underline supplied)
39. In Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra

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[(2026) 1 SCC 500] the main issue raised before a Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court was the violation of the appellants' right
under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 50 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), now Section 47 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) as the
appellants asserted that they were not informed of the grounds of
arrest in writing. The questions of law formulated by the Two-
Judge Bench were as follows;
“(a) Whether in each and every case, even arising out of an
offence under the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) now Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), would it be necessary to furnish
the grounds of arrest to an accused either before arrest or
forthwith after arrest; and
(b) Whether, even in exceptional cases, where on account
of certain exigencies it will not be possible to furnish the
grounds of arrest either before arrest or immediately after
arrest, the arrest would be vitiated on the ground of non-
compliance with the provisions of Section 50 Cr.P.C. (now
Section 47 of BNSS).”
40. In Mihir Rajesh Shah [(2026) 1 SCC 500] , the Two-
Judge Bench held that to achieve the intended objective of the
constitutional mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India,
the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in

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each and every case without exception and the mode of the
communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language
he understands. In cases where the police already possess
documentary material furnishing a cogent basis for the arrest, the
written grounds of arrest must be furnished to the arrestee on his
arrest. However, in exceptional circumstances such as offences
against body or property committed in flagrante delicto , where
informing the grounds of arrest in writing on arrest is rendered
impractical, it shall be sufficient for the police officer or other
person making the arrest to orally convey the same to the person
at the time of arrest. Later, a written copy of the grounds of arrest
must be supplied to the arrested person within a reasonable time
and in no event later than two hours prior to the arrestee’s
production before the Magistrate for remand proceedings. The
remand papers shall contain the grounds of arrest, and in case
there is delay in supply thereof, a note indicating a cause for it be
included for the information of the Magistrate. The Two-Judge
Bench held that non-supply of the grounds of arrest in writing to
the arrestee prior to or immediately after arrest would not vitiate

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such arrest on the grounds of non-compliance with the provisions
of Section 50 Cr.P.C. (now Section 47 of BNSS) provided the said
grounds are supplied in writing within a reasonable time and in
any case two hours prior to the production of the arrestee before
the Magistrate for remand proceedings.
41. In Mihir Rajesh Shah [(2026) 1 SCC 500] , after
having come to the above conclusions, the Two-Judge Bench noted
that the provision of law under Section 50 Cr.P.C. (Section 47 of
BNSS) does not provide for a specific mode of or time-frame for
communication of the grounds of arrest to the person arrested.
There existed no consistent or binding requirement mandating
written communication of the grounds of arrest for all the
offences. Therefore, the Two-Judge Bench, in the judgment dated
06.11.2025, observed that the ends of fairness and legal discipline
demand that this procedure, as affirmed above, shall govern
arrests ‘henceforth’. Paragraphs 67 and 68 of the said decision
read thus;
“67. After having come to the above conclusion, it is
pertinent to note that the provision of law under Section
50CrPC (Section 47 of BNSS 2023) does not provide for a

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specific mode of or time-frame for communication of the
grounds of arrest to the person arrested. This Court in Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC 254],
held that the grounds of arrest be conveyed to the arrestee
in writing in all offences at the earliest, which means it need
not be given at the time of arrest but within a reasonable
time thereafter, for offences under all the statutes, which
period would be as has been laid down above in this order.
68. We are cognizant that there existed no consistent or
binding requirement mandating written communication of
the grounds of arrest for all the offences. Holding as above,
in our view, would ensure implementation of the
constitutional rights provided to an arrestee as engrafted
under Article 22 of the Constitution of India in an effective
manner. Such clarity on obligation would avoid uncertainty
in the administration of criminal justice. The ends of fairness
and legal discipline therefore demand that this procedure as
affirmed above shall govern arrests henceforth.”
(underline supplied)
42. As observed by the Two-Judge Bench in Ram Kishor
Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , the Three-Judge Bench in Vijay
Madanlal [(2023) 12 SCC 1] held that the action of informing
the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is sufficient
compliance of Section 19 of the PML Act as also Article 22(1) of
the Constitution of India. Noticing the inconsistent practice being

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followed by the officers arresting persons under Section 19 of the
PML Act, the Two-Judge Bench in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC
576] directed furnishing the grounds of arrest in writing as a
matter of course, ‘henceforth’, meaning thereby from the date of
the pronouncement of the judgment, i.e., 03.10.2023. In Ram
Kishor Arora [(2024) 7 SCC 599] , it was categorically held by
the Two-Judge Bench that the very use of the word ‘henceforth’
by the Two-Judge Bench in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576]
implied that the said requirement of furnishing the grounds of
arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest
was not mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said judgment
[i.e., till 03.10.2023]. Hence, non-furnishing of the grounds of
arrest in writing till the date of pronouncement of judgment
in Pankaj Bansal [(2024) 7 SCC 576] could neither be held to
be illegal, nor the action of the officer concerned in not furnishing
the same in writing could be faulted with. In the case at hand, the
st th
1 appellant-19 accused was arrested on 24.04.2022, and the
nd th
2 appellant-20 accused was arrested on 26.04.2022, in Crime
No.318/2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station, well before

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the judgment of the Two-Judge Bench in Pankaj Bansal [(2024)
7 SCC 576] . After NIA took over the investigation of the said case
th th
as a connected offence, the 19 and 20 accused were produced
before the Special Court on production warrants, and NIA recorded
their formal arrest on 10.02.2023. Therefore, non-communication
of the grounds of arrest in writing is not a ground available to the
th th
appellants-19 and 20 accused, who were arrested on
24.04.2022 and 26.04.2022, respectively, to challenge their arrest
as violative of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. The
contentions to the contra raised by the learned counsel for the
th th
appellants-19 and 20 accused are untenable, and are rejected
as such.
43. Proviso to Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act -
prima facie materials:- The Special Court, in the impugned
order dated 09.09.2025, found that, apart from the statement of
th
witnesses, there are materials which prima facie suggest that 19
th
and 20 accused had an active role in the commission of the
offence. The materials placed before the court prima facie make
out the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P) Act. There are

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th
materials that prima facie show the involvement of the 19 and
th
20 accused in the conspiracy and destruction of evidence. The
th
proviso to Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act applies to the 19
th
and 20 accused, and they are not entitled to be released on bail
at this stage.
44. As per clause (o) of Section 2 of the UA (P) Act,
‘unlawful activity’, in relation to an individual or association, means
any action taken by such individual or association (whether by
committing an act or by words, either spoken or written, or by
signs or by visible representation or otherwise), (i) which is
intended, or supports any claim, to bring about, on any ground
whatsoever, the cession of a part of the territory of India or the
secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union, or
which incites any individual or group of individuals to bring about
such cession or secession; or (ii) which disclaims, questions,
disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of India; or (iii) which causes or is intended to cause
disaffection against India.
45. Chapter III of the UA (P) Act deals with offences and

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penalties. Section 13 deals with punishment for unlawful activities.
As per sub-section (1) of Section 13, whoever (a) takes part in or
commits, or (b) advocates, abets, advises or incites the
commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine. As per sub-section (2) of Section 13,
whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any
association, declared unlawful under Section 3, after the
notification by which it has been so declared has become effective
under sub-section (3) of that section, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with
fine, or with both. As per sub-section (3) of Section 13, nothing in
this Section shall apply to any treaty, agreement or convention
entered into between the Government of India and the
Government of any other country or to any negotiations therefor
carried on by any person authorised in this behalf by the
Government of India.
46. Chapter IV of the UA (P) Act deals with punishment for
terrorist activities. Section 15 deals with terrorist act. In view of

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the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 15, whoever does
any act enumerated in clauses (a) to (c) thereto with intent to
threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike
terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the
people in India or in any foreign country, commits a terrorist act.
As per sub-section (2) of Section 15, the terrorist act includes an
act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as
defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
47. Section 16 of the UA (P) Act deals with punishment for
a terrorist act. As per sub-section (1) of Section 16, whoever
commits a terrorist act shall, (a) if such act has resulted in the
death of any person, be punishable with death or imprisonment
for life, and shall also be liable to fine; (b) in any other case, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and
shall also be liable to fine. Section 17 deals with punishment for
raising funds for a terrorist act.
48. Section 18 deals with punishment for conspiracy, etc.

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As per Section 18, whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or
advocates, abets, advises or incites, directs or knowingly
facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory
to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to fine.
49. In Union of India v. Barakathullah [2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1019] , the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court
observed that, for the purpose of considering the offence under
Section 18 of the UA (P) Act, the commission of a terrorist act, as
contemplated in Section 15, is not required to be made out. What
Section 18 contemplates is that whoever conspires or attempts to
commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or
knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act
preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act would be
punishable under the said provision. Hence, if there is any material
or evidence to show that the accused had conspired or attempted
to commit a terrorist act, or committed any act preparatory to the

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commission of a terrorist act, such material evidence would be
sufficient to invoke Section 18. For attracting Section 18, the
involvement of the accused in the actual commission of a terrorist
act as defined in Section 15 need not be shown.
50. Section 20 of the UA (P) Act deals with punishment for
being a member of a terrorist gang or organisation. As per Section
20, any person who is a member of a terrorist gang or a terrorist
organisation, which is involved in a terrorist act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
st th
51. The charges levelled against the 1 appellant-19
accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, originally accused No.21 in Annexure
A1 charge sheet, and the objections put forward by the
prosecution to the grant of bail, before the Special Court, read
thus;
“1. Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-21)
Charge in Annexure A1:
a) That, the accused Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-21) being a
Kongad Area President of PFI, knowingly and intentionally
became a part of larger conspiracy hatched by PFI, its office
bearers and cadres since few years to enact their ‘India

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2047’ agenda of establishing Islamic Rule in India. In
furtherance to the conspiracy, he underwent Arms and
Physical training as a preparation for committing terrorist
acts. He knowingly and intentionally became a member of
terrorist gang formed by PFI to commit terrorist act as a
part of larger conspiracy hatched by PFI and its office
bearers and cadres since last few years. In furtherance to
the larger conspiracy, he attended conspiracy meetings held
th th
at Palakkad on 15 and 16 of April 2022 for committing
terrorist act of murdering any available Hindu Leader with
the intention of creating terror in the minds of the Hindu
community and among public at large. On 16.04.2022, he,
along with A-20 (Identifiable person), travelled by white
activa KL-09/AK- 6726 of Khaja Hussain (A-30) to the Scene
of Crime, assisted the assault team to carry out terrorist act
of killing Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. He also conspired to
destroy evidence in the case. He committed acts prejudicial
to the maintenance of harmony between different religious
groups and has disturbed the public tranquillity in the State
at large.
b) That, the accused Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-21) along
with 43 other co-accused were already charge sheeted by
Kerala Police in connected offence in Crime No. 318/2022 of
Palakkad Town South Police Station under Section 120B, 34,
118, 119, 109, 115, 143, 144, 147, 148, 449, 341, 201,
212, 302 r/w 149 of IPC and Section 3(a)(b)(d) r/w 7 of the
Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988,
wherein, the offence committed by Abdul Khader @ Iqbal

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(A-21) in the said connected offence has been enumerated
in detail in that charge-sheet.
c) Therefore, accused Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-21)
committed offences punishable under sections 153A of IPC
and Sections 13, 16, 18 & 20 of the UA (P) Act along with
additional offences under Section 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109,
115, 143, 144, 147, 148, 449, 341, 201, 212, 302 r/w 149
of IPC and Section 3(a)(b)(d) r/w 7 of the Religious
Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 as charge
sheeted by the Kerala Police in connected offence in Crime
No.318/2022 of Palakkad Town South Police Station.”
Objections by the prosecution:
(i) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) is alleged to be the Area
President of PFI, Kongad area of Palakkad and an active
cadre of PFI. The statement of witnesses CWs-771, 734,
786, 797, 798, 800, 801, 802, 809, 814, 823, 833 and 835,
the statement of approver Aboobacker Sidik (A-57, now A-
52), photos of Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) in PFl uniform
and various posters of PFl recovered from his mobile phone
(M-42) seized vide recoverý mahazar dated 30.04.2022 (D-
78), PFI poster of Palakkad Division council in which photo
of A-19 is seen with printed writing 'Abdul Kadar (lqbal)'
'Kongad Area President' of PFI, recovered from MO-69
mobile phone of Akbar Ali (A-45) seized vide inspection
memo dated 01.05.2022 (D-729), photo of A-19 in PFI
uniform recovered from mobile phone (MO-72) of Sadam
Hussain (A-41) seized vide inspection memo dated
22.04.2022 (D-725), prima facie establish that A-19 is an

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active cadre of PFI and Kongad Area President of PFI.
(ii) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) is alleged to be a member
of the terrorist gang formed by PFI to commit terrorist acts
as a part of the larger conspiracy hatched by PFI and its
office bearers and cadres since last few years to enact their
‘India 2047’ agenda of establishing Islamic rule in India.
There is prima facie material to show the larger conspiracy
of PFI to establish Islamic rule in India under their hidden
agenda ‘India 2047’. It also shows that the accused in this
case are members of a terrorist gang, prepared for the
commission of terrorist acts by imparting/undergoing arms
training, collecting the details of targets and also by
committing the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on
16.4.2022 as a part of a larger conspiracy.
(iii) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) allegedly attended arms
training imparted by PFI at Falah Masjid, Palakkad, as
preparation for committing terrorist acts. Protected
Witness-17 and approver Muhammed Shajid (A-37) and
accused Basheer (A-49) stated that A-19 attended arms
training at Falah Masjid at Chunnambuthara, Palakkad along
with the assailants. Based on the disclosure of Basheer (A-
49), a disclosure-cum-scene mahazar was prepared at the
Falah Masjid on 29.10.2022. CW-835 has also stated that A-
49, the master trainer of PFI, imparted arms training to A-
19 and other accused at the said location.
(iv) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) allegedly attended a
conspiracy meeting with other accused and cadres of PFI
held near Khabristan at Palakkad on the night of

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15.04.2022, for committing a terrorist act of murdering any
Hindu leader. The protected witnesses 36, 37 and 38 and
CW-814 have clearly stated the active involvement of A-19
in the conspiracy. Based on the disclosure of Muhammed
Bilal (A-22), disclosure-cum-scene mahazar (D-16) has
been prepared. CDR and IPDRS also show the presence of
A-19 at the place of conspiracy on 15.04.2022.
(v) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) allegedly attended the
conspiracy meeting held at Palakkad on 16.04.2022 for
committing the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan with
the intention of creating terror in the minds of the Hindu
community and among the public at large. In furtherance of
the conspiracy, he handed over his mobile phone to co-
accused Muhammed Rizwan (A-42), before proceeding to
commit the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022 to screen his presence at the scene of crime.
Protected witness 18, 36 and witnesses CWs-37, 38 and
approver Aboobacker Sidik have given statements that they
had seen A-19, along with assailants and other PFI leaders
on 16.4.2022 at noon (i.e., just an hour before the murder
of Sreenivasan) at the vacant land near District Hospital,
Palakkad. Approver Aboobacker Siddik (A-52) has given a
statement that 'the plan was to kill anyone and the decision
to kill Sreenivasan was taken near hospital premises and
behind the hospital'. Based on the disclosure of Muhammed
Riswan (A-42), a scene mahazar (D-13) was prepared on
22.04.2022 at the conspiracy site. The CDR and IPDR
reports (D-223, D-238 and D-1460) also show the presence

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of Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) at the scene of conspiracy.
CCTV footage shows the movement of A-19, along with
other assailants, from the place of conspiracy to the scene
of crime, then, after committing the terrorist act of murder
of Sreenivasan, escaping from the scene of the crime.
During the commission of the terrorist act of murder of
Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022, the mobile phone (MO-42) of
Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) was kept by co-accused
Muhammed Rizwan (A-42) in his possession, to screen the
presence of A-19 at the scene of the crime. The phone was
later returned to A-19 after the incident and was seized
under recovery mahazar dated 30.04.2022 (D-78) based on
his disclosure.
(vi) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) in furtherance of the
conspiracy, proceeded to BOC road, Palakkad as rider of the
scooter bearing No. KL-09/AK-6726 (MO-120), which
belongs to accused Kaja Robot Kaja (A-26), with the
accused Muhammed Manzoor (A-21) as pillion rider, where
he received weapons from absconding accused Abdul
Rasheed (A-28), for commission of the terrorist act of
murder of Sreènivasan. The statements of witnesses CW-39
and CW-40 confirm that they had seen A-19 along with
assailants at the spot and also stated that they had seen a
person in the red car giving something to the assailants.
Scene mahazar (D-100) at BOC Road, Palakkad was
prepared based on the disclosure of Abdu Rahman (A-17)
on 08.05.2022 regarding collection of weapons. CCTV
footages (D-20, D-21, D-29, D-30, D-33, D-34, D-63 and

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D-64) shows the movement of accused Abdul Khader @
Igbal (A-19) with assailant Muhammed Manzoor (A-21) on
scooter KL-09/AK-6726 (MO-120), along with other
assailants on bikes and a car, to BOC Road, where Abdul
Rasheed (A-28, absconding) handed over weapons to the
assailants from car KL-55/D-4700 (MO-122) for committing
the murder of Sreenivasan. CW-823 has identified the
petitioner and other assailants from the CCTV footage.
(vii) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19), after the receipt of
weapons by the assailants at BOC road, Palakkad, further
proceeded to Melamuri as the rider of the white Activa
scooter bearing No.KL-09/AK-6726 (MO-120) with the
accused Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20) as pillion
rider of the said scooter and on reaching in front of SKS
Autos, Melamuri, the assailants possessing lethal weapons,
criminally trespassed into the said shop and hacked
Sreenivasan to death on 16.04.2022. After the murder of
Sreenivasan, A-19 escaped from the scene of crime along
with the assailant Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-
20), on the white scooter KL-09/AK-6726. Witnesses CW-1,
CW-2, CW-3, CW-4, CW-5, CW-6, CW-8, CW-9 and CW-10
clearly stated that they had seen A-19 along with the
assailants coming to the scene on one scooter and two
motorcycles and Aburahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T (A-
18) and Shamnad EK @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20), who were
possessing lethal weapons, criminally trespassed into the
shop and committed terrorist act by murdering Sreenivasan
on 16.04.2022. Scene mahazar (D-3) dated 16.04.2022 has

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been prepared at the scene of crime based on the pointing
out of CW-1, and an associated scene mahazar (D-206)
dated 30.06.2022 was also prepared at the scene of crime
by the investigation officer. Scene plan of scene of crime (D-
626) submitted by CW-244, MO-8 to MO-12, which are the
scientific evidence collected by scientific officer from the
scene of crime seized vide seizure mahazar dated
16.04.2022 (D-4) and victim's DNA was detected on
forensic analysis from the MOs collected by scientific officer,
vide RFSL report (D-742) and report prepared by scientific
officer on examination of scene of crime (D 582) prove the
terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan. The seized CCTV
footages D-45, D-46, D-49, D-50, D-53, D-54, D-203 and
D-204 clearly show the movement of Abdul Khader @ Iqbal
(A-19), on the scooter bearing Reg. No. KL-09/AK-6726
(MO-120) with the assailant Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad
Ellikkal (A-20) as pillion rider, and the other assailants on
two motorcycles to the scene of crime. Hard Disk (MO-107)
seized from NSR/ASR Vegetables shop near scene of crime
contains CCTV footage which shows, A-19 along with the
assailants Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20),
Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T. @ Manu (A-18),
Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) and Muhammed Mansoor (A-21)
coming to the scene of crime on one scooter and two
motorcycles and Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T(A-
18) and Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Elikkal (A-20),
possessing lethal weapons, criminally trespassing into the
shop and committing the terrorist act of murder of

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Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. lnquest report (D-2) prepared
on 16.04.2022 by CW-271, D-655, D-656 and D-657, the
wound certificate, the death declaration certificate and the
Post Mortem report, respectively, of Sreenivasan produced
by witnesses CW-257, CW-258 and CW-259, respectively,
will prove the death of Sreenivasan due to injuries inflicted
by the assailants Abdu Rahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T.
(A-18) and Shamnad E.K. (A-20). Document (D-248),
containing the names of the accused Abdul Khader @ Igbal
(A-19) and other assailants written in it, was seized from
accused Sirajudheen (A-51), vide seizure mahazar dated
17.09.2022 (D-240). Document (D-315) containing the
names of A-19 and other assailants written on it was seized
from approver Aboobacker Sidik (A-52), vide seizure
mahazar dated 19.09.2022 (D-286), which will also prove
the involvement of A-19 in committing the terrorist act of
murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022.
(viii) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19), after the commission of
the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022,
escaped from the scene of crime on scooter No.KL-09/AK-
6726 with the assailant Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal
(A-20). A-19 tampered with evidence by concealing the
dress worn by him, helmet, vehicle and mobile phone used
by him. Based on his disclosure, recovery mahazar (D-78)
dated 30.04.2022 has been prepared for the recovery of the
helmet (MO-43), baniyan (MO-44) and jeans pants (MO-45)
and mobile phone (MO-42) used by A-19 during the
commission of the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on

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16.04.2022. Victim Sreenivasan's DNA has been detected
from the baniyan (MO-44) and jeans pants (MO-45) of Abdul
Khader @ Iqbal (A-19), vide RFSL, Thrissur report (D-742)
dated 17.05.2022. Based on the disclosure of A-19, the
scooter (MO-120) used by him and assailant Shamnad E.K.
(A-20) to reach and escape from the scene of crime was
seized, vide seizure mahazar (D-26) dated 25.04.2022. The
report submitted by the scientific officer (D-583) during the
pointing-out proceedings for A-19 confirms the presence of
blood on the scooter. The RFSL report, Thrissur (D-744)
dated 30.06.2022, shows the activa scooter and dresses
(MO-44, MO-45) used by A-19 during the murder of
Sreenivasan, as seen in the CCTV footage (MO-107), are
similar.
(ix) Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-19) is also involved in Crime
No.353/2020 of Palakkad Town North Police Station, Crime
No.267/2026 of Kongad Police Station, Crime No.50/2020
of Kalladikkode Police Station, Crime No.933/2018 of
Hemambika Nagar Police Station and Crime No.908/2020 of
Palakkad Town North Police Station.”
nd th
52. The charges levelled against the 2 appellant-20
accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, originally accused No.22 in Annexure
A1 charge sheet, and the objections put forward by the
prosecution to the grant of bail, before the Special Court, read
thus;
“2. Firoz @Thambi (A-22)

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Charge in Annexure A1:
a) That, the accused Firoz @ Thambi (A-22) being a cadre of
PFI knowingly and intentionally became a member of
terrorist gang formed by PFI to commit terrorist act as a part
of larger conspiracy hatched by PFI and its office bearers and
cadres since last few years to enact their ‘India 2047’ agenda
of establishing Islamic Rule in India. Being a member of
terrorist gang, he attended conspiracy meeting held at
th
Palakkad on 16 of April 2022 for committing terrorist act of
murdering any available Hindu Leader with the intention of
creating terror in the minds of the Hindu community and
among public at large which resulted in the murder of
Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022 by PFI cadres. In furtherance to
the conspiracy, on 16.4.2022, he travelled with Ummar (A-
19) to the Scene of Crime by his Motorcycle TN-37-BF-4800
and assisted the assault team to carry out the terrorist act
of killing Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. He also conspired to
destroy evidence in the case. He committed acts prejudicial
to the maintenance of harmony between different religious
groups and has disturbed the public tranquillity in the State
at large.
b) That, the accused Firoz @ Thambi (A-22) along with 43
other co-accused were already charge sheeted by Kerala
Police in connected offence in Crime No.318/2022 of
Palakkad Town South Police Station under Section 120B, 34,
119, 109, 115, 143, 144, 147, 148, 449, 341, 201, 212, 302
r/w 149 of IPC and Section 3(a)(b)(d) r/w 7 of the Religious
Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988, wherein, the

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offence committed by Firoz @ Thambi (A-22) in the said
connected offence has been enumerated in detail in that
charge-sheet.
c) Therefore, accused Firoz @ Thambi (A-22) committed
offences punishable under Sections 153A of IPC and sections
13, 16, 18 & 20 of the UA (P) Act along with additional
offences under Section 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143,
144, 147, 148, 449, 341, 201, 212, 302 r/w 149 of IPC and
Section 3(a)(b)(d) r/w 7 of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 as charge sheeted by the
Kerala Police in connected offence in Crime No.318/2022 of
Palakkad Town South Police Station.
Objections by the prosecution:
(i) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) is alleged to be an active cadre of
PFI. The statement of approver Aboobacker Sidik and the
statements of CWs-784, 786, 797, 798, 800, 809 & 835 and
PFI procession video recovered from the mobile phone (MO-
29) of Muhammed Bilal (A-22) prima facie show that A-20
is an active cadre of PFI.
(ii) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) is alleged to be a member of a
terrorist gang formed by PFI to commit terrorist act as part
of the larger conspiracy hatched by PFI. There are prima
facie materials to substantiate the allegation of the larger
conspiracy of PFI to establish Islamic rule in India. It also
shows that the accused in this case are members of a
terrorist gang, prepared for the commission of the terrorist
act by imparting/undergoing arms training, collecting the
details of targets and also by committing the terrorist act of

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murder of Sreenivasan on 16.4.2022 as a part of larger
conspiracy.
(iii) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) allegedly attended arms training
imparted by PFI at Falah Masjid, Palakkad as preparation for
committing terrorist acts. The protected witness 17 has
given a statement that arms training to PFI cadres was
imparted at Falah Masjid at Palakkad and A-20 attended
arms training at Falah Masjid at Palakkad along with
assailants. Based on the disclosure of Basheer (A49), he had
imparted arms training to A-20 and other accused at the
said location, and a disclosure-cum-scene mahazar (D-347)
was prepared at Falah Masjid at the instance of A-49 on
29.10.2022. CW-835 has given a statement that Basheer
(A-49) is the master trainer of PFI, imparted arms training
to A-20 and the assailants at Falah Masjid.
(iv) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) attended conspiracy meetings
held at Palakkad on 16.04.2022 for committing the terrorist
act of murder of Sreenivasan. Protected witnesses 13, 18,
19 and 20, and witness CW-38 have given statements that
they had seen A-20 along with the assailants and other PFI
leaders and cadres on 16.04.2022 at noon (i.e., just before
the murder of Sreenivasan) at the vacant land near District
Hospital, Palakkad. Approver Aboobacker Siddik (A-52) has
given a statement that 'the plan was to kill anyone and the
decision to kill Sreenivasan was taken near hospital
premises and behind the hospital', and other accused were
also part of the conspiracy. Based on the disclosure of
Muhammed Riswan @ Riswan (A-42), scene mahazar (D-

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13) was prepared on 22.04.2022. The CDR/IPDRS show the
presence of Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) at the scene of the
conspiracy.
(v) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), in furtherance of the conspiracy,
travelled with Ummer T @ Manu (A-18) as a pillion rider on
his motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800 to BOC Road, Palakkad,
where Ummer T. (A-18) received weapons from Abdul
Rasheed (A-28), and on receipt of weapons, they proceeded
to the scene of crime. The statements of witnesses CW-39
and CW-40 confirmed that they had seen A-20 and other
accused at the spot and stated that they had seen a person
in the red-coloured car giving something to the assailants.
Scene mahazar (D-100) at BOC Road, Palakkad was
prepared based on the disclosure of Abdu Rahman (A-17)
on 08.05.2022 regarding collection of weapons. CCTV
footages D-20, D-21, D-29, D-30, D-33, D-34, D-63 and D-
64 show the movement of A-20 with assailant Ummer T @
Manu (A-18) on motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800, along with
other assailants on bikes and a car, to BOC Road, where
Abdul Rasheed (A-28, absconding) handed over weapons to
the assailants from car No.KL-55/D-4700 (MO-122) for
committing the murder of Sreenivasan. CW-823 has
identified A-20 and other assailants from CCTV footage.
(vi) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), after the receipt of weapons by
the assailants at BOC road, Palakkad, further proceeded to
Melamuri as the rider of a motorcycle bearing No.TN-37/BF-
4800 with the assailant Ummar T @ Manu (A-18) as pillion
rider of the said motorcycle and on reaching in front of SKS

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Autos, Melamuri, the assailants possessing lethal weapons,
criminally trespassed into the said shop and committed the
terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. After
the commission of the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan
on 16.04.2022, A-20 further escaped from the scene of
crime along with the assailant Ummer T. (A-18) on
motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800. Witnesses CW-1, CW-2,
CW-3, CW-4, CW-5, CW-11 and CW-12 clearly stated that
they had seen Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), along with assailants
coming to the scene on one Scooter and two motorcycles
and Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T. (A-18) and
Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20), possessing lethal
weapons, criminally trespassed into the shop and
committed the terrorist act by murdering Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022. Scene mahazar (D-3) dated 16.04.2022 has
been prepared at the scene of crime based on the pointing-
out of CW-1, and associated scene mahazar (D-206) dated
30.06.2022 has also been prepared at the scene of crime by
the investigation officer. Scene plan of scene of crime (D-
626) submitted by CW-244, the scientific evidence (MO-8 to
MO-12) collected by the scientific officer from the scene of
crime, seized vide seizure mahazar dated 16.04.2022 (D-4)
and victim's DNA was detected on forensic analysis from the
MOs collected by the scientific officer, vide RFSL report (D-
742) and report prepared by the scientific officer on
examination of scene of crime (D-582) proves the terrorist
act of murder of Sreenivasan. The seized CCTV footages (D-
45, D-46, D-49, D-50, D-53, D-54, D-203 and D-204)

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clearly shows the movement of Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) on
motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800 with the assailant Ummer T.
@ Manu (A-18) as the pillion rider, and the other assailants
on two motorcycles to the scene of crime. There are other
materials such as CCTV footage to prove the presence of A-
20 at the scene of the incident at the relevant time.
(vii) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), tampered with evidence by way
of concealing the dress he had worn during the commission
of the terrorist act and the motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800,
which was used for the commission of the terrorist act of
murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. A-20 handed over
his mobile phone to accused Muhammed Rizwan (A-42) for
screening his presence from the scene of crime. The seized
CCTV footages D-67, D-68, D-87, D-88, D-102 and D-103
show A-20 with the assailant Ummer T. @ Manu (A-18), as
the pillion rider on the motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800
escaping from the scene of crime, after the commission of
the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022.
Based on his disclosure, recovery mahazars (D-43) dated
27.04.2022 and (D105) dated 09.05.2022 were prepared
for the seizure of the T-shirt (MO-24) and jeans pants (MO-
33) worn by Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), and white plastic cover
(MO-34) and motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800 used by A-20
and the assailant Ummer T. @ Manu(A-18), for the
commission of the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022. Victim Sreenivasan's DNA has been detected
from the T-shirt (MO-24) and jeans pants (MO-33) of Firoz
@ Thambi (A-20), vide the report of RFSL, Thrissur dated

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17.05.2022 (D-742). The scientific officer found blood stains
in the seat cover and footrest (MO-35 and MO-36) of the
seized motorcycle bearing No.TN-37/BF-4800 and
submitted in sealed cover, and the same was seized vide
seizure mahazar dated 09.05.2022 (D-106). Recovery
mahazar dated 04.05.2022 (D-92) was prepared for the
recovery of five number plates (MO-46 to MO-50), including
the number plates bearing registration No.TN-37/BF-4800
and KL-37/BF-4800, which were the registration numbers of
the vehicle used by A-20 and the assailant Ummer T. @
Manu (A-18) for the commission of the terrorist act of
murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022, based on the
disclosure of the accused Haneefa (A-34). Further, the
witnesses CW-35 and CW-36 have stated that the
motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800 is owned by Firoz @ Thambi
(A-20). Photographs recovered from the phone (MO-99) of
A-20 also establish that he is in actual possession of the
motorcycle. Report of RFSL, Thrissur dated 30.06.2022 (D-
744), comparing the dress (MO-24 and MO-33) worn by A-
20 during the commission of the terrorist act of murder of
Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022 and motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-
4800 with the CCTV footage on the hard disk (MO-107) of
the scene of crime are found to be similar. Moreover, the
mobile phone (MO-99) of A20 was possessed by the accused
Muhammed Rizwan (A-42) to screen his presence at the
scene of crime during the commission of the terrorist act of
murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. The said mobile
phone (MO-99) was later handed over to accused Ashraf (A-

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44) by the accused Asfak @ Unni (A-43) and the same was
recovered vide recovery mahazar (D-74) dated 28.04.2022,
based on the disclosure of the accused Ashraf (A-44).
(ix) Firoz @ Thambi (A-20) is also an accused in Crime No.
780/2018 of Palakkad Town North Police Station.
53. Section 43-D of the UA (P) Act deals with modified
application of certain provisions of Cr.P.C. (now BNSS). As per sub-
section (1) of Section 43-D, notwithstanding anything contained
in the Code (now BNSS) or any other law, every offence
punishable under this Act shall be deemed to be a cognizable
offence within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 of the Code
(now clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of BNSS), and
‘cognizable case’ as defined in that clause shall be construed
accordingly. As per sub-section (4) of Section 43-D, nothing in
Section 438 of the Code (now Section 482 of BNSS) shall apply in
relation to any case involving the arrest of any person accused of
having committed an offence punishable under this Act. As per
sub-section (5) of Section 43-D, which begins with a non-obstante
clause, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code (now
BNSS), no person accused of an offence punishable under
Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on

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bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been
given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such
release. As per the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D,
such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own
bond if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made
under Section 173 of the Code (now Section 193 of BNSS), is of
the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusation against such person is prima facie true.
54. In State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8
SCC 21] , in the context of Section 437 of Cr.P.C., a Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court reiterated that the matters to be
considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any
prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had
committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii)
severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger
of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered

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with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by
grant of bail.
55. In National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] , after referring to the
law laid down in Amarmani Tripathi [(2005) 8 SCC 21], a Two-
Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that, when it comes to
offences punishable under special enactments, such as the UA (P)
Act, something more is required to be kept in mind in view of the
special provisions contained in Section 43-D of the said Act,
inserted by Act 35 of 2008, with effect from 31.12.2008. By virtue
of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D, it is the duty of
the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie
true or otherwise. The principle underlying the decisions in which
the court had occasion to deal with similar special provisions in
the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985
(TADA Act) and the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act,
1999 (MCOCA) may have some bearing while considering the
prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the UA (P) Act as

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well. Under the special enactments such as the TADA Act, MCOCA
and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(NDPS Act), the court is required to record its opinion that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is ‘not
guilty’ of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference
between the satisfaction to be recorded by the court that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is ‘not
guilty’ of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the
purposes of the UA (P) Act that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against such person is ‘prima facie’
true. By its very nature, the expression ‘prima facie true’ would
mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating
agency in reference to the accusation against the accused
concerned in the first information report must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and
on the face of it shows the complicity of such accused in the
commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient
on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts
constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted.

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In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the court
has to opine that the accusation is ‘prima facie true’, as compared
to the opinion of the accused ‘not guilty’ of such offence as
required under the other special enactments. In any case, the
degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the court in relation to
offences under the UA (P) Act, for opining that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the
accused is ‘prima facie true’, is lighter than the degree of
satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application
or framing of charges.
56. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] , a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noted that, in
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1], the Two-Judge
Bench intervened and cancelled the bail, since the High Court had
re-appreciated the entire evidence on record to overturn the
conclusion of the Special Court of there being a prima facie case
of conviction and concomitant rejection of bail. The High Court
practically conducted a mini-trial and determined the admissibility
of certain evidence, thereby exceeding the limited scope of a bail

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petition. It was not only beyond the statutory mandate of a prima
facie assessment under Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act, but also
premature, thereby prejudicing the trial itself.
57. In the case at hand, in the impugned order dated
09.09.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023, in the
context of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA
(P) Act, the Special Court found that, apart from the statement of
witnesses, there are materials which prima facie suggest that the
th th
19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 had active role in the
commission of the offence. The materials placed before the court
prima facie make out the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P)
Act. After referring to the objections put forward by the
th th
prosecution to the grant of bail to the 19 and 20 accused, which
we have extracted in paragraphs 51 and 52 hereinbefore, the
Special Court observed that there are prima facie materials to
th th
show the presence of the 19 and 20 accused, who are active
members of PFI, at the place of conspiracy and near the scene of
th
crime. There are prima facie materials to show the role of the 19
th
and 20 accused in the commission of the offence.

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58. As per the prima facie materials referred to in the
objections put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to
th
the 19 accused (extracted in paragraph 51 hereinbefore), the
th
19 accused is allegedly the Area President of PFI, Kongad area of
th
Palakkad and an active cadre of PFI; the 19 accused allegedly
attended arms training imparted by PFI at Falah Masjid, Palakkad,
th
as preparation for committing terrorist acts; and the 19 accused
allegedly attended the conspiracy meeting held on 15.04.2022
and 16.04.2022 at Palakkad for committing the terrorist act.
Those prima facie materials show the alleged movement of the
th
19 accused from the scene of conspiracy to the scene of crime,
along with other assailants, and escaping from the scene of crime,
after the alleged commission of the terrorist act of murdering
Sreenivasan, and also the alleged destruction of evidence.
Similarly, as per the prima facie materials referred to in the
objections put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to
th
the 20 accused (extracted in paragraph 52 hereinbefore), the
th th
20 accused is allegedly an active cadre of PFI; the 20 accused
allegedly attended arms training attended by PFI at Falah Masjid,

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Palakkad, as preparation for committing terrorist acts; and the
th
19 accused allegedly attended the conspiracy meeting held on
16.04.2022 at Palakkad for committing the terrorist act. Those
th
prima facie materials show the alleged movement of the 20
accused from the scene of conspiracy to the scene of crime, along
with other assailants, and escaping from the scene of crime, after
the alleged commission of the terrorist act of murdering
Sreenivasan, and also the alleged destruction of evidence.
59. When the materials placed before the court prima facie
make out the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P) Act, the
Special Court cannot be found fault with in arriving at a conclusion
that there are materials that prima facie show the involvement of
th th
the 19 and 20 accused in the conspiracy and destruction of
evidence. The said finding of the Special Court is neither arbitrary
nor illegal, warranting any interference in this Crl. Appeal. In such
circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the proviso to
th th
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act applies to the 19 and 20
accused, and they are not entitled to be released on bail.
60. Claim for parity in bail:- In support of the claim for

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parity in bail, it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the
th th
appellant-19 and 20 accused that certain other accused, who
are alleged to have taken active part in the alleged ‘terrorist act’
of murdering Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022, have been granted bail
by the decision of a Division Bench in Muhammed Bilal v. Union
of India [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] . Out of 64 accused persons
arrested in S.C.No.2 of 2023, 58 have been enlarged on bail either
th th
by the High Court or by the Apex Court. The 19 and 20 accused
are not alleged to have entered the shop or inflicted injuries on
Sreenivasan. The persons alleged to have entered the shop and
committed murder are Abdu Rahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar @
Manu (A-18) and Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-65). A-17
and A-18 remain in custody. A-65 was arrested on 04.04.2025.
st th
The alleged role of the 1 appellant-19 accused is limited to
riding a scooter bearing No.KL-09/AK-6726 to the scene of crime
with Ummar @ Manu (A-18) as pillion rider.
61. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai
Makwana [(2021) 6 SCC 230] , after referring to the law laid
down in Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508]

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that, while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot
exercise its powers in a capricious manner, and has to consider
the totality of circumstances before granting bail, a Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court held that, parity while granting bail must
focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another
accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is
not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on
the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of
parity, the role attached to the accused, and their position in
relation to the incident and the victims, are of utmost importance.
62. In Tarun Kumar v. Enforcement Directorate
[(2024) 13 SCC 788] , in the context of the commission of the
offence of money laundering, as defined under Section 3 of the
PML Act, punishable under Section 4 of the said Act, a Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court held that parity is not the law. While
applying the principle of parity, the court is required to focus upon
the role attached to the accused whose application is under
consideration. The Two-Judge Bench observed that it is axiomatic
that the principle of parity is based on the guarantee of positive

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equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of
India. However, if any illegality or irregularity has been committed
in favour of any individual or a group of individuals, or a wrong
order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or
multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a
similar wrong order. Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to
perpetuate the illegality or irregularity. If there has been a benefit
or advantage conferred on one or a set of people by any authority
or by the court, without legal basis or justification, other persons
could not claim as a matter of right the benefit on the basis of
such wrong decision.
63. In Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] , a
decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants herein-
th th nd th
19 and 20 accused, the 22 and 24 accused in S.C.No.2 of
2023 on the file of the Special Court for NIA Cases, Ernakulam,
who are the appellants in Crl.A.No.1248 of 2025, had undergone
a pre-trial detention for more than three years and three months,
rd th
and the 23 and 60 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, who are the

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appellants in Crl.A.No.1253 of 2025, had undergone a pre-trial
detention for more than two years and eight months and more
than two years and three months, respectively. The appellants
were allegedly members of the 'Defence Team'. According to the
appellants, the members of the 'Assault Team' are the prime
accused persons in the case, who were allegedly present at the
place of occurrence, armed with weapons, and executed the plan.
According to the prosecution, the appellants, the members of the
‘Defence Team’, did not participate in the crime, but they were
watching the activities near the place of occurrence armed with
weapons. The appellants, being the members of a terrorist gang,
conspired on 15.04.2022 for committing a terrorist act of
murdering any available Hindu leader with the intention of creating
terror in the minds of the Hindu community and among the public
at large. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the appellants prepared
for the commission of a terrorist act by imparting/undergoing
arms training, collecting the details of targets, conducting recce of
the targets to eliminate them and also by committing the terrorist
act of murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022 as a part of a larger

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conspiracy to establish Islamic Rule in India as per their hidden
agenda 'India 2047'.
64. In Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] , the
appellants were granted bail by a Division Bench of this Court on
the ground that they have undergone a pre-trial detention for
more than three years and three months/two years and eight
months/two years and three months; the trial proceedings in
S.C.No.2 of 2023 were stayed pursuant to an order of the Apex
Court in SLP(Crl.)No.3658 of 2024; that the final report submitted
by the NIA is voluminous, comprising 1688 documents, 1114
witnesses, 696 material objects, and 10 TB of FSL reports; and
that the accused with almost similar charges were already
released on bail. The Division Bench observed that, considering
the magnitude of the prosecution case and the stay on
proceedings issued in SLP(Crl.)No.3658 of 2024, which specifically
interdicts the framing of charges, there is no foreseeable
possibility of the trial commencing or concluding in the near
future.
65. In Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] , the

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Division Bench relied on the decision of a Two-Judge Bench of the
Apex Court in Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India
[(1996) 2 SCC 616] .
66. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , for the purpose of grant of bail to the detenue under the
TADA Act, the Two-Judge Bench divided the undertrials into four
classes, i.e., (a) hardcore undertrials whose release would
prejudice the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be
a menace to society in general and to the complainant and
prosecution witnesses in particular; (b) other undertrials whose
overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3 and/or
Section 4 of the TADA Act; (c) undertrials who are roped in, not
because of any activity directly attracting Sections 3 and 4 of the
TADA Act, but by virtue of Sections 120-B or 147 of the IPC (now
Sections 61(2) or 191(2) of BNS), and; (d) those undertrials who
were found possessing incriminating articles in notified areas and
are booked under Section 5 of the TADA Act. Ordinarily, the
provisions of sub-sections (8) and (9) of Section 20 of the TADA
Act would apply to all the aforesaid classes. But while adopting a

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pragmatic and just approach, no one can dispute that all
undertrials cannot be dealt with by the same yardstick. Different
approaches would be justified based on the gravity of the charges.
Adopting such an approach, the Two-Judge Bench opined as
follows;
(i) cases of undertrials falling within group (a), i.e., hardcore
undertrials whose release would prejudice the prosecution
case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to society
in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses
in particular, cannot receive liberal treatment;
(ii) undertrials falling in group (b), i.e., other undertrials
whose overt acts or involvement directly attract Sections 3
and/or Section 4 of the TADA Act, would have to be
differently dealt with, in that, if they have been in prison for
five years or more and their trial is not likely to be
completed within the next six months, they can be released
on bail unless the court comes to the conclusion that their
antecedents are such that releasing them may be harmful
to the lives of the complainant, the family members of the
complainant, or witnesses;
(iii) cases of undertrials falling in group (c), i.e., undertrials
who are roped in, not because of any activity directly
attracting Sections 3 and 4 of the TADA Act, but by virtue
of Section 120-B or 147 of the IPC, and those falling in
group (d), i.e., undertrials who were found possessing
incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under

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Section 5 of the TADA Act, can be dealt with leniently and
they can be released if they have been in jail for three years
and two years respectively. (underline supplied)
The Two-Judge Bench opined that those falling in group (b), when
released on bail, may be released on bail of not less than
Rs.50,000/- with one surety for like amount, and those falling in
groups (c) and (d) may be released on bail on their executing a
bond for Rs.30,000/- with one surety for like amount, subject to
the terms enumerated in sub-paras (1) to (5) of paragraph 14 of
the said decision [@ page 623 of SCC].
67. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , the Two-Judge Bench has referred to the observation made
by a Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab
[(1994) 3 SCC 569] , while considering the validity of sub-section
(8) of Section 20 of the TADA Act, which contained a prohibition
in releasing on bail an accused of an offence punishable under the
said Act, unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that
he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail, that while
liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the courts,

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nonetheless the courts while dispensing justice in cases like the
one under the TADA Act, should keep in mind not only the liberty
of the accused but also the interest of the victims and their near
and dear ones and above all the collective interest of the
community and the safety of the nation so that the public may not
lose faith in the system of judicial administration and indulge in
private retribution.
68. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, when the release of
undertrials on bail is severely restricted as in the case of the TADA
Act, by virtue of the provisions of sub-section (8) of Section 20, it
becomes necessary that the trial does proceed and conclude
within a reasonable time. Where this is not practical, release on
bail, which can be taken to be embedded in the right of a speedy
trial, may, in some cases, be necessary to meet the requirements
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was on this basis that
in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 731] ,
a Two-Judge Bench considered similar provisions restricting the

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grant of bail under the NDPS Act and directed release of
undertrials on bail in certain situations and subject to the terms
and conditions set out therein. The Two-Judge Bench, while doing
so, observed that deprivation of personal liberty without ensuring
speedy trial would not be in consonance with the right guaranteed
by Article 21 of the Constitution. Of course, some amount of
deprivation of personal liberty cannot be avoided in such cases;
but if the period of deprivation pending trial becomes unduly long,
the fairness assured by Article 21 of the Constitution would receive
a jolt. Therefore, it was felt that, after the accused persons have
suffered imprisonment which is half of the maximum punishment
provided for the offence, any further deprivation of personal
liberty would be violative of the fundamental right visualised by
Article 21 of the Constitution, which has to be telescoped with the
right guaranteed by Article 14, which also promises justness,
fairness and reasonableness in procedural matters.
69. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , after referring to the decision in Supreme Court Legal Aid
Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) [(1994) 6 SCC

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731], the Two-Judge Bench found it necessary to grant some relief
to those persons who have been deprived of their personal liberty
for a considerable length of time, without any prospect of the trial
being concluded in the near future. The Two-Judge Bench
observed that, undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the
nation needs to be safeguarded, looking to the nature of the
offences the undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate
justification for such deprivation of liberty, pending trial, can only
be their being found guilty of the offences for which they have
been charged. If such a finding is unlikely to be reached within a
reasonable time, some relief becomes necessary.
70. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that the writ petition filed as a
Public Interest Litigation, under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India, in which the petitioner has prayed for certain reliefs to
undertrial prisoners charged under the TADA Act, poses the
problem of reconciling conflicting claims of individual liberty
versus the right of the community and the nation to safety and
protection from terrorism and disruptive activities. While it is

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essential that innocent people should be protected from terrorists
and disruptionists, it is equally necessary that terrorists and
disruptionists are speedily tried and punished. In fact, the
protection of innocent civilians depends on such speedy trials and
punishment. The conflict is generated on account of the gross
delay in the trial of such persons. This delay may contribute to the
absence of proper evidence at trial, so that the truly guilty may
ultimately be acquitted. It also causes irreparable harm to
innocent persons who may have been wrongly accused of the
crime and are ultimately acquitted, yet remain in jail for a long
period pending trial because of the stringent bail provisions under
the TADA Act. They suffer severe hardship, and their families may
be ruined. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need
to protect society and the nation, stringent provisions for granting
bail have been prescribed in sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the
TADA Act. Such stringent provisions can be justified by reference
to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh [(1994) 3
SCC 569], on the presumption that the trial of the accused will
take place without undue delay. No one can justify the gross delay

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in the disposal of cases when undertrials are perforce kept in jail,
giving rise to situations that may warrant invocation of Article 21
of the Constitution of India. These competing claims can be
reconciled by taking a pragmatic approach. The proper course is
to identify from the nature of the role played by each accused
person the real hardcore terrorists or criminals from others who
do not belong to that category; and apply the bail provisions
strictly insofar as the former class is concerned and liberally in
respect of the latter class.
71. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need
to protect society and the nation, stringent provisions governing
the grant of bail have been prescribed in Section 43-D(5) of the
UA (P) Act. As per sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA (P)
Act, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code (now BNSS),
no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and
VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own
bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity
of being heard on the application for such release. As per the
proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D, such accused person

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shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the court, on a
perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of
the Code (now Section 193 of BNSS), is of the opinion that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against
such person is prima facie true.
72. The observation made by the Constitution Bench of the
Apex Court in Kartar Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 569] , in the context
of the provisions under sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA
Act, that while liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded
by the courts, nonetheless the courts while dispensing justice in
cases under the TADA Act should keep in mind not only the liberty
of the accused but also the interest of the victims and their near
and dear ones and above all the collective interest of the
community and the safety of the nation, applies with equal force
in cases under the UA (P) Act. Therefore, the courts, while
dispensing justice in cases under the UA (P) Act, should keep in
mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the interests of
the victims and their near and dear ones and above all the
collective interests of the community and the safety of the nation.

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73. In the instant case, the charge against the appellants-
th th
19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 is that they committed
offences punishable under Section 153A of IPC and Sections 13,
16, 18 and 20 of the UA (P) Act along with additional offences
under Sections 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143, 144, 147, 148,
449, 341, 201, 212, 302 read with Section 149 of IPC and Section
3(a)(b)(d) read with Section 7 of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 as charge sheeted by the Kerala
Police in connected offence in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad
Town South Police Station.
74. In the impugned order dated 09.09.2025 in
Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023, in the context of the
proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA (P) Act, the
Special Court found that, apart from the statement of witnesses,
th
there are materials which prima facie suggest that the 19 and
th
20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 had active role in the commission
of the offence. The materials placed before the court prima facie
make out the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P) Act. After
referring to the objections put forward by the prosecution to the

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th th
grant of bail to the 19 and 20 accused, which we have extracted
in paragraphs 51 and 52 hereinbefore, the Special Court observed
in the impugned order dated 09.09.2025 that, there are prima
th th
facie materials to show the presence of the 19 and 20 accused,
who are active members of PFI, at the place of conspiracy and
near the scene of crime. There are prima facie materials to show
th th
the role of the 19 and 20 accused in the commission of the
offence.
75. As per the prima facie materials referred to in the
objections put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to
th
the 19 accused (extracted in paragraph 51 hereinbefore), the
th
19 accused is allegedly the Area President of PFI, Kongad area of
th
Palakkad and an active cadre of PFI; the 19 accused allegedly
attended arms training imparted by PFI at Falah Masjid, Palakkad,
th
as preparation for committing terrorist acts; and the 19 accused
allegedly attended the conspiracy meeting held on 15.04.2022
and 16.04.2022 at Palakkad for committing the terrorist act.
Those prima facie materials show the alleged movement of the
th
19 accused from the scene of conspiracy to the scene of crime,

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along with other assailants, and escaping from the scene of crime,
after the alleged commission of the terrorist act of murdering
Sreenivasan, and also the alleged destruction of evidence.
Similarly, as per the prima facie materials referred to in the
objections put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to
th
the 20 accused (extracted in paragraph 52 hereinbefore), the
th th
20 accused is allegedly an active cadre of PFI; the 20 accused
allegedly attended arms training imparted by PFI at Falah Masjid,
Palakkad, as preparation for committing terrorist acts; and the
th
19 accused allegedly attended the conspiracy meeting held on
16.04.2022 at Palakkad for committing the terrorist act. Those
th
prima facie materials show the alleged movement of the 20
accused from the scene of conspiracy to the scene of crime, along
with other assailants, and escaping from the scene of crime, after
the alleged commission of the terrorist act of murdering
Sreenivasan, and also the alleged destruction of evidence.
76. The prima facie materials referred to in the objections
put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to Abdul Khader
@ Iqbal (A-19) (extracted in paragraph 51 hereinbefore) include

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the seized CCTV footages D-45, D-46, D-49, D-50, D-53, D-54,
D-203 and D-204, which clearly show the movement of A-19 on
the scooter bearing Reg. No. KL-09/AK-6726 (MO-120) with the
assailant Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20) as pillion rider,
and the other assailants on two motorcycles to the scene of crime.
Hard Disk (MO-107) seized from NSR/ASR Vegetables shop near
scene of crime contains CCTV footage showing A-19 along with
the assailants Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20),
Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T. @ Manu (A-18), Firoz @
Thambi (A-20) and Muhammed Mansoor (A-21) coming to the
scene of crime on one scooter and two motorcycles and
Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T(A-18) and Shamnad E.K.
@ Shamnad Elikkal (A-20), possessing lethal weapons, criminally
trespassing into the shop and committing the terrorist act of
murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. Abdul Khader @ Iqbal (A-
19) tampered with evidence by concealing the dress he wore, the
helmet, the vehicle and mobile phone he used during the
commission of the terrorist act. Based on his disclosure, recovery
mahazer (D-78) dated 30.04.2022 has been prepared for the

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recovery of the helmet (MO-43), the baniyan (MO-44), the jeans
(MO-45) and the mobile phone (MO-42) used by A-19 during the
commission of the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022. DNA of the victim Sreenivasan has been detected
from the baniyan (MO-44) and jeans (MO-45) of A-19, vide RFSL,
Thrissur report (D-742) dated 17.05.2022. Based on the
disclosure of A-19, the scooter (MO-120) used by him and the
assailant Shamnad E.K. @ Shamnad Elikkal (A-20) to reach and
escape from the scene of crime was seized vide seizure mahazar
(D-26) dated 25.04.2022. The report submitted by the scientific
officer (D-583) during the pointing-out proceedings for A-19
confirms the presence of blood on the scooter. The RFSL report,
Thrissur (D-744) dated 30.06.2022, shows the activa scooter and
dresses (MO-44, MO-45) used by A-19 during the murder of
Sreenivasan, as seen in the CCTV footage (MO-107), are similar.
77. Similarly, the prima facie materials referred to in the
objections put forward by the prosecution to the grant of bail to
th
the 20 accused (extracted in paragraph 52 hereinbefore) include
CCTV footages D-20, D-21, D-29, D-30, D-33, D-34, D-63 and D-

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64, which clearly show the movement of A-20 with assailant
Ummer T @ Manu (A-18) as a pillion rider on motorcycle No.TN-
37/BF-4800, along with other assailants on bikes and a car, to BOC
Road, where Abdul Rasheed (A-28, absconding) handed over
weapons to the assailants from car No.KL-55/D-4700 (MO-122)
for committing the murder of Sreenivasan. CW-823 has identified
A-20 and other assailants from the CCTV footage. The witnesses
CW-1, CW-2, CW-3, CW-4, CW-5, CW-11 and CW-12 stated that
they had seen Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), along with assailants
coming to the scene on one Scooter and two motorcycles and
Abdurahman @ Adru (A-17), Ummar T. (A-18) and Shamnad E.K.
@ Shamnad Ellikkal (A-20), possessing lethal weapons, criminally
trespassed into the shop and committed the terrorist act by
murdering Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022. A-20 tampered with
evidence by way of concealing the dress he wore and the vehicle
he used during the commission of the terrorist act. Based on his
disclosure, recovery mahazars (D-43) dated 27.04.2022 and
(D105) dated 09.05.2022 were prepared for the seizure of the T-
shirt (MO-24) and the jeans (MO-33) worn by A-20, and a white

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plastic cover (MO-34) and motorcycle No.TN-37/BF-4800 used by
A-20 and the assailant Ummer T. @ Manu (A-18), for the
commission of the terrorist act of murder of Sreenivasan on
16.04.2022. DNA of the victim Sreenivasan has been detected
from the T-shirt (MO-24) and jeans (MO-33) of A-20, vide the
report of RFSL, Thrissur dated 17.05.2022 (D-742). The scientific
officer found blood stains in the seat cover and footrest (MO-35
and MO-36) of the seized motorcycle bearing No.TN-37/BF-4800
and submitted in sealed cover, and the same was seized vide
seizure mahazar dated 09.05.2022 (D-106). The RFSL report,
Thrissur (D-744) dated 30.06.2022 shows the dress (MO-24 and
MO-33) worn by A-20 during the commission of the terrorist act
of murder of Sreenivasan on 16.04.2022 and motorcycle No.TN-
37/BF-4800, as seen in CCTV footage on the hard disk (MO-107)
of the scene of crime, are similar.
78. As held by the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in
Ramesh Bhavan Rathod [(2021) 6 SCC 230] , parity while
granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. In deciding
the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused and their

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position in relation to the incident and the victims are of utmost
importance. In Tarun Kumar [(2024) 13 SCC 788] , a Two-
Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated that parity is not the
law. While applying that principle, the court is required to focus
upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under
consideration. The principle of parity is based on the guarantee of
positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. Since Article 14 of the Constitution is not
meant to perpetuate the illegality or irregularity, if any illegality or
irregularity has been committed in favour of any individual or a
group of individuals, or a wrong order has been passed by a
judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher
or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity
or illegality or for passing a similar wrong order.
79. As already noted hereinbefore, in Muhammed Bilal
[2025 KHC OnLine 2006] , a decision relied on by the learned
th th
counsel for the appellants herein-19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2
nd th
of 2023, the 22 and 24 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, who are
rd th
the appellants in Crl.A.No.1248 of 2025, and the 23 and 60

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accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, who are the appellant in
Crl.A.No.1253 of 2025, were members of the ‘Defence Team’.
According to the prosecution, the appellants, the members of the
‘Defence Team’, did not participate in the crime, but they were
watching the activities near the place of occurrence armed with
weapons. Further, the appellants, being the members of a terrorist
gang, conspired on 15.04.2022 for committing a terrorist act, and
in furtherance of the conspiracy, they prepared for the commission
of a terrorist act. The Division Bench granted them bail on the
ground that they have undergone a pre-trial detention for more
than three years and three months/two years and eight
months/two years and three months; the trial proceedings in
S.C.No.2 of 2023 were stayed pursuant to an order of the Apex
Court in SLP(Crl.)No.3658 of 2024; that the final report submitted
by the NIA is voluminous, comprising 1688 documents, 1114
witnesses, 696 material objects, and 10 TB of FSL reports; and
that the accused with almost similar charges were already
released on bail.
th th
80. The learned counsel for the appellants-19 and 20

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accused would point out that, in Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC
nd
OnLine 2006] , the 2 appellant in Crl.A.No.1248 of 2025,
th
Riyasudheen, the 24 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, who was
released on bail by the Division Bench, alleged to have travelled
to the scene of crime on 16.04.2022, along with pillion rider
Shaheer (A-60) on a motorcycle bearing No.KL-09/AQ-713
arranged by Abbas (A-52) and assisted the assailants for the
commission of the terrorist act of murdering Sreenivasan. DNA of
the victim Sreenivasan has been detected from the clothes of A-
24. On the aforesaid submission by the learned counsel for the
th th
appellants-19 and 20 accused, it has to be noted that, as per
the objections of the prosecution, which has been referred to in
paragraph 24 of the decision in Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC
nd
OnLine 2006] , Riyasudheen (A-24), the 2 appellant in
Crl.A.No.1248 of 2025, proceeded as the rider of the motorcycle
bearing No.KL-09/AQ-713 (MO-111) along with Saheer K.V. (A-
60) as pillion rider to BOC Road, Palakkad, and Saheer K.V. (A-60)
received weapons from Abdul Rasheed (A-28) at BOC Road,
Palakkad to eliminate those who came to defend the terrorist act

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of murdering Sreenivasan. After receipt of the weapons from BOC
Road, Palakkad, Riyasudheen (A-24) proceeded as the rider of the
motorcycle bearing No.KL-09/AQ-713 to SKS Autos, Melamuri,
Palakkad and stood there as a ‘Defence Team’ to the assailants,
when Sreenivasan was hacked to death. It is not discernible from
the decision in Muhammed Bilal [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] that
any material to show the detection of DNA of the victim
Sreenivasan from the clothes of A-24 was brought to the notice of
the Division Bench, which rendered that decision.
81. The principle of parity is based on the guarantee of
positive equality before law enshrined in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused and their position in relation to the
incident and the victims are of utmost importance. Parity is not
the law. While applying that principle, the court is required to focus
upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under
consideration. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , a decision relied on by the Division Bench in Muhammed
Bilal [2025 KHC OnLine 2006] , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex

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Court has made it clear that all undertrials cannot be dealt with
by the same yardstick. Different approaches would be justified
based on the gravity of the charges. In the impugned order dated
09.09.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023, in the
context of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA
(P) Act, the Special Court found that, apart from the statement of
witnesses, there are materials which prima facie suggest that the
th th
19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 had active role in the
commission of the offence under Chapter IV of the UA (P) Act.
After referring to the objections put forward by the prosecution to
th th
the grant of bail to the 19 and 20 accused, the Special Court
observed that there are prima facie materials to show the
th th
presence of the 19 and 20 accused, who are active members of
PFI, at the place of conspiracy and near the scene of crime. There
th th
are prima facie materials to show the role of the 19 and 20
accused in the commission of the offence.
82. As noted hereinbefore, the prima facie materials
st th
against the 1 appellant-19 accused Abdul Khader @ Iqbal
include the DNA of the victim Sreenivasan alleged to have been

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detected from the baniyan (MO-44) and jeans (MO-45) of A-19,
vide RFSL, Thrissur report (D-742) dated 17.05.2022; and the
nd th
prima facie materials against the 2 appellant-20 accused Firoz
@ Thambi include the DNA of the victim Sreenivasan alleged to
have been detected from the T-shirt (MO-24) and jeans (MO-33)
of A-20, vide the report of RFSL, Thrissur dated 17.05.2022 (D-
742), and also blood stains allegedly found in the seat cover and
footrest (MO-35 and MO-36) of the motorcycle bearing No.TN-
37/BF-4800, seized vide seizure mahazar dated 09.05.2022 (D-
106). Therefore, applying the principle of parity, or placing
reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in Muhammed Bilal
nd rd th
[2025 KHC OnLine 2006] granting bail to the 22 , 23 , 24
th
and 60 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, who were allegedly the
th
members of the ‘Defence Team’, the appellants herein-19 and
th
20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, are not entitled to a release on
bail. The contentions to the contra raised by the learned counsel
th th
for the appellants-19 and 20 accused are untenable, and are
rejected as such.

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83. Bail - long incarceration and inordinate delay in
completion of the trial:- The learned counsel for the appellants-
th th th
19 and 20 pointed out that the 19 accused, who was arrested
th
on 24.04.2022 and the 20 accused, who was arrested on
26.04.2022, have undergone more than 4 years and 1 month of
actual custody. There is no possibility that the trial in S.C.No.2 of
2023 would either commence or conclude in the near future. There
are 71 accused, 937 witnesses, 60 protected witnesses and 4
approvers (total 1001); 1634 documents and 54 protected
documents (total 1688); 692 material objects; and 10 Terabytes
(TB) of FSL reports. Out of 71 accused, 4 are absconding, 10 are
in judicial custody, 55 are on bail, 4 approvers are on bail, and 1
accused is dead.
84. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] , a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court observed that the
presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA
(P) Act per se does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts
to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution
of India. Indeed, both the restrictions under a statute as well as

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the powers exercisable under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well harmonised. Whereas at the commencement of proceedings,
the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against
the grant of bail, but the rigours of such provisions will melt down
where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such
an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions
like Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act being used as the sole metric
for denying bail or for a wholesale breach of the constitutional
right to speedy trial.
85. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , before the
Three-Judge Bench, the learned Additional Solicitor General for
India, for the appellant, argued that the High Court erred in
granting bail without adverting to the statutory rigours of Section
43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act. Relying on the decision of the Two-
Judge Bench in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1], it
was highlighted that bail proceedings under the special enactment
were distinct and that courts are duty-bound to refuse bail where

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the suspect is prima facie believed to be guilty. Further, in
numerous prior rounds before the Special Court and the High
Court, sufficient grounds emerged to believe that the respondent
was, prima facie , guilty of the accusations made against him. The
fact that the respondent had absconded for years was pressed into
aid as legitimate apprehension of his not returning, if set free. As
regards the early conclusion of the trial, NIA has filed an additional
affidavit before the Apex Court, suggesting the examination of 276
witnesses on a day-to-day basis and completion within around a
year.
86. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the Apex Court
was dealing with a case in which the respondent, who was facing
trial in a crime registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B,
341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506 Part II, 201, 202, 153-A, 212, 307,
149 of IPC, Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act and Sections
16, 18, 18-B, 19 and 20 of the UA (P) Act, was in jail for more
than 5 years. Before the Three-Judge Bench, the learned Senior
Counsel for the respondent highlighted that many of the co-
accused had been acquitted. Although a few co-accused had been

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convicted, they had been sentenced to not more than eight years.
The respondent has already suffered incarceration of almost 5½
years without the trial having even started, which would violate
his constitutional liberty and rights to have him serve most of his
sentence without any adjudication of guilt by a judicial authority.
Once the High Court had exercised discretion to grant bail, the
same ought not to be interfered with except in rare circumstances.
Relying on Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC 616]
and Hussain v. Union of India [(2017) 5 SCC 702] , it was
argued that such protracted incarceration violates the right of the
respondent to speedy trial and access to justice; in which case,
the constitutional courts could exercise their powers to grant bail,
regardless of limitations specified under special enactments.
87. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the Three-
Judge Bench emphasised that there is a vivid distinction between
the parameters to be applied while considering a bail application,
vis-à-vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its
cancellation. The Three-Judge Bench noted the decision in State
of Bihar v. Rajballav Prasad [(2017) 2 SCC 178] , wherein a

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Two-Judge Bench held that, once the discretion is exercised by the
High Court on relevant considerations and bail is granted, the Apex
Court would normally not interfere with such a discretion, unless
it is found that the discretion itself is exercised on extraneous
considerations and/or the relevant factors which need to be taken
into account while exercising such a discretion are ignored or
bypassed.
88. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , on the facts of
the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noted that, in the
impugned judgment, the High Court has not determined the
likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or whether the
rigours of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act are alien to him. The
High Court instead appears to have exercised its power to grant
bail owing to the long period of incarceration and the unlikelihood
of the trial being completed in the near future. The reasons
assigned by the High Court are apparently traceable to Article 21
of the Constitution of India, of course, without addressing the
statutory embargo created by Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act.
The view taken by the High Court draws support from a batch of

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decisions, including the Two-Judge Bench decision in Shaheen
Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC 616], laying down that gross
delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of
Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to
release the undertrial on bail.
89. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the Three-
Judge Bench noted that, even in the case of special legislation like
the TADA Act and the NDPS Act, which too have somewhat
rigorous conditions for the grant of bail, the Court in Paramjit
Singh [(1999) 9 SCC 252], Babba v. State of Maharashtra
[(2005) 11 SCC 569] and Umarmia v. State of Gujarat
[(2017) 2 SCC 731] enlarged the accused on bail when they had
been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of
early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions
for bail in such special enactments has thus been primarily
justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to protect innocent
civilians. The Three-Judge Bench has also referred to the orders
enlarging similarly situated accused under the UA (P) Act
in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra [(2021)

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3 SCC 723] and in Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe v. State of
Maharashtra [(2021) 3 SCC 725] . Paragraph 13 of the decision
of the Three-Judge Bench reads thus;
“13. We may also refer to the orders enlarging similarly
situated accused under UA (P) Act passed by this Court
in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra [(2021)
3 SCC 723]. That was also a case under Sections 10, 13,
17, 18, 18-A, 18-B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the UA (P)
Act. This Court, in its earnest effort to draw a balance
between the seriousness of the charges and the period of
custody suffered and the likely period within which the trial
could be expected to be completed, took note of the 5 years'
incarceration and over 200 witnesses left to be examined,
and thus granted bail to the accused notwithstanding
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act. Similarly, in Sagar
Tatyaram Gorkhe v. State of Maharashtra [(2021) 3 SCC
725], an accused under the UA (P) Act was enlarged
because he had been in jail for 4 years and over 147
witnesses were still unexamined.” (underline supplied)
90. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , on the facts of
the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noted that the
respondent had been in jail for more than 5 years and there are
276 witnesses left to be examined. Charges have been framed
only on 27.11.2020. Still further, though two opportunities were

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given, the appellant NIA has shown no inclination to screen its
endless list of witnesses. Of the 13 co-accused, who have been
convicted, none have been sentenced to more than 8 years'
rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, it can be legitimately expected
that, if found guilty, the respondent would also receive a sentence
within the same ballpark. Two-thirds of such incarceration has
already been completed, and the respondent has already paid
heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice. In Supreme Court Legal
Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) [(1994) 6 SCC
731], a Two-Judge Bench held that undertrials cannot indefinitely
be detained pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely trial
would not be possible and the accused has been incarcerated for
a significant period, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge them on bail.
91. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the Three-
Judge Bench noted that, in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5
SCC 1], the Two-Judge Bench intervened and cancelled the bail,
since the High Court had re-appreciated the entire evidence on
record to overturn the conclusion of the Special Court of there

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being a prima facie case of conviction and concomitant rejection
of bail. The High Court practically conducted a mini-trial and
determined the admissibility of certain evidence, thereby
exceeding the limited scope of a bail petition. It was not only
beyond the statutory mandate of a prima facie assessment under
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act, but also premature, thereby
prejudicing the trial itself.
92. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , on the facts of
the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noted that the charges
levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to
societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, perhaps the
Court would have outrightly turned down the prayer of the
respondent. However, keeping in mind the length of the period
spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left
with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been
made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead
evidence of its choice and to establish the charges beyond any
doubt, and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed

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under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected. The
Three-Judge Bench noted that Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act
is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Unlike the NDPS Act, where the competent court needs to be
satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is
unlikely to commit another offence while on bail, there is no such
precondition under the UA (P) Act. Instead, Section 43-D(5)
merely provides another possible ground for the competent court
to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations such
as the gravity of the offence, the possibility of tampering with
evidence, the possibility of influencing witnesses or the chance of
the accused evading trial by absconding, etc.
93. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the Three-
Judge Bench though declined interference with the impugned
judgment, imposed certain additional conditions, which would
serve the best interest of justice and the society at large.
Paragraph 20 of the decision reads thus;
“20. In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to
interfere with the impugned order. However, we feel that
besides the conditions to be imposed by the trial court while

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releasing the respondent, it would serve the best interest of
justice and the society at large to impose some additional
conditions that the respondent shall mark his presence
every week on Monday at 10 a.m. at the local police station
and inform in writing that he is not involved in any other
new crime. The respondent shall also refrain from
participating in any activity which might enrage communal
sentiments. In case the respondent is found to have violated
any of his bail conditions or attempted to tamper with the
evidence, influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any
other way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel
his bail forthwith. The appeal is accordingly dismissed
subject to the above-stated directions.”
94. In Athar Parwez v. Union of India [2024 SCC
OnLine SC 3762] , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was
dealing with a case in which Athar Parwez and the co-accused
Jalaluddin Khan @ Md. Jalaluddin were arrested on 12.07.2022,
and a crime was registered at the Police Station Phulwari Sharif,
Patna. The investigation was later taken up by NIA and the case
was re-registered. After investigation, a chargesheet against the
appellant was filed alleging offences under Sections 121, 121A,
122, 153A and 153B of IPC and Sections 13, 17, 18, 18A, 18B and
20 of the UA (P) Act. The allegation against the appellant was that

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he was an active member of PFI and that he and his associates
were planning to cause disturbance during the proposed visit of
the Prime Minister to Patna. This led to the raid being conducted
on 11.07.2022 at the first floor of Ahmad Palace, Phulwari Sharif,
Patna, which was taken on rent by the appellant from the co-
accused Md. Jalaluddin. During the raid, certain recoveries were
made. Prominent amongst them was a document titled ‘India 2047
towards rule of Islam in India’, an internal document not for
circulation. Assertions were made in the complaint, based on
seized documents, that the appellant, along with other members
of PFI, aimed to disrupt the sovereignty of India and cause
disaffection against the country. The application for bail having
been dismissed, he approached the Apex Court seeking bail.
95. In Athar Parwez [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762] , one
of the contentions raised before the Apex Court was prolonged
incarceration without trial. He had undergone incarceration for 2
Years and 4 months at the time of consideration of the Appeal by
the Apex Court. The Two-Judge Bench noted that long
incarceration and the unlikely likelihood of the trial being

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completed in the near future have also been taken as a ground for
exercising its constitutional role by the constitutional courts to
grant bail on violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India,
which guarantees that the trial shall be concluded within a
reasonable time. Gross delay in conclusion of the trial would justify
such invocation, leading to a conclusion of violation of Part III of
the Constitution of India, which may be taken as a ground to
release an undertrial on bail. A reference in this regard was also
made to the decision of the Three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713].
96. In Athar Parwez [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762] , the
Two-Judge Bench observed that, keeping the statutory provisions
of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act in mind, but with the passage
of time, the effect of that statutory provision would in fact have to
be diluted, giving way to the mandate of Part III of the
Constitution where the accused as of now is not a convict and is
facing the charges. The constitutional right of speedy trial in such
circumstances will have precedence over the bar/strict provisions
of the statute and cannot be made the sole reason for denial of

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bail. The period of incarceration of an accused could also be a
relevant consideration for constitutional courts and should not be
governed solely by statutory provisions. A reference in this regard
was also made to the decisions in Thwaha Fasal v. Union of
India [(2022) 14 SCC 766] and Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [(2024) 9 SCC 813] . The
Court gave precedence to the protection of fundamental rights and
emphasised its primacy over the statutory provisions in case of
delayed trial. The Court even asserted that the seriousness of the
crime for which the accused is on trial would not be material, as
an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
97. In Athar Parwez [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762] , with
the aforesaid basic principles in mind, the Two-Judge Bench
proceeded to consider the position with regard to the appeal at
hand. The Two-Judge Bench noted that the primary allegation
against the appellant was that he is an active member of PFI,
which according to the prosecution is an organisation committed
to bringing about Islamic rule in India. For the said purpose,
disharmony and internal conflicts are sought to be brought about

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within the society so that there is discontentment and the peace
and calm within the society gets disturbed. The allegation against
the appellant was regarding the collection of zakat from people to
help PFI or the recruitment of members to PFI. On the day the
appellant carried out such activities, PFI was not a banned
organisation. None of the witnesses or the protected witnesses
stated that the money so collected as zakat was ever
misappropriated by the appellant or used in any manner for illegal
activities. The statements of the protected witnesses have not
mentioned anything specific that could be attributed to the
appellant, and that could, prima facie, attract charges under the
UA (P) Act. Therefore, it is apparent that the first test as has been
laid down by the various judgments on the point stands satisfied
relating to Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act. Moreover, the
material which has been allegedly recovered from the appellant,
especially the documents, which, according to the prosecution,
contained incriminating contents as per the seizure memo, was
from the second floor. As is apparent from the rent deed, on which
the prosecution itself has placed reliance, only the first floor of

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Ahmad Palace was rented out to the appellant, and he was in
exclusive possession thereof. This also raises doubts regarding the
recovery of the material.
98. In Athar Parwez [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3762] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that the appellant was arrested on
12.07.2022. He had undergone custody for more than two years
and four months. The charge-sheet was filed on 07.01.2023, but
till date charges have not been framed, which is an admitted
position. The prosecution has cited 40 accused and 354 witnesses
for examination. There can be no doubt that the trial is not likely
to be completed soon. The appellant cannot be allowed to languish
in jail indefinitely and that too without a trial. If such an approach
is allowed, Article 21 of the Constitution of India would stand
violated. The Two-Judge Bench held that the ratio as laid down in
K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] as also the ratio in Thwaha
Fasal [(2022) 14 SCC 766] and Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh [(2024)
9 SCC 813] would be applicable to the case at hand and would
squarely apply, entitling the appellant to the grant of bail.
99. In Union of India v. Barakathullah [2024 SCC

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OnLine SC 1019] , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was
considering a case in which the respondents-accused were charge-
sheeted for the offences under Sections 120B, 121A, 12, 153A,
505(1)(b) and (c), 505(2) of IPC and Sections 13, 18, 18A, 18B
th
of the UA (P) Act, except the 6 accused - S. Khaja Maideen, who
has been additionally implicated under Section 38 and 39 of the
UA (P) Act. Out of the offences under the UA (P) Act, the offences
under Sections 18, 18A and 18B would fall under Chapter-IV,
whereas the offences under Section 38 and 39 would fall under
Chapter-VI of the said Act. During the course of investigation, the
respondents-accused were arrested on 22.09.2022 for the alleged
offences. They filed bail applications before the Special Court
under the NIA Act (Sessions Court for Exclusive Trial of Bomb Blast
Cases). The Special Court, after considering the case diary, the
documents and material produced before it, and after having been
satisfied about the prima facie case made out against the
respondents-accused, as also considering the provisions of
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act, in the light of the position of
law settled by various decisions, dismissed the said bail

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applications. Being aggrieved by the said orders, the respondents
filed Crl.A.Nos.98, 114 and 116 of 2023 before the High Court of
Judicature at Madras. Some of the respondents-accused had also
filed Crl.M.P.Nos.11595 and 8094 of 2023 seeking interim bail
pending the said appeals. During the pendency of the said
appeals, the chargesheet came to be filed by NIA against all the
respondents along with others, on 17.03.2023 for the offences
under Sections 120B, 121A, 122, 153A, 505(1)(b) and (c), 505(2)
of IPC and Sections 13, 18, 18A, 18B of the UA (P) Act. The High
Court, after taking into consideration the submissions made by the
learned Counsel for the parties and materials placed on record,
including the chargesheet, allowed the said appeals by a common
judgment dated 19.10.2023, releasing the respondents on bail,
subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Aggrieved by the said
judgment, the Union of India, through NIA, Chennai Branch, filed
the appeals.
100. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that, from the statements of witnesses
and the incriminating documents collected during the course of

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investigation, as referred to in the charge-sheet, PW-A, PW-C, PW-
D, PW-E, and the witnesses Syed Abutaheer and Mohammed Satik
have stated about the activities of PFI like radicalising youth for
recruitment, arms training (knife, sword and use of petrol
bombs/inflammable substances) and preparatory acts for the
commission of terrorist activities. Similarly, PW-F has stated about
PFI's ideal of an Islamic State and about providing support to ISIS.
PW-A, PW-B, PW-C, PW-D, PW-H and PW-I have stated about the
conspiracy hatched by the members of the PFI and particularly the
role of A-8 Yasar Arafat for creating an Islamic State by the year
2047 through an armed struggle against the Government of India.
In paragraph 15 of the decision [SCC OnLine], the Two-Judge
Bench tabulated the role of each of the respondents-accused, from
the relevant extracts of the statements of the protected witnesses
and of the listed witnesses.
101. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that, as transpiring from the material on
record, PFI was registered under the Societies Registration Act,
having an organisational set up as contained in its constitution. All

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the respondents-accused were members or office bearers of PFI
at the relevant time. As alleged in the chargesheet, though PFI
was projecting itself as an organisation fighting for the rights of
minorities, dalits and marginalised communities, it was pursuing
a covert agenda to radicalise a particular section of society and to
work towards undermining the concept of democracy and integrity
of India. The investigation disclosed that the activities and
undeclared objectives of PFI had a strong communal and anti-
national agenda to establish an Islamic rule in India by
radicalisation of Muslims and communalization of issues. After
recruitment as members of PFI, they were motivated towards
violent terrorist activities by providing training through a
beginners' course and advanced training courses. During the
training courses, physical education classes were conducted in
which members were taught to attack, assault, maim and murder
with bare hands. The training also covered how to use weapons
such as knives and swords, and how to hurl bombs. Within a few
days of the arrest of respondents, on 22.09.2022, PFI was
declared as an ‘unlawful association’ and banned by the

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Government of India under the UA (P) Act. The Two-Judge Bench
noted that there are sufficient materials in the form of statements
of witnesses and other incriminating evidence in the form of digital
devices, books, photographs, etc., collected during the course of
investigation and relied upon by the appellant, as recorded in the
charge sheet, to form an opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusations against the
respondents-accused are prima facie true.
102. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that, as stated in Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1], the material/evidence collated by the
Investigating Agency in reference to the accusation against each
of the accused concerned in the chargesheet would prevail until
rebutted, contradicted and overcome or disproved by other
evidence. The material collated and statements of witnesses
recorded also show prima facie complicity of the respondents-
accused in the commission of the alleged offences, which material/
evidence is good and sufficient on its face to establish the facts
constituting the alleged offences, till such material/evidence is

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rebutted or contradicted. The court, at the stage of considering
the bail applications of the respondents-accused, is merely
required to record a finding, on broad probabilities, regarding the
involvement of the accused in the commission of the alleged
offences.
103. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench opined that the High Court has committed gross
error in not considering the material/evidence in its right and
proper perspective and in recording a perverse finding to the effect
that there was no material to suggest the commission of any
offence, which falls under Section 15 of the UA (P) Act, and that
the prosecution had not produced any material about the
involvement of any of the respondents-accused in any terrorist act
or as a member of a terrorist gang or organisation or training
terrorism. Such perverse findings of the High Court deserve to be
strongly deprecated, more particularly when the appellant has not
alleged the offence under Section 15 of the UA (P) Act either in
the FIR or in the chargesheet against the respondents-accused.
The alleged offences are under Sections 18, 18A, 18B, etc. of the

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UA (P) Act. For the purpose of considering the offence under
Section 18, the commission of a terrorist act, as contemplated in
Section 15 of the UA (P) Act, is not required to be made out. What
Section 18 contemplates is that whoever conspires or attempts to
commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or
knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act
preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act would be
punishable under the said provision. Hence, if there is any material
or evidence to show that the accused had conspired or attempted
to commit a terrorist act, or committed any act preparatory to the
commission of a terrorist act, such material evidence would be
sufficient to invoke Section 18. For attracting Section 18, the
involvement of the accused in the actual commission of a terrorist
act as defined in Section 15 need not be shown. The Two-Judge
Bench opined that the High Court, having miserably failed to
comprehend the correct import of Section 18, read with the
definition of terrorist act as contemplated in Section 15 of the UA
(P) Act, has fallen into a patent and manifest error.
104. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] ,

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before the Two-Judge Bench, it was submitted by the learned
counsel for the respondent-accused that the material/evidence
collected by the Investigating Agency and statements of witnesses
relied upon by the prosecuting agency are not reliable. The Two-
Judge Bench found that the said submission cannot be accepted.
As held in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1], the
question of discarding the material or document at the stage of
considering the bail application of an accused, on the ground of
being not reliable or inadmissible in evidence, is not permissible.
The court must look at the contents of the documents and take
such documents into account as they are and satisfy itself on the
basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the
accused in the commission of the alleged offences for recording
whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused. No
doubt, in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], relied on by the learned
counsels for the respondents-accused, it has been observed that
a Constitutional court is not strictly bound by the prohibitory
provisions of grant of bail in the UA (P) Act, and can exercise its
constitutional jurisdiction to release the accused on bail who has

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been incarcerated for a long period of time relying upon
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Two-Judge Bench
observed that the said observations in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] may not be applicable to the facts of the case at hand. In the
said case, the Three-Judge Bench did not interfere with the order
passed by the High Court granting bail to the accused, on the
ground that the said accused had already spent 5 years and 5
months in custody and the trial was likely to take a long time. So
far as the respondents-accused in the appeals at hand are
concerned, they have been in custody hardly for one and a half
years, apart from the fact that all the respondents-accused are
shown to have been involved in previous cases. There are about 8
to 9 previous cases shown in the charge sheet against the
respondents-accused, except accused Nos.1, 4 and 6, who are
shown to have been involved in 2 cases. Considering the nature
and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their criminal
antecedents, the Two-Judge Bench opined that the High Court
should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly when there
was sufficient material to show their prima facie involvement in

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the alleged offences under the UA (P) Act.
105. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that the decision in Vernon v. State of
Maharashtra [2023 SCC OnLine SC 885] , relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondents-accused also would be of
hardly any help in as much in the said case the Court, after
considering allegations made against the accused, and long
incarceration of five years, did not think it proper to continue
further detention of the appellants-accused in that case.
In Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra [(2024) 6 SCC
571] , the Court had deemed it proper to release the accused
involved in the offences under the UA (P) Act on bail, having
considered the facts of the case and observing that Section 43-
D(5) of the UA (P) Act was not applicable.
106. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , on
the facts of the case at hand, the Two-Judge Bench recorded its
satisfaction from the charge sheet as also the other materials/
documents relied upon by the appellant that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accusations against the

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respondents-accused are prima facie true and that the mandate
contained in the proviso to Section 43(D)(5) of the UA (P) Act
would be applicable for not releasing the respondents on bail.
Having regard to the seriousness and gravity of the alleged
offences, previous criminal history of the respondents-accused, as
mentioned in the charge sheet, the period of custody undergone
by the accused being hardly one and a half years, the severity of
punishment prescribed for the alleged offences and prima
facie material collected during the course of investigation, the
Two-Judge Bench concluded that the impugned judgment of the
High Court cannot be sustained.
107. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench observed that it is conscious of the legal position
that the Court should be slow in interfering with the order when
bail has been granted by the High Court. However, it is equally
well settled that if such an order of granting bail is found to be
illegal and perverse, it must be set aside. The Court has often
interpreted the counter terrorism enactments to strike a balance
between the civil liberties of the accused, human rights of the

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victims and compelling interest of the State. It cannot be denied
that national security is always of paramount importance and any
act in aid of any terrorist act, violent or non-violent, is liable to be
restricted. The UA (P) Act is one such Act that has been enacted
to provide for effective prevention of certain unlawful activities by
individuals and associations, to deal with terrorist activities, and
to impose reasonable restrictions on the civil liberties of persons
in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India. In that
view of the matter, the Two-Judge Bench set aside the judgment
of the High Court. The respondents-accused were directed
forthwith to surrender themselves before the appellant-NIA. Since
the charge sheet has already been submitted, the Special Court
was directed to proceed with the trial, as expeditiously as possible,
in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the
observations contained in the judgment of the Apex Court.
108. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation
Agency [2026 SCC OnLine SC 881] , a Two-Judge Bench of the
Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the appellant was
arrested in a crime registered under Sections 17, 38 and 40 of the

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UA (P) Act, read with Sections 8, 21, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act.
He was arrested on 11.06.2020 and had been in custody for more
than 5 years and 11 months. The Two-Judge Bench noted that,
regarding the stringent conditions to be met under Section 43D(5)
of the UA (P) Act before an accused can be granted bail, a Three-
Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] held as follows at
paragraph 17;
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act per se
does not oust the ability of the constitutional courts to
grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of
the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a
statute as well as the powers exercisable under
constitutional jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas
at the commencement of proceedings, the courts are
expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail, but the rigours of such provisions will melt down
where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within
a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard
against the possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of
the UA (P) Act being used as the sole metric for the denial
of bail or for wholesale breach of the constitutional right to
speedy trial.” (underline supplied)

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It is crystal clear that the above was not an equitable exception
laid down only with reference to the facts of that case, but was an
authoritative declaration of a constitutional limitation on the
operation of the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) itself. While
noting that the charges levelled against the respondent were
grave and a serious threat to societal harmony, the Three-Judge
Bench observed that, had it been a case at the threshold, perhaps
the Court would have rejected the prayer for bail. However,
keeping in mind the length of the period spent in custody and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the bail
granted by the High Court was not interfered with. In paragraph
18 of the decision, the Three-Judge Bench held as follows;
“18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the
fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are
grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been
a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned
down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind
the length of the period spent by him in custody and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the
High Court appears to have been left with no other option
except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a
balance between the appellant's right to lead evidence of
its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt, and

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simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under
Part III of our Constitution have been well protected.”
(underline supplied)
109. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra [(2024) 9 SCC 813] , the
Apex Court was examining the legality and validity of an order
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay by which the
High Court declined to release the appellant on bail in connection
with his prosecution under the provisions of the UA (P) Act. While
reiterating the principle declared by the Court in one judgment
after the other that the right to speedy trial of an offender facing
criminal charges is implicit in the broad sweep and content of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the Two-Judge Bench noted
that the provisions of Section 19 of the National Investigation
Agency Act mandate that trial under the said Act by a Special
Court shall be held on a day to day basis on all working days and
should have precedence over the trial of any other case. In this
regard, Special Courts are to be designated for such offences by
the Central Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of

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the High Court as contemplated under Section 11 of the said Act.
110. In Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh [(2024) 9 SCC 813] ,
the Two-Judge Bench referred to the decision in Satender Kumar
Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation [(2022) 10 SCC
51] , wherein it was held that the general principle engrafted in
Section 436A of Cr.P.C. (now Section 479 BNSS) which requires
inter alia the accused to be enlarged on bail if the trial is not
concluded within the specified period would apply to the special
enactments as well, for example, the rigour as provided under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in the way in such a
case as liberty of a person is concerned. The Two-Judge Bench
emphasised that the more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication
ought to be. Observing that the appellant in that case was still an
accused and not a convict, the Bench held that the overarching
postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed
to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly,
howsoever stringent a penal law may be. In paragraph 17 of the
decision, the Two-Judge Bench held as follows;
“17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect

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the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
of the nature of the crime.” (underline supplied)
111. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in the case of Sheikh
Javed Iqbal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2024) 8 SCC 293] ,
the Court considered the order of the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, Lucknow Bench rejecting the bail application of the
appellant, who was facing trial under various provisions of IPC as
well as the provisions of the UA (P) Act. The Bench noted that the
appellant had been in custody for more than 9 years. The evidence
of only two witnesses had been recorded at that point of time.
Therefore, the Court was of the opinion that a reasonable view
could be taken that the trial was likely to take considerable time.
As regards the right of an accused to speedy trial, the Two-Judge
Bench underscored that such a need is an essential facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If the alleged offence is
serious, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure

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that the trial is concluded expeditiously. Bail cannot be denied only
on the ground that the charges are very serious, though there is
no end in sight for the trial to conclude. In paragraph 24 of the
decision, the Two-Judge Bench held as follows;
“24. It is trite law that an accused is entitled to a speedy
trial. This Court, in a catena of judgments, has held that
an accused or an undertrial has a fundamental right to a
speedy trial, which is traceable to Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. If the alleged offence is a serious
one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to
ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a
trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to
oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that
the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only
on the ground that the charges are very serious though
there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude.”
(underline supplied)
112. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Sheikh Javed Iqbal
[(2024) 8 SCC 293], while agreeing with the reasoning given in
K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] qua the decision in Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1], it was observed that Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has to be read and

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understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a
precedent to deny bail to an accused undertrial suffering long
incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial. As to the
restrictions imposed on granting bail to an accused under the
stringent provisions of the UA (P) Act, it was declared that such
statutory restrictions would not come in the way of a constitutional
court from granting bail to an accused if it finds that the right of
the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been
infringed. In Sheikh Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC 293], the Bench
reiterated that the decision in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713]
was rendered by a Three-Judge Bench and, therefore, would be
binding on a Bench of Two Judges. In the facts and circumstances
of the case at hand, the Two-Judge Bench held that continued
incarceration of the appellant would not be justified and therefore
granted bail to the appellant.
113. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Arvind Dham v.
Directorate of Enforcement [2026 SCC OnLine SC 30] , the
appellant was granted bail, albeit in a case of economic offence

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under the PML Act. Section 45 of the PML Act lays down stringent
and restrictive conditions for the grant of bail. In that case, the
appellant was arrested on 09.07.2024. The cognisance of the
prosecution's complaint was yet to be taken. A total of 208
prosecution witnesses were cited. It was in that context the Court
reiterated the declaration of law made in Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh [(2024) 9 SCC 813] that if the State or any prosecuting
agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to
provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a
speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution,
then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of
the crime. This Court emphasised that the right to speedy trial is
not eclipsed by the nature of the offence. Prolonged incarceration
of an under-trial, without commencement or reasonable progress
of trial, cannot be countenanced, as it has the effect of converting
pre-trial detention into punishment. In the facts of the case at
hand, the Two-Judge Bench directed the release of the appellant

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on bail during pendency of the trial.
114. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Chintan Rajubhai
Panseriya v. State of Maharashtra [2026 SCC OnLine SC
924] , where the petitioner-accused was arrested under Sections
8(b), 22(c), 25, 27A and 29 of the NDPS Act, it was noted that
though the charge against the accused involves seizure of
Mephedrone to the extent of 2428 kilograms, the accused had
suffered custody of more than 3½ years. Though the charge sheet
was submitted, the charges were yet to be framed. As many as
159 witnesses were cited. While granting bail to the petitioner-
accused, in paragraph 5 of the order, the Two-Judge Bench
observed as follows;
“5. We do not undermine the seriousness of the alleged
crime. We are mindful of the fact that the prosecution is for
the offence punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. At the same time, we
should not overlook the fact that the petitioner is in judicial
custody as an under-trial prisoner for the past 3 years and
6 months and the prosecution intends to examine as many
as 159 witnesses. Examination of 159 witnesses, or even
50% of them, is going to take a pretty long time. At times,

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we wonder why the prosecution wants to examine so many
witnesses, thereby prolonging the trial and delaying the
same. We have observed in a number of orders that the
prosecution should examine important witnesses and try to
establish its case. There is no point in multiplying the
witnesses on one and the same issue.”
115. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Gurwinder Singh v.
State of Punjab [(2024) 5 SCC 403] and Gulfisha Fatima v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [2026 SCC OnLine SC 10] , the
Two-Judge Bench has taken a somewhat divergent view from the
clear distinctive trajectory taken by the Court qua grant of bail
even under the special enactments like TADA Act, the UA (P) Act
and the NDPS Act.
116. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Gurwinder Singh
[(2024) 5 SCC 403], the appellant was charged under various
provisions of IPC as well as under the UA (P) Act and the Arms
Act. The appellant’s prayer for bail was rejected by the Special
Court, and the High Court of Punjab and Haryana upheld the
rejection. The matter was taken up before the Apex Court. The

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appellant was in jail for about 5 years and relied upon K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] for bail. A Two-Judge Bench, while rejecting
the prayer for bail, distinguished K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713],
at paragraph 45, in the following manner;
“45. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], this Court was
confronted with a circumstance wherein except the
respondent-accused, other co-accused had already
undergone trial and were sentenced to imprisonment of not
exceeding eight years therefore this Court's decision to
consider bail was grounded in the anticipation of the
impending sentence that the respondent-accused might
face upon conviction and since the respondent-accused had
already served portion of the maximum imprisonment, i.e.,
more than five years, this Court took it as a factor
influencing its assessment to grant bail. Further, in K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], the trial of the respondent-
accused was severed from the other co-accused owing to
his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was
being separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a
long list of witnesses that were left to be examined with
reference to the said accused therefore this Court was of
the view of unlikelihood of completion of trial in near future.
However, in the present case the trial is already underway,
and 22 witnesses, including the protected witnesses, have
been examined.”
In Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403], the Two-Judge Bench

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held that, Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act creates a standalone
and rigorous limitation upon the ordinary power of courts to grant
bail and observed that, unlike the conventional approach under
criminal law where ‘bail is the rule and jail the exception,’ the
legislative intent underlying the UA (P) Act was the reverse,
namely that ‘bail must be rejected as a rule’, and that the courts
must give full effect thereto. The judgment formulated instead
what it described as a ‘twin-prong test’ of bail under the UA (P)
Act. Interpreting K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], the Court
observed that the decision could not be read as mandating bail
solely on account of prolonged incarceration.
117. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench viewed that the decision in Gurwinder
Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403], inasmuch as it refuses to be bound by
K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], is difficult to be followed as a
matter of precedent. It is plain that a judgment rendered by a
Bench of lesser strength is bound by the law declared by a Bench
of greater strength. Judicial discipline mandates that such binding
precedent must either be followed or, in case of doubt, be referred

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to a larger Bench. A smaller Bench cannot dilute, circumvent, or
disregard the ratio of a larger Bench. The reliance placed
by Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] on Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] is difficult to justify in light of the
subsequent treatment of Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5
SCC 1] by the Court, firstly, by a Bench of a higher strength in
K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], and secondly, by a coordinate
bench in Sheikh Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC 293]. In K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713], the Three-Judge Bench clarified that Zahoor
Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] arose in a very specific
factual context where the High Court had effectively conducted a
mini-trial by reappreciating evidence and determining
admissibility issues at the stage of bail and, therefore, this Court
had to step in to cancel the bail granted by the High Court to the
accused therein. The larger Bench in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713], therefore, confined Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5
SCC 1] to the impropriety of undertaking extensive evidentiary
evaluation at the bail stage by the High Court. Importantly, K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] did not treat Zahoor Ahmad Shah

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Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] as establishing a general rule of near-
automatic denial of bail under the UA (P) Act. This view was
followed even more explicitly in Sheikh Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC
293], where the Two-Judge Bench observed that the decision in
Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] has to be read and
understood in the context in which it was rendered and not as a
precedent to deny bail to an accused-undertrial suffering long
incarceration with no end in sight of the criminal trial. The position
of law emerging from K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] and Sheikh
Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC 293] is therefore clear: Zahoor Ahmad
Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] cannot be invoked to justify
indefinite incarceration of the accused under the UA (P) Act. For
the aforesaid reasons, the Two-Judge Bench in Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC 881] found that the attempt in
Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] to read Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] as laying down a general rule of denial of
bail, notwithstanding the period of incarceration, is difficult to
reconcile with the Court’s own subsequent clarification of what the
ratio in Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] actually

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meant.
118. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that the Two-Judge Bench in
Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] formulated the so-called
‘twin-prong test’ governing grant of bail under the UA (P) Act. It
held that the inquiry under Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act must
proceed in two sequential stages: first, whether the accusation
is prima facie true; and second, only if the first question is
answered in favour of the accused, whether ordinary bail
considerations, such as flight risk, tampering with evidence, or
influencing witnesses, justify release. If the first stage of this twin-
prong test is satisfied against the accused, bail becomes
absolutely impermissible. This test flows neither from the text of
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act nor from K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3
SCC 713]. In fact, on the contrary, it is in teeth of K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] which categorically stated that Section 43-
D(5) of the UA (P) Act provides no more than another possible
ground, namely, that the accusations against the accused
are prima facie true, for the competent court to refuse bail, in

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addition to the well-settled considerations like possibility of
tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses, or the
accused evading the trial by absconding, etc. If this twin-prong
test is accepted, the State need only satisfy a low prima
facie threshold while the trial may continue for years, with the
result that pre-trial incarceration begins to acquire a post-trial
punitive character, and even then, no court could ever grant bail
no matter the length of the period of such incarceration because
the case stood prima facie made out against the accused. A plain
reading of K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] will show that it was
trying to prevent precisely this possibility from arising when it
cautioned that Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act must not become
‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial’. Therefore, the caution of K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] is that continued incarceration cannot
go unabated by a mere discharge by the State of the prima
facie standard under Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act. The
judgment explicitly held that Section 43-D(5) will ‘melt down’
where prolonged incarceration and delayed trial produce a

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violation of Article 21. The constitutional inquiry in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] therefore operated independent of, and
notwithstanding, the statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) in the
realm of constitutional principles. That being the case, the
formulation of Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] becomes
difficult to follow. Once the three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] recognised that constitutional courts retain
the authority to intervene despite the existence of a prima
facie case against the accused where prolonged incarceration and
delayed trial would breach Article 21, the statutory embargo of
Section 43-D(5) could no longer be treated as the gateway
through which the prayer of bail must first pass.
119. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench observed that, as a matter of law,
nothing further need be said except that in any case, constitutional
courts can always intervene to grant bail despite satisfaction
of prima facie threshold under Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act,
and the said Section need not control the grant of bail if the
accused person's liberty is infringed for a prolonged period of time.

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The power of the constitutional court to grant such a prayer cannot
be diminished by exercise of legislative power. The holding in K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] was never that mere passage of time
automatically entitles the accused to bail. Instead, the larger
Bench recognised that where incarceration becomes unduly
prolonged, and the trial is unlikely to conclude within a reasonable
time, the continued application of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P)
Act becomes constitutionally suspect given the mandate of Article
21. In that sense, K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] articulated a
constitutional limitation on the operation of the statutory embargo
of Section 43-D(5).
120. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that, in Gulfisha Fatima [2026
SCC OnLine SC 10], the appellants in a batch of appeals, who had
been charged for committing various offences, including the
offences under Sections 13, 16, 17 and 18 of the UA (P) Act, were
arrested on various dates in the year 2020, and have been in
custody since the respective dates of their arrest. By a common
judgment, the High Court of Delhi affirmed the Special Court’s

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order rejecting their bail applications. Before a Two-Judge Bench,
it was argued on behalf of the appellants that prolonged
incarceration, coupled with the absence of any realistic prospect
of early conclusion of trial, rendered their continued detention
constitutionally impermissible. In that context, the Two-Judge
Bench posed the question: when can delay and prolonged
incarceration be invoked as grounds for bail in prosecutions under
the UA (P) Act, and what should be the principled approach of a
constitutional court to examine such a plea? The Two-Judge Bench
referred to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the right to
speedy trial of an accused, but observed that the constitutional
promise under Article 21 is not that liberty will be unregulated,
but that deprivation of liberty will not be arbitrary, unconscionable
or unfair. Thereafter, the Two-Judge Bench referred to K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] and observed that this decision operates as a
protection against unconscionable detention. However, the Bench
put in a caveat that the decision in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] does not indicate a laying down of a mechanical rule under
which the mere passage of time becomes determinative in every

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case arising under a special statute. Such a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory regime enacted by the
Parliament to address offences of a special category cannot be
supported. It has been observed that the constitutional inquiry
into delay is contextual, which includes the nature of the
allegation, the statutory field, the stage of the proceedings,
realistic trajectory of the trial, causes contributing to delay and
the risk attendant upon release; delay cannot be detached from
these considerations and treated as a solitary determinant.
121. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , it was noted that, in Gulfisha Fatima [2026 SCC OnLine SC
10], on the facts of the case at hand, the Two-Judge Bench held
that while the constitutional concern arising from prolonged
custody is acknowledged, it does not translate into a finding that
continued detention has become punitive or unconscionable solely
by reason of delay. The prolonged custody, though a matter of
concern, does not operate as an automatic ground for grant of bail
where the statutory threshold continues to be attracted. At such a
stage, the court is required to examine whether, notwithstanding

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delay, continued detention remains constitutionally justified,
having regard to the statutory context and the facts of the case.
Such considerations would include the gravity of the alleged
offence in its statutory setting, the role attributed to the accused,
the prima facie strength of the accusation, the integrity of the trial
process, the risks associated with release, etc. The Two-Judge
Bench, thereafter, held that K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] must
be understood as a principled safeguard against unconscionable
detention. Prolonged incarceration is a serious constitutional
concern and carries great weight. However, it is not the sole
determinant. The court must consider in totality whether
continued detention has become constitutionally unjustifiable,
having regard to the role attributed, the statutory context, the
limited prima facie material, the trajectory of the trial, the causes
of delay and the availability of intermediate remedies. The Bench
further held that to read K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] as
mandating bail solely on account of prolonged incarceration,
irrespective of the statutory context or the nature of the
allegations, would be to attribute to the decision a consequence it

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neither intended nor supports. Therefore, K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3
SCC 713] cannot be used as a mathematical formula of universal
application. In the facts and circumstances of the case at hand,
the Two-Judge Bench granted bail to five of the seven appellants,
but denied the same to two of the appellants, taking the view that
while the period of incarceration undergone by the two appellants
is substantial, on the present record, their continued detention has
not crossed the threshold of constitutional impermissibility so as
to override the statutory embargo of Section 43D(5) of the UA (P)
Act. Underlying that the Court is mindful that pre-trial detention,
even when justified by the statute, cannot be permitted to
continue without regard to the progress of the trial, the Two-Judge
Bench opined that on a completion of the examination of the
protected witnesses relied upon by the prosecution or upon expiry
of the period of one year from the date of the said order, whichever
is earlier, the two appellants would be at liberty to renew their
prayer for bail before the jurisdictional court.
122. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench expressed its reservations on various

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aspects of the earlier coordinate bench decision in Gulfisha Fatima
[2026 SCC OnLine SC 10], including foreclosing the right of the
two appellants to seek bail for a period of one year, and that the
import of the observations in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] is
only a narrow and exceptional departure from Section 43-D(5) of
the UA (P) Act, justified in extreme factual situations.
123. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that no reading of K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] suggests that the mere passage of time,
divorced from all surrounding circumstances, mechanically entitles
an accused to release. The real concern addressed in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] lies elsewhere. The Three-Judge Bench was
concerned with the manner in which Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P)
Act was, in practice, being deployed as an almost conclusive basis
for denial of bail, notwithstanding extraordinary delay in trial and
prolonged incarceration. It is precisely for that reason that the
Three-Judge Bench observed that the ‘rigours’ of Section 43-D(5)
would ‘melt down’ where there is no likelihood of the trial being
completed within a reasonable time and where the period of

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incarceration undergone has already exceeded a substantial part
of the prescribed sentence. The Three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] cautioned that such an approach was
necessary to prevent provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P)
Act from being used as ‘the sole metric for denial of bail or for
wholesale breach of the constitutional right to speedy trial’. The
Three-Judge Bench was clear and unequivocal in holding that once
it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the
accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period, the
courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge the accused on bail.
124. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench extracted at paragraph 21.3 [SCC
OnLine], paragraph 17 of the judgment of the Three-Judge Bench
in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], where it has been clearly
stated that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-
D(5) of the UA (P) Act per se does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution. Whereas, at the commencement of the
proceedings, the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative

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policy against grant of bail, but the rigours of such provisions will
‘melt down’ where there is no likelihood of the trial being
completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration
already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. In the facts of the case at hand, the Three-
Judge Bench observed that it was conscious that the charges
levelled against the accused were grave and posed a serious threat
to societal harmony, and had it been the case at the threshold, the
Court would perhaps have outrightly rejected such a prayer.
However, keeping in mind the duration of incarceration and the
unlikelihood of the trial being completed in the near future, the
accused had to be enlarged on bail.
125. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that the reasoning first in
Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] and then in Gulfisha Fatima
[2026 SCC OnLine SC 10], appears to proceed against something
invented and then destroyed. K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] was
not warning courts against treating incarceration as the sole factor
favouring bail. Instead, it warned against treating the statutory

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embargo as the sole factor justifying continued detention by
ignoring constitutional principles. Therefore, the subsequent
reading that K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] does not create an
automatic entitlement to bail on account of delay answers a
proposition that K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] itself never
advanced. The emphasis in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] was
constitutional in nature: it was directed towards preventing
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act from overpowering Article 21
considerations in cases of gross delay and prolonged incarceration.
The constitutional force of K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] lies in
its restoration of the hierarchy between a statute, i.e., the UA (P)
Act, and the Constitution. Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act
remains subordinate to Article 21 of the Constitution at all times,
and a constitutional court need not hold back bail to the accused
in the garb of Section 43-D(5). As held in Sheikh Javed Iqbal
[(2024) 8 SCC 293], once it is obvious that a timely trial would
not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a
significant period, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge them on bail.

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126. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that the decision of the
coordinate bench in Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India
[(2024) 10 SCC 574] is a timely warning to the courts. It says
that when a case is made out for the grant of bail, the courts
should have no hesitation in granting bail. The allegation of the
prosecution may be very serious; but the duty of the courts is to
consider a case for grant of bail in accordance with law. ‘Bail is the
rule and jail is the exception’ is a settled law. The Bench cautioned
that if the courts start denying bail in deserving cases, it will
violate the rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.
127. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench observed that the often invoked
phrase ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’ is not merely an
empty statutory slogan flowing from Cr.P.C. as Gurwinder Singh
[(2024) 5 SCC 403] has stated. It is a constitutional principle
flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India and
the presumption of innocence, which is the cornerstone of any

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civilised society governed by the rule of law. Statutes may
undoubtedly calibrate the manner in which that principle is
applied, particularly in cases involving national security or terrorist
offences for which the UA (P) Act is meant, but those cannot
altogether invert the constitutional relationship between liberty
and detention. The statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) of the
UA (P) Act must remain a circumscribed restriction that operates
subject to the guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution.
Therefore, the Two-Judge Bench concluded that even under the
UA (P) Act, ‘bail is the rule and jail is the exception’; of course, in
an appropriate case, bail can be denied having regard to the facts
of that particular case.
128. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that several subsequent
decisions rendered after Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403]
have continued to apply the approach articulated in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] in granting bail under the UA (P) Act on
grounds of prolonged incarceration, gross delay in conclusion of
trial, and the absence of any realistic possibility of the trial

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concluding in the near future. The logic underlying all these
judgments traces back to K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713], which
now governs the law of the land on the grant of bail under the UA
(P) Act in a situation of prolonged detention. While Gulfisha Fatima
[2026 SCC OnLine SC 10] relied on Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5
SCC 403] to adopt a narrower reading of K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3
SCC 713], neither Gulfisha Fatima [2026 SCC OnLine SC 10] nor
Gurwinder Singh [(2024) 5 SCC 403] engage with this subsequent
line of authority of case law. Thus, it is clear beyond doubt that
the preference for bail, or the often invoked principle ‘bail is the
rule and jail is the exception’ flows from the constitutional primacy
of personal liberty under Article 21 and, therefore, cannot be
displaced by legislation. The Two-Judge Bench made it clear that
K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] is binding law entitled to the
protection of stare decisis . It cannot be diluted, circumvented, or
disregarded by the trial courts, the High Courts or even by the
benches of lower strength of the Apex Court. The Two-Judge Bench
noted that, as per the data compiled by the National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB), the countrywide conviction rate under

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the UA (P) Act for the 5 years from 2019 to 2023 hovers between
2% and 6%.
129. As already noted hereinbefore, Section 15 of the UA (P)
Act deals with a terrorist act, punishable under Section 16,
whereas Section 18 deals with punishment for conspiracy, etc. As
observed by the Two-Judge Bench in Barakathullah [2024 SCC
OnLine SC 1019] , for the purpose of considering the offence
under Section 18 of the UA (P) Act, the commission of a terrorist
act, as contemplated in Section 15, is not required to be made
out. What Section 18 contemplates is that whoever conspires or
attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites,
directly or knowingly facilitates the commission of a terrorist act
or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act would
be punishable under the said provision. Hence, if there is any
material or evidence to show that the accused had conspired or
attempted to commit a terrorist act, or committed any act
preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, such material
evidence would be sufficient to invoke Section 18. For attracting
Section 18, the involvement of the accused in the actual

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commission of a terrorist act as defined in Section 15 need not be
shown.
130. While considering the prayer for bail in relation to the
offences under the UA (P) Act, the satisfaction to be recorded by
the court for the purpose of the said Act is that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is ‘prima facie’ true, which would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in
reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the
first information report must prevail until contradicted and
overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it
shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the
stated offence. The degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the
court in relation to offences under the UA (P) Act, for opining that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation
against the accused is ‘prima facie true’, is lighter than the degree
of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge
application or framing of charges.
131. As held by the Two-Judge Bench in Shaheen Welfare

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Association [(1996) 2 SCC 616] , while adopting a pragmatic
and just approach in the context of bail to the detenue under the
TADA Act, all undertrials cannot be dealt with by the same
yardstick. Different approaches would be justified based on the
gravity of the charges. In the said decision, the Two-Judge Bench
has referred to the observation made by a Constitution Bench in
Kartar Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 569] , while considering the
validity of sub-section (8) of Section 20 of the TADA Act, that while
liberty of a citizen must be zealously safeguarded by the courts,
nonetheless the courts while dispensing justice in cases like the
one under the TADA Act, should keep in mind not only the liberty
of the accused but also the interest of the victims and their near
and dear ones and above all the collective interest of the
community and the safety of the nation so that the public may not
lose faith in the system of judicial administration and indulge in
private retribution.
132. In Shaheen Welfare Association [(1996) 2 SCC
616] , the Two-Judge Bench referred to the decision of a
coordinate bench in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee

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(Representing Undertrial Prisoners) [(1994) 6 SCC 731], in
the context of the provisions under the NDPS Act restricting the
grant of bail, wherein it was observed that, though deprivation of
personal liberty without ensuring speedy trial would not be in
consonance with the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Constitution, some amount of deprivation of personal liberty
cannot be avoided in such cases. But if the period of deprivation
pending trial becomes unduly long, the fairness assured by Article
21 of the Constitution would receive a jolt. Therefore, it was felt
that, after the accused persons have suffered imprisonment which
is half of the maximum punishment provided for the offence, any
further deprivation of personal liberty would be violative of the
fundamental right visualised by Article 21 of the Constitution,
which has to be telescoped with the right guaranteed by Article
14, which also promises justness, fairness and reasonableness in
procedural matters.
133. As already noted in paragraphs 71 and 72
hereinbefore, bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need
to protect society and the nation, stringent provisions governing

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the grant of bail have been prescribed in Section 43-D(5) of the
UA (P) Act. As per the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D,
person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and
VI of the said Act shall not be released on bail or on his own bond
if the court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made
under Section 173 of the Code (now Section 193 of BNSS), is of
the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accusation against such person is prima facie true. The
observation made by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in
Kartar Singh [(1994) 3 SCC 569] that while liberty of a citizen
must be zealously safeguarded by the courts, nonetheless the
courts while dispensing justice in cases under the TADA Act should
keep in mind not only the liberty of the accused but also the
interest of the victims and their near and dear ones and above all
the collective interest of the community and the safety of the
nation, applies with equal force in cases under the UA (P) Act.
Therefore, the courts, while dispensing justice in cases under the
UA (P) Act, should keep in mind not only the liberty of the accused
but also the interests of the victims and their near and dear ones

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and, above all, the collective interests of the community and the
safety of the nation.
134. In view of the law laid down by the Three-Judge Bench
in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act per se does not
oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India. At the
commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against the grant of bail, but the
rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section
43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act being used as the sole metric for denying
bail or for a wholesale breach of the constitutional right to speedy
trial.
135. As already noted in paragraph 86 hereinbefore, in K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , before the Three-Judge Bench, the

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learned Senior Counsel for the respondent highlighted that many
of the co-accused had been acquitted. Although a few co-accused
had been convicted, they had been sentenced to not more than
eight years. The respondent has already suffered incarceration of
almost 5½ years without the trial having even started, which
would violate his constitutional liberty and rights to have him serve
most of his sentence without any adjudication of guilt by a judicial
authority. The learned Senior Counsel further highlighted that
once the High Court had exercised discretion to grant bail, the
same ought not to be interfered with by the Apex Court except in
rare circumstances.
136. The Three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3
SCC 713] emphasised that there is a vivid distinction between the
parameters to be applied while considering a bail application, vis-
à-vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its cancellation.
On the facts of the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noted
that the respondent had been in jail for more than 5 years and
there are 276 witnesses left to be examined. Charges have been
framed only on 27.11.2020. Still further, though two opportunities

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were given, the appellant NIA has shown no inclination to screen
its endless list of witnesses. Of the 13 co-accused, who have been
convicted, none have been sentenced to more than 8 years'
rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, it can be legitimately expected
that, if found guilty, the respondent would also receive a sentence
within the same ballpark. Two-thirds of such incarceration has
already been completed, and the respondent has already paid
heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice. As held by a Two-Judge
Bench in Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Undertrial Prisoners) [(1994) 6 SCC 731], undertrials cannot be
detained indefinitely pending trial. Once it is obvious that a timely
trial would not be possible and the accused has been incarcerated
for a significant period, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge them on bail. Though the Three-Judge Bench declined
interference with the impugned judgment, it imposed certain
additional conditions, as noted in paragraph 93 hereinbefore, to
serve the best interest of justice and the society at large.
137. As already noted in paragraph 123 hereinbefore, in
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC 881] , the Two-

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Judge Bench noted that no reading of the decision of the Three-
Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] suggests that the
mere passage of time, divorced from all surrounding
circumstances, mechanically entitles an accused to release. The
Three-Judge Bench was concerned with the manner in which
Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act was, in practice, being deployed
as an almost conclusive basis for denial of bail, notwithstanding
extraordinary delay in trial and prolonged incarceration. It is
precisely for that reason that the Three-Judge Bench observed
that the ‘rigours’ of Section 43-D(5) would ‘melt down’ where
there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and where the period of incarceration undergone
has already exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. The Two-Judge Bench noted that, in K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713], the Three-Judge Bench cautioned that such
an approach was necessary to prevent provisions like Section 43-
D(5) of the UA (P) Act from being used as ‘the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of the constitutional right to
speedy trial’. The Three-Judge Bench was clear and unequivocal in

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holding that once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a
significant period, the courts would ordinarily be obligated to
enlarge the accused on bail.
138. As already noted in paragraph 125 hereinbefore, in
Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC 881] , the Two-
Judge Bench noted that the constitutional force of K.A. Najeeb
[(2021) 3 SCC 713] lies in its restoration of the hierarchy between
a statute, i.e., the UA (P) Act, and the Constitution. Section 43-
D(5) of the UA (P) Act remains subordinate to Article 21 of the
Constitution at all times, and a constitutional court need not hold
back bail to the accused in the garb of Section 43-D(5). As held in
Sheikh Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC 293], once it is obvious that a
timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period, the courts would ordinarily
be obligated to enlarge them on bail.
139. As observed by the Two-Judge Bench in Syed Iftikhar
Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC 881] , statutes may undoubtedly
calibrate the manner in which the principle ‘bail is the rule and jail

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is the exception’ is applied, particularly in cases involving national
security or terrorist offences for which the UA (P) Act is meant.
But those statutes cannot altogether invert the constitutional
relationship between liberty and detention. The statutory embargo
of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act must remain a circumscribed
restriction that operates subject to the guarantee of
Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, the Two-Judge
Bench concluded that even under the UA (P) Act, ‘bail is the rule
and jail is the exception’; of course, in an appropriate case, bail
can be denied having regard to the facts of that particular case.
140. As already noted in paragraph 103 hereinbefore, in
Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the Two-Judge
Bench of the Apex Court observed that, for the purpose of
considering the offence under Section 18 of the UA (P) Act, the
commission of a terrorist act, as contemplated in Section 15 of the
UA (P) Act, is not required to be made out. What Section 18
contemplates is that whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or
advocates, abets, advises or incites, directly or knowingly
facilitates the commission of a terrorist act or any act preparatory

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to the commission of a terrorist act would be punishable under the
said provision. Hence, if there is any material or evidence to show
that the accused had conspired or attempted to commit a terrorist
act, or committed any act preparatory to the commission of a
terrorist act, such material evidence would be sufficient to invoke
Section 18. For attracting Section 18, the involvement of the
accused in the actual commission of a terrorist act as defined in
Section 15 need not be shown.
141. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench noted that in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713],
relied on by the learned counsels for the respondents-accused, it
has been observed that a Constitutional court is not strictly bound
by the prohibitory provisions of grant of bail in the UA (P) Act, and
can exercise its constitutional jurisdiction to release the accused
on bail who has been incarcerated for a long period of time relying
upon Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the said case, the
Three-Judge Bench did not interfere with the order passed by the
High Court granting bail to the accused, on the ground that the
said accused had already spent 5 years and 5 months in custody

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and the trial was likely to take a long time. On the other hand, so
far as the respondents-accused in the appeals at hand are
concerned, they have been in custody hardly for one and a half
years, apart from the fact that all the respondents-accused are
shown to have been involved in previous cases. Considering the
nature and gravity of the alleged offences and considering their
criminal antecedents, the Two-Judge Bench opined that the High
Court should not have taken a lenient view, more particularly
when there was sufficient material to show their prima facie
involvement in the alleged offences under the UA (P) Act.
142. During the course of argument, the learned Special
Public Prosecutor for NIA argued that in murder cases involving
PFI cadres, including the one in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad
Town South Police Station, none of the accused had any personal
enmity with the deceased. The victims have been selected solely
because of their leadership/membership in a particular community
and were killed to create terror in the society.
143. As already noticed hereinbefore, in the impugned order
dated 09.09.2025 in Crl.M.P.No.381 of 2025 in S.C.No.2 of 2023,

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in the context of the proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of
the UA (P) Act, the Special Court found that, apart from the
statement of witnesses, there are materials which prima facie
th th
suggest that the 19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 had
active role in the commission of the offence under Chapter IV of
the UA (P) Act. After referring to the objections put forward by the
th th
prosecution to the grant of bail to the 19 and 20 accused, the
Special Court observed that there are prima facie materials to
th th
show the presence of the 19 and 20 accused, who are active
members of PFI, at the place of conspiracy and near the scene of
th
crime. There are prima facie materials to show the role of the 19
th
and 20 accused in the commission of the offence.
144. As noted hereinbefore, the prima facie materials
st th
against the 1 appellant-19 accused Abdul Khader @ Iqbal
include the DNA of the victim Sreenivasan alleged to have been
detected from the baniyan (MO-44) and jeans (MO-45) of A-19,
vide RFSL, Thrissur report (D-742) dated 17.05.2022; and the
nd th
prima facie materials against the 2 appellant-20 accused Firoz
@ Thambi include the DNA of the victim Sreenivasan alleged to

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have been detected from the T-shirt (MO-24) and jeans (MO-33)
of A-20, vide the report of RFSL, Thrissur dated 17.05.2022 (D-
742), and also blood stains allegedly found in the seat cover and
footrest (MO-35 and MO-36) of the seized motorcycle bearing
No.TN-37/BF-4800, seized vide seizure mahazar dated
09.05.2022 (D-106).
145. In the impugned order dated 09.09.2025, the Special
th
Court noted that 19 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, Abdul Khader
@ Iqbal, is also involved in Crime No.353/2020 of Palakkad Town
North Police Station, Crime No.267/2026 of Kongad Police Station,
Crime No.50/2020 of Kalladikkode Police Station, Crime
No.933/2018 of Hemambika Nagar Police Station and Crime
No.908/2020 of Palakkad Town North Police Station. Similarly, the
th
20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, Firoz @ Thambi (A-20), is also
an accused in Crime No.780/2018 of Palakkad Town North Police
th th
Station. The allegations and materials against the 19 and 20
accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023, taken note of by the Special Court
in the impugned order dated 09.09.2025, in the context of the
proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA (P) Act, have

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already been referred to in paragraphs 51 and 52 hereinbefore.
th th
146. The learned counsel for the appellants-19 and 20
accused argued that there is no possibility that the trial in
S.C.No.2 of 2023 would either commence or conclude in the near
future. There are 71 accused, 937 witnesses, 60 protected
witnesses and 4 approvers (total 1001); 1634 documents and 54
protected documents (total 1688); 692 material objects; and 10
Terabytes (TB) of FSL reports. Out of 71 accused, 4 are
absconding, 10 are in judicial custody, 55 are on bail, 4 approvers
are on bail, and 1 accused is dead. Further investigation is still
ongoing qua A64 and A70. A64 surrendered on 23.02.2026, and
A70 was arrested by NIA on 17.02.2026 and remanded to judicial
custody. An application filed by the Public Prosecutor under
Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UA (P) Act for extending the period of
judicial custody was allowed by the Special Court for a period of
180 days, vide the order dated 15.05.2026 in Crl.M.P.No.16 of
2026 in RC No.2 of 2022/NIA. Further investigation qua A28, who
was arrested on 30.04.2026, is still ongoing. For judicial remand
of A28, NIA has already moved an application dated 01.06.2026.

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In the challenge made to the power of NIA to register a fresh FIR
and the subsequent transfer of the case to NIA, the Apex Court
granted an interim order in SLP(Crl.)Nos.3658 of 2024 and 4384
of 2024, ordering that charge shall not be framed in S.C.No.2 of
2023. The said interim order was vacated by the order dated
19.05.2026, whereby NIA is given liberty to proceed with the trial,
in accordance with law, without prejudice to the rights of the
petitioners therein, subject to the final outcome of the Crl.Appeals
pending before the Apex Court. The fact that the Apex Court
granted a stay of the proceedings in S.C.No.2 of 2023 cannot be
th th
held against the appellants-19 and 20 accused on their claim
for bail on the ground of prolonged incarceration, as observed by
the Apex Court in the order dated 19.05.2025 in Crl.A.No.2717 of
2025.
147. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for NIA argued
that prolonged incarceration is not the sole determinant for
granting bail. The gravity of the offence, the legislative context,
and the prima facie material on record cannot be eclipsed merely
because the trial has taken time. The hearing on the charge in

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S.C.No.2 of 2023 in R.C.No.2 of 2022 on behalf of the prosecution
was completed before the Special Court on 12.10.2023. Upon
hearing the submission of the prosecution, the defence counsel for
the accused Muhammed Mubarak (A-15) filed a discharge petition
before the Special Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn only
on 03.02.2025. In SLP(Crl.) Nos.3658 of 2024 and 4384 of 2024,
the Apex Court stayed the framing of charges in S.C.No.2 of 2023,
vide the order dated 06.05.2024. The said interim order
restraining the framing of charges was vacated by the Apex Court
only on 19.05.2026, and ordered that NIA would be at liberty to
proceed with the trial in accordance with law. Hence, there is no
delay on the part of the prosecution in commencing the trial. The
learned Special Public Prosecutor pointed out that, in compliance
with the order of the Apex Court dated 08.05.2026 in Suo Moto
Writ Petition (Crl.)No.1 of 2026, the Government of Kerala
accorded sanction for the establishment of two exclusive NIA
Special Courts in Ernakulam. Hence, there will be a speedy trial of
the case.
st th
148. The 1 appellant-19 accused was arrested on

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nd th
24.04.2022, and the 2 appellant-20 accused was arrested on
26.04.2022. Therefore, as on date, they have undergone 4 years
and 4 months of actual custody. The final report in S.C.No.2 of
2023, along with the evidence collected, discloses a prima facie
th th
case for commission of offences by the 19 and 20 accused,
punishable under Sections 153A of IPC and Sections 13, 16, 18
and 20 of the UA (P) Act along with additional offences under
Sections 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143, 144, 147, 148, 449,
341, 201, 212, 302 read with Section 149 of IPC and Section
3(a)(b)(d) read with Section 7 of the Religious Institutions
(Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 as charge sheeted by the Kerala
Police in connected offence in Crime No.318/2022 of Palakkad
Town South Police Station. As per Section 302 IPC, whoever
commits murder shall be punishable with death or imprisonment
for life and shall also be liable to fine. The offences under the UA
(P) Act include Section 16. As per sub-section (1) of Section 16,
whoever commits a terrorist act shall, (a) if such act has resulted
in the death of any person, be punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

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149. The law laid down by the Three-Judge Bench in K.A.
Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] is that the presence of statutory
restrictions like Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act per se does not
oust the ability of the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution of India. At the
commencement of proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against the grant of bail, but the
rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no
likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a
substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section
43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act being used as the sole metric for denying
bail or for a wholesale breach of the constitutional right to speedy
trial.
150. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , on the facts of
the case at hand, the Three-Judge Bench noted that the
respondent had been in jail for more than 5 years and there are
276 witnesses left to be examined. Charges have been framed

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only on 27.11.2020. Still further, though two opportunities were
given, the appellant NIA has shown no inclination to screen its
endless list of witnesses. Of the 13 co-accused, who have been
convicted, none have been sentenced to more than 8 years'
rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, it can be legitimately expected
that, if found guilty, the respondent would also receive a sentence
within the same ballpark. Two-thirds of such incarceration has
already been completed, and the respondent has already paid
heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice.
151. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench noted that no reading of the decision
of the Three-Judge Bench in K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC
713] suggests that the mere passage of time, divorced from all
surrounding circumstances, mechanically entitles an accused to
release. The Three-Judge Bench was concerned with the manner
in which Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act was, in practice, being
deployed as an almost conclusive basis for denial of bail,
notwithstanding extraordinary delay in trial and prolonged
incarceration. It is precisely for that reason that the Three-Judge

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Bench observed that the ‘rigours’ of Section 43-D(5) would ‘melt
down’ where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed
within a reasonable time and where the period of incarceration
undergone has already exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence.
152. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC OnLine SC
881] , the Two-Judge Bench observed that statutes may
undoubtedly calibrate the manner in which the principle ‘bail is the
rule and jail is the exception’ is applied, particularly in cases
involving national security or terrorist offences for which the UA
(P) Act is meant. But those statutes cannot altogether invert the
constitutional relationship between liberty and detention. The
statutory embargo of Section 43-D(5) of the UA (P) Act must
remain a circumscribed restriction that operates subject to the
guarantee of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, the
Two-Judge Bench concluded that even under the UA (P) Act, ‘bail
is the rule and jail is the exception’; of course, in an appropriate
case, bail can be denied having regard to the facts of that
particular case.

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153. In K.A. Najeeb [(2021) 3 SCC 713] , the respondent,
who was facing trial in a crime registered under Sections 143, 147,
148, 120-B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506 Part II, 201, 202, 153-
A, 212, 307, 149 of IPC, Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act
and Sections 16, 18, 18-B, 19 and 20 of the UA (P) Act, was in jail
for more than 5 years. In Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC
OnLine SC 881] , the Two-Judge Bench was dealing with a case
in which the appellant was arrested in a crime registered under
Sections 17, 38 and 40 of the UA (P) Act, read with Sections 8,
21, 25 and 29 of the NDPS Act. He was arrested on 11.06.2020
and had been in custody for more than 5 years and 11 months. In
Sheikh Javed Iqbal [(2024) 8 SCC 293] , a decision referred to
by the Two-Judge Bench in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi [2026 SCC
OnLine SC 881], the appellant, who was facing trial in a crime
registered under Sections 489-B and 489-C of IPC and Section 16
of the UA (P) Act, had been in custody for more than 9 years.
154. In Barakathullah [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1019] , the
Two-Judge Bench was dealing with a case in which the
respondents therein and other members and office bearers of PFI

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were facing trial in a crime registered under Sections 120B, 153A,
153AA of IPC and Section 13, 17, 18, 18-B, 38 and 39 of the UA
(P) Act. The Two-Judge Bench noted that in K.A. Najeeb [(2021)
3 SCC 713], the Three-Judge Bench did not interfere with the
order passed by the High Court granting bail to the accused, on
the ground that the said accused had already spent 5 years and 5
months in custody and the trial was likely to take a long time. On
the other hand, so far as the respondents-accused in the appeals
before the Two-Judge Bench are concerned, they have been in
custody hardly for one and a half years. Apart from that, all the
respondents-accused are shown to have been involved in previous
cases. Considering the nature and gravity of the alleged offences
and considering their criminal antecedents, the Two-Judge Bench
opined that the High Court should not have taken a lenient view,
more particularly when there was sufficient material to show
their prima facie involvement in the alleged offences under the UA
(P) Act.
155. In the instant case, as already noted hereinbefore, the
final report in S.C.No.2 of 2023, along with the evidence collected,

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th
discloses a prima facie case for commission of offences by the 19
th
and 20 accused, punishable under Sections 153A of IPC and
Sections 13, 16, 18 and 20 of the UA (P) Act along with additional
offences under Sections 120B, 34, 118, 119, 109, 115, 143, 144,
147, 148, 449, 341, 201, 212, 302 read with Section 149 of IPC
and Section 3(a)(b)(d) read with Section 7 of the Religious
Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 as charge sheeted
by the Kerala Police in connected offence in Crime No.318/2022 of
Palakkad Town South Police Station. As per Section 302 IPC,
whoever commits murder shall be punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine. The offences
under the UA (P) Act include Section 16. As per sub-section (1) of
Section 16, whoever commits a terrorist act shall, (a) if such act
has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death
st
or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine. The 1
th nd
appellant-19 accused was arrested on 24.04.2022, and the 2
th
appellant-20 accused was arrested on 26.04.2022. Therefore, as
on date, they have undergone 4 years and 4 months of actual
custody. Considering the prescribed punishment under Section

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302 IPC and Section 16(1)(a) of the UA (P) Act, it cannot be
contended that the period of incarceration undergone by the
th th
appellant-19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 has already
exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence, so as to
enlarge them on bail on the ground of any delay in the trial of
S.C.No.2 of 2023 before the Special Court. Therefore, we find
absolutely no merits in the contention of the learned counsel for
th th th th
the appellants-19 and 20 accused that the 19 and 20 accused
are entitled to be enlarged on bail on grounds of violation of Part
III of the Constitution of India.
156. We note the submission made by the learned Special
Public Prosecutor for NIA, that, in compliance with the order of the
Apex Court dated 08.05.2026 in Suo Moto Writ Petition (Crl.)No.1
of 2026, the Government of Kerala accorded sanction for the
establishment of two exclusive NIA Special Courts in Ernakulam.
Hence, there will be a speedy trial of the case.
157. In the above circumstances, we hold that the
th th
appellants-19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 on the file of
the Special Court for the Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam, are not

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entitled to be enlarged on bail on the ground of prolonged
incarceration or on account of any delay in the trial of S.C.No.2 of
2023 before the Special Court. In that view of the matter, no
interference is warranted with the impugned order dated
09.09.2025 of the Special Court, whereby the bail application filed
th th
by the 19 and 20 accused in S.C.No.2 of 2023 stands dismissed.
In the result, this criminal appeal fails and the same is
accordingly dismissed.
Sd/-
ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE

Sd/-
MURALEE KRISHNA S., JUDGE

Bkn/Av/MINU

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APPENDIX OF CRL.A NO. 1749 OF 2025

PETITIONER ANNEXURES

Annexure A1 THE TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF FINAL
REPORT IN SC NO.2/2023 ON THE FILES OF
SPECIAL COURT FOR NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM
Annexure A2 THE TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PORTION OF
FINAL REPORT DATED 13.07.2022 IN CRIME NO.
318 OF 2022 OF PALAKKAD TOWN SOUTH POLICE
STATION
Annexure A3 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.05.2025
IN CRL. APPEAL NO.2717/2025 OF HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Annexure A4 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 21.05.2025
IN CRL. APPEAL NO.2744/2025 AND CRL. APPEAL
NO. 2745/2025 OF HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF
INDIA
Annexure A5 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 14.08.2025
IN SLP (CRL.) DIARY NO.38992/2025 OF HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Annexure A6 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 29.08.2025
IN SLP (CRL.) DIARY NO.38993/2025 OF HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Annexure A7 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 04.09.2025
IN SLP (CRL.) DIARY NO.38997/2025 OF HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Annexure A8 THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON JUDGMENT DATED
19.08.2025 IN CRL. APPEAL NO.1248/2025 AND
CRL. APPEAL NO. 1253/2025 OF THIS HON’BLE
COURT
Annexure A9 THE TRUE COPY OF THE OBJECTION DATED
02.09.2025 FILED BY THE RESPONDENT IN CRL.
MP NO. 381 OF 2025 IN SC NO.2/2023/NIA ON THE
FILES OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA
CASES, KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
Annexure A10 THE ACCUSED COPY OF THE ORDER DATED
09.09.2025 IN CRL. MP NO. 381 OF 2025 IN SC
NO.2/2023/NIA ON THE FILES OF THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, KERALA AT
ERNAKULAM
Annexure A11 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 03.11.2022 IN
CRL.M.P. NO. 3725 OF 2022 IN SC. NO. 982 OF
2022 ON THE FILES OF THE SESSIONS COURT,
PALAKKAD

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Annexure A12 TRUE COPY OF THE LEGAL OPINION DATED
14.12.2022 SUBMITTED BY THE LD. ADDL.
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF PROSECUTION PALAKKAD
Annexure A13 A TRUE COPY OF THE COMMON ORDER IN CRL. A.
NO. 1035 OF 2023 DATED 14.07.2023 OF THIS
HON’BLE COURT.
Annexure A14 TRUE COPY OF THE ARREST MEMO DATED 24.04.2022
ALONG WITH INSPECTION MEMO OF THE 1ST
APPELLANT.
Annexure A15 TRUE COPY OF THE ARREST MEMO DATED 26.04.2022
ALONG WITH INSPECTION MEMO OF THE 2ND
APPELLANT.
Annexure A16 TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION DATED 08.02.2023
FILED BY THE RESPONDENT IN CRL. M.P. NO.
85/2023 IN RC/02/2022/NIA/KOC
Annexure A17 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 10.02.2023 IN
CRL. M.P. NO. 90/2023 IN RC/02/2022/NIA/KOC
Annexure A18 TRUE COPY OF THE ARREST MEMO DATED 10.02.2023
ALONG WITH PERSONAL SEARCH MEMO OF THE 1ST
APPELLANT
Annexure A19 TRUE COPY OF THE ARREST MEMO DATED 10.02.2023
ALONG WITH PERSONAL SEARCH MEMO OF THE 2ND
APPELLANT
Annexure A20 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT IN CMP NO. 16 OF
2026 FILED BY THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION
AGENCY
Annexure A21 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 15.05.2026
IN CMP 16 OF 2026 ISSUED BY THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES, ERNAKULAM
Annexure A22 THE TRUE COPY OF THE APPLICATION FOR
REMANDING ACCUSED NO. 28 IN CMP 20 OF 2026
FILED BY THE NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
Annexure A23 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 19.05.2026
IN S.L.P. NO. 3658 OF 2024