Karuna Shanker Singh @ Nintoo vs State Of U.P.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
LUCKNOW
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 253 of 2002
Karuna Shanker Singh @ Nintoo
…..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of U.P.
…..Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s) : S.C. Srivastava,
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Govt. Advocate,
Court No. - 11
HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.
HON'BLE PRAMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.
1. Heard Sri S.C. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant as well as learned A.G.A. appearing on behalf of the State-
respondents.
2. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 04.02.2002 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge / Fast Track
Court No. IV, Sultanpur in Sessions Trial No. 138/1999 (State vs.
Karuna Shanker Singh and another), arising out of Case Crime No.
30/1999, under Section 302 IPC, Police Station Baldirai, District
Sultanpur. By the impugned judgment, the trial court convicted the
appellant Karuna Shanker Singh alias Nintoo under Section 302 of the
Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as "I.P.C.") and sentenced him
to life imprisonment along with a fine of 10,000/-, and in default of ₹10,000/-, and in default of
payment of fine, to undergo one year additional rigorous imprisonment.

2
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
3. The prosecution case in brief is that the deceased Ajay Kumar
Singh, aged about 22 years, was a student of B.A. Part-III at Rana Pratap
Post Graduate College, Sultanpur. On 02.02.1999 at about 9:00 AM, he
left his house on foot to attend college at Sultanpur. When he failed to
return home by evening, his family members began searching for him. In
the night between 8:00 PM and 9:00 PM, complainant’s wife Smt.
Savitri Devi informed that around 2:00 PM while she was working in the
field, she had seen her son Ajay Kumar going along with the accused
Karuna Shanker Singh and Dharmraj Yadav towards the north. Despite
search, Ajay Kumar could not be traced out that night. On the next
morning, i.e., 03.02.1999, information was received that Ajay Kumar
had been murdered by sharp-edged cutting weapons and his dead body
was lying near the canal at village Narsinghpur, Hamlet of Deeh, within
the jurisdiction of Police Station Baldirai.
4. Following the incident, a written report was submitted by the
complainant Bambahadur Singh (P.W. 1) at Police Station Baldirai on
03.02.1999 at 1:00 PM, on the basis of which Chick FIR No. 8/1999 was
registered as Case Crime No. 30/1999 under Section 302 IPC (Ex. Ka-
06) by Head Constable Komalnath Singh (P.W. 6) and GD entry was
made at Report No. 14 at 13:00 hrs (Ex. Ka-07). The investigation was
undertaken by Station Officer Ram Naresh Yadav (P.W. 7), who reached
the spot and conducted the inquest ( पंचायतनामा ) on the dead body of the
deceased Ajay Kumar Singh on 03.02.1999 between 2:40 PM and 3:40
PM (Ex. Ka-08). The I.O. collected plain and blood-stained earth from
the spot (Ex. Ka-15), prepared the site plan of the place of occurrence
(Ex. Ka-14), and dispatched the dead body in a sealed bundle for post-
mortem examination through Constables Jaypal Saroj and Ganga Ram
(P.W. 10).
5. On 04.02.1999 at 1:30 PM, Dr. P.M. Srivastava (P.W. 5), Senior
Child Specialist, District Hospital, Sultanpur, conducted the autopsy on
the cadaver of deceased Ajay Kumar Singh and proved the Post-Mortem
Report (Ex. Ka-05). The autopsy surgeon found as many as 44 ante-
mortem incised/cut wounds distributed all over the body, including vital

3
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
parts such as the skull, face, neck, back, chest, and defensive cut wounds
over both hands, thumbs, and fingers. On internal examination, the left
parietal, temporal, and occipital bones were found fractured, the brain
was found lacerated with subdural hematoma, the base of the skull was
found fractured, and both chambers of the heart as well as the stomach
and urinary bladder were found completely empty. The doctor opined
that the cause of death was coma, shock, and excessive hemorrhage
resulting from ante-mortem cut injuries caused by a deadly heavy sharp-
cutting weapon, such as a Gandasah.
6. During the course of investigation, the appellant Karuna Shanker
Singh was arrested on 07.02.1999 at 12:30 PM near the Gomti bridge,
Isauli (Ex. Ka-21). On his pointing out and confession under Section 27
of the Evidence Act, one iron Gandasa (the weapon of offense) and a
blood-stained sweater belonging to him were recovered from beneath
dry straw in a tube-well room (Ex. Ka-18), and a pair of slippers was
recovered from the mud near the canal embankment (Ex. Ka-17). The
medical examination of the appellant Karuna Shanker Singh was
conducted on 08.02.1999 by Dr. Manoj Kumar (P.W. 9), Medical
Officer, PHC Baldirai, who proved his injury report (Ex. Ka-25), noting
an old abrasion on his right palm. The recovered articles were dispatched
to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL), Lucknow, which submitted its
report (Ex. Ka-26) confirming the presence of human blood on the
clothing items and disintegrated blood on the Gandasa. After completing
the investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted the Charge-sheet
(Ex. Ka-23) against both accused persons.
7. To substantiate its case, the prosecution examined ten witnesses,
namely, P.W. 1 Bambahadur Singh, P.W. 2 Smt. Savitri Devi, P.W. 3 Jang
Bahadur Singh, P.W. 4 Pradeep Kumar, P.W. 5 Dr. P.M. Srivastava, P.W.
6 Head Constable Komalnath Singh, P.W. 7 S.O. Ram Naresh Yadav,
P.W. 8 Dr. G.P. Shukla, P.W. 9 Dr. Manoj Kumar, and P.W. 10 Constable
Ganga Ram.

4
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
8. In his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., the appellant
Karuna Shanker Singh denied the prosecution allegations and pleaded
complete innocence. He stated that he was falsely implicated due to
village party-bandi and long-standing litigation enmity. He specifically
stated that he was illegally picked up from his home by the police,
assaulted in custody, and that a false injury report was prepared under
police pressure, and that the recovery of the Gandasa and clothes was
entirely fabricated. Co-accused Dharmraj Yadav also denied the
prosecution allegations.
9. The defence examined no witnesses in their favour, nor did they
produce any documentary evidence on record.
10. Upon evaluating the oral and documentary evidence, the trial court
held that the date, time and place of offence stood conclusively
established by the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. The FIR is prompt,
and the testimonies of P.W. 1 Bambahadur Singh, P.W. 2 Savitri Devi,
P.W. 3 Jang Bahadur Singh, and P.W. 4 Pradeep Kumar supported the
prosecution version. The prosecution established the circumstantial chain
of "last seen" and the recovery of the weapon used in the commission of
the offence on the pointing out of the appellant-accused, as well as the
recovery of the blood-stained clothes which were verified in the
examination of the FSL. Motive was established. As many as 44 cut
wounds were caused on the body of the deceased which corroborated the
ocular evidence. The place of occurrence stood proved. However, the
charge levelled against co-accused Dharmraj Yadav was not found
proved and he was acquitted by extending the benefit of doubt, but the
offence under Section 302 IPC against the appellant-accused Karuna
Shanker Singh was found proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Consequently, the trial court convicted and sentenced the appellant-
accused as above mentioned.
11. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment and order of the trial
court, the appellant-accused preferred the present appeal.

5
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
12. During the pendency of the present appeal, an application was
filed praying for declaring the appellant as a juvenile.
13. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that as on
the date of the incident, i.e., 02.02.1999, the appellant was a juvenile, his
date of birth being 15.11.1981 as per the High School
certificate/marksheet and the school leaving certificate/transfer
certificate of Class-8th, copies whereof have been brought on record as
Annexure No. 1 to the affidavit filed in support of the application.
14. It was argued that under Section 7A of Act of 2000, the plea of
juvenility can be raised at any stage. It is expedient to extract provisions
of Section 7A of Act, 2000 as below:
“[7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is raised
before any court.—
(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a
court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on the
date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an inquiry,
take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as
to determine the age of such person, and shall record a finding
whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as
nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court
and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of
the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the
provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder, even
if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of
commencement of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward the
juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the
sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no
effect.]”
15. It was argued that under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act,
the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after final disposal
of the case.
16. An objection/counter affidavit has been filed by the State-
respondents, wherein in paragraph 5 it has been stated that the High
School marksheet and the school leaving certificate have been duly

6
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
verified by the respondent authorities and as per the transfer certificate
and certificate issued by the Principal of the Poorva Madhyamik
Vidyalaya, Deeh, Baldirai, Sultanpur, the date of birth of the appellant
has been found to be 15.11.1981. It is thus not in dispute that the
appellant, having the date of birth as 15.11.1981, was a juvenile on the
date of the incident.
17. We have proceeded to consider the said records and verification
submitted on behalf of the State.
18. Section 94 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Act, 2015 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 2015") provides for
presumption and determination of age of a juvenile. For ready reference,
the same is reproduced herein under:
“94. Presumption and determination of age. —(1) Where, it
is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the
appearance of the person brought before it under any of the
provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving
evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or
the Board shall record such observation stating the age of
the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry
under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case may be, without
waiting for further confirmation of the age.
(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable
grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought
before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the
case may be, shall undertake the process of age
determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining—
(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the
matriculation or equivalent from the concerned examination
Board, if available; and in the absence thereof;
(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall
be determined by an ossification test or any other latest
medical age determination test conducted on the orders of
the Committee or the Board:
Provided such age determination test conducted on the order
of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within
fifteen days from the date of such order.
(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be
the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose
of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person.
18.1. Thus the process of age determination is provided in sub-
section (2) of Section 94 which is identical to the procedure

7
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
prescribed under sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007,
which is extracted herein-below:
“(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict
with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted
by the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining-
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if
available; and in the absence whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a
play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a
municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause
(a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly
constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the
juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot
be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the
Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by
considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of
one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking
into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the
medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in
respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any
of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof,
clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards
such child or the juvenile in conflict with law.”
19. Thus the process of age determination is provided in sub-section
(2) of Section 94, which gives primacy to the matriculation or equivalent
certificate, or date of birth certificate from the school first attended.
20. In the present case, the educational records and the school transfer
certificate of Class-8th as well as the High School certificate have been
verified by the State authorities and found to be genuine, establishing his
date of birth as 15.11.1981.
21. The prosecution has raised no dispute to the said verified date of
birth.
22. We have perused the verified documents on record. As per the said
conclusive evidence and the counter affidavit filed by the State, the date
of birth of the appellant Karuna Shanker Singh is 15.11.1981. When the

8
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
date of incident is seen, which is 02.02.1999, we find the appellant to be
aged 17 years, 2 months and 17 days on the date of incident, and as such
he was a juvenile on the date of incident. We hold accordingly.
23. The next question arises for our consideration is whether the
conviction of the appellant is justified or not.
24. Learned counsel for the appellant states that he does not intend to
challenge the conviction of the appellant, but prays that, keeping in view
the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mumtaz v. State of
U.P., (2016) 11 SCC 786, the sentence be set aside and the matter be
remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the
appropriate order/sentence as prescribed under law.
25. On the other hand, the learned A.G.A. does not dispute the
verified date of birth of the appellant and also does not dispute the
proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Mumtaz (supra).
26. From the perusal of the record and autopsy report of the deceased
Ajay Kumar, it emerges that he had been brutally killed by inflicting
blows of a deadly sharp-edged weapon on various parts of the body,
resultantly he succumbed to the injuries. There is no contradiction
between ocular and medical evidence in this regard.
27. This case rests on circumstantial evidence. To establish the chain
of circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has examined witnesses.
28. Out of them, P.W. 2 Savitri Devi deposed that on the date of
occurrence, while she was busy in agricultural work in her field, she had
seen that her deceased son Ajay Kumar was going along with the
accused persons, and when she asked him, he replied that he was going
along with the accused persons and would return after some time. But in
the night until 8:00 PM, he did not return. Another witness, P.W. 3 Jang
Bahadur Singh, was also examined to corroborate the theory of "last
seen together", who stated that he had seen the deceased Ajay Kumar in
the company of the accused persons when they were going along the

9
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
canal embankment ( पटरी ). Their testimony remained intact, and they are
witnesses of sterling quality. Therefore, no reason arises to disbelieve the
veracity of these witnesses. The presence of the deceased and the
appellant-convict at the place of occurrence, and thereafter the discovery
of his dead body, sufficiently substantiated the prosecution version with
regard to the culpability of the appellant-accused. Apart from this, the
weapon, Gandasa, which was used in the commission of the offence, had
been recovered on the pointing out of the appellant-convict, and the
blood-stained cloth which he had worn at the time of commission of the
offence was also recovered. This fact has been corroborated by the
independent recovery witness Pradeep Kumar (P.W. 4). On examination
in the FSL, blood was found on the Gandasa and the cloth which was
sent for examination.
29. The learned trial court, on the basis of evidence adduced by the
prosecution, after elaborate discussion observed and concluded that the
appellant-convict is responsible for committing the offence.
Consequently, he has been held guilty for the offence with which he had
been charged. Thus, we find no perversity or illegality in the impugned
judgment and conviction of the appellant-convict.
30. In the circumstances of the case, no interference in the finding
recorded by the trial court regarding the conviction of the appellant-
convict is warranted, and the conviction of the appellant is accordingly
upheld.
31. After upholding the conviction of the appellant-convict, the next
point which arises before us for consideration is as to what sentence
would be appropriate for the appellant-convict.
32. In this regard, it would be apt to refer to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mumtaz (supra) , wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court also considered the interplay of the Juvenile Justice Act,
1986 and the Act of 2000, and the procedure to be adopted when a claim
of juvenility is raised during the pendency of a criminal appeal.

10
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
33. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
18. The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act was considered in
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand [Pratap Singh v. State of
Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 742] and it
was stated as under : (SCC p. 570, para 31)
“31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the
special provision in respect of pending cases and begins with a
non obstante clause. The sentence
‘notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in
any area on the date on which this Act came into force’
has great significance. The proceedings in respect of a juvenile
pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of the Act are
relatable to proceedings initiated before the 2000 Act came
into force and which are pending when the 2000 Act came into
force. The term “any court” would include even ordinary
criminal courts. If the person was a “juvenile” under the 1986
Act the proceedings would not be pending in criminal courts.
They would be pending in criminal courts only if the boy had
crossed 16 years or the girl had crossed 18 years. This shows
that Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be
a juvenile under the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age
of 18 years then the pending case shall continue in that court
as if the 2000 Act has not been passed and if the court finds
that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such
finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the
juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which shall
pass orders in respect of that juvenile.”
19. In Bijender Singh v. State of Haryana [Bijender Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2005) 3 SCC 685 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 889] ,
the legal position as regards Section 20 was stated in the
following words : (SCC pp. 687-88, paras 8-10 & 12)
“8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986 Act and the
2000 Act relates to the age of males and females. Under the
1986 Act, a juvenile means a male juvenile who has not
attained the age of 16 years, and a female juvenile who has not
attained the age of 18 years. In the 2000 Act, the distinction
between male and female juveniles on the basis of age has not
been maintained. The age-limit is 18 years for both males and
females.
9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was not a
juvenile. In that view of the matter the question whether a
person above 16 years becomes “juvenile” within the purview

11
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
of the 2000 Act must be answered having regard to the object
and purport thereof.
10. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile
could be tried in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act takes
care of such a situation stating that despite the same the trial
shall continue in that court as if that Act has not been passed
and in the event, he is found to be guilty of commission of an
offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in the
judgment of conviction, if any, but instead of passing any
sentence in relation to the juvenile, he would be forwarded to
the Juvenile Justice Board (in short “the Board”) which shall
pass orders in accordance with the provisions of the Act as if it
has been satisfied on inquiry that a juvenile has committed the
offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been created in the said
provision. A legal fiction as is well known must be given its full
effect although it has its limitations. …
*11.
12. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person, although not a
juvenile, has to be treated to be one by the Board for the
purpose of sentencing, which takes care of a situation that the
person although not a juvenile in terms of the 1986 Act but still
would be treated as such under the 2000 Act for the said
limited purpose.”
20. In Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Dharambir v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1274]
the determination of juvenility even after conviction was one of
the issues and it was stated : (SCC p. 347, paras 11-12)
“11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to Section
20 that in all pending cases, which would include not only
trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision or
appeal, etc., the determination of juvenility of a juvenile has to
be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile ceases
to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when the 2000 Act
came into force, and the provisions of the Act would apply as if
the said provision had been in force for all purposes and for
all material times when the alleged offence was committed.
12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the 2000 Act provides that
“juvenile in conflict with law” means a “juvenile” who is
alleged to have committed an offence and has not completed
eighteenth year of age as on the date of commission of such
offence. Section 20 also enables the court to consider and
determine the juvenility of a person even after conviction by
the regular court and also empowers the court, while
maintaining the conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed

12
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
and forward the case to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned
for passing sentence in accordance with the provisions of the
2000 Act.”
21. Similarly in Kalu v. State of Haryana [Kalu v. State of
Haryana, (2012) 8 SCC 34 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 761] this
Court summed up as under : (SCC p. 41, para 21)
“21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of
pending cases. It states that notwithstanding anything
contained in the Juvenile Act, all proceedings in respect of a
juvenile pending in any court in any area on the date on which
the Juvenile Act comes into force in that area shall be
continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had not been
passed and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an
offence, it shall record such finding and instead of passing any
sentence in respect of the juvenile forward the juvenile to the
Board which shall pass orders in respect of that juvenile in
accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Act as if it had
been satisfied on inquiry under the Juvenile Act that the
juvenile has committed the offence. The Explanation to Section
20 makes it clear that in all pending cases, which would
include not only trials but even subsequent proceedings by way
of revision or appeal, the determination of juvenility of a
juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2, even if the
juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on or before 1-4-2001, when
the Juvenile Act came into force, and the provisions of the
Juvenile Act would apply as if the said provision had been in
force for all purposes and for all material times when the
alleged offence was committed.”
22. It is thus well settled that in terms of Section 20 of the 2000
Act, in all cases where the accused was above 16 years but
below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, the
proceedings pending in the court would continue and be taken
to the logical end subject to an exception that upon finding the
juvenile to be guilty, the court would not pass an order of
sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to the
Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. What kind of
order could be passed in a matter where claim of juvenility
came to be accepted in a situation similar to the present case,
was dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P.
[Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4
SCC (Cri) 725] in the following terms : (SCC pp. 210-11, para
32)
“32. A perusal of the “punishments” provided for under the
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the
offence committed by the appellant, advising or admonishing
him [clause (a)] is hardly a “punishment” that can be

13
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
awarded since it is not at all commensurate with the gravity of
the crime. Similarly, considering his age of about 40 years, it
is completely illusory to expect the appellant to be released on
probation of good conduct, to be placed under the care of any
parent, guardian or fit person [clause (b)]. For the same
reason, the appellant cannot be released on probation of good
conduct under the care of a fit institution [clause (c)] nor can
he be sent to a special home under Section 10 of the Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986 which is intended to be for the rehabilitation
and reformation of delinquent juveniles [clause (d)]. The only
realistic punishment that can possibly be awarded to the
appellant on the facts of this case is to require him to pay a
fine under clause (e) of Section 21(1) of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 1986.”
23. In Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of
U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725] , having
found the juvenile guilty of the offence with which he was
charged, in accordance with the law laid down by this Court
as stated above, the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional
Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the 2000 Act for
determining appropriate quantum of fine. The view taken
therein is completely consistent with the law laid down by this
Court and in our opinion the decision in Jitendra Singh v.
State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC
193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725] does not call for any
reconsideration. The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and
with effect from 15-1-2016 would not affect the inquiry in
which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the
2015 Act makes it very clear.
24. Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad alias Pappu to be
juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence
and guilty of the offence with which he was tried, we set aside
the sentence of life imprisonment passed against him and remit
the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for
determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be
levied on the appellant Dilshad alias Pappu and the
compensation that should be awarded to the family of the
deceased, keeping in mind the directions issued in Jitendra
Singh v. State of U.P. [Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2013) 11
SCC 193 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 725]
25. Criminal Appeal No. 2084 of 2009 is thus dismissed while
Criminal Appeal No. 460 of 2010 is allowed to the aforesaid
extent and the matter as regards appellant Dilshad alias
Pappu stands remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice
Board for determination as aforesaid. The bail bonds furnished
by appellant Mumtaz alias Muntyaz are cancelled and he shall

14
CRLA No. - 253 of 2002
be taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded
to him.”
34. Thus, where a juvenile is found guilty of the offence alleged to
have been committed, he simply cannot go unpunished, but what
punishment should be awarded, must be left to the Juvenile Justice
Board constituted under the Act.
35. In the present case, the offence was committed by the appellant-
convict on 02.02.1999 when the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force,
and by virtue of the subsequent enactments and the law laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, only the punishments/orders permissible under
the law governing juveniles ought to be awarded.
36. The conviction of the appellant is upheld; however, the matter is
remitted to the Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing appropriate
orders qua sentence.
37. The appellant, who is already on bail, shall appear before the
Juvenile Justice Board concerned on 27.10.2026 along with a certified
copy of this judgment.
38. The Board shall pass appropriate orders strictly in accordance with
law within a period of four weeks from the date of communication of a
certified copy of this order.
39. Keeping in view the aforesaid observations, the appeal is partly
allowed to the extent of sentence as indicated above.
40. Trial court record be sent back along with a copy of this judgment
for compliance as per rules.
(Pramod Kumar Srivastava,J.) (Abdul Moin,J.)
October 13, 2026
Haseenuddin
Digitally signed by :-
HASEENUDDIN
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench