Shiv Balak Goswami vs Pankaj Puri
- Court
- Delhi High Court
$~58
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 04.05.2026
+ FAO (COMM) 295/2025
SHIV BALAK GOSWAMI .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Anjalika Sharma and Mr.
Narender Goswami, Advs.
versus
PANKAJ PURI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satish Kumar, Mr. Rakesh Tiwari
and Mr. Shiv Kumar Yadav, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J (ORAL)
1. This is an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 [‘Act of 2015’], against the order dated 06.06.2025 in CS(COMM)
193/2020 [‘impugned order’], passed by the District Judge, Commercial
Court, West District, Tis Hazari, returning the plaint for being presented
before the Court of appropriate jurisdiction.
2. The brief factual matrix as set out in the appeal is as follows:
3. The Appellant is a manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, and distributor
of automobile oils and other lubricants. One of the marks under which the
Appellant has been selling its products is LAIMAX and SUPER LAIMAX
4T. The Appellant has also filed Trademark applications bearing nos.
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 1 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
4387812 and 4386053 for the said marks, which are still pending
registration. It is stated that the Appellant has built a substantial reputation
and goodwill in the mark LAIMAX in view of its continuous use since
2009.
4. The Respondent is also engaged in the manufacturing and supplying
of engine oils and lubricants under the mark LAIMAX. The Appellant learnt
about the Respondent’s use of the mark LAIMAX in January 2020. From
further search, the Appellant learnt that the Respondent has a registration for
the mark LAIMAX bearing TM no. 3200528, dated 25.01.2018, and
claiming use since 02.03.2016, which is much later than the Appellant’s
adoption of the said mark.
5. The Appellant, to protect its mark LAIMAX, instituted a suit bearing
no. CS(COMM) 193/2020, seeking relief of permanent injunction to restrain
the Respondent from using the mark LAIMAX, passing off, rendition of
accounts, and other ancillary reliefs.
6. The District Judge vide order dated 17.02.2021 passed an order
granting an interim injunction in favour of the Appellant, restraining the
Respondent from using the marks LAIMAX and SUPER LAIMAX 4T,
subject to liquidation of old stock in view of the Respondent’s registration.
7. Thereafter, issues were framed, and both parties filed their list of
witnesses and affidavits by way of evidence. After the conclusion of the
recording of evidence of the plaintiff and the defendant, the matter was
listed for final arguments on 09.05.2025.
8. That District Judge heard final arguments on 09.05.2025 and
21.05.2025. During the arguments, it was noticed by the said Court that the
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 2 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
suit was not properly valued, hence the District Judge on 21.05.2025 framed
a preliminary issue “ whether the plaint of the present suit is liable to be
returned for want of pecuniary jurisdiction ”.
9. Thereafter, the District Judge passed the impugned order returning the
plaint on the ground that it lacked pecuniary jurisdiction, holding that the
suit value did not cross the specified value as necessary to institute a suit
before the Commercial Court.
10. In these facts, the Appellant has preferred the said appeal.
COURT’S FINDINGS
11. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that after the District Judge
had concluded that the suit was undervalued, it ought to have granted an
opportunity to the Appellant to amend the plaint and pay the requisite Court
fee.
11.1. She relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Marg Limited
1
v. Sushil Lalwani and Others and more specifically paragraph ‘33’ which
reads as under: -
“33. A plain and conjoint reading of clauses (b) and (c) of Order VII Rule
11 of the Code makes it abundantly clear that the power to reject a plaint on
the grounds enumerated therein, is not to be exercised in the first instance,
without affording an opportunity to the plaintiff. The statutory scheme
contemplates a two-step process. Firstly, the Court must form an opinion
that the relief claimed is undervalued or that the court fee paid is
insufficient. Secondly, upon such determination, the Court is obligated to
require the plaintiff to correct the valuation and/or supply the requisite court
fee within a time to be fixed by it. It is only upon failure of the plaintiff to
comply with such direction within the stipulated time, that the consequences
of rejection of the plaint can ensue. Thus, the rejection of a plaint under
Order VII Rule 11(b) or (c) is not automatic upon a finding of
undervaluation or deficit court fee; rather, it is conditional upon non-
compliance with the opportunity so granted by the Court.”
1
2026 SCC OnLine SC 647
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 3 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
[Emphasis Supplied]
12. In response, learned counsel for the Respondent states that Appellant
had sufficient time from 2020 to 06.06.2025 to file an application for
amendment of the plaint to ensure that the reliefs in the suit are valued
above Rs. 3 lakhs so as to bring the suit within the pecuniary jurisdiction of
the Court as per Section 2(1)(i) of the Act of 2015.
12.1. He states that the commercial suit was filed with an insufficient Court
fee and therefore the plaint has been rightly rejected by the District Judge.
13. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused
the record.
14. Section 21(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 [‘CPC’] prescribes
the stage of the proceedings until when an objection with respect to the
pecuniary jurisdiction of a Court can be raised, which reads as under: -
“ 21. Objections to jurisdiction. — (1) No objection as to the place of suing
shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection
was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity
and in all cases where issues are settled at or before such settlement, and
unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.
(2) No objection as to the competence of a Court with reference to the
pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or
Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first
instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues
are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a
consequent failure of justice.
(3) No objection as to the competence of the executing Court with reference
to the local limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or
Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the executing Court at
the earliest possible opportunity, and unless there has been a consequent
failure of justice.
[Emphasis Supplied]
15. It is trite law and also evident on a plain reading of Section 21(2) of
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 4 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
CPC that an objection with respect to pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of a
Court has to be raised at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases
where issues are settled, at or before such settlement. The Court is precluded
from returning the plaint on this ground at the stage of final hearing, if no
such objection was raised or deficiency noted prior to settlement of issues.
16. In the facts of this case, admittedly, neither the Respondent [i.e.,
defendant] raised any objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial
Court in its written statement, nor was any issue in this regard framed. The
Respondent rather filed an application challenging the territorial jurisdiction
of the District Court, which was dismissed by the District Court vide order
dated 17.02.2021. The parties thereafter proceeded to trial and led evidence.
It is thus apparent that the Respondent had no objection to the pecuniary
jurisdiction of the Court. It was only at the stage of final arguments that the
District Judge, on its own, raised this issue, raised by the Respondent. In our
considered opinion, the District Judge could not have on its own accord
raised this issue at the stage of final arguments and in fact, no objection
could have also been entertained by the District Judge even at the instance of
the Respondent.
17. In this regard, we find it apposite to refer to the dicta of the Supreme
2
Court in the case of Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. D.L.F. Universal Ltd. ,
wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that issues in relation to pecuniary
jurisdiction of the trial Court have to be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity and not later than the stage of settlement of issues. The relevant
paragraph of the judgment reads as follows: -
2
(2005) 7 SCC 791
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 5 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
“30. We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a
Court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are
(i) Territorial or local jurisdiction (ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction; and
(iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and
pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction
has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or
before settlement of issues . The law is well settled on the point that if
such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be
taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is
totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation
imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or
matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
18. An earlier judgment of the Supreme Court in Kiran Singh v.
3
Chaman Pawan also settles the law as regards the reasons of non-dismissal
of a suit on the technical ground of pecuniary jurisdiction beyond the stage
contemplated under Section 21 of CPC. The relevant paragraphs read as
follows: -
“6. The answer to these contentions must depend on what the position in
law is when a court entertains a suit or an appeal over which it has no
jurisdiction, and what the effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is
on that position. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity
could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied
upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A
defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in
respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the
court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent
of parties. If the question now under consideration fell to be determined
only on the application of general principles governing the matter, there can
be no doubt that the District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and
that its judgment and decree would be nullities. The question is what is the
effect of Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act on this position.
7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the
Code of Civil Procedure an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction
3
AIR 1954 SC 340
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 6 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or
undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as
provided in the section. Then follow provisions as to when the objections
could be entertained, and how they are to be dealt with. The drafting of the
section has come in—and deservedly—for considerable criticism; but
amidst much that is obscure and confused, there is one principle which
stands out clear and conspicuous. It is that a decree passed by a court, which
would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation
or undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the
section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on
overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and
not otherwise. The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the
opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing
that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects
mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts
from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no
protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them
lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a
view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that
objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or
undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the
manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained
provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on
overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance
with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction,
Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection as to the
place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless
there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has
been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to
pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and
Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case
had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not
be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in
failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat
objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not
open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a
prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the
decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a
nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.”
19. It would also be apposite to refer to the judgment of the full bench of
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 7 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
4
this Court in Subhashini Malik v. S.K. Gandhi & Ors. wherein the full
bench, while discussing Section 21 of CPC, explained that in case of
territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, the want of jurisdiction can be remedied
by waiver, consent or acquiescence of the parties, and therefore a party is
precluded from raising such objections at the appellate stage. The relevant
findings are as follows: -
“151. Secondly, a distinction must be drawn between subject-matter
jurisdiction and pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction. In each situation, the
question relates to the jurisdiction of the court, but in the case of territorial
or pecuniary jurisdiction, the want of jurisdiction of this kind may be
remedied by waiver, consent or acquiescence. These are treated as
jurisdictional defects which can be cured. Thus, in spite of lack of
jurisdiction, a party can be precluded from raising an objection even at the
stage of appellate proceedings. There is case law which suggests that the
Bootstrap Doctrine, without statutory backing, cannot give binding effect to
a judgment by a Court that had no subject matter jurisdiction.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. The rationale for not permitting a party to raise an objection after the
settlement of issues is not far to find. As held by the Supreme Court, the
issue of pecuniary jurisdiction does not affect the inherent jurisdiction of the
Court over the subject matter; therefore, it does not affect the competence of
the Court to adjudicate the dispute and does not prejudice the defendant.
However, as in this case, if an objection is permitted to be raised for the first
time during final arguments, after the parties have already concluded
recording of evidence, it will not only entail wasteful expenditure for the
parties who have completed pleadings and recording of evidence, but also
the judicial time taken up in trying the suit till that stage.
21. Section 21(2) of CPC, however, stipulates an exception, as regards
4
2016 SCC OnLine Del 5058
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 8 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
entertaining an objection to pecuniary jurisdiction, even when such an
objection is raised after the settlement of issues. The said exception is that
entertaining the suit will result in failure of justice. However, there is no
such failure of justice recorded in the impugned order, so as to justify the
suo moto exercise of jurisdiction of Order VII Rule 10 of CPC by the
District Judge at the stage of final hearing.
22. In our considered opinion, in view of the bar of Section 21(2) of CPC,
in the facts of this case, the District Judge could not have rejected the plaint
on the grounds of lack of pecuniary jurisdiction while hearing final
arguments. The impugned order is hereby set aside on this finding alone.
23. We may also note the submission of the Appellant that it is willing to
amend the plaint so as to value the reliefs appropriately and pay the required
Court fee.
24. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that in view of the judgment
of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Vishal Pipes Ltd. v. Bhavya
5
Pipe Industries , the District Judge could have granted the Appellant an
opportunity to amend the plaint. Relevant paragraphs of the judgment read
as follows: -
“65. This Court is cognizant of the fact that the valuation of intellectual
property is by itself a very complex process. It is clarified that the
Commercial Court is not expected to value the specific IP on the basis of
any mathematical formulae but to broadly take into consideration whether
the said IP would be worth more than Rs. 3 lakhs, which is the threshold for
the Commercial Court to exercise jurisdiction.
66. In light of the above discussion, the following directions are issued:
(i) Usually, in all IPR cases, the valuation ought to be Rs. 3 lakhs and
5
2022 SCC OnLine Del 1730
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 9 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11
above and proper Court fee would have to be paid accordingly. All
IPR suits to be instituted before District Courts, would therefore, first
be instituted before the District Judge (Commercial).
(ii) In case of any IPR suits valued below Rs. 3 lakhs, the Commercial
Court shall examine the specified value and suit valuation to ensure it
is not arbitrary or unreasonable and the suit is not undervalued.
(iii) Upon such examination, the concerned Commercial Court would
pass appropriate orders in accordance with law either directing the
plaintiff to amend the plaint and pay the requisite Court fee or to
proceed with the suit as a non-commercial suit.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
25. The Appellant, if so advised, will be at liberty to file the amendment
application within two [2] weeks, which will be decided in accordance with
the law.
26. The impugned order is hereby set aside, and the appeal is allowed.
The interim injunction order dated 17.02.2021 is also hereby restored.
27. The parties are directed to appear before the learned District Judge on
18.05.2026.
28. The registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the concerned
Court through e-mail for the listing of the suit.
MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA, J
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
MAY 04, 2026/ mt/aa
Signature Not Verified
FAO (COMM) 295/2025 Page 10 of 10
Signed By:MOHIT
Signing
Date:14.05.2026 18:11