SRI KRISHNENDU MONDAL vs SWAPAN DEY
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
- Case type
- MEMORANDUM OF REVIEWS
- Decided on
- 01-04-2026
<div> <b>2026:CHC-OS:109</b><br /> IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA <br /> ORIGINAL SIDE <br /> Original Civil Jurisdiction <br /> BEFORE: <br /> The Hon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur <br /> <br /> RVWO/23/2024 <br /> WITH <br /> AP/818/2023 <br /> <br /> SRI KRISHNENDU MONDAL <br /> VS <br /> SWAPAN DEY <br /> <br /> <br /> For the petitioner : Mr. Dibyendu Chatterjee, Advocate <br /> Ms. Rashmi Ghosh, Advocate <br /> Ms. Parna Mukherjee, Advocate <br /> Mr. Rahul Deb Goenka, Advocate <br /> Mr. S. Chatterjee, Advocate <br /> <br /> For the respondent : Mr. Abhishek Kabir, Advocate <br /> <br /> Heard on : 1 April, 2026 <br /> <br /> Judgment on : 1 April, 2026 <br /> <br /> <b>Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.: </b><br /> <br /> 1. This is an application seeking review of an order dated 19 April 2024 <br /> passed in an application under section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and <br /> Conciliation Act, 1996. For convenience, the order dated 19 April, <br /> 2024 is set out below: <br /> <i>“The Court: It is fairly submitted by the petitioner that the instant </i><br /> <i>application is misconceived and there is no valid nor subsisting </i><br /> <i>arbitration clause by and between the parties. The respondent is </i><br /> <i>represented and submits that there has been gross fraud perpetrated </i><br /> <i>by the petitioner and that on the basis of an invalid and inoperative </i><br /> <i>arbitration clause, proceedings have also been filed under Section 9 of </i><br /> <i>the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the District Judge at </i><br /> <i>Alipore. For convenience, clause 17 of the agreement is set out </i><br /> <i>hereinbelow; </i><br /> <i>“17. That in event of any problem that the both party can appoint any </i><br /> <i>Arbitrator with the consent of other party.” </i><br /><br /> 2 <br /> <br /> <b>2026:CHC-OS:109</b><br /> <i>A perusal of the said clause would ex facie demonstrate that the same </i><br /> <i>is unintelligible and meaningless. There is lack of mutuality and no </i><br /> <i>consensus ad idem. In fact, there is no valid arbitration clause between </i><br /> <i>the parties. In such circumstances, as prayed for by the petitioner, </i><br /> <i>AP/818/2023 stands dismissed on the ground of maintainability. </i><br /> <i>Needless to mention, the incidental proceedings under Section 9 of the </i><br /> <i>Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are also misconceived and not </i><br /> <i>maintainable. Both parties are at liberty to take appropriate steps, </i><br /> <i>before the learned District Judge at Alipore in Misc. Case no. 15/2023, </i><br /> <i>in accordance with law.” </i><br /> <br /> 2. The present application for review has been filed on the ground that <br /> though the arbitration clause is cryptic but the intention is clear from <br /> the word “Arbitrator” that there was <i>consensus</i> to refer the disputes to <br /> arbitration. In this background, the applicants seeks review on the <br /> ground that there is an error apparent from the records and the <br /> application is liable to be allowed. In support of such contentions, the <br /> applicant relies on <i>Jagdish Chander vs. Ramesh Chander & Ors. </i><br /> <i>(2007) 5 SCC 719</i> , <b> </b> <i>Powertech World Wide Ltd. Vs. Delvin International </i><br /> <i>General Trading LLC (2012) 1 SCC 361 </i> and <b> </b> <i>Visa International Ltd. Vs. </i><br /> <i>Continental Resources (USA) Ltd. (2009) 2 SCC 55.</i> <br /> 3. On behalf of the respondent, it is submitted that there is no scope for <br /> review of an order passed under section 11 of the Act and the only <br /> remedy of the petitioner is to file an appeal. The jurisdiction of review <br /> cannot be invoked to reopen and reconsider a determination made <br /> under section 11 of the Act. In any event, in view of the recorded <br /> concession in the order dated 19 April, 2024, the applicant is <br /> estopped from seeking review of the order. There is no binding <br /> arbitration agreement between the parties. The word “Arbitrator” in <br /> the clause does not automatically make the same binding. In support <br /><br /> 3 <br /> <br /> <b>2026:CHC-OS:109</b><br /> of such contentions, the respondent relies on <i>Jagdish Chander vs. </i><br /> <i>Ramesh Chander & Ors. </i> (Supra), <i> BGM and M-Rpl-Jmct (JV) vs. Easter </i><br /> <i>Coalfields Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1471, (BVEPL Bhartia (JV) vs. </i><br /> <i>State of West Bengal & Ors. Judgment dated 22.05.2025 passed by a </i><br /> <i>Co-ordinate Bench in A.P.-Com 991 of 2024, Calcutta High Court </i> and <i> </i><br /> <i>South Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. SMS Ltd. (2026) 1 SCC </i><br /> <i>545</i> and <i>Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Shariff, (2011) 12 </i><br /> <i>SCC 658. </i><br /> 4. At the outset, the order dated 9 April 2024 was passed at the <br /> invitation of the petitioner. The concession made by the Advocates <br /> appearing for the petitioner is expressly recorded in the opening <br /> sentence <b> </b> of the order. There is no challenge to the said recording in <br /> this application. A mere change of Advocates does not give a ground to <br /> review the recording in the order. There is no mistake of the Court <br /> which warrants interference. [ <i>Vimleshwar Nagappa Shet vs Noor </i><br /> <i>Ahmad Sheriff and Ors. (Supra)</i> ] <i>.</i> <br /> 5. It is now well-settled that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is <br /> a self-contained Code and the scope for judicial intervention is limited <br /> in cases where an order is passed under section 11 of the Act. The <br /> only remedy available to a party is to approach the Hon’ble Supreme <br /> Court challenging the said order or raise the question of jurisdiction <br /> before the Arbitral Tribunal. It has been repeatedly reiterated that <br /> attempts to re-agitate issues through the back-door of what the <br /> statute has expressly prohibited is impermissible. Any attempt to <br /> review an order passed under Section 11(6) of the Act goes against the <br /><br /> 4 <br /> <br /> <b>2026:CHC-OS:109</b><br /> grain of the Act and undermines the principle of minimal judicial <br /> interference. [ <i>Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. Vs. Bihar Rajya </i><br /> <i>Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd. (Supra),</i> <b> </b> <i>BSNL vs. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd. </i><br /> <i>(Supra)]</i> . <br /> 6. In any event, apart from the question of maintainability even on <br /> merits there is no question for re-opening the order dated 19 April <br /> 2024. The use of the expression ‘ <i>can’</i> in the arbitration clause does <br /> not indicate finality nor conclusiveness. An arbitration agreement <br /> must reflect a definitive and mutual intention to refer the disputes to <br /> arbitration. The agreement must contemplate a binding and <br /> enforceable resolution of disputes. There must be both clarity and <br /> certainty in an arbitration clause. There is something incomplete and <br /> tentative about the arbitration clause and the same requires the <br /> parties to arrive at a further agreement to go to arbitration. An <br /> agreement requiring further consent is not a binding arbitration <br /> agreement. There is an element of contingency which is left in the <br /> arbitration clause which makes the same tentative, optional and <br /> incapable of enforcement. It is not the role of any Court to fill in the <br /> gaps in case the arbitration clause is inaccurately or inartistically <br /> drafted. In this connection, the decision in <i>Visa International Ltd. </i><br /> <i>(Supra) </i> is distinguishable. In the said decision, the arbitration clause <br /> provided that the disputes “shall be finally settled”. The use of the <br /> word ‘shall’ indicated a clear binding and unequivocal intention of the <br /> parties to refer the disputes to arbitration. To this extent, the mere <br /> use of the word ‘ <i>Arbitrator’</i> is irrelevant and is not conclusive insofar <br /><br /> 5 <br /> <br /> <b>2026:CHC-OS:109</b><br /> as the arbitration clause is concerned. [ <i>Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh </i><br /> <i>Chander & Ors.</i> (Supra), <i>BGM and M-Rpl-Jmct (JV) v. Easter Coalfields </i><br /> <i>Limited </i> (Supra). <i> BVEPL Bhartia (JV) v. State of West Bengal & Ors. </i><br /> (Supra) <i>. South Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. SMS Limited </i><br /> (Supra)]. <i> </i><br /> <br /> 7. In view of the above, the present application is dismissed both on the <br /> grounds of maintainability and on the merits. <br /> <br /> <br /> (Ravi Krishan Kapur, J.) </div>