State vs Sanjay
- Court
- Delhi High Court
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 24.08.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 01.09.2026
# CNR No. DLHC011478782016
+ CRL.A. 479/2016
STATE .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State with
SI Parminder, P.S. Nihal Vihar.
Versus
SANJAY .....Respondent
Through: Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. In this appeal filed under Section 378 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Cr.P.C.), the State in Sl. No. 392/1
on the file of the Metropolitan Magistrate – 08, West District,
Delhi, assails the judgment dated 26.08.2013 as per which the sole
accused has been acquitted of the offence punishable under
Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the IPC).
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2. The prosecution case is that, on 12.11.2009, at about
09:15 a.m., PW5 was riding a bicycle with his mother as pillion
rider heading towards Kamaruddin Nagar, and when he reached C
Block, Naresh Park Extension, the accused, driving tempo bearing
registration no. DL 1 LE 2469 from the opposite direction in a rash
and negligent manner so as to endanger the human life and safety,
knocked them down as a result of which both of them were thrown
on to the road. The tempo’s right front wheel ran over PW5’s
mother, crushing her to death on the spot. Hence, as per the
chargesheet/final report, the accused is alleged to have committed
the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC.
3. On the basis of Ext. PW5/A FIS/FIR of PW5, given on
12.11.2009, crime no. 277/2009, Nihal Vihar police station, was
registered by PW2, Head Constable (HC). PW10, Assistant Sub-
Inspector (ASI) conducted the investigation into the crime and on
completion of the same, filed the chargesheet/ final report alleging
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the commission of the offences punishable under the
aforementioned sections.
4. When the accused was produced before the trial court,
all the copies of the prosecution records were furnished to him as
contemplated under Section 207 Cr.P.C. As contemplated under
Section 251 Cr.PC, the particulars of the offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 304A IPC was read over and explained to
the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty.
5. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs 1 to 11 were
examined and Ext. PW1/A-B, PW2/A-C, PW3/A-B, PW4/A,
PW5/A-E, PW7/A, PW8/A, PW9/A, PW10/A-F, PW11/A, Mark
A, Mark D1 and Ext. P1 to P11 were marked in support of the
case.
6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused
was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.P.C. regarding the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence
of the prosecution. The accused denied all those circumstances and
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maintained his innocence. The accused submitted that he has been
falsely implicated in the case.
7. No oral or documentary evidence was adduced by the
accused.
8. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary
evidence on record, and after hearing both sides, the trial court,
vide the impugned judgment dated 26.08.2013, acquitted the
accused under Section 255(1) Cr.P.C. of the offences punishable
under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. Aggrieved, the State has
preferred this appeal.
9. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing on
behalf of the state, submitted that the trial court failed to properly
appreciate the ocular and medical evidence available on record. It
is further submitted that the testimony of PW5 clearly establishes
that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of
the accused.
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10. When the appeal was taken up for hearing, the
respondent was present in person. However, the counsel was
absent. On an earlier occasion also, that is, on 25.03.2026 when the
matter was taken up for hearing, the lawyer never turned up. As
the appeal is of the year 2016, this Court was not inclined to
further adjourn the case. Hence, relying on the dictum in Bani
Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 , this Court is
proceeding to consider the appeal on merits after going through the
entire records of the case.
11. The only point that arises for consideration in the
present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
12. I make a brief reference to the oral and documentary
evidence relied on by the prosecution in support of the case. Ext.
PW5/A FIS/FIR of PW5 recorded on 12.11.2009 in Hindi,
translated reads thus:- “…Today, On 12-11-2009, I was taking my
mother Smt. Prem, on my bicycle to Kamruddin Nagar, Nangloi
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for work. At around 09:15 AM, when we reached C-block, Naresh
Park Docks, a tempo bearing No. DL 1L E-2469 came from the
opposite direction. The driver (the accused) was driving the tempo
at a very high speed in a very rash and negligent manner. I tried
my best to avoid the tempo to moving my bicycle to my side but the
tempo driver hit my bicycle from the front side. As a result, I fell
from the bicycle and landed at some distance from the tempo,
while my mother, Smt. Prem, (the deceased) also fell from the
bicycle. The right front tyre of the tempo ran over her head and
crushed her. Someone informed the police and the PCR Vehicle
arrived at the spot and took me and my mother, Smt. Prem to
Sanjay Gandhi Hospital, Mangol Puri, Delhi. The doctor at the
hospital declared my mother dead. The accident occurred due to
the rash and negligent driving of the tempo at a very high speed.
The driver left his tempo and fled from the spot. I can identify him
if he is produced before me…”
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12.1. PW5, when examined before the trial court, deposed
that on 12.11.2009 at about 09:15 a.m., he was on his way to work
with his mother from their house towards Kamaruddin Nagar,
Nangloi. He was riding a bicycle, while his mother was the pillion
rider. When they reached C Block, Naresh Park Extension, tempo
bearing registration no. DL 1 LE 2469 came from the opposite
direction and the same was being driven by the accused at a very
high speed. He was riding on the left side of the road and, despite
his best efforts to save himself, the tempo hit his bicycle, as a
result of which he fell at some distance, while his mother fell in
front of the tempo. The right front wheel of the tempo ran over his
mother's head, causing her head to be crushed on the spot. The
accused stopped the tempo at some distance, came towards his
mother and, upon seeing her condition, immediately fled from the
spot. Someone called the police, whereafter a PCR van arrived and
took him and his mother to SGM Hospital, Mangol Puri, where his
mother was declared brought dead. According to PW5, the
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accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of the
accused. PW5 further deposed that he visited the spot along with
the police officials and that the police had prepared the site plan
and seized his bicycle and the offending tempo vide Ext. PW5/B
and Ext. PW5/C seizure memos respectively.
13. PW5 in his cross examination, deposed that he himself
had noted the registration number of the offending vehicle. At the
time of the incident, he was riding his bicycle through the left side
of the road. He admitted that he had not stated either the exact or
approximate speed of the offending vehicle to the police and had
only stated that the vehicle was driven at great speed. On being
questioned by the Court regarding the approximate speed of the
offending vehicle, PW5 answered that he is unable to say as he had
never driven any motor vehicle. He had stated to the police that the
offending vehicle came from the front side at a high speed and that
it was being driven in a rash and negligent manner. PW5 initially
stated that he had not visited the scene of occurrence with the
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police on the date of the incident after his statement had been
recorded. He thereafter deposed that after the incident he did go to
the spot with the police officials, though he was unable to recall
the number of visits to the scene. PW5 admitted that the site plan
had not been prepared in his presence. PW5 denied the suggestion
that the incident occurred due to his own negligence or that his
bicycle had struck the left side of the tempo and not on the right
side of the offending vehicle. PW5 denied having lodged a false
complaint to obtain compensation from the owner or Insurance
Company of the offending vehicle.
14. PW10, then ASI, the investigating officer (the I.O.)
deposed regarding the various steps taken during the course of
investigation. On receipt of Ext. PW2/C DD No. 13-A, he along
with PW9 Constable went to the place of incident at C-1, Naresh
Park Extension, Nihal Vihar, where one tempo bearing registration
No. DL-1LE-2469 and one bicycle were found. He came to know
that the injured had been taken to the hospital in a PCR van. He
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recorded the statement of PW5, which is Ext. PW5/A. Thereafter,
he returned to the spot along with PW5 and prepared Ext. PW10/B
site plan. He took photographs of the place of incident, which have
been exhibited as Ex. P-1 to P-11. He seized the bicycle and the
offending tempo bearing registration No. DL-1LE-2469 vide Ext.
PW5/B and Ext. PW5/C seizure memos. PW3, the owner of the
offending vehicle, was served with Ext. PW10/D notice under
Section 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act to which he gave Ext.
PW3/B reply to the effect that it was the accused who was driving
his tempo at the time of the incident. He thereafter arrested the
accused vide Ext. PW5/D arrest memo and conducted personal
search vide Ext. PW5/E memo. The documents of the vehicle were
seized vide Ex. PW9/A seizure memo. The driving license of the
accused was seized vide Ext. PW10/E seizure memo. On
13.11.2009, pursuant to Ext. PW10/F request, mechanical
inspection of the offending vehicle was conducted by PW4
Mechanical Inspector, who gave Ext. PW4/A report.
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15. PW4, a diploma holder in Automobile Engineering,
deposed that he had inspected the TATA tempo bearing
registration no. DLlLE2469 at the request of the IO and had issued
Ext. PW6/A report. According to PW4, he found fresh damage,
that is, a slight dent on the left side corner of the vehicle.
16. As is evident, the present appeal is from a judgment of
acquittal by the trial court. The Appellate Court under Section
386(1) Cr.P.C, may in an appeal from an order of acquittal, reverse
such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the
accused may be retried or committed for trial, as the case may be,
or find the accused guilty and pass sentence on him according to
law. The general principles regarding the powers of the appellate
court while dealing with an appeal against acquittal are:- firstly,
the appellate court has the power to review, re-appreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded. Secondly, the Code puts no limitation, restriction or
condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the
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evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law. Thirdly, various expressions, such as,
“substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail the extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to
emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an
acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the
evidence and to come to its own conclusion. Fourthly, an appellate
court, however, must bear in mind that in the case of acquittal,
there is a double presumption in favour of the accused, that is, (i)
the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law, (ii) the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
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reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. Lastly, if two
reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial court. (See Babu Sahebogouda
Rudragoudar and others vs. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC
149 , Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 ,
Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 ).
17. As observed by the Apex court in Ram Kumar vs.
State of Haryana, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 248 , the powers of the
High Court in an appeal from order of acquittal to reassess the
evidence and reach its own conclusions under Sections 378 and
379 Cr.P.C. are as extensive as in any appeal against the order of
conviction. But as a rule of prudence, it is desirable that the High
Court should give proper weight and consideration to the view of
the trial court with regard to the credibility of the witness, the
presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, the right of
accused to the benefit of any doubt and the slowness of appellate
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court in reversing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge who had
the advantage of seeing the witness. If the main grounds on which
the trial court has based its order acquitting the accused, are
reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and
effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not
disturb the order of acquittal.
18. The respondent/accused is alleged to have committed
the offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. The
offence under Section 279 IPC is made out when a person drives
or rides any vehicle on any public way in a manner so rash or
negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or
injury to any person. The offence under Section 304A IPC is
attracted when death of any person is caused by doing any rash or
negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide. To bring a case
of homicide under Section 304A IPC, the following conditions
must exist, namely, (i) there must be death of the person in
question; (ii) the accused must have caused such death; and (iii)
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that such act of the accused was rash or negligent and that it does
not amount to culpable homicide. The section deals with homicidal
death by rash or negligent act.
18.1. As held in Naresh Giri vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2008) 1 SCC 791 , Section 304A IPC applies to cases where there
is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done
in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at
offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section
304A IPC applies only to such acts which are rash and negligent
and are directly the cause of the death of another person.
Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section
304A IPC.
18.2. The criminality as far as rash acts are concerned, lies in
running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or
indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence occurs
when there is gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise the
required care and precaution to guard against injury, either to the
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public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having
regard to all the circumstances, was the imperative duty of the
accused person to have adopted. In other words, negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon
the considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or, the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do.
19. Coming to the case on hand, the presence of the
accused at the time of the incident, the fact that he was driving the
offending vehicle, and the death of the deceased arising out of the
incident are not seen disputed. The only question that remains for
consideration by this Court is whether the incident resulting in the
death of the deceased was caused by the rash and negligent act of
the accused. To establish the aforesaid ingredient, the prosecution
has placed reliance solely upon the testimony of PW5, who was
riding the bicycle on which the deceased was travelling as a pillion
rider. However, his testimony does not establish that the accused
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was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. He only
deposed that the accused was driving the vehicle in great speed as
well as rashly and negligently. Mere occurrence of a road traffic
incident, which results in a fatality, cannot ipso facto lead to an
inference of rashness or negligence on the part of the driver.
According to PW5, when the tempo hit his bicycle, he was also
thrown on to the road and he fell at a distance. But he is not seen to
have sustained any injuries. This appears highly unlikely, because
if a person is thrown on to the road, in all probability there would
be some abrasion or contusion. PW5 is also not seen examined by
a doctor. The testimony of PW5 is silent as to the manner in which
the accused was rash and negligent. PW5 only deposed that the
accused was driving his vehicle at a very high speed. Vehicles are
intended to be driven in speed. Merely because the vehicle was
driven at high speed would not mean that the driver was rash or
negligent by itself. ' High speed ' or ' over speed ' are relative terms. It
is for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to
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what is meant by ' high speed ' in the facts and circumstances of the
case. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential
to the establishment of the offences alleged against an accused
always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of
innocence in favour of accused until the contrary is proved.
Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some
statutory exceptions. In the absence of any material on record, no
presumption of 'rashness' or 'negligence' can be drawn by invoking
the maxim “ res ipsa loquitur ”.
20. Further, a perusal of Ext. PW4/A, the mechanical
inspection report, read with the testimony of PW4 establishes that
the offending vehicle had sustained damage in the form of a slight
dent on its left side corner. However, as per the version of PW5,
the offending vehicle had come from the opposite side and had hit
the bicycle. According to PW5, he was riding through on the left
side of the road. If the incident had occurred in the manner
deposed by PW5, the impact would ordinarily have resulted in
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damage to the right side of the offending vehicle. Contrary to the
same, the mechanical inspection reveals damage to its left side.
This material inconsistency between the version of PW5 and report
of the inspection of the vehicle further renders his version doubtful
and weakens the prosecution case regarding the alleged rash and
negligent driving on the part of the accused. It is no doubt true that
a witness cannot be expected to narrate every minute detail with
mathematical precision. Nevertheless, in a case alleging offences
punishable under Sections 279 and 304A IPC, the prosecution is
required to establish not merely the occurrence of the incident but
that the incident was the direct consequence of the rashness or
negligence of the accused driving the vehicle. In the present case,
the testimony of PW5 does not provide any material from which it
can be reasonably inferred that the accused was driving the
offending tempo in a rash or negligent manner.
21. Coming to Ext. PW10/B site plan, the same appears to
have been prepared in a rather mechanical manner and does not
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contain any meaningful description of the scene of occurrence. A
perusal of Ext. PW10/B reveals that it is merely a rough sketch
depicting the place of occurrence, along with a note given at the
foot of the site plan, recorded in Hindi, which translated, reads as
follows: “ 1. The spot map (site plan) has been prepared without a
scale. 2. In the spot map, mark ‘A’ is the place where the accident
is stated/reported to have occurred. ”
22. The site plan does not indicate even the width of the
road at the place of occurrence. Therefore, there is no material on
record to find out whether the accused had in fact strayed into the
wrong side of the road. Further, the site plan has also not been
proved. PW5 in his cross examination admitted the site plan had
not been prepared in his presence. If so, who identified the place of
occurrence to PW10, the I.O? PW10 apparently was not an eye
witness. In such circumstances, how did he prepare the site plan?
No answer is forthcoming from the prosecution.
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23. The material(s) on record do not furnish sufficient basis
to infer the requisite rashness or negligence on the part of the
accused. In such circumstances, I find that the trial court was
justified in acquitting the accused. I find no infirmity in the
impugned judgment calling for an interference by this Court.
24. In the result, the appeal sans merit is dismissed.
25. Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
SEPTEMBER 01, 2026
rs/ p’ma
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