KARNATAKA TNTIBIOTICS, BANGALORE vs PRESIDING OFFICER, HYD., AND 3 OTHERS
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
*
WRIT PETITION Nos.1844 & 20970 of 2004
:
Between
Karnataka Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Limited …Petitioner
AND
Presiding Officer Hyderabad and three others …Respondents
th
DATE OF COMMON ORDER: 06 MAY, 2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
1 Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment?
Yes/No
2 Whether the copies of judgment may
be marked to Law
Reporters/Journals
Yes/No
3 Whether HER Lordship wish to see
the fair copy of the Judgment?
Yes/No
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
2
* THE HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
+ WRIT PETITION Nos.1844 & 20970 of 2004
th
% Date: 06 May, 2026
Between :
Karnataka Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Limited …Petitioner
AND
Presiding Officer Hyderabad and three others …Respondents
Sri G.V.S. Ganesh, learned counsel
! Counsel for the Petitioners:
for the petitioner-company, and Sri Abid Hussain, learned counsel
for the petitioner-workman
: Learned Government Pleader for
! Counsel for Respondent
Labour
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 736
2. (1972) 4 Supreme Court Cases 569
3. (1973) 1 Supreme Court Cases 813
4. Civil Appeal No. of 2021 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C)
No.19648 of 2019
3
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI
WRIT PETITION Nos.1844 & 20970 of 2004
th
DATED: 06 MAY, 2026
:
Between
Karnataka Antibiotics and Pharmaceuticals Limited …Petitioner
AND
Presiding Officer Hyderabad and three others …Respondents
COMMON ORDER :
The Writ Petition No.1844 of 2004 has been filed by the
petitioner seeking the following relief:
“(a) call for the records pertaining to the impugned Award
dated October 15 2003 in I.D.No.47 of 1995 passed by the
Respondent No.1 viz the Presiding Officer, Addl Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court and published by the respondent
No.3 herein vide G.O.Rt.No.23350, dated December 3, 2003
on 22nd December, 2003; and (b) quash the same by the
issuance of a writ, more particularly in the nature of a writ of
certiorari or any other appropriate writ order or direction as
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper and pass such
other further order(s) as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper including awarding costs to the petitioner and render
justice”
02. The Writ Petition No.20970 of 2004 has been filed by
the petitioner seeking the following relief:
4
“…to issue a writ order or direction more particularly one in
the nature of writ of Certiorari and quash the Award dated
15.10.2003 in I.D.No.47 of 1995 to the extent of not granting
full back wages and ordering for stoppage of two annual
increments with cumulative effect and consequently to direct
the management to reinstate the petitioner into service with
full back wages and all other attendant benefits, to call for
the records on the file of the Addl Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Addl Labour Court at Hyderabad and to pass…”
03. For the sake of convenience, the petitioner in
W.P.No.1844 of 2004 is hereinafter referred to as the “Company”,
and the petitioner in W.P.No.20970 of 2004 as the “Workman”.
Since the parties in both the writ petitions are one and the same,
having instituted proceedings against each other, and as both writ
petitions arise out of and challenge the same impugned Award, they
are being disposed of by this common order.
04. Heard Sri G.V.S. Ganesh, learned counsel for the
petitioner-company, and Sri Abid Hussain, learned counsel for the
petitioner-workman, as well as the learned Government Pleader for
Labour. Perused the material available on record.
05(a). It is the case of the Company that it is a Government of
India undertaking engaged in the manufacture and sale of
5
pharmaceutical products and life-saving drugs. The workman was
employed as a Professional Service Representative, and one of the
conditions of his service was that he was liable to be transferred
anywhere in India.
05(b). It is further stated that the workman was a member of
the A.P. Medical and Sales Representatives Union (APMSRU),
which is not a recognized union insofar as the Company is
concerned. One Mr.P.Bhaskar, a Professional Service
Representative employed by the Company, was transferred to
Cuddapah. In protest against the said transfer, the workman, along
with about 30 members of APMSRU, allegedly indulged in riotous
and disorderly behaviour, including abusing, jostling, pushing, and
threatening the superior officers of the Company.
05(c). Consequently, a charge sheet was issued to the
workman. The charges levelled against him, if proved, constituted
misconduct under the Certified Standing Orders of the Company,
namely Standing Orders 21.01, 21.25, 21.27, and 21.35. The
workman submitted his explanation, which was found to be
unsatisfactory. Thereafter, the Company initiated a domestic
enquiry, in which the workman fully participated and availed the
6
assistance of a co-employee of his choice, namely Mr. H.V.
Nerlekar. Upon completion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer
submitted his report holding that the charges levelled against the
workman were proved. The Company, having framed the Karnataka
Antibiotics & Pharmaceuticals Limited Conduct, Discipline and
Appeal Rules, issued a second show-cause notice to the workman,
calling upon him to explain as to why the punishment of dismissal
from service should not be imposed.
05(d). In response, the workman submitted his explanation
alleging that the Management was acting with mala fide intention
and that he was being victimised for his union activities. However,
considering the gravity of the proved misconduct, the Company
dismissed the workman from service. Aggrieved thereby, the
workman preferred an appeal before the Managing Director of the
Company, which came to be rejected by the Appellate Authority.
Thereafter, the workman filed an application under Section 2-A(2) of
the Industrial Disputes Act before the learned Additional Industrial
Tribunal, which was numbered as I.D. No. 47 of 1995. Upon receipt
of notice, the Company entered appearance and filed its counter.
7
The workman also filed an additional affidavit raising certain further
grounds, to which the Company filed its reply.
05(e). The learned Tribunal, upon consideration of the rival
contentions, passed an order holding that the domestic enquiry
conducted by the Company was vitiated. Challenging the said
order, the Company filed Writ Petition No. 6898 of 1996 before this
Court. During the pendency of the said writ petition, the learned
Tribunal proceeded to record evidence and ultimately passed an
Award directing reinstatement of the workman with continuity of
service, full back wages, and other attendant benefits. Aggrieved
by the said Award, the Company filed Writ Petition No. 20664 of
1998 before this Court, wherein this Court remitted the matter to the
learned Tribunal for reconsideration on certain aspects. Pursuant
thereto, the learned Tribunal passed the impugned Award directing
reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service, awarding
50% back wages, withholding two annual increments with
cumulative effect, and granting all consequential benefits.
06(a). Learned counsel for the Company submitted that the
impugned Award is erroneous, perverse, and suffers from errors
apparent on the face of the record. It is contended that the learned
8
Tribunal has failed to appreciate the well-settled legal position that
strict rules of evidence are not applicable either to domestic
enquiries or to proceedings before quasi-judicial authorities such as
Industrial Tribunals or Labour Courts. Such authorities are required
to be guided by the existence of some material evidence, sufficient
to establish a case on the touchstone of preponderance of
probabilities.
06(b). It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal
erroneously proceeded to evaluate the evidence as though it were
adjudicating a criminal trial, applying principles akin to those under
the Indian Evidence Act. In proceedings before an Industrial
Tribunal, it is well settled that the provisions of the Evidence Act do
not strictly apply, nor is the standard of proof required in criminal
cases applicable to such quasi-judicial proceedings.
06(c). Learned counsel further contend that the approach
adopted by the learned Tribunal clearly demonstrates that it has
misdirected itself in law and has failed to adhere to the specific
directions issued by this Court while remanding the matter, which
required the Tribunal to assess the evidence in accordance with the
9
principles governing domestic enquiries and quasi-judicial
adjudication.
06(d). It is further submitted that the learned Tribunal has
gone astray in its analysis of the evidence by disregarding the
unrebutted material on record and by taking into consideration
wholly irrelevant factors. The impugned Award, therefore, is vitiated
by a patent misapplication of legal principles as well as non-
compliance with the binding directions of this Court upon remand.
On these grounds, learned counsel for the Company prayed that the
Writ Petition be allowed and the impugned Award be set aside.
06(e). In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for
the company relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
1
in wherein it
Onkar Nath Misra v. State of Haryana and another
was held at Paragraph Nos.3 and 5 that:
“3. The award of the Labour Court came to be challenged by
the appellant and one Megh Singh by way of two writ
petitions before the Punjab and Haryana High Court which
by a common judgment dismissed both the writ petitions.
The High Court in the course of its order agreed with the
Labour Court that the evidence produced by the
management marked as Ext. M-6 as also the documentary
evidence Exts. M-11 to M-15 coupled with the evidence of
1
(2005) 3 Supreme Court Cases 736
10
Shri B.K. Uppal, Vice-President clearly established the
misconduct alleged against the writ petitioners before it.
Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners had argued
before the High Court that the Labour Court discriminated
between them and Pradeep Sharma whose punishment was
not upheld by the Labour Court even though the evidence in
regard to all of them stood on a similar footing. The High
Court agreed with the finding of the Labour Court that the
case of the petitioners before it and Pradeep Sharma did not
stand on the same footing inasmuch as from the material
produced before the Labour Court it was clear that Pradeep
Sharma was falsely involved, while the misconduct alleged
against the writ petitioners had been duly established. It also
did not accept the argument of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that the punishment was in any manner
disproportionate to the misconduct proved.
Learned counsel appearing for the appellant seriously
5.
contended that from the entire material produced before the
Labour Court in the form of Exts. M-11 to M-15 as well as
the evidence of Pritam Singh and B.K. Uppal, the
management had failed to establish the alleged misconduct.
He also contended that there was absolutely no difference in
the evidence produced by the management between the
case of the appellant and Pradeep Sharma who has been
granted relief by the Labour Court. Per contra, the learned
counsel appearing for the respondent pointed out that the
Labour Court has taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record during the domestic enquiry as also the
material available before it and has rightly come to the
conclusion that so far as the appellant is concerned his
involvement in the gherao was clearly proved. He submitted
that the fact that Pradeep Sharma, the other workman was
11
exonerated of the misconduct alleged against him would not
by itself further the case of the appellant in any manner,
hence, the appellant is not entitled to relief in this appeal.”
06(f). Further, he upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in
M/s. Francis Klein & Co. (P) Ltd., v. Their workmen and
2
wherein it was held at conclusion of Paragraph No.3 that:
another
“…..In our view when an employer loses confidence in his
employee particularly in respect of a person he is
discharging an office of trust and confidence there can be no
justification for directing his reinstatement…..”
06(g). Further, he upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of
3
India (Pvt.) Ltd., v. The Management and others wherein it was
held at Paragraph No.53 that:
“53. We have indicated the changes effected in the law by
Section 11-A. We should not be understood as laying down
that there is no obligation whatsoever on the part of an
employer to hold an enquiry before passing an order of
discharge or dismissal. This Court has consistently been
holding that an employer is expected to hold a proper
enquiry according to the Standing Orders and principles of
natural justice. It has also been emphasised that such an
enquiry should not be an empty formality. If a proper enquiry
is conducted by an employer and a correct finding arrived at
regarding the misconduct, the Tribunal, even though it has
2
(1972) 4 Supreme Court Cases 569
3
(1973) 1 Supreme Court Cases 813
12
now power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the
management, will have to give very cogent reasons for not
accepting the view of the employer. Further by holding a
proper enquiry, the employer will also escape the charge of
having acted arbitrarily or mala fide. It cannot be
overemphasised that conducting of a proper and valid
enquiry by an employer will conduce to harmonious and
healthy relationship between him and the workmen and it will
serve the cause of industrial peace. Further it will also
enable an employer to persuade the Tribunal to accept the
enquiry as proper and the finding also as correct.”
07(a). On the other hand, it is the case of the workman that he
was appointed in the services of the Company in October, 1987,
and had discharged his duties continuously and satisfactorily
without any adverse remarks. It is contended that upon his joining
the A.P. Medical and Sales Representatives Union (APMSRU) and
actively participating in its activities, he became an eyesore to the
Management.
07(b). It is further stated that the Management issued a
charge sheet dated 10.08.1992, to which the workman submitted
his explanation denying all the allegations. However, according to
the workman, a domestic enquiry was conducted in a mechanical
and biased manner, without affording him a fair and proper
opportunity. Thereafter, he was dismissed from service by order
13
dated 15.11.1993. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the workman
raised an industrial dispute, and the learned Labour Court, by its
Award dated 15.04.1998, directed the Management to reinstate him
into service with full back wages and all attendant benefits.
Challenging the said Award, the Management filed Writ Petition No.
20664 of 1998 before this Court, wherein the matter was remanded
to the learned Tribunal for fresh consideration.
07(c). Pursuant thereto, the learned Tribunal reconsidered the
matter and passed the impugned Award dated 15.10.2003, directing
reinstatement of the workman with continuity of service, awarding
50% back wages, and imposing the penalty of withholding two
annual increments with cumulative effect.
08(a). Learned counsel for the workman submitted that the
learned Tribunal, having categorically held that no misconduct was
proved against the workman, ought to have granted full back wages
without imposing the penalty of withholding two annual increments.
It is contended that the partial denial of back wages and imposition
of penalty is unsustainable in law and contrary to the findings
recorded by the Tribunal.
14
08(b). It is further submitted that, according to the
Management, the alleged incident took place on 26.06.1992;
however, no charge sheet was issued immediately thereafter, and,
in fact, the charge sheet came to be issued only on 18.08.1992,
after an inordinate and unexplained delay of more than 50 days,
which casts serious doubt on the genuineness of the allegations.
08(c). Learned counsel further contended that the presence of
Mr. Nayeem and Mr. P. Seshagiri Rao, who were officials
unconnected with the workman and had no official duty on the said
date, clearly indicates that their presence was procured with an
ulterior motive to create false evidence against the workman.
08(d). It is also contended that, on 26.06.1992, the workman
had duly discharged his official duties, submitted his expense
report, and the same was sanctioned and paid on the
recommendation of Mr. Kurup. Further, the workman had submitted
his daily report evidencing the work performed on the said date.
08(e). It is pointed out that the workman was granted an
increment on 01.07.1992 in recognition of his satisfactory
performance, and had there been any such incident on 26.06.1992,
15
the Management would not have sanctioned the said increment.
This circumstance, according to the learned counsel, clearly belies
the case of the Management. It is thus contended that the alleged
misconduct was falsely concocted with mala fide intention, solely on
account of the workman’s active role as an office bearer of the
Union and his efforts in espousing the grievances of fellow
employees. The workman, having committed no misconduct, was
unjustly dismissed from service without any fault on his part.
Therefore, learned counsel for the workman prayed that this Court
be pleased to allow the Writ Petition by setting aside the
punishment imposed by the learned Tribunal and to grant full
consequential benefits.
08(f). In support of his submissions, the learned counsel for
the workman relied upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
4
in wherein it
Allahabad Bank and others v. Krishan Pal Singh
was held at Paragraph No.8:
“8. The directions issued by the High Court of Allahabad for
reinstatement were stayed by this Court on 23.08.2019.
During the pendency of these proceedings, the respondent –
workman had attained age of superannuation. Though, there
was strong suspicion, there was no acceptable evidence on
4
Civil Appeal No. of 2021 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19648 of 2019
16
record for dismissal of the workman. However, as the
workman has worked only for a period of about six years and
he has already attained the age of superannuation, it is a fit
case for modification of the relief granted by the High Court.
The reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic in
every case, where termination / dismissal is found to be not
in accordance with procedure prescribed under law.
Considering that the respondent was in effective service of
the Bank only for about six years and he is out of service
since 1991, and in the meantime, respondent had attained
age of superannuation, we deem it appropriate that ends of
justice would be met by awarding lump sum monetary
compensation. We accordingly direct payment of lump sum
compensation of Rs.15 lakhs to the respondent, within a
period of eight weeks from today. Failing to pay the same
within the aforesaid period, the respondent is entitled for
interest @ 6% per annum, till payment.”
09. This Court, by interim order dated 03.02.2004 passed in
W.P.M.P.No.2404 of 2004 in W.P.No.1844 of 2004, directed as
follows:
“There shall be an interim suspension of the Award, except
to the extent of reinstatement of the workman into service,
on condition of the petitioner depositing 50% of the back
wages as awarded by the Labour Court, within six weeks
from today. Upon such deposit, the workman shall be
permitted to withdraw the same without furnishing any
security.”
17
10. Subsequently, this Court, by further interim order dated
29.04.2005 passed in W.P.M.P.No.7660 of 2005 in W.P.No.1844 of
2004, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, issued the
following direction:
“Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Issue interim
direction to the writ petitioner to comply with Section 17-B of
the Industrial Disputes Act.”
11. The Company filed a review application in
W.P.M.P.No.15263 of 2005 seeking review of the aforesaid interim
order dated 29.04.2005. However, the said review application came
to be dismissed by order dated 18.10.2005.
12. Having regard to the rival submissions made on either
side and upon perusal of the material available on record, it is
evident that the workman was terminated from the services of the
Company by order dated 15.11.1993, pursuant to the charge sheet
dated 18.08.1992. Aggrieved by the said order of termination, the
workman raised an industrial dispute in I.D. No. 47 of 1995 before
the learned Labour Court, which, by its Award dated 15.04.1998,
directed reinstatement of the workman into service with full back
wages.
18
13. Challenging the said Award, the Company filed Writ
Petition No.20664 of 1998 before this Court. This Court, by order
dated 28.03.2003, remanded the matter to the learned Tribunal for
fresh consideration on the issue as the validity of the penalty
imposed against the workman by the company in the light of the
evidence led before the learned Tribunal by the management. This
Court also directed the Company to deposit the amount payable
under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act in a nationalised
bank, in terms of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Division
Bench in its order dated 13.04.1999 passed in W.A.No.414 of 1999,
and further directed that the workman shall not withdraw the
accrued interest, subject to the outcome of the proceedings upon
such reconsideration.
14. Aggrieved by the order dated 28.03.2003 passed in
W.P.No.20664 of 1998, the workman preferred Writ Appeal
No.1216 of 2003. The Hon’ble Division Bench, by its judgment
dated 21.07.2003, dismissed the said Writ Appeal, thereby
confirming the order of remand, and further directed the learned
Tribunal to dispose of the matter afresh within a period of three
months. Pursuant thereto, the learned Tribunal reconsidered the
19
matter and ultimately passed the impugned Award dated
15.10.2003, directing reinstatement of the workman into service with
50% back wages, while imposing the penalty of withholding two
annual increments with cumulative effect.
15. In view of the above background of the case, the issues
arise for determination are whether the findings of the learned
Tribunal suffer from perversity warranting interference at the
instance of the company and whether the workman is entitled to full
back wages and setting aside of the punishment of withholding
increments. At the outset, it must be noted that the scope of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in matters
arising out of Industrial Adjudication is limited. This Court does not
sit as an appellate authority over the findings of fact recorded by the
learned Tribunal unless such findings are perverse, based on no
evidence, or suffer from patent illegality.
16. As borne out from the record, the learned Tribunal
categorized the charges against the workman into four distinct
events. The first allegation was that, on 26.06.1992, the workman,
along with about 30 members of APMSRU, gheraoed Mr. Kurup,
Mr. M.Y. Nayeem, and Mr. P. Seshagiri Rao, abused them, and
20
prevented them from carrying out their official duties at NIMS,
declaring that they were “freezing” their work. The second allegation
was that the workman and others forcibly attempted to obstruct the
said officers from discharging their duties, prevented them from
entering the Cardiac Ward, and did not allow them to meet the
doctors. The third allegation was that the workman and others
entered the chambers of doctors and requested them not to grant
interviews to the managers of the Company and not to prescribe the
Company’s products. The fourth allegation was that, due to such
unlawful activities, Mr. Kurup and the other officials were unable to
carry out any work.
17. Before the learned Tribunal, the workman examined
himself as WW1, while Mr. M.Y. Nayeem and Mr. P. Seshagiri Rao
were examined as MW1 and MW2, respectively. During the course
of their evidence, certain material inconsistencies emerged. While
MW1 stated that security guards were present at NIMS, MW2
deposed that there were no such security personnel. It is, however,
an admitted position that in a hospital like Nizam’s Institute of
Medical Sciences (NIMS), even attendants of patients are required
to carry passes for entry into specific departments, thereby
21
indicating the presence of security arrangements. In that context,
the allegation that 25–30 persons prevented Mr. Kurup, along with
MW1 and MW2, from entering the Cardiac or Orthopaedic Wards
raises serious doubt, particularly as the Management failed to
explain how such a large group could have entered and obstructed
officials without any intervention from security personnel.
Significantly, both MW1 and MW2 admitted that they had, in fact,
entered the hospital premises and reached the vicinity of the
Cardiac and Orthopaedic Wards.
18. Further, MW1 deposed that the workman and others
went to the doctors’ chambers and requested them not to grant
interviews or prescribe the Company’s products, and that, owing to
such conduct, MW1 and MW2 left the hospital without performing
their duties. However, MW1 also admitted that he did not
personally witness the workman or others speaking with the
doctors. MW2, on the other hand, stated that he was unsure
whether the doctors even heard such requests and that he did not
know what impression, if any, was created in the minds of the
doctors due to the alleged conduct. In light of such evidence, the
22
learned Tribunal found it doubtful whether the alleged incident could
have occurred in the manner suggested by the Management.
19. On the other hand, the workman, examined as WW1,
deposed that by the time he reached the hospital, Mr. Kurup, Mr.
Nayeem, and Mr. Seshagiri Rao were already present. He
categorically denied preventing them from discharging their duties,
as alleged in the charge sheet, and stated that he was not
concerned with the other individuals. He asserted that he carried
out his normal duties and that no such incident occurred. He further
stated that Mr. Kurup had, in fact, met the doctors, namely Dr. K.R.
Shamsunder and Dr. Y. Laxman Rao, in the Cardiac Ward. The
workman also deposed that he submitted his expense report for the
said date, which was duly approved and reimbursed on the
recommendation of Mr. Kurup, and that he submitted his daily report
for the work performed on 26.06.1992. He further stated that NIMS
had strict security protocols, with security personnel regulating
entry, and that no one could enter sensitive areas such as the
Cardiology Department without proper authorization. He asserted
that if any such incident had taken place, the security personnel or
police would have taken appropriate action. He also pointed out that
23
no complaint or notice regarding the alleged incident was issued to
him prior to 19.08.1992, and that he continued to discharge his
duties uninterruptedly until 24.07.1992.
20. Significantly, MW1 did not dispute the submission of the
expense report by the workman or the payment made on
26.06.1992. The workman further relied upon documentary
evidence, including the daily report dated 27.06.1992, which made
no reference to any incident on the previous day. It was also
brought on record that the workman was granted an increment on
01.07.1992 in appreciation of his performance. The learned Tribunal
observed that, had any such serious incident occurred on
26.06.1992, the Management would not have sanctioned such an
increment within a short span of four working days.
21. The learned Tribunal also took note of the unexplained
delay of more than 50 days in issuing the charge sheet, i.e. from
26.06.1992 to 18.08.1992, which, in its view, cast serious doubt on
the veracity of the allegations and weakened the oral testimony of
MW1 and MW2. Consequently, it held that the documentary
evidence produced by the workman outweighed and effectively
discredited the oral evidence adduced by the Management. The
24
learned Tribunal further observed that, although MW1 and MW2
claimed to have lost confidence in the workman, no material was
placed on record to substantiate the circumstances under which
such loss of confidence arose. Ultimately, the learned Tribunal held
as follows:
“The plea of loss of confidence must have a direct nexus to
the employee having misused his position of trust, rendering
it undesirable to retain him in service. Loss of confidence in
the integrity of an employee must be substantiated by cogent
evidence before the Labour Court. If, upon appreciation of
the material on record, no such cogent evidence is found,
the workman would be entitled to reinstatement. In the
present case, the material on record clearly establishes that
the major charges framed against the workman have not
been proved. It also discloses that the prescribed procedure
was not strictly followed in issuing the charge sheet,
appointing the Enquiry Officer, and passing the order of
dismissal. At best, the evidence of MW1 and MW2 only
establishes that the workman and some others obstructed
them near the scooter stand while entering the hospital;
however, both witnesses have categorically stated that they
ultimately entered the Cardiac and other wards. Thus, the
misconduct, if any, is proved only to that limited extent.”
22. Upon a comprehensive analysis of the material on
record, the sum and substance is that the workman was dismissed
from service pursuant to the charge sheet dated 18.08.1992, which
led to protracted litigation, including a remand by this Court and its
25
affirmation by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1216 of 2003. Pursuant
to the remand, the learned Tribunal examined the allegations by
classifying them into distinct events said to have occurred on
26.06.1992 at NIMS. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned
Tribunal found material inconsistencies in the testimonies of MW1
and MW2, particularly with regard to the presence of security
personnel and the plausibility of the alleged incident involving a
large group entering restricted hospital premises. The learned
Tribunal also considered the evidence of the workman (WW1), who
denied the allegations and substantiated his defence through
contemporaneous documentary evidence, including expense
reports, daily reports, and the grant of an increment shortly after the
alleged incident. The unexplained delay in issuance of the charge
sheet and absence of contemporaneous records were also taken
into account. On such evaluation, the learned Tribunal held that the
documentary evidence adduced by the workman outweighed the
oral testimony of MW1 and MW2, and that the principal charges
were not proved. It further held that the plea of “loss of confidence”
was not supported by cogent evidence and cannot be sustained in
the absence of established misconduct affecting the integrity of the
employee. Therefore, the learned Tribunal concluded that the order
26
of dismissal was not justified and directed reinstatement of the
workman, while awarding 50% back wages and imposing the minor
penalty of withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect.
23. In the present case the learned Tribunal, upon remand
by this Court, has re-appreciated both oral and documentary
evidence. It has assigned cogent reasons for disbelieving the
version of the management witnesses i.e. MW1 and MW2,
particularly there are material contradictions in their testimonies,
improbability of the alleged incident occurring in a high-security
institution like NIMS without any contemporaneous complaint,
unexplained delay of more than 50 days in issuing the charge sheet,
and documentary evidence showing that the workman continued to
discharge duties normally, including submission of reports and
receipt of increment immediately after the alleged incident. The
learned Tribunal rightly held that the major charges were not
proved, and the plea of “loss of confidence” was unsupported by
cogent evidence. The contention of the company that the learned
Tribunal applied criminal standards of proof is not borne out from
the record. On the contrary, the learned Tribunal applied the
principle of preponderance of probabilities, but found the
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management’s case inherently unreliable. There is no perversity ,
no misapplication of law, and no violation of the remand directions
issued by this Court. Accordingly, this Court finds no merit in the
Writ Petition filed by the company.
24. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the
Company that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to domestic
enquiries and that findings can be based on preponderance of
probabilities, there can be no quarrel with the said proposition. The
decisions relied upon, including Onkar Nath Misra v. State of
Haryana , M/s. Francis Klein & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Their Workmen , and
The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.)
Ltd. v. The Management , lay down settled principles. However,
even on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, there
must exist some cogent and credible material to sustain the charge.
In the present case, such foundational evidence is conspicuously
absent. Further, the plea of “loss of confidence” advanced by the
Management cannot be accepted in the absence of established
misconduct. As rightly held by the learned Tribunal, such a plea
must be founded on tangible material demonstrating misuse of
28
position or breach of trust. A mere assertion, without supporting
evidence, cannot justify dismissal from service.
25. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for
the workman on Allahabad Bank v. Krishan Pal Singh’s case is
concerned, the said decision reiterates that reinstatement with full
back wages is not automatic and depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. In the present case, however, the
learned Tribunal has categorically held that the major charges were
not proved. Once the very foundation of the dismissal is held to be
unsustainable, the denial of full back wages and imposition of
penalty, in the absence of any proved misconduct, cannot be
justified.
26. The admitted position emerging from the record is that
the core charges of misconduct have not been proved. The learned
Tribunal itself recorded a categorical finding that the major
allegations are not established. Procedural lapses in the
disciplinary process were also noticed. Once such findings are
recorded, the normal consequence in service jurisprudence is
reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service, unless
there are compelling reasons to deny such relief.
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27. In the present case the learned Tribunal did not assign
any convincing reasons for restricting the back wages to 50%, and
imposing the penalty of withholding two increments with cumulative
effect. On the contrary, the material on record shows that the
workman continued duties after the alleged incident, was granted
increment shortly thereafter, no contemporaneous complaint or
action was taken. These factors clearly indicate that the alleged
misconduct was doubtful and not established. In such
circumstances, imposition of any penalty, even a minor one, is
unsustainable. Denial of back wages amounts to penalizing the
workman despite absence of proved misconduct, which is
impermissible in law. It is well settled that where termination is
found to be unjustified and not attributable to any proven
misconduct, full back wages ordinarily follow.
28. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the impugned Award of the learned Tribunal
does not warrant interference at the instance of the company.
However, the impugned Award requires modification to the extent it
denies full back wages and imposes penalty.
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29. Accordingly, the Writ Petition No. 1844 of 2004 filed by
the Company is dismissed, and the Writ Petition No.20970 of 2004
filed by the workman is allowed. Consequently, the impugned
Award dated 15.10.2003 passed in I.D.No.47 of 1995 is modified to
the extent that the workman shall be entitled to reinstatement with
continuity of service and full back wages. The penalty of
withholding two annual increments with cumulative effect is hereby
set aside. The Company is directed to implement the aforesaid
directions within a period of eight (8) weeks from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall
stand closed.
___________________
JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J
Date: 06-MAY-2026
KHRM