State of Telangana vs Bandari Rajaiah
- Court
- High Court for the State of Telangana
* THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY
AND
*THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
+ WRIT APPEAL No. 6 of 2025
Between:
State of Telangana,
Represented by its Principal Secretary to Government,
I & CAD Department, Secretariat Buildings,
Saifabad, Hyderabad & others … Appellants
AND
Bandari Rajaiah and others … Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 03.09.2026
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
1. Whether Reporters of Local
newspapers may be allowed to see
the Judgment ?
: Yes/No
2. Whether the copies of judgment
: Yes/No
may be marked to Law
Reports/Journals
3. Whether Their Lordship/Ladyship
: Yes/No
wish to see the fair copy of
judgment
_____________________________
P. SAM KOSHY , J
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
-2-
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT APPEAL No. 6 of 2025
% 03.09.2026
Between:
# State of Telangana,
Represented by its Principal Secretary to Government,
I & CAD Department, Secretariat Buildings,
Saifabad, Hyderabad & others … Appellants
AND
$ Bandari Rajaiah and others …Respondents
! Counsel for the Appellants : Mr. P. Sridhar Reddy,
learned Special GP attached
to the office of learned
Advocate General
^ Counsel for Respondents : Mr. G. Chandan Raaj
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1. 2012 (6) ALT 220
2. 1997 (2) ALT 429 (S.B.)
3. (1994) 4 SCC 67 = 1994 LACC 365 (SC)
4. 1996 A.P. High Court Notes 298
5. (1995) 2 SCC 736
6. (2003) 7 SCC 280
7. AIR 2004 AP 1 = 2003 (6) ALT 353 (F.B.)
8. 2000 (2) ALT 519 (D.B.) = 2000 (3) ALD 43
1
9. (2002) 7 SCC 273
10. AIR 1966 SC 735
11. (2020) 13 SCC 285
12. AIR 1966 SC 81
13. (2007) 11 SCC 447
14. (1985) 3 SCC 737
15. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 968
16. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725
17. (2020) 2 SCC 569
-3-
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P. SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY
WRIT APPEAL No.6 of 2025
(CNR No.HBHC010534442024)
Dated: 03.09.2026
Between:
State of Telangana,
Represented by its Principal Secretary to Government,
I & CAD Department, Secretariat Buildings,
Saifabad, Hyderabad & others
… Appellants
AND
Bandari Rajaiah, S/o. Neelaiah, aged about 69 years,
R/o. Hathini Village, Dahegaon Mandal,
Kumuram Bheem Asifabad District, and 54 others.
… Respondents
JUDGMENT: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice Vakiti Ramakrishna Reddy)
This intra-Court appeal, preferred under Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent, is directed against the order dated 21.08.2023
passed in W.P.No.16034 of 2023. By the said order, the learned
Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants
herein to re-determine the compensation payable to the
respondents/writ petitioners by taking into consideration the
compensation fixed by the order dated 05.02.2018 in
L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil
Judge, Asifabad, and to pay the differential compensation within a
-4-
period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the
order.
2. We have heard Mr. P. Sridhar Reddy, learned Special
Government Pleader attached to the office of the learned Advocate
General, appearing for the appellants, and Mr. G. Chandan Raaj,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents/writ petitioners.
Both sides have filed written submissions along with a compilation
of authorities, which we have considered together with the record
of the writ petition and the material placed before us.
3. The controversy in the present case turns on a specific
question. Fifty-five persons who lost their residential houses on
account of an acquisition made in the years 2002 and 2003
applied for a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) within the time prescribed by the
statute. Their applications, however, were rejected by the Land
Acquisition Officer on the sole ground that they had received the
compensation without protest. Ten other awardees under the very
same award obtained enhanced compensation in L.A.O.P.No.32 of
2011. The petitioners thereafter sought re-determination of
compensation under Section 28-A of the Act on the basis of such
enhancement. The question that, therefore, arises for our
consideration is whether their applications can be rejected on the
-5-
ground that it is barred by the period of limitation prescribed by
Section 28-A of the Act.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE
4. The residential houses and lands situated within the village
limits of Hathini, Dahegaon Mandal, Kumuram Bheem Asifabad
District (erstwhile Adilabad District) came to be acquired for
submergence under the P.P. Rao Project. The requisition was made
by the Executive Engineer, I & CAD, P.P. Rao Project Division,
Bellampally, by letter No.BD/297/M dated 15.01.2002, for
acquisition of the abadi (houses) of Hathini village. On the report of
the then Mandal Revenue Officer and the Assistant Director
(S&LR), Adilabad, the draft notification was approved by the
District Collector, Adilabad, was issued in Gazette No.9/2001-1
dated 06.03.2002 and was published on 11.03.2002. The
declaration was published simultaneously on the same day.
5. On completion of the process, the Revenue Divisional Officer
and Land Acquisition Officer, Asifabad passed Award
No.B/628/2002 dated 26.05.2003 in respect of 532 structures.
The compensation determined thereunder was confined to the
estimated value furnished by the engineering authority. It is the
specific case of the writ petitioners that the two other components
of compensation, namely solatium and additional market value,
-6-
were omitted altogether, and that the award was to that extent
contrary to the mandate of Section 23 of the Act.
6. Within six weeks of the award, on 05.07.2003, the writ
petitioners submitted applications under Section 18 of the Act
seeking a reference to the competent civil Court for proper
determination of compensation. Those applications were rejected
by the Revenue Divisional Officer by Memo No.B/628/2002 dated
01.08.2003, on the ground that the compensation amount had not
been received “under protest”.
7. Some of the awardees covered by the same award, Sri
Tallapally Linga Rao and nine others, were, however, referred to
the civil Court. That reference was numbered as L.A.O.P.No.32 of
2011 on the file of the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad,
and was allowed by judgment and decree dated 05.02.2018,
enhancing the compensation. The said judgment and decree were
confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in L.A.A.S. No.32 of
2019 by judgment dated 20.01.2020.
8. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioners submitted
representations on 21.02.2009, 04.02.2010, 17.04.2010 and
02.04.2013 before respondent Nos.2 and 3, seeking release of the
missing components of compensation, namely 30% solatium and
-7-
12% additional market value. No orders were passed on those
representations. It is also on record that a learned Single Judge of
this Court disposed of W.P.No.15911 of 2011 by order dated
06.07.2012, which is reported in Kalvala Padma v. Government of
1
Andhra Pradesh
, and that the writ petitioners thereafter sought to
have their applications under Section 18 of the Act treated as
applications under Section 28-A of the Act for re-determination of
compensation on the basis of the award of the reference Court.
9. On coming to know of the enhancement obtained by the
above said ten awardees, the writ petitioners, along with a large
number of other awardees, approached the Land Acquisition
Officer and Revenue Divisional Officer, Kagaznagar in the last week
of October 2020 with applications for re-determination of the
market value under Section 28-A of the Act, relying upon the
judgment dated 05.02.2018 in L.A.O.P. No.32 of 2011. It is stated
in the counter affidavit of the fourth respondent that those
applications were entertained; that the Land Acquisition Officer
proceeded to pass an award in respect of 523 awardees, including
100 persons taken up suo motu ; and that a draft award in terms of
Section 28-A of the Act was submitted to the District Collector,
Kumuram Bheem Asifabad, with a request to approve the same.
1
2012 (6) ALT 220
-8-
10. In April 2021 the District Collector returned the proposals
with a direction to re-examine them with reference to the original
file and the original applications under Section 28-A. On such re-
examination, the Revenue Divisional Officer and Land Acquisition
Officer, Kagaznagar rejected all 423 applications for re-
determination by proceedings No.B/628/2002-1 dated 14.07.2021,
on the ground that the applications had been filed after a lapse of
935 days from 05.02.2018, whereas an application under Section
28-A of the Act was required to be filed within 90 days.
11. According to the writ petitioners, the said proceedings dated
14.07.2021 were served only on three out of the fifty-five writ
petitioners, and they came to know of the rejection only on receipt
of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. W.P. No.16034 of
2023 was thereafter filed seeking a writ of mandamus directing the
respondents to re-determine the compensation in respect of the
lands and structures of the writ petitioners by treating the
objections filed under Section 18 of the Act as applications under
Section 28-A of the Act, and to pay the full compensation together
with solatium, additional market value and interest in terms of the
judgment in L.A.O.P. No.32 of 2011 as confirmed in appeal.
-9-
12. The fourth respondent filed a counter affidavit resisting the
writ petition on the grounds noticed above, and the first writ
petitioner filed a reply affidavit traversing the same.
THE ORDER UNDER APPEAL
13. The learned Single Judge, on a consideration of the material
on record, recorded that there was no dispute about the factual
aspects of the case and that the submission of the applications
under Section 18 of the Act on 05.07.2003 was well within time.
Relying upon the decision of this Court in Kotipalli Chitti v. Special
2
Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition for ONGC , which in turn
followed the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh v.
3
State of Punjab and the decision in Sode Pentaiah v. Land
4
Acquisition Officer and Special Deputy Collector, IPT & Railways ,
the learned Single Judge held that mere non-recording of protest
while receiving compensation does not preclude a land loser from
seeking a reference under Section 18 of the Act, if such a request is
made within the time stipulated therein. The relevant portion of the
decision in Kotipalli Chitti’s case (supra) extracted in the order
under appeal reads as follows:
“Thus, even though there is no express protest in the
acquittance register at the time of receiving the compensation, there
is clear admission on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer that the
2
1997 (2) ALT 429 (S.B.)
3
(1994) 4 SCC 67 = 1994 LACC 365 (SC)
4
1996 A.P. High Court Notes 298
-10-
petitioner herein not having satisfied with the compensation
awarded, presented the application under Section 18(2) of the Act for
referring the matter to the Court. In view of this application under
Section 18(2) of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer made the
reference and the same has been numbered as O.P. No. 33/1989.
In "Ajit Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors." , 1994
LACC 365 (S.C.), the Supreme Court held that inasmuch as the
appellants have filed an application for reference under Section 18 of
the Act that will manifest their intention and therefore, the protest
against the award of the Collector is implied notwithstanding the
acceptance of compensation. Following the said Supreme Court
decision, in a recent case in "Sode Pentaiah v. The Land Acquisition
Officer & Special Deputy Collector, IPT & Railways", 1996 A.P. High
Court Notes 298 my learned brother Rajagopala Reddy, J. also held
that persons who took the compensation without any express protest
but filed applications for reference on the same day are also entitled
to claim for enhancement of compensation as there was implied
protest. I am in full agreement with the said observations.
In the instant case also as the revision-petitioner filed the
application under Section 18 of the Act immediately after receiving
the amount and the notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, there is
implied protest against the compensation awarded. Therefore the
reference is maintainable even in the absence of express protest at
the time of receiving the compensation. As seen from the impugned
order, the learned Judge was carried away by the absence of
express protest in the acquittance register. He has not considered the
application submitted under Section 18(2) of the Act requesting the
Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference to the Civil Court on the
ground that he was not satisfied with the compensation awarded.
Therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.
In the result, the revision petition is allowed. The order in
I.A. No. 163/92 in O.P. No. 33/1989 is set aside. The learned
Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry is directed to dispose of the O.P.
No. 33 /1989 within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of
-11-
this order. The office is directed to forward the records to the lower
Court within (10) days. Parties are directed to bear their costs in this
appeal.”
14. Proceeding on that basis, the learned Single Judge held in
paragraph 4 of the order under appeal:
“4. In the light of the above, the ground on which the request made by
the petitioners for reference under Section 18 of the Act was negatived
vide memo No.B/628/2002, dated 01.08.2003, cannot be sustained
under law. As already observed above, the said memo is not
challenged by the petitioners. But, there are sufficient pleadings on
record contending that the said memo is contrary to law.”
15. In paragraph 5, after referring to the object of Section 18 of
the Act and to the decision in Kalvala Padma’s case (supra) , the
learned Single Judge held:
“5. In the light of the settled legal position in this regard, this
Court is inclined to take the pleadings on record as the one
questioning the said memo, dated 01.08.2010. Even otherwise,
Section 18 of the Act, is incorporated into the Act, 1894 to enable the
land losers to claim for just Compensation as against the arbitrary
compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Though the
petitioners invoked the said provision well within time in accordance
with law, the same was negatived in an arbitrary manner and all the
petitioners herein are the persons belonging to poor downtrodden with
rural background. From the vakalath filed in this writ petition, it is
seen that all of them are illiterate and thumb impression holders. May
be for want of proper and timely legal advice and for want of sufficient
financial assistance, the petitioners could not have prosecuted the
matter in an effective manner. Hence, they failed to question the memo
dated 01.08.2003. This Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under
Section 226 of the constitution of India, having noticed the irregularity
and illegality committed by the respondent No.4 in rejecting the
request made by the petitioners under Section 18 of the Act is unable
-12-
to remain as a silent spectator especially in the context of the fact that
the petitioners, who lost their residential houses and properties as
early as in the year 2003 have been continuously pursuing the matter
for enhancement of compensation. In the light of the above, this Court
is of the considered view that it is the bounded duty of this Court to
raise to the occasion in such circumstances and grant relief to the
petitioners, directing the respondent No.4 to refer the matter under
Section 18 of the Act to the competent civil Court for considering their
claim for enhancement of compensation. But, taking into consideration
the fact that some of the land losers, who lost their lands and covered
by very same draft notification, and award have already sought
reference under Section 18 of the Act and the same was answered by
the Court of the Senior Civil Judge at Asifabad in L.A.O.P.No.32 of
2011 by a judgment dated 05.2.2018 and the same was also
confirmed by a Division Bench of this Court, this Court is of the
considered view that instead of directing respondent No.4 to refer the
matter to the competent civil Court, under Section 18 of the Act, it
would be just and proper in peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case on hand to declare that the petitioners are entitled for payment of
compensation at the rates as fixed by the order dated 05.02.2018 in
L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Asifabad.”
16. The portion of the decision in Kalvala Padma’s case (supra)
relied upon and extracted by the learned Single Judge reads thus:
“It is true that this Court does not entertain writ petitions,
which are barred by laches. However, the writ petitions filed
seeking enforcement of the rights under the Act, particularly for
reference under Section 18, stand on a different footing. Support for
this proposition can be drawn from the concept of re-determination
of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. In a given case, it
may take more than a decade for the decree passed by a Civil
Court in a reference made under Section 18 of the Act, at the
instance of owners of the land acquired through the same
notification; to become final. Still, remedy would be available to the
person, who did not seek reference. When such is the facility
-13-
provided for by the Parliament, the High Court would ill afford to be
hyper-technical. Failure on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer,
to refer the matter under Section 18 of the Act, if the application is
otherwise in order; cannot be permitted to defeat the valuable
rights of the persons, whose lands are acquired.”
17. The operative portion of the order under appeal is in
paragraph 6, which reads:
“6. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed directing the
respondents to re-determine the compensation payable to the
petitioners by duly taking into consideration the compensation fixed in
the order dated 05.02.2018 passed in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 on the
file of Senior Civil Judge at Asifabad and pay the differential
compensation to the petitioners within a period of three (3) months
from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. This Course is all the
more necessary to avoid further delay in doing justice to the
petitioners who were denied the same in the year, 1983.”
18. We may now notice the rival contentions. Both sides have
placed their cases before us in writing, and we set out only such of
the submissions as bearing upon the questions arising in this
appeal, together with the authorities relied upon in support of
them.
RIVAL SUBMISSIONS:
(a) Submissions on behalf of the Appellants
19. In support of the appeal, written submissions dated
14.07.2026 have been filed on behalf of the appellants through the
office of the learned Advocate General. The case set out therein is
that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on
-14-
06.03.2002 and the declaration under Section 6 followed on
07.03.2002; that the Land Acquisition Officer passed the award
determining compensation as per the eligibility of the awardees;
that the writ petitioners applied for a reference under Section 18 of
the Act on 05.07.2003, which application was rejected on
01.08.2003 on the ground that they had not protested while
receiving the compensation, and that the order of rejection, never
having been challenged, has become final; that some of the
awardees covered by the same notification were referred to the civil
Court in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011, in which the compensation was
enhanced two-fold, and that the appeal preferred by the State in
L.A.A.S.No.32 of 2019 was dismissed on 20.01.2020; and that the
writ petitioners thereafter applied under Section 28-A of the Act in
October 2020, beyond the statutory period, for which reason the
Land Acquisition Officer rejected their applications as barred by
limitation by order dated 14.07.2021.
20. Upon that foundation, learned Special Government Pleader
contended that the applications for re-determination were made
beyond the period of three months prescribed by Section 28-A of
the Act and were rightly rejected. He extracted the provision and
placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
-15-
5
Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari , in which the conditions
governing an application under that provision were set out, and
submitted that condition (iv) is not satisfied because the writ
petitioners had themselves made an application to the Collector
under Section 18 of the Act on 05.07.2003 and had never
challenged its rejection, and that condition (v) is not satisfied
because the application for re-determination was made with a
delay of 983 days. He further relied upon State of A.P. v. Marri
6
Venkaiah , in which it was held that although Section 28-A of the
Act is a beneficial provision, the advantage of the benefit conferred
must be taken within the stipulated time, and that whosoever
wishes to take advantage of beneficial legislation has to be vigilant
and must at least make efforts to find out whether other
landowners have filed reference applications and with what result.
21. It was further submitted, that the writ petitioners never
challenged the orders of rejection passed by the Land Acquisition
Officer, and that the learned Single Judge, without any pleading in
that behalf, directed the authorities to re-determine the
compensation payable to the writ petitioners duly taking into
consideration the compensation fixed in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 and
pay differential compensation to the petitioners; that the learned
5
(1995) 2 SCC 736
6
(2003) 7 SCC 280
-16-
Single Judge did not advert to the purport of Section 28-A of the
Act or to the time frame prescribed by it, and did not discuss the
specific contention raised in that behalf; and that the objections
raised in the counter affidavit went unnoticed. In the course of oral
arguments it was added that the delay of nearly twenty years in
approaching the writ Court was not considered; that ignorance of
law cannot be used as a weapon to approach the Court belatedly;
that the finding of continuous pursuit is contrary to the record;
that the decision in Kalvala Padma was wrongly applied, the facts
being distinguishable; and that the direction to pay compensation
at the rate fixed in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 is unsustainable, the writ
petitioners not being parties to that reference.
22. In the course of the deliberations on 20.08.2026, this Court
sought to know from the learned Special Government Pleader
whether, in the course of calculation of compensation, solatium
and other statutory amounts would also be added to the
compensation quantified. On instructions, the learned Special
Government Pleader fairly submitted that solatium under Section
23(2), the additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and interest
under Sections 28 and 34 of the Act are statutory components
consequential to the determination of compensation, and these
-17-
components have neither been awarded nor included in the award
passed by the Land acquisition Officer.
(b) Submissions on behalf of the Respondents/ Writ Petitioners
23. On behalf of the respondents/writ petitioners, written
submissions have been filed comprising a synopsis, a list of dates
and events, the questions said to arise for consideration, a seriatim
answer to the appellants’ written arguments and a compilation of
authorities. The principal submission is that the appeal proceeds
upon a mischaracterisation of the respondents’ case. They are not
strangers to the reference remedy who approached the Collector for
the first time under Section 28-A of the Act after an inordinate
interval; they are awardees who invoked Section 18 of the Act
within six weeks of the award, on 05.07.2003, and whose
applications were rejected on 01.08.2003 for the solitary reason
that an express protest had not been recorded at the moment of
receipt of compensation. The legality of that refusal, it is urged,
falls to be tested as on the date on which it was made and by
reference to Section 18 read with the second proviso to Section
31(2) of the Act, and not by importing a period of limitation which
governs a later and distinct remedy. The subsequent resort to
Section 28-A of the Act was an alternative route to parity,
occasioned by the State’s own refusal to transmit the timely
-18-
applications, and it neither erases the right which had accrued
under Section 18 of the Act nor validates the antecedent illegality.
24. In support of the contention that the requirement of protest
stood satisfied, learned counsel relied upon Ajit Singh’s case
(supra) , the Full Bench decision in District Collector, Kakinada v. P.
7
Nagabhushana Rao , and the decisions in Special Deputy Collector,
8
Land Acquisition v. N. Sangaiah and Kotipalli Chitti’s case (supra) ,
for the propositions that the Act prescribes neither a rigid form nor
an exclusive mode in which protest is to be expressed, and that a
written application for reference presented within limitation is itself
an unequivocal manifestation that the awardee disputes the
quantum and does not accept the award as final. He submitted
that the arbitrary character of the rejection is demonstrated by the
treatment of the co-awardees: claimants under the same
notification and the same award, whose requests had encountered
the very same objection, approached this Court in W.P.No.24130 of
2010, and pursuant to the direction issued therein a reference was
made and registered as L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011, in which the
Reference Court found the original valuation to be substantially
deficient and the statutory additions to have been denied, and
enhanced the compensation by judgment dated 05.02.2018, which
7
AIR 2004 AP 1 = 2003 (6) ALT 353 (F.B.)
8
2000 (2) ALT 519 (D.B.) = 2000 (3) ALD 43
-19-
has since attained finality. To refer one set of co-awardees to the
civil Court and to exclude the rest permanently, it was urged, is
procedural discrimination offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
25. Meeting the authorities relied upon by the appellants,
learned counsel submitted that Pradeep Kumari’s case and Marri
Venkaiah’s case (supra) regulate the independent statutory remedy
under Section 28-A of the Act and do not authorise a Collector to
reject a timely application under Section 18 of the Act on an invalid
ground. He submitted that condition (iv) in Pradeep Kumari must
in any event be read in the light of the decision of the Constitution
9
Bench in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi , which explains that the
expression “had not made an application to the Collector under
section 18” refers to an effective application which was entertained
and answered, and that an application rejected on delay or on
another technical ground does not operate as the disqualifying
application contemplated by Section 28-A of the Act; and that Marri
Venkaiah is distinguishable, the respondents advancing no
contention that the period under Section 28-A of the Act is to be
computed from the date of knowledge. Upon the objection that the
memo dated 01.08.2003 was not separately assailed, reliance was
9
(2002) 7 SCC 273
-20-
10
placed upon Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul , Maharashtra
11
Chess Association v. Union of India and Dwarka Nath v. Income
12
Tax Officer , for the amplitude of Article 226 of the Constitution of
India and for the principle that relief is not defeated by the form of
the prayer where the cause, the facts and the controversy were
pleaded and contested and no prejudice is shown.
26. On the question of delay, learned counsel submitted that the
cause of injustice originated not in a belated initial claim but in the
Collector’s unlawful refusal, and relied upon Kalvala Padma
13
(supra) , Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar and Bhag
14
Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh , for the propositions that a
party cannot take advantage of its own wrong and that the State,
as a model litigant in acquisition matters, ought not to rely upon a
technical plea to deprive citizens of compensation lawfully due; and
he submitted, in the alternative, that if any period of inaction is
found attributable to the respondents, the equitable consequence
should be confined to a regulation of interest for that period and
should not extend to extinguishment of the principal entitlement.
Reliance was also placed upon Kolkata Municipal Corporation v.
10
AIR 1966 SC 735
11
(2020) 13 SCC 285
12
AIR 1966 SC 81
13
(2007) 11 SCC 447
14
(1985) 3 SCC 737
-21-
15
Bimal Kumar Shah for the procedural and substantive content of
Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION
27. On the above pleadings and submissions, the following
points arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the rejection of the applications filed under
Section 18 of the Act on 05.07.2003, by Memo No.
B/628/2002 dated 01.08.2003, on the sole ground that
the compensation was received without protest, is
sustainable in law;
(ii) Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed
for the reason that the said Memo dated 01.08.2003 was
not specifically challenged;
(iii) Whether the claim of the respondents/writ petitioners
is governed by, and defeated by, the period of limitation
prescribed by Section 28-A(1) of the Act, having regard to
the decisions relied upon by the appellants;
(iv) Whether the writ petition was liable to be dismissed
on the ground of delay and laches; and
(v) Whether the direction issued by the learned Single
Judge calls for interference, and what relief the
respondents/writ petitioners are entitled to, including
whether solatium and other statutory amounts form part
of the compensation to be re-determined.
15
2024 SCC OnLine SC 968
-22-
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
28. Before we take up the points one by one, it is useful to say
plainly where the two sides part company, because a good deal of
the argument on either side follows from that difference. The
appeal is argued as though this case began in October 2020, when
the writ petitioners applied for re-determination under Section 28-
A of the Act. The writ petitioners say that it began on 05.07.2003,
when they applied under Section 18 of the Act and were turned
away. If the first is the true starting point, the appeal is a short
matter, for the three months prescribed by Section 28-A(1) had
admittedly run out long before. If the second is the true starting
point, limitation under Section 28-A does not arise for decision at
all, and what has to be examined instead is whether the refusal
made in the year 2003 was lawful. It is significant that the written
submissions filed on behalf of the appellants do not deal with that
refusal at any place; they begin and end with Section 28-A of the
Act. We propose, therefore, to begin where the case itself began.
29. We should also say a word about the way in which we have
approached the record. What is claimed here is not a bounty. Fifty-
five families gave up the houses they lived in so that a project
might be built, and they have been asking ever since for the
balance of what the statute itself promised them. That
-23-
circumstance relaxes no rule of law, and we do not treat it as doing
so. It does, however, mean that we should be slow to dispose of the
matter upon the form in which their case happened to be
presented, and careful to see what in substance was done to them
and whether the law permitted it.
Point (i) — Rejection of the applications under Section 18 for
want of protest
30. Section 18(1) of the Act reads as follows:
“18. Reference to Court.—(1) Any person interested who has
not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector,
require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the
determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the
measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person
to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation
among the persons interested.”
31. The bar upon which the fourth respondent acted is found in
the second proviso to Section 31(2) of the Act, which reads:
“Provided also that no person who has received the amount
otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application
under section 18.”
32. Neither Section 18 nor the second proviso to Section 31(2)
prescribes the form in which a protest is to be made, or requires
that it be endorsed in the acquittance register. What the statute
requires is that the person interested should not have accepted the
award. Where a written application under Section 18 is presented
within the period prescribed by the proviso to Section 18(2), the
-24-
application is itself the clearest possible manifestation of the
refusal of the claimant to accept the award, and the protest against
the award is implied notwithstanding the acceptance of the amount
offered. That is the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ajit Singh’s case (supra) Kotipalli
, and followed by this Court in
Chitti’s case (supra) , and in Sode Pentaiah’s case (supra) . The same
view was taken by the Full Bench of the erstwhile High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in P. Nagabhushana Rao’s case (supra) , and by a
Division Bench in N. Sangaiah’s case (supra) , both of which hold
that where a person interested applies for a reference within the
time prescribed by Section 18 of the Act, that conduct itself
denotes non-acceptance of the award and gives rise to the legal
inference that the compensation was received under protest,
unless the State establishes an express and unconditional
acceptance of the award in full satisfaction. We are in respectful
agreement with that view, which the learned Single Judge has
rightly applied.
33. On the facts, the position admits of no doubt. The award is
dated 26.05.2003. The applications under Section 18 of the Act
were made on 05.07.2003, that is, within six weeks. The counter
affidavit of the fourth respondent does not deny either the making
or the receipt of those applications; the only plea taken is that the
-25-
compensation was not received under protest, and that for that
reason the applications were rejected by the Memo dated
01.08.2003.
34. More significantly, the counter affidavit of the fourth
respondent itself discloses that ten awardees under the very same
award were referred to the civil Court, and that the reference in
their case was made “basing on the representation submitted by
the above (10) awardees”. It is thus admitted that in the case of
those ten awardees the authority treated a representation as
sufficient compliance with the requirement of protest. It is further
admitted that at the time of the award enquiry all the land and
structure losers were present. Once the authority accepted, in the
case of ten awardees, that the requirement of protest stood
satisfied otherwise than by an endorsement in the acquittance
register, there was no warrant whatsoever for taking a different
view in the case of the remaining awardees who had, in addition,
filed written applications under Section 18 of the Act within the
statutory period.
35. Persons covered by the same notification, the same award
and the same acquisition, who have suffered the same deprivation
on the same date, constitute a single class. To refer ten of them to
the civil Court and to shut out the rest on a ground which was not
-26-
applied to those ten is discrimination without any rational basis,
and is arbitrary. Such action cannot survive the scrutiny of Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
36. We accordingly hold that Memo No.B/628/2002 dated
01.08.2003, rejecting the applications of the writ petitioners under
Section 18 of the Act on the sole ground that the compensation
had not been received under protest, is contrary to Section 18 of
the Act and to the settled position of law, and is unsustainable.
Point (i) is answered against the appellants.
Point (ii) — Absence of a specific challenge to the Memo dated
01.08.2003
37. The conclusion just recorded does not, by itself, dispose of
the appeal. The appellants have an answer of a different kind, and
it is a procedural one. Their answer is not that the refusal of the
year 2003 was right, but that it is now beyond challenge: the memo
was never assailed in the writ petition, and a Court, it is said,
cannot undo what it was never asked to undo. We turn to that
objection.
38. The appellants make much of the circumstance that the
learned Single Judge, having recorded that the Memo dated
01.08.2003 was not challenged, nevertheless proceeded to grant
relief. We are unable to see any error in the course adopted. The
-27-
learned Single Judge expressly recorded that there are sufficient
pleadings on record contending that the said memo is contrary to
law. A writ petition is not to be construed with the strictness of a
pleading in a civil suit, particularly where it is filed by displaced
and illiterate villagers. What matters is whether the illegality
complained of has been pleaded with sufficient particularity, and
whether the opposite party had notice of it and an opportunity to
meet it. Both conditions are satisfied here: the affidavit filed in
support of the writ petition set out the rejection by the Memo dated
01.08.2003 and challenged its legality in terms, and the fourth
respondent filed a counter affidavit dealing with that very plea on
merits. No prejudice of any kind is shown.
39. Further, an order made in the teeth of an express statutory
provision does not gain immunity merely because it is not formally
assailed. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
includes the power to mould the relief to meet the justice of the
case, and a Court which finds that a statutory authority has
refused a reference on a ground unknown to the statute is not
powerless to act merely because the prayer clause is inartistically
drawn. That, in substance, is the principle of Bhagwati Prasad’s
case (supra) , where it was held that relief is not to be refused
merely because the pleading is inartistically expressed if the
-28-
necessary facts are present and the real controversy was
understood and contested by the parties, and of Dwarka Nath’s
case (supra) and Maharashtra Chess Association’s case (supra) ,
which describe the amplitude of the jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution of India and the power inhering in it to mould
relief to meet the requirements of the case. We may add that the
memo of 01.08.2003 was in any event superseded, in substance,
by the proceedings dated 14.07.2021, which the writ petitioners
assert were served upon only three of them, an assertion which the
appellants have not effectively met.
40. Point (ii) is answered against the appellants.
Point (iii) — Applicability of Section 28-A and bar of limitation
41. This is the principal ground urged on behalf of the
appellants, and it requires close examination. Section 28-A(1) of
the Act reads as follows:
“28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
basis of the award of the Court.—(1) Where in an award under this
Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in
excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11, the
persons interested in all the other land covered by the same
notification under section 4, sub-section (1), and who are also
aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that
they had not made an application to the Collector under section 18, by
written application to the Collector within three months from the date
of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation
payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of
compensation awarded by the Court:
-29-
Provided that in computing the period of three months within
which an application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-
section, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.”
42. Section 28-A was inserted by the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984 to confer a benefit upon those inarticulate
and poor persons who, by reason of poverty or ignorance, omit to
seek a reference under Section 18 of the Act and are thereby left
with a lower compensation than that obtained by their more
resourceful neighbours in respect of land covered by the same
notification. In Pradeep Kumari’s case (supra) , the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, after noticing that object, laid down the conditions
which must be satisfied before an application under Section 28-A
can be entertained. The relevant portion of that judgment reads:
"If the said expression in Section 28-A(l) is thus construed, a
person would be able to seek re-determination of the amount of
compensation payable to him provided the following conditions are
satisfied :- (i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after
the coming in to force of Section 28-A; (ii) By the said award the amount
of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector
under Section 11 has been allowed to the applicant in that reference;
(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested
in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to
which the said award relates; (iv) The person moving the application did
not make an application to the Collector under Section 18; (v) The
application is moved within three months from the date of the award on
the basis of which the re-determination of amount of compensation is
sought; and (vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A
for re-determination of compensation by an applicant."
-30-
43. In Marri Venkaiah , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the
period of three months prescribed by Section 28-A(1) is mandatory,
that it is to be computed from the date of the award of the
reference Court, and that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
cannot be invoked to condone a delay in making such an
application. The relevant portion of that judgment reads:
"Plain language of the aforesaid Section would only mean that
the period of limitation is three months from the date of the Award of
the Court. It is also provided that in computing the period of three
months the day on which the award was pronounced and the time
requisite for obtaining the copy of the award is to be excluded.
Therefore, the aforesaid provision crystallizes that application under
Section 28-A is to be filed within three month from the date of the award
by the Court by only excluding the time requisite for obtaining copy.
Hence, it is difficult to infer further exclusion of time on the ground of
acquisition of knowledge by the applicant."
In our view, with regard to first contention that Section 28-A is
a beneficial provision, there cannot be any dispute. However, the
advantage of the benefit, which is conferred, is required to be taken
within the stipulated time. A land owner may be poor or illiterate and
because of that he might not have filed reference application but that
would not mean that he could be negligent in not finding out whether
other landowners have filed such applications. Whosoever wants to
take advantage of the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to
take appropriate action within prescribed time. He must at least be
vigilant in making efforts to find out whether other landowner has filed
any reference application and if so what is the result. If that is not done
then law cannot help him. Admittedly, in the present case, award
enhancing the compensation was pronounced by the civil court by order
dated 29th November 1984 and applications were filed on 27th
November, 1989 i.e. after lapse of 5 years. In such case, as the
applicant was having an opportunity of knowing the award and/or he
-31-
was required to make efforts of knowing about such proceedings, he
must be presumed to have had knowledge of the award.
44. We respectfully accept both these decisions as laying down
the law that binds us. The question, however, is whether they
govern the case on hand. In our considered view, they do not, for
the reason that the respondents/writ petitioners do not belong to
the class of persons for whose benefit Section 28-A was enacted,
and their claim does not rest upon that provision at all.
45. The opening words of Section 28-A (1) are significant. The
provision enables persons interested in the other land covered by
the same notification to seek re-determination “notwithstanding
that they had not made an application to the Collector under
section 18”. The provision is thus addressed to the case of a
claimant who did not seek a reference. The respondents/writ
petitioners did seek a reference. They made written applications
under Section 18 of the Act on 05.07.2003, within the period
prescribed by the statute. That fact is not in dispute; it is recorded
by the learned Single Judge and is not denied in the counter
affidavit. Their right to have the matter referred to the civil Court
arose under Section 18 of the Act in the year 2003, and it was
defeated only by the illegal Memo dated 01.08.2003. Their
grievance and their entitlement are therefore anterior to, and
independent of, Section 28-A of the Act. For the same reason, the
-32-
reliance placed by the appellants upon condition (iv) in Pradeep
Kumari’s case (supra) is misplaced. As explained by the
Constitution Bench in Hansoli Devi’s case (supra) , the expression
“had not made an application to the Collector under section 18” is
directed to a claimant who has obtained an effective reference
which was entertained and answered on merits; an application
which was aborted at the threshold on a technical ground, and
which never reached the reference Court, does not place the
claimant in the class which has availed of and exhausted the
remedy under Section 18 of the Act. The appellants cannot be
heard to say, in the same breath, that the applications dated
05.07.2003 were good enough to disqualify the writ petitioners
from the benefit of Section 28-A of the Act, and yet not good
enough to oblige the Collector to make a reference under Section
18 of the Act.
46. The applications made by them in October 2020 invoking
Section 28-A of the Act were made in consequence of the course
indicated by this Court in Kalvala Padma’s case (supra) , and upon
their coming to know that the ten awardees under the same award
had obtained an enhancement in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011. Those
applications were, in truth, a means of obtaining the very relief
which had been unlawfully denied to them in 2003. The label
-33-
under which they approached the authority cannot be permitted to
alter the true character of their claim, nor can it confer upon the
appellants a defence which would not otherwise have been
available to them.
47. The contention of the appellants, when reduced to its
essentials, comes to this: having illegally refused to refer the claims
of the writ petitioners under Section 18 of the Act, the State now
says that the writ petitioners ought to have travelled the route of
Section 28-A, and are out of time under that provision. No party,
and least of all the State, can be permitted to take advantage of its
own wrong, a principle reaffirmed in Kusheshwar Prasad Singh’s
case (supra) , and one which applies with particular force to a
public authority whose conduct must conform to legality and
fairness. If the reference had been made in the year 2003 as it
ought to have been, the writ petitioners would have been before the
reference Court along with the ten awardees, or in a like reference,
and would have received the enhanced compensation in the same
manner. The limitation prescribed by Section 28-A(1) was never
intended to protect an authority which has wrongfully shut out a
claimant from the remedy under Section 18 of the Act.
48. There is a further and independent reason. The learned
Single Judge did not direct the making of an award under Section
-34-
28-A of the Act, and did not condone any delay under that
provision. He moulded the relief. Having found that the refusal of a
reference was illegal, and that the ordinary consequence would be
a direction to refer the matter under Section 18 of the Act to the
competent civil Court, he took note of the fact that the very
question had already been answered by the reference Court in
L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 in respect of the same award, and that the
judgment therein had been confirmed in appeal and had attained
finality. He therefore directed re-determination at the rate so fixed,
in order to avoid a further round of litigation over ground already
covered. The period of limitation in Section 28-A(1) governs the
making of an application to the Collector under that provision; it
does not curtail the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India to remedy an illegality of the kind
established here.
49. We may also notice the conduct of the appellants themselves.
The counter affidavit discloses that the applications for re-
determination were entertained by the Land Acquisition Officer and
Revenue Divisional Officer, Kagaznagar; that an award was
proposed in respect of 523 awardees, including 100 persons taken
up suo motu ; and that a draft award in terms of Section 28-A of the
Act was submitted to the District Collector for approval. The
-35-
rejection came only in July 2021, and only after the District
Collector returned the proposals for re-examination. While there
can be no estoppel against a statute, this conduct shows that the
administration itself understood the enhancement granted in
L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 as enuring to the benefit of all the awardees
covered by Award No.B/628/2002, and that there is nothing
peculiar or unmerited about the claim of the writ petitioners.
50. As regards the proposition that the period under Section 28-
A of the Act commences from the date of knowledge of the award of
the reference Court, it is unnecessary for us to examine them. The
question of the point from which the period of three months is to
be reckoned stands concluded by the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Marri Venkaiah’s case (supra) , and our
conclusion does not rest upon the date of knowledge of the writ
petitioners.
51. Point (iii) is answered against the appellants. The claim of
the respondents/writ petitioners is not defeated by the period of
limitation prescribed by Section 28-A (1) of the Act.
Point (iv) — Delay and laches
52. That brings us to the objection which, on the appellants’ own
arguments, has the most substance in it, namely that the writ
-36-
petition reached this Court two decades after the events
complained of.
53. Delay and laches constitute a rule of discretion and not a
rule of limitation. The Court is required to see whether the delay is
explained, whether the claimant has slept over his rights, whether
rights of third parties have intervened, and whether the party
resisting the claim has altered its position to its detriment.
54. In this context, it is pertinent to consider the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi &
16
others , wherein the Court, at paragraph 47, considered the
17
judgment in Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh , and held,
inter alia , as follows:
“47. It is pertinent for us to consider the judgment of this Court in
Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020) 2 SCC 569, wherein it
was held, inter alia, as follows:
“12.12. The contention advanced by the state of delay
and laches of the appellant in moving the court is also liable
to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of
a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the
judicial conscience of the court. Condonation of delay is a
matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised
judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of
a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights,
and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose.
There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts …”
16
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725
17
(2020) 2 SCC 569
-37-
55. Judged by these tests, the plea of the appellants must fail.
The writ petitioners applied under Section 18 of the Act within time
in 2003. They submitted representations on 21.02.2009,
04.02.2010, 17.04.2010 and 02.04.2013, to which no reply was
given, the fourth respondent taking the stand that those
applications are not traceable in the file transferred on the
formation of the new Division at Kagaznagar in 2016. The reference
in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 was itself decided only on 05.02.2018,
and the judgment therein attained finality on 20.01.2020. The writ
petitioners moved the Land Acquisition Officer in October 2020,
within months of that finality. The rejection dated 14.07.2021 was,
on the material placed before the writ Court, served upon only
three of the fifty-five writ petitioners, and only three of the orders
enclosed to the counter affidavit bear dispatch particulars. An
order which is not communicated to the person affected by it
cannot be relied upon by the authority to defeat him on the ground
of delay.
56. It must also be borne in mind that the writ petitioners are
displaced persons who lost their dwelling houses to submergence,
that they are, as the learned Single Judge found from the
vakalaths on record, illiterate and thumb impression holders, and
that a number of the original awardees have died during the
-38-
pendency of these proceedings and are represented by their legal
representatives. No third party right has intervened. The appellants
have not altered their position to their detriment; they are merely
resisting the payment of amounts which the statute itself requires
to be paid. In such circumstances, the discretion exercised by the
learned Single Judge in entertaining the writ petition cannot be
said to be improper. The learned Single Judge was right in relying
on the principle laid down in Kalvala Padma’s case (supra) , and we
find no substance in the contention that the said decision is
distinguishable on facts; it arose out of the self-same statutory
scheme and out of a comparable failure to refer applications made
under Section 18 of the Act.
57. Point (iv) is answered against the appellants.
Point (v) — The relief and the statutory components of
compensation
58. This brings us to the question which this Court put to the
learned Special Government Pleader on 20.08.2026, namely
whether, in the course of calculation of compensation, solatium
and other statutory amounts would also be added to the
compensation quantified.
59. In our view, the answer must be in the affirmative, and the
submission made on behalf of the State on this aspect is a correct
-39-
statement of the position. Compensation under the Act is not a
single figure but a composite of statutorily prescribed components.
Once the market value is determined under Section 23(1) of the
Act, the additional amount under Section 23(1-A), the solatium
under Section 23(2) and interest under Sections 28 and 34 follow
as a matter of statutory course; they are not matters of discretion,
and they cannot be severed from the market value. Indeed, the
grievance of the writ petitioners from the very inception has been
that Award No.B/628/2002 confined itself to the estimated value
furnished by the engineering authority and omitted the remaining
components altogether. The direction of the learned Single Judge
to pay the “differential compensation”, understood in the light of
the prayer in the writ petition, necessarily takes in these statutory
components.
60. We accordingly find no reason to interfere with the direction
issued by the learned Single Judge. We consider it appropriate,
however, to clarify the manner in which that direction is to be
worked out, so that no further round of litigation ensues.
61. It is necessary to add a word of caution. Our conclusion
rests upon the peculiar facts of this case, namely that the
respondents/writ petitioners made applications under Section 18
of the Act within the statutory period that those applications were
-40-
rejected on a ground unknown to the statute, and that ten
awardees under the very same award were referred and obtained
an enhancement which has attained finality. This judgment shall
not be understood as diluting the mandatory character of the
period prescribed by Section 28-A(1) of the Act, or as an authority
for entertaining belated applications for re-determination under
that provision.
62. Before parting with the case, we consider it necessary to say
this. The State is not an ordinary litigant. When it takes away a
person’s house for a public project, the obligation to pay him what
the law provides is its own obligation, and it is not discharged by
waiting until he is no longer in a position to ask. The writ
petitioners did ask, and they asked in time. Everything that has
followed is the consequence of a refusal which ought never to have
been made. We say this not in censure of any individual officer, for
most of those now before us would have been strangers to the file
when it began, but because the direction which we now issue
should be worked out in that spirit, promptly and without a further
resort to technicality.
CONCLUSION AND RESULT
63. For the reasons recorded above, points (i) to (iv) are answered
against the appellants, and point (v) is answered by holding that
-41-
the compensation to be re-determined shall carry the statutory
components referred to above. The order dated 21.08.2023 in
W.P.No.16034 of 2023 does not suffer from any error warranting
interference in this intra-Court appeal.
64. In the result, the writ appeal is dismissed, and the order
dated 21.08.2023 passed in W.P.No.16034 of 2023 is confirmed,
subject to the following clarifications:
(a) The fourth appellant shall re-determine the
compensation payable to the respondents/writ
petitioners in respect of their lands and structures
covered by Award No.B/628/2002 dated 26.05.2003, by
adopting the rates fixed by the judgment dated
05.02.2018 in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011 on the file of the
Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Asifabad, as confirmed in
L.A.A.S.No.32 of 2019 by judgment dated 20.01.2020.
(b) The compensation so re-determined shall carry the
additional amount under Section 23(1-A), solatium under
Section 23(2) and interest under Sections 28 and 34 of
the Act, on the same basis on which they were granted to
the awardees in L.A.O.P.No.32 of 2011, after deducting
the amounts already paid under Award No.B/628/2002
dated 26.05.2003.
-42-
(c) Where any of the respondents/writ petitioners has
died, the amount shall be disbursed to his or her legal
representatives, upon their moving the fourth appellant
with the necessary particulars, and the fourth appellant
shall pass appropriate orders in that regard.
(d) The exercise shall be completed and the differential
compensation paid within a period of three months from
the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, the period
of three months granted by the learned Single Judge
having elapsed during the pendency of this appeal.
(e) There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this writ
appeal shall stand closed.
___________________
P. SAM KOSHY, J
___________________________________
VAKITI RAMAKRISHNA REDDY, J
Date: 03.09.2026
Note: LR copy to be marked
B/o. AS