THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER vs STATE OF KARNATAKA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
- 1 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
®
DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
WRIT APPEAL NO. 4520 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1518 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1519 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1520 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 1521 OF 2014 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 4517 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 4518 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB)
WRIT APPEAL NO. 4521 OF 2015 (LA-KIADB)
IN WA NO. 4520/2015
Digitally
signed by
VASANTHA
KUMARY B
K
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND EXECUTIVE MEMBER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
- 2 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD, NO.3,
KHENY BUILDING, 1ST CROSS,
GANDHINAGAR, BANGALORE-9
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
(INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT),
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES
AND COMMERCE,
M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SRI GOVINDAPPA,
SINCE DEAD BY LRS,
2(a) SMT. NEELAMMA,
W/O LATE GOVINDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
2(b) SRI BABU G,
S/O LATE GOVINDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS,
2(c) SRI NANDISHA G,
S/O LATE GOVINDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
R2(a) TO R2(c) ARE R/AT NO.309,
VEERASANDRA VILLAGE,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BENGALURU - 560 099.
(AMENDED V/O DT. 25.02.2026)
3. M/S. EESHA SOLUTIONS,
NO.139, 1ST CROSS ROAD,
5TH BLOCK, KORAMANGALA,
BENGALURU-560 095,
REP. BY ITS PARTNER,
SRI H.R. RAJASHEKAR.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYRE GOWDA, AGA FOR R1;
SRI G.V.P. DAS, ADVOCATE FOR SRI H.R.ANANTHA KRISHNA
MURTHY, ADVOCATE FOR R2(A TO C);
SRI NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SRI ABHINAV RAMANAND, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI CHANDRAKANTH R PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING
APPLICANT IN IA NO.1/2018)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.9325/2007 DATED
12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 1518/2014
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
(WRONGLY SHOWN IN WP AS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER),
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
- 4 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
KHENY BUILDING,
I CROSS, GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE-9.
PRESENTLY AT NO.14/3,
R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01.
2. THE SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES
AND COMMERCE,
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01.
3. M/S JS SOFTWARE INDIA PVT LTD.,
A COMPANY REGISTERED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF
INDIAN COMPANIES ACT, 1956,
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE
AT NO.10/82, SRINIVASA NAGARA,
BSK III STGE, BANGALORE-560 085.
PRESENTLY HAVING ITS
CORPORATE OFFICE AT NO.326/32,
RAJENDRA PARTY NILAYA,
ERAMMA LAYOUT, HULIMANGALA POST,
ANEKAL TALUK, BANGALORE-560 005.
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR,
H.P.RAJAGOPALA REDDY,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
4. SMT. CHINNAMMA,
SINCE DEAD BY LRS,
4(a) SRI MUNIYAPPA,
HUSBAND OF CHINNAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,
4(b) SRI RAJASHEKAR M,
S/O LATE CHINNAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
4(c) SRI JAGADISH M,
S/O LATE CHINNAMMA,
AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS,
R-4(a) TO 4(c) ARE
R/AT NO.E-240,
NEAR MUNESHWARA TEMPLE,
VEERASANDRA,
BENGALURU-560 100.
(IMPLEADED V/O
DATED 25.06.2026)
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI D R RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI AJAY J NANDALIKE, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SRI UDAYA HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI V N SHANKARE GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R4[A TO C])
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED
IN WRIT PETITION NO.14723/2007 DATED 12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 1519/2014
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
(WRONGLY SHOWN IN W.P. AS
- 6 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER),
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P.BUILDING
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
KHENY BUILDING,
1ST CROSS, GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE-9
PRESENTLY AT NO.14/3, R.P.BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY,
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01.
2. THE SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE,
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
VIKASA SOUDHA, BANGALORE-01.
3. M/S GOYAL PROJECTS PVT LTD.,
REGD. OFFICE AT NO.326/32,
RAJENDRA PATIL NILAYA,
YERAMMA LAYOUT,
HULIMANGALA POST,
ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105,
REP. BY ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
SRI H P RAJAGOPAL REDDY.
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
4. SMT. BHAGYALAKSHMI,
W/O R BASKAR,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
R/AT POOJAPPA LAYOUT,
VEERASANDRA VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI, ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105.
(R5 TO R45 ARE DELETED
V/O DATED 08.04.2026)
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI DHYAN CHINNAPPA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR
SRI AJAY J NANDALIKE, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SRI M SHIVAPRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R4, R5, R9, R12,
R13, R16, R18, R19, R23, R24, R28, R29, R32, R33, R42,
R43 & R45;
R5 TO 45 ARE DELETED V/O DT. 08.04.2026)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.15813/2007 DATED
12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 1520/2014
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
(WRONGLY SHOWN IN W.P. AS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER),
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001
- 8 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
KHENY BUILDING, 1ST CROSS,
GANDHINAGAR, BANGALORE-09,
PRESENTLY AT NO.14/3,
R.P BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES AND
COMMERCE,
MULTISTORIED BUILDING
VIDHANA VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-01,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY.
2. SRI RAMAKRISHNAPPA,
S/O JEDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
NO.57, VEERASANDRA VILLAGE,
ANEKAL HOBLI (TALUK),
BANGALORE DISTRICT.
(R3 TO R15 ARE DELETED
V/O DATED 08.04.2026)
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SRI M SHIVAPRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R3, R5, R12 &
R15;
R2, R4, R6 TO R11, R13, R14 SERVED;
R-3 TO 15 ARE DELETED V/O DT. 08.04.2026)
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.16509/2007 DATED
12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 1521/2014
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
& EXECUTIVE MEMBER,
THE KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL
AREAS DEVELOPMENT BOARD
(KIADB), NO.14/3, SECOND FLOOR,
R P BUILDING, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT,
DIVISION OFFICE, NO.14/3,
R P BUILDING, NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
M S BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-01, REP. BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRIES DEPARTMENT.
2. K ANAND S/O KRISHNAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 18 YEARS,
R/AT VEERASANDRA VILLAGE,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE-560 105.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1;
SRI V ANAND, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.5382/2008 DATED
12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 4517/2015
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
AND EXECUTIVE MEMBER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001,
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH & 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD, NO.3,
KHENY BUILDING, 1ST CROSS,
GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE-9,
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
(INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT),
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES
AND COMMERCE, M.S. BUILDING,
BANGALORE-01.
2. SRI KANAKAPPA,
SINCE DEAD BY LRS
2(a) SMT. RAJAMMA,
W/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
ST
R/AT #28/2, 1 CROSS,
KANAKAPPA BUILDING,
VEERASANDRA,
ELECTRONIC CITY,
BENGALURU-560 100.
2(b) SRI NAGARAJ K,
S/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
ST
R/AT #24/1, 1 CROSS,
NEAR GOVT. PRIMARY SCHOOL,
VEERASANDRA, BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA-560 100.
2(c) SRI RAVI V K,
S/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS,
ST
R/AT #24/1, 1 CROSS
NEAR GOVT. PRIMARY SCHOOL,
VEERASANDRA,
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C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA-560 100.
2(d) SMT. SUSHILA,
D/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
W/O NAGARAJU,
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS,
R/AT #221/2, CHANDAPUR CIRCLE
VEERASANDRA, ELECTRONIC CITY,
ANEKAL, BENGALURU-560 100.
2(e) SMT. K RAJAMMA,
D/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
W/O N RAJENDRA,
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS,
TH
R/AT #03, 20 CROSS,
NEAR BAJENEMANE, EJIPURA,
BANGALORE SOUTH,
BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA-560 047.
2(f) SMT. GOWRAMMA K,
D/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
W/O MUNIRAJ G,
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
ST
R/AT #28/2, 1 CROSS,
NEAR GOVT. PRIMARY SCHOOL,
VEERASANDRA, BANGALORE SOUTH,
BANGALORE, ELECTRONIC CITY,
KARNATAKA-560 100.
2(g) SRI MANJUNATH @ MANJU K,
S/O LATE KANAKAPPA,
R/AT #24/2, KANAKAPPA BUILDING
VEERASANDRA, ELECTRONIC CITY,
BANGALORE SOUTH, BANGALORE,
KARNATAKA-560 100.
(R2(A) TO R2(G) ARE IMPLEADED
V/O DATED 09.09.2026)
3. M/S EESHA SOLUTIONS
NO.139,1ST CROSS ROAD,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
5TH BLOCK, KORAMANGLA,
BANGALORE-560 095,
REP. BY ITS PARTNER
SRI H.R. RAJASHEKAR.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1;
SRI A RAMESH GOWDA, ADVOCATE FOR R2(A,B,D,F & G);
R2(C) SERVED;
SRI SIDDA REDDY K G, ADVOCATE FOR R2(E);
SRI NITIN PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR R3;
SRI ABHINAV RAMANAND, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI CHANDRAKANTH R PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR IMPLEADING
APPLICANT IN I.A.NO.2/2017)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED
IN WRIT PETITION NO.27425/2009 DATED 12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 4518/2015
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001,
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
KHENY BUILDING, 1ST CROSS,
GANDHINAGAR, BANGALORE-9,
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REP. BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIES
AND COMMERCE,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01
2. SRI G PERIYANNA,
S/O LATE GOVINDAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 90 YEARS,
3. DR. CHANDIL KUMAR,
S/O LATE P GUNASHEKAR,
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS,
R2 AND R3 ARE R/AT
GOLLAHALLI VILLAGE,
ATTIBELE HOBLI,
ANEKAL TALUK,
BANGALORE DISTRICT-560 099
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1;
SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R2 & R3 HELD SUFFICIENT
V/O DATED 13.06.2019)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
- 15 -
WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NOS.13055-13056/2012
DATED 12.11.2013.
IN WA NO. 4521/2015
BETWEEN:
1. THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
(WRONGLY SHOWN IN W.P. AS
EXECUTIVE OFFICER),
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD,
NO.14/3, R.P. BUILDING,
NRUPATHUNGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001
PRESENTLY AT NO.49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 009
2. SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER,
KARNATAKA INDUSTRIAL AREAS
DEVELOPMENT BOARD, KHENY BUILDING,
1ST CROSS, GANDHINAGAR,
BANGALORE-9,
PRESENTLY AT NO. 49,
4TH AND 5TH FLOOR,
KHANIJA BHAVAN,
RACE COURSE ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 009
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI BASAVARAJ V SABARAD, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI H L PRADEEP KUMAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
BY ITS CHIEF SECRETARY,
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
VIDHANA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01.
2. THE SECRETARY,
MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES
AND COMMERCE,
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
VIKASA SOUDHA,
BANGALORE-01.
3. M/S. AAREL TECH PARK,
NO. 4, 6TH CROSS ROAD,
NANDI DURGA ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 046.
4. SRI M. RAHMATHULLA,
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS,
S/O SRI AJMATHULLA,
R/AT NO. 1014B, 4TH M BLOCK,
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560 010.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI N BYREGOWDA, AGA FOR R1 & R2;
SERVICE OF NOTICE TO R3 IS DISPENSED WITH
VIDE ORDER DATED 05.04.2017;
R4 SERVED THROUGH PAPER PUBLICATION VIDE
ORDER DATED 23.05.2023)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE
ORDER PASSED IN WRIT PETITION NO.3293/2012 DATED
12/11/2013.
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR JUDGMENT ON 11.08.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
D K SINGH PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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WA No. 4520 of 2015
C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)
I. PREFACE:
1. The present writ appeals are filed against the judgement
and order of the learned Single Judge dated 12.11.2013 passed
in W.P. 14723/2007 and connected matters, quashing the
notification dated 27.08.2003 issued under Sections 3(1), 1(3)
and 28(1) of the Karnataka industrial Areas Development Act,
1966 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the KIAD Act’), along with
notification dated 14.05.2007 issued under Section 28(4) of the
Act, thereby quashing the land acquisition proceedings.
II. BRIEF FACTS:
The Brief facts leading to the present writ appeals are as
follows:
2. The Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’), vide its Board
Resolution dated 16.12.2000, had resolved to acquire an extent
of 300 acres of land in Veerasandra, Konappana Agrahara,
Doddathogur and Berathena Agrahara villages for Electronic
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C/W WA No. 1518 of 2014
WA No. 1519 of 2014
AND 5 OTHERS
City IV Phase. Subsequently, the Appellant No.1 – CEO placed a
note before the Board that it would be expedient to acquire
lands in Hebbagodi and Veerasandra villages, and accordingly,
vide Board resolution dated 10.04.2002, it was resolved to
acquire 320.14 acres for the purpose of expansion of existing
Electronics City.
3. Pursuant to a proposal dated 02.05.2002 wherein it was
proposed to notify 322.03 acres of land as Industrial Area, the
Board issued a letter to the Appellant No.2 – SLAO wherein it
was directed to exclude 93.33 acres of land on the ground that
it was found to be fully developed on spot inspection conducted
by the Appellant No.1.
4. The State Government, pursuant to a proposal issued by
the Board, issued a preliminary notification u/s 1(3), 3(1), and
28(1) of the Act dated 27.08.2003, declaring lands to an extent
of 224.33 acres situated in Veerasandra and Hebbagodi
villages, Attibele Hobli, Anekal Taluk, as Industrial Areas. On
the same day, another preliminary notification was issued u/s
28(1) of the Act by the State Government, reducing the extent
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of lands to 193.22 acres, as lands to an extent of 32.32 acres
were excluded as being government lands.
5. During the proceedings u/s 28(2) and 28(3) of the Act,
the Respondents-landowners filed their objections dated
21.10.2003 before the Appellant No.2 – SLAO. It was noticed
by the Appellants that the following extent of lands were not
available for acquisition along with reasons:
Reasons Extent A-G
Change of land use already given by the
18-27
Bangalore Development Authority (residential
purpose)
Land acquired under Bangalore Development
18-02
Authority Act
Project Clearance by SLSWCC under Karnataka
15-37
Industries Facilitation Act in favour of Parasam
Associates P Ltd and Abharan Infotec etc
Government tank 31-08
Land falling outside the compactness and
02-25
contiguity Sy No. 38 of Veerasandra village
Total 86-19
Accordingly, the lands to an extent of 73.39 acres and 12.20
acres from Veerasandra and Hebbagodi villages respectively
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were deleted from acquisition proceedings vide notification
dated 14.05.2007 issued by the State u/s 4 of the Act. The
remaining land left for acquisition was 60.28 acres and 77.20
acres from Veerasandra and Hebbagodi villages respectively,
totalling to an extent of 138.08 acres.
6. The State issued the Final Notification dated 14.05.2007
u/s 28(4) of the Act, proposing to acquire 138.08 acres of land
in the said villages. On 30.08.2007, the State issued a
notification, deleting an extent of 89.25 acres from the
acquisition proceedings due to the time gap between the
preliminary and final notifications, approval of projects by the
State Level Single Window Clearance Committee (SLSWCC),
and projects awaiting approvals and lands being situated in the
midst of developed areas. Subsequent to such notification, the
final extent of lands sought to be acquired are as follows:
Village Extent A-G
Veerasandra 42-30
Hebbagodi 05-33
Total 48-23
7. The SLSWCC granted clearances for the projects of the
following companies, along with their respective shares of land:
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Name Date of Veerasandra Hebbagodi
clearance
RGR Techpark P 23.03.2007 14-04 -
Ltd.
Goyal Projects P 23.03.2007 14-31 -
Ltd
JS Software India 23.03.2007 07-19 -
P Ltd.
Easha Solutions 26.11.2007 03-00 -
Ltd.
New Gen R&D 18.08.2007 - 02-10
Centre P Ltd.
27.09.2007 - 01-15
Bangalore Social
& Educational
Association
AAR EL Tech Park 27.09.2007 - 00-32
Land required for - - 00-16
Road
- - 01-00
Proposed Oxide
Business
Solutions P Ltd.
TOTAL 48-23
Subsequent to the Final Notification dated 14.05.2007,
possession was taken over lands to the extent of 38.35 ¼ acres
and transferred to KIADB u/s 28(8) of the Act. Compensation of
Rs. 15,24,65,625/- was paid at the agreed rate of Rs. 65 lakhs
per acre.
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8. W.P. 9325/2007 and connected matters were filed by the
landowners challenging the Preliminary and Final notifications
issued by the State and prayed for quashing of the notifications
dated 27.08.2003 and 14.05.2004. The learned Single Judge,
vide order dated 15.12.2010 in W.P. 14723/2007, allowed the
writ petitions and quashed the impugned notifications. Vide
order dated 14.09.2011, the learned Single Judge allowed W.P.
9375/2007 with the same effect as that of order dated
15.12.2010.
9. Aggrieved by the orders dated 15.12.2010 and
14.09.2011, the Appellants filed W.A. 758/2011 and 1021-
22/2012 respectively. The Coordinate Bench of this Court, vide
common order dated 04.10.2012, allowed the writ appeals and
remanded the batch of petitions for reconsideration before the
Learned Single Judge. The Coordinate Bench of this Court
passed the following order:
"14. From the above narration of the
order of the learned Single Judge, it is
clear to the court, none of the
contentions urged by the Board or by the
allottee has been considered by the
learned Single Judge. No point is
formulated by the learned Single Judge
to decide the Writ Petition on merits. In
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paragraphs-17 to 19, the learned Single
Judge has stated that the practice of the
Board in identifying the beneficiaries
even prior to the acquisition proceedings
as bad and the same is nothing but
disastrous to the maintenance of law and
he however stated that State is always
required to treat all the citizens equally.
Exercise of the said power for acquisition
of private lands which is an inroad into
the private rights of citizens can be
characterized as an exception to the
enforcement of rule of Law. In order to
come to this conclusion, the learned
Single Judge was required to consider
the objections filed by the Board as well
as by the allottee. But unfortunately, the
learned Single Judge did not consider the
case of the parties. Though the appellant
has contended that the Writ Petition filed
by the petitioner was barred by principles
of res judicata, whether really filing of
second petition was res judicata or not,
Single Judge was required to give a
finding and if the case of the appellant
and the allottee had been considered by
the learned Single Judge, we would not
have interfered with the order of the
learned Single Judge. Because the
learned Single Judge has proceeded on a
footing that the acquisition procedure is
bad in law on account of misuse of power
and with a mala fide intention to give
benefit to the 5th respondent, without
considering their case, we are of the view
that an error is committed by the learned
Single Judge. If he had formed such a
opinion after considering the objections
of the allottee and the appellant, the
matter would have been different.
Therefore, we are of the view that the
order of the learned Single Judge suffers
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from infirmity and that the matter
requires to be reconsidered by the
learned Single Judge afresh.
15. In the circumstances, the appeal is
allowed. The order passed in
W.P.No.14723/2007 dt. 15.12.2010 is
set aside. We request the Registry to
place the matter before the Bench which
deals with the roaster and we further
request the learned Single Judge to
consider the case of all the parties on
merits and in accordance with law.
Since the Writ Petitioner was enjoying
the Interim order when the matter was
pending before the learned Single Judge,
the same shall be continued till the
disposal of the matter."
10. Subsequent to the order dated 04.10.2012, the batch of
connected petitions were reconsidered by the learned Single
Judge. Vide impugned common order dated 12.11.2013, the
learned Single Judge allowed the batch of petitions and
quashed the acquisition proceedings arising from notifications
dated 27.08.2003 and 14.05.2007. Aggrieved by the Impugned
Common order, the present appeals are filed.
11. This Court vide order dated 24.11.2016, passed the
following interim order:
"Issue notice in connection with the
application for condonation of delay.
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Ms. Niloufer Akbar, learned additional
government advocate, accepts notice for
the respondent No.1.
Therefore, formal service of notice to the
respondent No.1 is dispensed with.
During the pendency of the application
for condonation of delay, the parties are
directed to maintain status quo, as of
today, in relation to the property-in-
dispute."
12. This Court, vide order dated 11.04.2019, allowed the
application or condonation of delay of 684 days, and the parties
were directed to maintain status quo . The order reads as
follows:
" ORDER ON I.A. NOS.3 OF 2016 AND
4 OF 2016
Heard learned counsels.
There is a delay of 684 days in filing the
writ appeal.
The reasons assigned for the delay in
filing the appeal are that, after disposal
of the matter by the learned Single Judge
the papers were sent to the Advocate to
prepare an appeal. The Advocate took
time to prepare the appeal. In the
interregnum, the aforesaid delay has
occurred.
On hearing learned counsels, we are of
the view that the reasons assigned for
the delay in filing the writ appeal
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constitutes sufficient cause. Hence, the
delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
IA.No.3 of 2016 is disposed of
accordingly.
Admit.
Stay of the Order dated 12.11.2013
passed in Writ Petition No.9325 of 2007
[LA-KAIDB] by the learned Single Judge.
Both the parties are directed to maintain
status quo with regard to the possession
of the land in question.
IA.No.4 of 2016 is accordingly disposed
of.
I.A. No.1 of 2018 filed for impleading is
to be considered at the stage of final
hearing after compliance of the office
objections.
List this appeal along with Writ Appeal
No.4517 of 2015."
13. On 10.06.2026, this Court passed the following order,
directing the Board to furnish details of landowners who
accepted compensation and did not challenge the acquisition
proceedings:
" IN W.A.No.4520/2015:
Learned counsel for the appellant/KIADB
submits that he will file details of the
landowners, who had accepted the
compensation in respect of their lands
acquired for the formation of Extension
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of Electronic City, III Phase, and have
filed writ petitions along with their writ
petition numbers.
Learned counsel for the KIADB should
also provide details of the extent of land
involved in each of the writ petition.
It has been stated at the Bar that many
land losers, who had accepted the
compensation did not challenge the land
acquisition proceedings. However, the
learned Single Judge has quashed the
entire land acquisition proceedings of 48
acres. The details of the land losers, who
had accepted the amount of
compensation and did not challenge the
land acquisition proceedings, extent of
land involved in respect of such each
land loser should also be provided in a
tabular form. For completing this
exercise and filing the details before this
Court, we adjourn the hearing of these
appeals.
Post these appeals on 25.06.2026."
14. As per the directions vide order of this Court dated
10.06.2026, the Board filed a memo containing the details of
the landowners who challenged the land acquisition
proceedings and the extent of lands involved, along with the
details of landowners who accepted compensation and did not
challenge the acquisition proceedings.
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The details of the landowners who have challenged the
acquisition proceedings, along with the extent of lands
involved, are as follows:
Sl.
No.
Case No. WA & Names of Land Details
WP Landowners Sy.No. and
extent
Village
1. W.A. 4520/2015
Sri Govindappa Sy.No. 3 of
Veerasandra,
in W.P. 9325/2007
0.30 acres
Attibele Hobli,
Anekal Taluk
2. W.A. 1518/2014
Smt.
Sy.No. 89/1 of
Veerasandra,
in W.P.
Chinnamma
2.14 acres
Attibele Hobli,
14723/2007
Anekal Taluk
3. W.A. 1519/2014
Smt.
Sy.No. 88 of
Veerasandra,
in W.P.
Bhagyalakshmi,
0.0375 acres
Attibele Hobli,
15183/2007
w/o. R Bhaskar
Anekal Taluk
4. W.A. 1520/2014
Sri
Sy.No. 90 of
Veerasandra,
in W.P.
Ramakrishnappa
0.0375 acres
Attibele Hobli,
16509/2007
Anekal Taluk
5. W.A. 1521/2014
Sri K Anand, s/o
Sy.No. 97/2 of
Veerasandra,
in W.P. 5382/2008
Krishnappa
2.12 acres
Attibele Hobli,
Anekal Taluk
6. W.A. 4517/2015
Sri Kanakappa Sy.No. 3 of
Veerasandra,
0.30 acres
Attibele Hobli,
in W.P.
27425/2009
Anekal Taluk
7. W.A. 4518/2015
G Periyanna &
Sy. No.
Hebbagodi,
in W.P. 13055-
Dr. Chandil
121/15 of
Attibele Hobli,
056/2012
Kumar
1.16 acres
Anekal Taluk
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8. W.A. 4521/2015
Sri M
Sy.No. 121/4
Veerasandra,
in W.P. 3293/2012
Rahmathulla
of 0.57 acres
Attibele Hobli,
Anekal Taluk
TOTAL EXTENT OF
8.02 acres
LANDS
The details of the landowners who accepted compensation and
did not challenge the acquisition proceedings are as follows:
Sl. Khatedar / Landowner Sy.No. Extent
No. (acres)
1. V. Ramanjanaya & S Venkatachalaya 86/1 3.24
2. K. Varadaiah Muthappa 87/1 2.07
3. Pappamma, Padmaraju, Shammanna, 92/1A 2.07
4. V. Y. Lakshmana 96/1 1.37
Poojappa, Pranca Jassarica, Sin
5.
Sajwal Rasna, G A Raju & Others SD
96/2P 1.38
Owners
6. J. S Subramanyam & J. S. Venu 82/1 1.35
7. Savithramma, T. V. Nagaraju 82/2 2.13
8. J. S Subramanyam & J. S. Venu 83/2 2.30
9. J.C. Munirathnam & J.C.Rajagopal 84/2 0.20
10. K. Subramani 84/3 0.16
11. Muniraju 84/4 0.21
12. J. C Munirathnamma & J.C. Rajagopal 84/5 1.14
13. Munivenkatappa 85/1 2.04
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14. K. Varadaiah Muthappa 86/2 2.11
Poojappa, Gayathri, S. R. Uma, R. P.
Chandra, Munigaman, Sujatha, M.
Appanna, S. Kumara, G. Thomas, C.
15.
88/P 4.02
V. shankar, L. Indrani, R. G Pal, G
Sathayamurthy, Robbin Thomas, C.B
Shajj, Suswacharirag, G D Jayasheela
Chilikappa Chinnamma, Chinnapaiah,
89/2P
2.08
16.
P Rangappa Shetty
17. Government Land 90 1.24
III. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
15. Learned Senior Counsel Shri Basavaraj V Sabarad
appearing for the Appellants submitted that the impugned
order suffers from the same infirmities as the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 15.12.2010 in W.P. 9325/2007 and
connected matters, which was pointed out by a Coordinate
Bench of this Court in its order dated 04.10.2012 in W.A.
758/2011 and connected matters. The observations of the
Coordinate Bench were that the learned Single Judge did not
consider the objections of the Board or the allottees of the land.
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15.1 It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge, in
the impugned order, did not frame points for consideration and
did not consider the objections raised by the Appellants.
Further, it did not note that even when the extent of lands was
progressively whittled down, the remaining lands acquired were
done after paying compensation to the landowners.
15.2 It was contended that the observation of the learned
Single Judge in the impugned order that the notifications were
quashed, as well as, that the State can resume such land after
reverting the monies received from the allottee, is
contradictory. Once the notifications are quashed, the land no
longer vests in the hands of either the Board or the State. The
lands must go back to the original landowners. The Appellants
have paid a compensation of Rs. 15,24,65,625 to the
landowners, and the process of refunding the compensation
and ensuring restitution of the lands to the landowners would
be placing the Board in an unfair situation.
15.3 It was further submitted that the learned Single Judge, in
the impugned order, did not consider that the preliminary
notification dated 27.08.2003 specified for lands to be declared
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as Industrial Areas, and nowhere it was mentioned that the
acquisition was for the purpose of formation of Electronic City
Phase IV.
15.4 Learned Counsel further submitted that the following
grounds were raised in W.A. 758/2011 and connected matters:
i. The acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed
merely because some lands were deleted without
assigning any reasons.
ii. The preliminary objections as well as the additional
objections raised by the Appellants, justifying the
acquisition, were not considered by the learned
Single Judge in his order dated 15.12.2010.
iii. The learned Single Judge did not consider that the
preliminary notification dated 27.08.2003 specified
for lands to be declared as Industrial Areas, and
nowhere it was mentioned that the acquisition was
th
for the purpose of Electronic City 4 Phase.
iv. The fact that the lands are acquired for
development of private industries does not exclude
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the acquisition from the scope of ‘public purpose’.
The acquisition was made in accordance with the
Karnatak industries Facilitation Act, 2002, and the
said policy decision cannot be subjected to judicial
review. Further, the development of industries is
monitored by the Board and such industries would
generate employment opportunities for the public.
Reliance was placed on the cases of PRATIBHA
NEMA v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (AIR
2003 SC 3140) and GIRIAS INVESTMENT v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA [(2008) 7 SCC 53] to
contend that there is no illegality or vitiation of
public purpose when the acquisition is for
development of private industries. The order of the
learned Single Judge dated 15.12.2010 is contrary
to the observations made by the Supreme Court in
BAJI RAO KOTE BY LRS. v. STATE OF
MAHARASHTRA [(1995) 2 SCC 442] wherein it
was observed that even when a private Trust
approached the State for acquisition of land, the
land acquisition stands valid.
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v. The lands subject to the acquisition proceedings are
abutting the Veerasandra Industrial Area, which
was developed by the Appellants. Further, 90% of
the lands acquired have been allotted to the
allottees, and compensation has been duly paid to
the landowners. Further, the learned Single Judge
has quashed the entire acquisition proceedings
when the challenge before the writ Court was
limited to the extent of land of the Petitioner and
other connected matters.
IV. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS:
16. Learned Counsel for the Respondents submitted that the
allotment of lands in favour of RGR Tech Park Pvt Ltd. was
made before the conclusion of the acquisition proceedings. The
allottee-company was incorporated in March 2007. Subsequent
to its incorporation, the Final Declaration was issued.
16.1 It was submitted that the financial status of RGR Tech
Park Pvt Ltd. and the other allottee-companies is not
forthcoming. They are bogus and fraudulent companies with
the main aim of acquiring lands through the Board for personal
gain. It was further submitted that the Director of the allottee-
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company, JS Software India Pvt Ltd., has political ties with the
then Minister of the Board, thereby questioning the bona fides
of the company and the object of the acquisition proceedings.
Further, RGR Tech Park Pvt Ltd., JS Software India Pvt Ltd., and
Goyal projects Pvt Ltd. were incorporated solely for the purpose
of allotment of valuable lands of the farmers/landowners.
16.2 It was further submitted that the land bearing Sy.No.90
to the extent of 1.24 Acres is utilised for the construction of
houses under the Ashraya Scheme. The subject land was sub
judice in the W.P. 31768-31839/2009, wherein the learned
Single Judge vide order dated 04.11.2009 prohibited the
dispossession of the landowner from the subject land except in
pursuance of the acquisition proceedings by the Board. The
same Sy.No.90 was sub judice in W.P. 8302/2026, wherein the
learned Single Judge vide order dated 18.03.2026 granted an
interim stay on the dispossession of the landowners. As such,
the acquisition proceedings over Sy.No.90 is invalid and goes
against the orders of this Court.
16.3 It was contended that during the proceedings before the
Board u/s 28(2) and 28(3) of the Act, written correspondences
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were made by the Minister for Industries, the then Chief
Minister and the Governor for dropping of certain lands from
the acquisition proceedings by the Board. Despite such
correspondences on record of the Board, the subject land is
part of the acquisition proceedings in the present case.
16.4 It was further contended that the land over which the
Veerasandra Tank was situated was allotted in favour of the
Managing Director of RGR Tech Park Pvt Ltd., and is occupied
by the said allottee-company, which has resulted in the lake
being destroyed. Further, it was submitted that the entire
scheme of the acquisition proceedings is in the garb of
acquiring agriculturist properties and conveniently supporting
the allottee-companies for their developments, thereby
deviating from the object and purpose of establishment of the
KIADB Board.
16.5 It was contended that M/s Easha Solution Pvt Ltd. instituted
W.P. 48937–940/2013 seeking the refund of development charges
amounting to Rs. 9,60,335 and the acquisition cost of Rs. 59,47,500,
along with interest, predicated on the complete absence of
infrastructure facilities and amenities despite the requisite payments
having been duly made. Vide impugned order dated 12.11.2013,
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the learned Single Judge allowed the said writ petition along
with connected matters, quashing the acquisition notifications.
The Court directed the Appellants to refund the monies
received from the allottee, subject to the deduction of
legitimate expenses incurred pursuant to the transaction, and
to resume the land—where the landowners are not inclined to
seek restitution—to be dealt with as State property. Following
the aforesaid order, the deposited amount was withdrawn by
the allottee-company. The Appellants herein preferred no
appeal against the said order, thereby allowing the same to
attain finality. This circumstance demonstrates that the
allottee-company has chosen not to establish its project upon
the subject lands.
V. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION:
I. Whether the procedure for acquisition of lands
undertaken by the KIAD Board were in accordance
with the provisions of the KIAD Act, 1966?
II. Whether the learned Single Judge duly consider the
Appellants’ objections before passing the impugned
order, and, in any event, was the KIADB’s
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identification and allotment of acquired land to
private industries a valid exercise of power under
the KIAD Act, 1966, insofar as such allotment
serves a “public purpose” within the meaning and
object of the Act?
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
Re. Issue No. I:
17. Before we proceed to decide on the issues at hand, it
would be apt to extract the Section 28 of the Act:
“ 28. Acquisition of land-
(1) If at any time, in the opinion of the
State Government, any land is required
for the purpose of development by the
Board, or for any other purpose in
furtherance of the objects of this Act, the
State Government may by notification,
give notice of its intention to acquire
such land.
(2) On publication of a notification
under sub-section (1), the State
Government shall serve notice upon
the owner or where the owner is not
the occupier, on the occupier of the
land and on all such persons known
or believed to be interested therein
to show cause, within thirty days
from the date of service of the
notice, why the land should not be
acquired.
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(3) After considering the cause, if
any, shown by the owner of the land
and by any other person interested
therein, and after giving such owner
and person an opportunity of being
heard, the State Government may
pass such orders as it deems fit.
(4) After orders are passed under
sub-section (3), where the State
Government is satisfied that any
land should be acquired for the
purpose specified in the notification
issued under sub-section (1), a
declaration shall, by notification in
the official Gazette, be made to that
effect.
(5) On the publication in the official
Gazette of the declaration under
subsection (4), the land shall vest
absolutely in the State Government free
from all encumbrances.
(6) Where any land is vested in the State
Government under sub-section (5), the
State Government may, by notice in
writing, order any person who may be in
possession of the land to surrender or
deliver possession thereof to the State
Government or any person duly
authorised by it in this behalf within
thirty days of the service of the notice.
(7) If any person refuses or fails to
comply with an order made under
subsection (5), the State Government or
any officer authorised by the State
Government in this behalf may take
possession of the land and may for that
purpose use such force as may be
necessary.
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(8) Where the land has been acquired for
the Board, the State Government, after it
has taken possession of the land, may
transfer the land to the Board for the
purpose for which the land has been
acquired.”
18. Section 28 prescribes for the procedure for acquisition of
land. Sub-section (1) provides for the issuance of preliminary
notification to acquire the lands when the State is of the
opinion that such is required for the purpose of development by
the Board. Sub-sections (2) and (3) provide for the issuance of
notice to the landowner and interested third parties, and
passing of orders after considering the objections filed by the
landowners respectively. Sub-section (4) provides for the
publication of Final Declaration in the Official Gazette by the
State Government after passing orders under sub-section (3).
Sub-section (5) provides for the State to take over the lands
acquired, free from encumbrances. Sub-section (6) and (7)
provide that the State Government may order for surrendering
or delivering possession over the acquired lands, and if the
order made under sub-section (6) is not complied with, the
State may take such possession with necessary force. Sub-
section (8) provides that upon the State taking possession over
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the lands acquired, it may transfer the same to the Board for
the requisite purposes.
19. Before the writ court, it was vehemently submitted by the
learned counsel for the landowners that they were not given an
opportunity of being heard, thereby violating the procedure laid
down in Section 28(3) of the KIAD Act. The learned Counsel for
the Board submitted that the Appellants had not only filed their
objections on 20.10.2003 and 21.10.2003 but also appeared
before the Appellant No.2 – SLAO on the said dates and
submitted their written and oral objections. A perusal of the
order passed u/s 28(3) by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO would
indicate that, while some landowners appeared personally,
other persons appeared through their advocate. The objections
were taken into consideration by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO at
Annexure 3 of the said Order. The Appellant No.2 – SLAO, in
the said order, has rejected certain unclear and non-specific
allegations, while giving specific consideration to the different
objections raised by the landowners. The contention raised by
the learned counsel for the landowners that no opportunity of
being heard was given during the proceedings is untenable and
does not stand.
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20. From a plain reading of the provisions, it can be observed
that there is no time limit specified between the issuance of
preliminary notification and final declaration under the Act.
Unlike the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which provides for time
limits for issuance of a final notification under Provisos (i) and
(ii) of Section 6(1), the KIAD Act does not provide for the
same. It is well settled by many courts that the Act is a self-
contained code and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 do not apply to the KIAD Act. However, it is also well
settled that when there is no time limit specified for exercise of
power under a statute, it must be done so within a reasonable
time [See: MEHER RUSI DALAL v. UNION OF INDIA
[(2004) 7 SCC 362], P.K. SREEKANTAN v. P.
SREEKUMARAN NAIR [(2006) 13 SCC 574] and K.B
NAGUR v. UNION OF INDIA [(2012) 4 SCC 483] . In RAM
CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA [(1994) 1 SCC 44] , the
Supreme Court held as follows:
“14. The Parliament has recognised and
taken note of the inaction and non-
exercise of the statutory power on the
part of the authorities, enjoined by the
provisions of the Act to complete the
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acquisition proceedings within a
reasonable time and because of that now
a time-limit has been fixed for making of
the award, failing which the entire
proceeding for acquisition shall lapse.
But, can it be said that before the
introduction of the aforesaid amendment
in the Act, the authorities were at liberty
to proceed with the acquisition
proceedings, irrespective of any schedule
or time-frame and to complete the same
as and when they desired? It is settled
that in a statute where for exercise
of power no time-limit is fixed, it has
to be exercised within a time which
can be held to be reasonable.
16. …Can the statutory authority take a
plea that although it has not performed
its duty within a reasonable time, but it
is of no consequence because the
person, who has been wronged or
deprived of his right, has also not
invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court
or of this Court for a suitable writ or
direction to grant the relief considered
appropriate in the circumstances? The
authorities are enjoined by the
statute concerned to perform their
duties within a reasonable time, and
as such they are answerable to the
Court why such duties have not been
performed by them, which has
caused injury to claimants. By not
questioning, the validity of the
acquisition proceedings for a long time
since the declarations were made under
Section 6, the relief of quashing the
acquisition proceedings has become
inappropriate, because in the meantime,
the lands notified have been developed
and put to public use. The lands are
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being utilised to provide shelter to
thousands and to implement the scheme
of a planned city, which is a must in the
present set-up. The outweighing public
interest has to be given due weight. That
is why this Court has been resisting
attempts on the part of the landholders,
seeking quashing of the acquisition
proceedings on ground of delay in
completion of such proceedings. But, can
the respondents be not directed to
compensate the petitioners, who were
small cultivators holding lands within the
ceiling limit in and around Delhi, for the
injury caused to them, not by the
provisions of the Act, but because of the
non-exercise of the power by the
authorities under the Act within a
reasonable time?”
21. In STATE OF GUJARAT v. RAGHAV NATHA (1969) 2
SCC 187 , the Supreme Court observed that where no time is
prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it does not
mean that it can be exercised at any time. Such powers must
be exercised within a reasonable time. In SANTOSHKUMAR
SHIVGONDA PATIL v. BALASAHEB TUKARAM SHEVALE,
(2009) 9 SCC 352 , the Supreme Court held as follows:
“11. It seems to be fairly settled that
if a statute does not prescribe the
time-limit for exercise of revisional
power, it does not mean that such
power can be exercised at any time;
rather it should be exercised within
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a reasonable time. It is so because
the law does not expect a settled
thing to be unsettled after a long
lapse of time. Where the legislature
does not provide for any length of time
within which the power of revision is to
be exercised by the authority, suo motu
or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of
such power within reasonable time is
inherent therein.”
22. The absence of time limit under the KIAD Act was
observed by this Court in a catena of cases. The declaration
must follow within a reasonable period from after Section 28
(1) notification. The KIAD Act does not prescribe a specific time
limit, but the process under Sections 28 (1) to 28 (4) must
proceed continuously within a reasonable period, otherwise the
preliminary notification becomes stale. A preliminary
notification cannot be kept alive indefinitely and that an
unexplained delay of several years between the issuance of the
notification under Section 28 (1) and declaration under Section
28 (4) renders the acquisition invalid. The principle has been
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in C. PADMA AND OTHERS
v. DEPUTY SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF TAMIL NADU
AND OTHERS (1997) 2 SCC 627 , wherein the Supreme Court
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held that the lethargic inaction of the State breaks the statutory
connectivity.
23. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in H.N. SHIVANNA v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA (2012 SCC ONLINE KAR 8956)
interpreted the decision laid down in RAM CHAND (Supra) as
follows:
“39. From the aforesaid discussion, it is
clear if a period is prescribed under the
Act for issue of a final declaration as well
as for passing of the award, if the final
declaration is not issued and the award is
not passed within the stipulated period,
the entire acquisition lapses, unless it is
shown by virtue of any order of stay or
injunction issued by any Court, the
authorities were precluded from
completing the acquisition proceedings.
It is by operation of law as contained in
the statute. Merely because such a
provision is not found in an
enactment, it does not mean
limitation is not a bar at all. If such a
prescription is not there expressly in
any enactment it is not possible to
hold that such an acquisition has
lapsed relying on the provisions
contained in the Land Acquisition
Act. In other words, the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be
read into the Act or such similar
statutes. But nonetheless in order to
decide what is the reasonable time
within which authorities have to
exercise their power either for issue
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of a final notification or for passing
of the award is concerned, certainly
the Parliament intendment as
contained in this provision cannot be
completely lost sight of on the
contrary, it acts as a guide. It
expresses the will of the Parliament.
It has to be given due weight. When
this acquisition proceedings were delayed
endlessly and landowners were deprived
of just compensation under law and
consequently the constitutional right was
violated, the Parliament amended the
Land Acquisition Act prescribing the time
limit. According to the Parliament, one
year is the reasonable time for passing of
a final declaration and two years is the
time for passing of an award. If within
those periods the final declaration is not
issued, the award is not passed, the
whole acquisition lapses. The Act is
enacted for industrial development
which has to be done expeditiously.
Such an industrial development
results in generation of employment
and economic growth of the State. If
the land is required for such public
purpose a special enactment was
enacted for speedy acquisition of
land. Merely because the provisions
contained in Section 6(1) and 11A is
not incorporated in this Act or after
the Parliament amended the Land
Acquisition Act in 1984, the State
legislature did not think it fit to bring
in similar provisions under the Act, it
does not mean that the State
Government can exercise its power
for issue of a final declaration or
passing of an award without any
regard to time limit. It has to be
done within a reasonable time. As
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held by the Apex Court in Ram
Chand's case, two years is held to be
a reasonable time within which a
final declaration has to be issued, if
there are no hurdles placed in the
acquisition by the land owners or if
there are no hurdles in law. If the
final declaration is not issued within
two years, certainly the land
acquisition has to lapse,
notwithstanding the absence of any
specific provision in the Act as
contained in the Land Acquisition
Act. When we say it is two years or one
year it does not mean on expiry of the
said two years or one year, as calculated
under the L.A. Act, the acquisition has to
lapse. It is roughly two years or one
year. Few days or months this way or
that way should not matter. Except for
this absence of mathematical precision in
calculating the period, the substance has
to be applied. The parliamentary
intention in prescribing time limit under
the L.A. Act cannot be ignored. However,
it all depends on the facts of that
particular case, the conduct of the
parties, the purpose for which the land is
sought to be acquired and the problems
faced by the acquiring authorities in
concluding the acquisition. Therefore, it
is not possible to accept the
contention of the acquiring authority
that in the absence of any specific
provision under the Act, no such
time limit can be imposed and the
same is without any substance. Even
in the absence of any such
prescriptions expressly under the
statute, having regard to the fact
that the right to property is a
constitutional right and the person
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whose land is sought to be acquired
is entitled to compensation at the
market rate, such a compensation
has to be paid to him at the earliest
and therefore, the power of
acquisition should be exercised
within a reasonable time so that the
person who lost the land is duly
compensated at the earliest point of
time.
44. In fact the material on record
discloses that after the issuance of
second final notification, it is the
purchaser, who challenged the cider. The
writ petitions came to be dismissed on
the ground of want of locus-standi. It is
thereafter the very same purchaser
through his sons as power of attorney
holders has preferred these writ
petitions. Therefore, the petition
lacks bona fides and therefore on the
ground of delay in issuing final
notification and passing of the award,
these acquisitions cannot be vitiated. As
held above, though no time limit is
prescribed under the Act and the
acquisition is to be completed within
a reasonable time, say two years,
still what is reasonable time has to
be decided in the facts of that
particular case. ”
24. Referring to the above decision and interpreting on the
question of delay in issuing the Final Declaration, along with its
effect on the landowner, this Court, in its judgement and order
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dated 05.03.2014, in M R SUJATHA v. KIADB & OTHERS
(W.P. 21613-21615/2010) observed as follows:
“14. It has to be seen that the
Division Bench has particularly
referred to the observation of the
Apex Court in P Narayanappa’s case,
which has been relied upon by the
learned Counsel for the respondents,
and further in so far as
Nagabhusan’s case was concerned, it
would be pertinent to note that it
was a decision with reference to the
delay in passing of the award and
therefore, the contention whether
Section 11(a) could be incorporated
or put forth the limit prescribed
therein would be read in KIADB Act
was answered in negative and this
was therefore not with reference to
the delay in issuance of notification.
The delay becomes significant to the
present petitioner as the petitioner
intended to eke out his livelihood by
establishing an industrial unit and
preparations were well on, at the time
when the notification was issued and the
petitioner had lodged her objection on
the same grounds.
15. Therefore, the petitioner was
kept in the dark for several years
without indication as to whether the
scheme is being implemented, which
would certainly affect the
petitioner’s interest in moving
forward with her plans. That would
be one of the reasons as to the how
the delay would affect the petitioner
and therefore is material. The
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contention that the respondents
sought to acquire such extent of land
and since there were innumerable
owners involved in process of claim
of the land involved and their
objection consumed much time and
therefore, the Code ought to be
given longer rope in publishing the
notification in accordance with the
procedure ought not to be fettered
with reference to any time limitation
and it cannot be accepted as
observed by the division bench
legislation being expropriate, it was
necessary that the authority
proceeded with the same with the
acceptance expedition was to that
person who were effectively planned
their affairs of life. If the persons
such as the petitioner has kept in
suspense as to the result that would
follow pursuant to the disbursal
proceedings, it would certainly affect
them in a serious manner . Therefore,
the dictum of the division bench
judgment of this Court accords with the
reason and justice.”
25. Taking note of the various observations made by the
Courts above, we revert back to the present case. The
preliminary notification issued u/s 28(1) of the Act was issued
on 27.08.2003, and the final declaration u/s 28(4) was issued
on 14.05.2007 i.e., after a gap of 3 years and 8 months.
Considering the settled time limit of 2 years as laid down in
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H.N. SHIVANNA (Supra), there is a delay of 1 year and 8
months from the end of the 2-year time limit. It is the
contention of the Learned Senior Counsel for the Landowners
that on a reading of Section 30 of the KIAD Act, the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are applicable to the KIAD Act
and thus, the time limit as provided u/s 6(1) of the 1894 Act is
applicable to the proceedings and Final Declaration issued by
the State under the KIAD Act. We do not find force in this
contention, inasmuch it is well settled that KIAD Act is a self-
contained code, and the provisions of the Central Act cannot be
used to interpret the provisions of the KIAD Act. The Appellants
have not justified the delay in issuing the Final Declaration,
although a faint mention is made that due to the delay between
the preliminary and final notifications, an extent of 89.25 acres
was deleted from the acquisition proceedings. This aspect will
be dealt with by us in subsequent discussions.
26. It can be observed that the landowners submitted before
the writ court that there was a delay in issuing the Final
Declaration as the procedure laid down under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, was not followed. The learned Single
Judge, neither in the order dated 15.12.2010, nor in the
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impugned order dated 12.11.2013, has taken note of the said
contention of the landowners. Therefore, we consider the
contention raised by the landowners before the writ Court and
accordingly, in view of the findings above, do not find any force
in the same.
27. Thus, the Preliminary Notification dated 27.08.2003 and
the Final Declaration dated 14.05.2007 deserve to be set aside
on this count.
Re. Issue No.II:
28. It is the contention of the Appellants that the objections
filed before the writ court were not taken into consideration by
the learned Single Judge, which led to the impugned order
being passed. The impugned order suffers from the very same
infirmities in the order of the learned Single Judge dated
15.12.2010 as pointed out by the Coordinate Bench.
29. Before we delve into a reading of the impugned order, it
is necessary to consider the order dated 04.10.2012 passed by
the Coordinate Bench of this Court. The Coordinate Bench
enunciated the contentions of the parties, the holding of the
learned Single Judge, and the ratio decidendi behind the order
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of the learned Single Judge. The issues framed by the
Coordinate Bench are as hereunder:
"1) Whether the learned Single Judge
has considered the contentions urged by
the appellants while allowing the Writ
Petition?
2) Whether the contentions raised by the
allottee were required to be considered
by the learned Single Judge while
allowing the Writ Petition? and
3) Whether the order of the learned
Single Judge suffers from any infirmity?"
The Coordinate Bench observed as follows:
"14. From the above narration of the
order of the learned Single Judge, it
is clear to the court, none of the
contentions urged by the Board or by
the allottee has been considered by
the learned Single Judge. No point is
formulated by the learned Single
Judge to decide the Writ Petition on
merits. In paragraphs-17 to 19, the
learned Single Judge has stated that the
practice of the Board in identifying the
beneficiaries even prior to the acquisition
proceedings as bad and the same is
nothing but disastrous to the
maintenance of law and he however
stated that State is always required to
treat all the citizens equally. Exercise of
the said power for acquisition of private
lands which is an inroad into the private
rights of citizens can be characterized as
an exception to the enforcement of rule
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of Law. In order to come to this
conclusion, the learned Single Judge
was required to consider the
objections filed by the Board as well
as by the allottee. But unfortunately,
the learned Single Judge did not
consider the case of the parties.
Though the appellant has contended
that the Writ Petition filed by the
petitioner was barred by principles
of res judicata, whether really filing
of second petition was res judicata
or not, Single Judge was required to
give a finding and if the case of the
appellant and the allottee had been
considered by the learned Single
Judge, we would not have interfered
with the order of the learned Single
Judge. Because the learned Single Judge
has proceeded on a footing that the
acquisition procedure is bad in law on
account of misuse of power and with a
mala fide intention to give benefit to the
5th respondent, without considering their
case, we are of the view that an error is
committed by the learned Single Judge.
If he had formed such a opinion after
considering the objections of the
allottee and the appellant, the
matter would have been different.
Therefore, we are of the view that the
order of the learned Single Judge suffers
from infirmity and that the matter
requires to be reconsidered by the
learned Single Judge afresh ."
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The Coordinate Bench allowed the appeals filed by the Board
and remanded the batch of petitions back to the learned Single
Judge for fresh consideration.
30. It is to be noted that the Coordinate Bench observed in its
order that the learned Single Judge proceeded on two footings:
the entire acquisition is done with mala fide intention coupled
with the identification of the beneficiaries of the acquired lands
before completion of acquisition proceedings. The learned
Single Judge did not consider the objections filed by the Board,
SLAO, and allottee. The Division Bench acknowledged the same
and observed that its decision would be different if the
objections of the Board, SLAO, and the allottees were
considered.
31. On a reading of the impugned order dated 12.11.2013,
we observe that the contentions of the parties in each of the
connected matters were mentioned before the issues were
framed. The learned Single Judge proceeded with the
undisputed chain of events of the acquisition proceedings. The
writ court then went on to the order in W.P. 48937-940/2013
wherein the allottee-company M/s Easha Solutions Pvt Ltd. had
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sought refund of monies paid as acquisition cost and
development charges over the lands allotted to them. The issue
framed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is as
follows:
“9. In the light of the above
developments, the glaring circumstance
that is apparent and which would be
required to be addressed as the primary
point for consideration, is whether the
very object of the acquisition is any
longer relevant with virtually the
entire extent of land declared as an
industrial area, Electronic City,
Phase-IV, having been dropped from
the acquisition proceedings.
In that, it is on record that the Electronic
City Phase – I spread over 370 acres.
Phase II is spread over 340 acres and
Phase III was again spread over several
hundred acres of land. It was keeping in
such a cohesive development that an
extent of about 320.03 acres was
recommended for acquisition for Phase
IV. THE Industrial area was spread over
224.1 acres. However, in the
circumstances above, the said extent has
been progressively and liberally whittled
down to infinitesimal parcels, and from
the tenor of the latest resolutions of the
Board the process of deleting the lands
duly notified under section 28(4) of the
KIADB Act, continues. The legality of that
exercise having been carried out even
earlier, by recourse to section 4, is itself
seriously doubtful. Therefore, whether
the object of acquisition, to wit, the
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formation of Electronic City Phase IV
was any longer identifiable, is the
point that rears up for
consideration . ”
32. The learned Single Judge noted that even though the
acquisition was set aside, the State Government could still
protect allottee-companies on plots where consenting
landowners took compensation and did not ask for their land
back or offer to return the money. In such cases, the State
Government could exercise its power under Section 37 of the
KIADB Act. Further, if any allottee-company no longer wanted
their land, the State was required to take back the property
and refund their money (after deducting valid expenses),
provided the original landowners were also not seeking
restitution. This relief was granted to the allottee-company JS
Software India Pvt Ltd. as a consequence of the order of refund
of monies in W.P. 48937-940/2013, as a result of which the
lands, which were not sought for restitution by the original
landowners, reverted back to the State Government and were
to be dealt with as State Property. Considering the same, the
learned Single Judge quashed the Preliminary Notification dated
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27.8.2003 and Final Notification dated 14.5.2007 along with all
consequential orders.
33. It can be observed that the learned Single Judge, vide the
impugned order, without considering the objections of the
Board and SLAO, expected the Borad to demonstrate that the
extent of 48.33 acres of land notified was of a size to qualify as
one of the phases of Electronic City and not merely consisting
of a few additional industrial units apart from the existing
phases. It was also expected of the Board to demonstrate that
the lands notified form a reasonable compact block for the
industrial facilities to be developed, and that the lands notified
were in proximity and contiguous to the existing phases of
Electronic city. The learned Single Judge observed that the
Board vaguely stated that the compact development of the
Industrial Layout would be affected if the claims of the
landowners were accepted. He proceeded on the notion that
the continuous reduction of lands for multiple reasons,
including the claims of the landowners, indicated gross
arbitrariness of treatment and proceeded to suggest that the
quashing of the acquisition proceedings would not bar the State
from allotting the lands of the landowners who consented to
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surrender their lands and receive compensation to the allottee
companies.
34. On a perusal of the impugned order, we observe that the
learned Single Judge not only quashed the notifications and
consequential orders but also directed the State to refund the
monies as per the order in W.P. 48937-940/2013 to the
allottee-company JS Software India Pvt Ltd. and that the land
can be used as State Property. We find force in the contention
of the Board that the observations of the learned Single Judge
in the impugned order run contrary to each other. On one hand,
the acquisition notifications issued by the State are quashed,
and on the other hand, the land surrendered by the allottee-
companies are to be dealt with by the State as State Property.
Even when the allottee-companies obtain clearance from the
SLSWCC for the proposed industrial projects, the lands allotted
for the projects must be vested with the State. The State has
the power to acquire the lands for industrial purpose under the
KIAD Act. The Board issues Preliminary Notification notifying
the lands required for industrial development, conducts
proceedings by hearing the objections to the acquisition, and
issues Final Notification notifying the revised lands required for
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industrial development, all done in accordance with Section
28(1), (2), (3), and (4) the KIAD Act. On a reading of section
28(5) of the Act, it can be inferred that the lands are vested
with the State after the publication of the Final Notification in
the Official Gazette. As per Section 28(7), after such vesting of
lands, the State Government transfers the notified lands to the
Board for the purpose for which the land has been acquired i.e.
industrial development projects.
35. In the present case, since the preliminary and final
notifications were quashed as per the impugned order, the
lands revert back to the landowners and the State shall not be
vested with the said lands, ultimately rendering the transfer of
the lands to the Board null and void. As a result, the Board
cannot allot the notified lands to the allottee-companies to
carry out the SLSWCC-approved industrial projects. Thus, the
clearances granted by the SLSWCC are ineffective, inasmuch as
there are no lands with the Board to allot to the allottee
companies for the industrial projects.
36. It is the further contention of the Board that the learned
Single Judge did not consider the objections filed before the
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writ court. The broad objections of the Board and the allottee-
companies were as follows:
i. The preliminary notification dated 27.08.2003 did not
specify that the lands notified for acquisition would be
th
utilised for the project ‘Electronic City 4 Phase.’
ii. The allotment of lands by the Board to the private
industries i.e., the allottee-companies in the present
case does not exclude the allotment from the scope of
‘public purpose’.
iii. The lands notified for acquisition are abutting the
Veerasandra Industrial Area.
iv. The learned Single Judge quashed the acquisition
proceedings over all the lands notified while the
challenge was limited to the extent of 8.02 acres
owned by the landowners who were petitioners in W.P.
9375/2007, W.P. 14723/2007, W.P. 15183/2007, W.P.
16509/2007, W.P. 5382/2008, W.P. 27425/2009, W.P.
13055-056/2012, and W.P. 3293/2012, with the
remaining landowners having accepted the
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compensation and consequently, their writ petitions
before the writ court being dismissed.
37. As observed, despite the order dated 04.10.2012 of the
Coordinate Bench directing the learned Single Judge to consider
the matter afresh with the objections and additional objections
filed by the Board and allottee-companies, the impugned order
does not consider the said objections. The learned Single Judge
termed the objections made by the Board as ‘vague’, without
going into the specific objections made by the Board and
allottee-companies.
38. It is trite law that a quasi-judicial or judicial authority
must pass a reasoned and speaking order, as reasoned
decisions form the cornerstone of the rule of law. A speaking
order reveals the mind of the adjudicating authority,
demonstrating that the relevant facts, material evidence, and
legal submissions raised by the parties were objectively
evaluated. When an authority fails to consider, address, or deal
with specific objections raised by an aggrieved party, the
resulting order is rendered non-speaking and unreasoned. Such
an omission violates the core principles of natural justice –
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specifically the rule of fair procedure ( audi alteram partem ) –
as affected parties are entitled to know the precise grounds
upon which their claims or objections were rejected.
Consequently, an unreasoned order that turns a blind eye to
material objections is arbitrary, procedurally defective, and
unsustainable in the eyes of the law. In UNION OF INDIA v.
ESSEL MINING & INDUSTRIES LTD. [(2005) 6 SCC 675] ,
the Supreme Court observed as follows:
“4. We find that though the High Court
referred to various statutes relating to
the mining activities e.g. the Mining Act,
etc. it did not indicate any reason as to
why it was of the view that the authority
issuing the notification lacked statutory
power to issue the notification. Though
the judgment runs to several pages,
after noticing the rival submissions, the
High Court in a very cryptic manner,
disposed of the writ petition coming to
the aforesaid view. It is not the
number of pages in a judgment
which is relevant. It is on the other
hand, the sufficiency of reasons
indicated to justify the conclusions.
We may only add here that paras 28 and
29 of the judgment which are supposed
to contain the conclusions are not only
confusing, but also make little sense.
They, to quote the immortal words of
Lord Sumner in R. v. Nat Bell Liquors
Ltd. [(1922) 2 AC 128 : 127 LT 437
(PC)] “speak only with the inscrutable
face of a sphinx”. It is “unspeaking
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order” as classically described by Lord
Cairns, IC in Overseers of the Poor of
Walsall Overseers v. London & NWR
Co. [(1878) 4 AC 30 : 39 LT 453 (HL)]
…”
39. In SBI v. AJAY KUMAR SOOD [(2023) 7 SCC 282] ,
the Supreme Court laid down the important elements and the
comprehensibility of a judgement as follows:
“9. The judgment [SBI v. Labour Court,
2020 SCC OnLine HP 4325] of the
Division Bench of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh is incomprehensible.
This Court in appeal found it difficult to
navigate through the maze of
incomprehensible language in the
decision of the High Court. A litigant for
whom the judgment is primarily
meant would be placed in an even
more difficult position. Untrained in
the law, the litigant is confronted
with language which is not heard,
written or spoken in contemporary
expression. Language of the kind in
a judgment defeats the purpose of
judicial writing. Judgment writing of
the genre before us in appeal
detracts from the efficacy of the
judicial process. The purpose of
judicial writing is not to confuse or
confound the reader behind the
veneer of complex language. The
Judge must write to provide an easy-
to-understand analysis of the issues
of law and fact which arise for
decision. Judgments are primarily
meant for those whose cases are
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decided by Judges. Judgments of the
High Courts and the Supreme Court
also serve as precedents to guide
future Benches. A judgment must
make sense to those whose lives and
affairs are affected by the outcome
of the case . While a judgment is read
by those as well who have training in the
law, they do not represent the entire
universe of discourse. Confidence in the
judicial process is predicated on the trust
which its written word generates. If the
meaning of the written word is lost in
language, the ability of the adjudicator to
retain the trust of the reader is severely
eroded.
12. In Shakuntala Shukla v. State of
U.P. [Shakuntala Shukla v. State of
U.P., (2021) 20 SCC 818 : 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 672] as well, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court, was faced with
an order [Swami Nath Yadav v. State
of U.P., 2018 SCC OnLine All 5465] of
the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad which made it difficult to
discern between the submissions of
counsel and the reasons of the court.
Laying emphasis on the purpose of a
judgment, this Court elaborated on what
should be the content of a judgment. The
Court observed that : (Shakuntala
Shukla case [Shakuntala Shukla v. State
of U.P., (2021) 20 SCC 818 : 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 672] , SCC para 9)
“9. … 9.2. … “Judgment” means a
judicial opinion which tells the
story of the case; what the case is
about; how the court is resolving
the case and why. “Judgment” is
defined as any decision given by a
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court on a question or questions or
issue between the parties to a
proceeding properly before court.
It is also defined as the decision or
the sentence of a court in a legal
proceeding along with the
reasoning of a Judge which leads
him to his decision. The term
“judgment” is loosely used as
judicial opinion or decision. Roslyn
Atkinson, J., Supreme Court of
Queensland, in her speech once
stated that there are four
purposes for any judgment that
is written:
(i) to spell out Judge's own
thoughts;
(ii) to explain your decision to
the parties;
(iii) to communicate the
reasons for the decision to the
public; and
(iv) to provide reasons for an
appeal court to consider.
9.3. It is not adequate that a
decision is accurate, it must also be
reasonable, logical and easily
comprehensible. … What the court
says, and how it says it, is equally
important as what the court
decides.
9.4. Every judgment contains
four basic elements and they
are (i) statement of material
(relevant) facts, (ii) legal
issues or questions,
(iii) deliberation to reach at
decision, and (iv) the ratio or
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conclusive decision. A judgment
should be coherent, systematic and
logically organised. It should
enable the reader to trace the fact
to a logical conclusion on the basis
of legal principles. It is pertinent to
examine the important elements in
a judgment in order to fully
understand the art of reading a
judgment. In the Path of Law,
Holmes, J. has stressed the
insentient factors that
persuade a Judge. A judgment
has to formulate findings of
fact, it has to decide what the
relevant principles of law are,
and it has to apply those legal
principles to the facts. The
important elements of a
judgment are:
(i) Caption
(ii) Case number and citation
(iii) Facts
(iv) Issues
(v) Summary of arguments by
both the parties
(vi) Application of law
(vii) Final conclusive verdict
9.5. The judgment replicates
the individuality of the Judge
and therefore it is
indispensable that it should be
written with care and
caution. The reasoning in the
judgment should be intelligible
and logical. Clarity and
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precision should be the goal. All
conclusions should be
supported by reasons duly
recorded. The findings and
directions should be precise
and specific. Writing judgments is
an art, though it involves skilful
application of law and logic. We are
conscious of the fact that the
Judges may be overburdened with
the pending cases and the arrears,
but at the same time, quality can
never be sacrificed for quantity.
Unless judgment is not in a precise
manner, it would not have a
sweeping impact. There are some
judgments that eventually get
overruled because of lack of clarity.
Therefore, whenever a
judgment is written, it should
have clarity on facts; on
submissions made on behalf of
the rival parties; discussion on
law points and thereafter
reasoning and thereafter the
ultimate conclusion and the
findings and thereafter the
operative portion of the order.
There must be a clarity on the final
relief granted. A party to the
litigation must know what actually
he has got by way of final relief.
The aforesaid aspects are to be
borne in mind while writing the
judgment, which would reduce the
burden of the appellate court too.
We have come across many
judgments which lack clarity on
facts, reasoning and the findings
and many a times it is very difficult
to appreciate what the learned
Judge wants to convey through the
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judgment and because of that,
matters are required to be
remanded for fresh consideration.
Therefore, it is desirable that
the judgment should have a
clarity, both on facts and law
and on submissions, findings,
reasonings and the ultimate
relief granted.”
(emphasis supplied)
17 . A judgment culminates in a
conclusion. But its content
represents the basis for the
conclusion. A judgment is hence a
manifestation of reason. The reasons
provide the basis of the view which
the decision-maker has espoused, of
the balances which have been
drawn. That is why reasons are
crucial to the legitimacy of a Judge's
work. They provide an insight into
judicial analysis, explaining to the
reader why what is written has been
written. The reasons, as much as the
final conclusion, are open to
scrutiny. A judgment is written
primarily for the parties in a forensic
contest. The scrutiny is first and
foremost by the person for whom the
decision is meant — the conflicting
parties before the court. At a
secondary level, reasons furnish the
basis for challenging a judicial
outcome in a higher forum. The
validity of the decision is tested by
the underlying content and reasons.
But there is more. Equally significant is
the fact that a judgment speaks to the
present and to the future. Judicial
outcomes taken singularly or in
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combination have an impact upon human
lives. Hence, a judgment is amenable to
wider critique and scrutiny, going beyond
the immediate contest in a courtroom.
Citizens, researchers and journalists
continuously evaluate the work of courts
as public institutions committed to
governance under law. Judgment writing
is hence a critical instrument in fostering
the rule of law and in curbing rule by the
law."
40. The Board contended before the writ court that W.P.
9784/2007, filed by the very same petitioners-landowners in
W.P. 14723/2007 on the same subject matter, was disposed of
as withdrawn vide order dated 02.09.2008 in terms of a memo
stating that the State had dropped the acquisition proceedings
over the subject lands in the said writ petition. We do not agree
with the said contention. The order dated 02.09.2008 was
disposed of as having become infructuous in terms of the
memo filed by the Appellant No.2 – SLAO that the subject lands
were excluded from acquisition proceedings. The writ petition
was not withdrawn by the petitioners. The decision of the
Supreme Court in SARGUJA TRANSPORT SERVICE v.
S.T.A.T. [(1987) 1 SCC 5] , which was relied upon by the
allottee-company in its objections before the writ court, is not
applicable to the facts in the present case. Therefore, the
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objection that, the principle of res judicata barred the
landowner from filing the writ petition in W.P. 14723/2007 on
the ground of suppression of material fact of filing the prior writ
petition, is not tenable. In KAILASH CHAND SHARMA v.
STATE OF RAJASTHAN (2025 SCC ONLINE RAJ 4219) , the
learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court held as
follows:
"44. In support of the
aforementioned observations, it
would be prudent to place reliance
upon the dictum of the Hon'ble Apex
Court as enunciated in State (NCT of
Delhi) v. BSK Realtors LLP, (2024) 7
SCC 370 where it was held that it is
a well-settled principle of law that
the fact suppressed or concealed by
a party must be material in nature,
in the sense that such suppression
would have a bearing on the merits
of the case. A ‘material fact’, as
expounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court, in
this context denotes a fact that is
material for the purpose of determining
the lis between the parties. The logical
consequence of this principle is that the
materiality of the suppressed fact is to be
assessed in relation to its impact on the
grant or denial of the relief sought. In
instances, such as the present one,
where the suppressed fact is not material
for the determination of the dispute
between the parties entirely, especially
looking to the subsequent developments
(declaration of final result and issuance
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of appointment orders) as noted above,
the court may not deem it appropriate to
refuse the exercise of its discretionary
jurisdiction. It was further held that in
situations where larger public
interest is at stake, courts ought not
to allow technicalities to be applied
in a rigid or inflexible manner.
Instead, in such cases, a more
flexible and nuanced approach
should be adopted by the courts in
considering the implications of the
suppression of facts. The relevant
extract of the dictum enunciated in BSK
Realtors LLP (Supra) is reproduced
herein-under:—
“25. The law, as we noticed
aforesaid, aptly resolves the first
issue . Res judicata, as a
technical legal principle,
operates to prevent the same
parties from relitigating the
same issues that have already
been conclusively determined
by a court. However, it is
crucial to note that the
previous decision of this Court
in the first round would not
operate as res judicata to bar a
decision on the lead matter and
the other appeals; more so,
because this Rule may not
apply hard and fast in
situations where larger public
interest is at stake. In such
cases, a more flexible approach
ought to be adopted by courts,
recognizing that certain
matters transcend individual
disputes and have far-reaching
public interest implications.”
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45. At this juncture, this Court deems
it appropriate to reference the
dictum of the Hon'ble Apex Court as
enunciated in National Confederation
of Officers Association of Central
Public Sector Enterprises v. Union of
India, (2022) 4 SCC 764, where the
Hon'ble Apex Court held that the
principle of res judicata would not
apply when there was no decision on
the merits of the case in a previous
petition. In essence, the Hon'ble
Court clarified that the previous
dismissal of a similar petition did not
involve a substantive adjudication on
merits. Therefore, the principle of res
judicata would not bar the subsequent
litigation. Similarly, upon a
corresponding application of the said
holding in the present factual matrix of
the case at hand, it becomes glaringly
obvious that S.B. CWP No. 7264/2022
was withdrawn without having any
discussion/adjudication on the merits of
the prayers sought, which have also
been significantly altered since the
declaration of the impugned final result
dated 01.06.2023.
48. Therefore, upon undertaking a
cumulative consideration of the
observations delineated herein
above, it becomes conclusively
evident that within the factual
context of the present batch of writ
petitions, when juxtaposed with the
petition previously filed in the Year
2022, what emerges is an ‘omission’
on the part of the petitioners rather
than a ‘material concealment’. This
is because the omission in question
does not possess the requisite power
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or magnitude to substantially impact
or resolve the lis presently before
this Court. Furthermore, the bar of
constructive res judicata shall also
not be applicable in the facts and
circumstances of the present case.
This is owing to the fact that the petition
withdrawn in the Year 2022 did not
involve an adjudication on the merits of
the prayers sought therein. Additionally,
the prayers in the present petitions are
noted to be unidentical to those in the
previously withdrawn petition. Hence,
given that the previous petition was
merely withdrawn without any
adjudication on the merits, it does not
operate as a bar to the present
proceedings and being adjudicated upon.
Thus, the mere fact that the landowners ‘omitted’ in mentioning
the filing of the prior writ petition does not bar them from filing
subsequent writ petition before the writ court.
41. The observations of the Supreme Court in STATE BANK
OF INDIA v. AJAY KUMAR SOOD [(2023) 7 SCC 282]
underscore that a judgment is essentially a manifestation of
reason, designed to convey a clear, logical, and intelligible
resolution of the dispute to the litigants and the public at large.
Adherence to these principles requires that judicial writing
refrain from sweeping, unreasoned generalizations and instead
deliver an articulate analysis that squarely resolves the distinct
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legal issues and factual complexities before the Court. In the
present batch of appeals, the learned Single Judge passed a
blanket quashing order without evaluating the specific
preliminary and additional objections filed by the Board and the
allottees, thereby failing to provide the transparent legal
reasoning mandated by the Supreme Court. To uphold the
integrity of the judicial process, this Court must supply that
missing analysis by measuring the statutory delay under the
KIAD Act against the doctrine of severability and the
established principles of laches.
42. It is trite law that when a statute does not prescribe a
specific time limit for the exercise of statutory power, such
power must nevertheless be exercised within a reasonable
timeframe. Under Section 28 of the KIAD Act, 1966, while the
statute operates as a self-contained code without a fixed
statutory deadline between the Section 28(1) Preliminary
Notification and the Section 28(4) Final Declaration, the
acquiring authority cannot keep land acquisition proceedings
hanging indefinitely to the detriment of landowners. As settled
by a Division Bench of this Court in H.N. SHIVANNA v. STATE
OF KARNATAKA (Supra) , a period of roughly two years
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constitutes a reasonable timeframe to issue a final declaration
unless delayed by court orders or genuine hurdles. In the
present case, an unexplained delay of 3 years and 8 months
elapsed between the Preliminary Notification dated 27.08.2003
and the Final Declaration dated 14.05.2007. This lethargic
inaction on the part of the State breaks the statutory
connectivity, rendering the acquisition proceedings stale,
arbitrary, and legally unsustainable as against landowners who
seasonably raised their grievances.
43. However, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the
subsequent developments and the distinct categories of
landowners involved. The doctrine of severability allows this
Court to strike down the acquisition to the extent of its
statutory infirmity while preserving completed transactions that
have attained finality. A clear distinction must be drawn
between those contesting landowners who actively challenged
the notifications and those who either accepted compensation
without protest, withdrew their challenges, or never
approached the Court. Landowners who accepted agreed
compensation under Section 29(2) or allowed possession to be
taken without timely demur are barred by the principles of
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estoppel and laches. As rightly contended by the Settled
acquisitions cannot be unsettled at their instance after
significant time lapses and infrastructural developments.
Consequently, the delay in issuing the Section 28(4) declaration
vitiates the acquisition only in respect of the lands belonging to
active, contesting petitioners who have steadfastly prosecuted
their claims and declined compensation.
44. Furthermore, this Court must address the findings of the
learned Single Judges in their orders dated 15.12.2010 and
12.11.2013 i.e., the impugned order, regarding the public
purpose of the acquisition. The learned Single Judges observed
that utilizing the machinery of the KIAD Act to identify and allot
lands to specific private entities — often prior to the issuance of
the Final Declaration — cannot qualify as a bona fide "public
purpose" and represents a misuse of statutory power. The
contesting landowners have placed reliance on the decision of
this Court dated 10.04.2026 in KRISHNAREDDY & ORS. v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. (W.A. 99/2013 & connected
matters) , which forcefully reiterated that public purpose cannot
be employed as a mere garb to facilitate the acquisition of
private lands for the ultimate benefit of private beneficiaries.
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While the legal principle articulated in KRISHNAREDDY
(Supra) remains an unquestionable safeguard against
expropriatory arbitrariness, its rigid application in the present
factual matrix must be balanced against the overarching
demands of equity.
45. Judicial intervention under Article 226 is inherently guided
by principles of equity, justice, and good conscience. Even
where procedural irregularities exist, such as the premature
identification or allotment of lands to private beneficiaries prior
to the Section 28(4) notification, a court of equity cannot
ignore decades of intervening ground realities. Where industrial
projects have already been set up, third-party rights have
accrued, and substantial compensation has been disbursed to
and accepted by consenting landowners, striking down the
entire scheme in toto would work grave injustice and cause
uncompensated disruption. Therefore, while acknowledging the
constitutional principles laid down in KRISHNAREDDY
(Supra) , equity demands a modified order that harmonizes
legal dogma with pragmatic reality.
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46. In view of the foregoing analysis, the Writ Appeals are
partly allowed. The impugned common order of the learned
Single Judge dated 12.11.2013 is modified accordingly. The
Preliminary Notification dated 27.08.2003 and Final Declaration
dated 14.05.2007 are quashed pro tanto solely to the extent of
the lands belonging to the contesting petitioners who have
continuously prosecuted their writ petitions and have not
accepted compensation. The possession of the lands covered
under the quashed portion shall revert to the respective
contesting landowners, provided that in the event any such
landowner has drawn compensation during the pendency of
proceedings, restitution shall be subject to refunding the entire
compensation amount with interest @ 6% per annum to KIADB
within eight weeks from the date of this order. Conversely, the
acquisition proceedings, vesting of lands, and subsequent
allotments in respect of landowners who accepted
compensation, surrendered possession, or did not challenge the
notifications are upheld as valid and complete. Finally, lands
where allotments stand cancelled or where third-party allottees
have withdrawn their funds from KIADB shall automatically
revert to their original owners, subject to the condition of
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returning any compensation received along with interest @ 6%
per annum.
Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, do not survive
for consideration and accordingly, they stand disposed of.
SD/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
SD/-
(H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
JUDGE
BKV
CT:SN