Labh Singh vs Nilokheri Municipality

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
RSA-594-1993
Reserved on : 27.08.2026
Date of decision : 13.11.2026
LABH SINGH ... APPELLANT
VERSUS
NILOKHERI MUNICIPALITY AND ANOTHER ...RESPONDENTS
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PARMOD GOYAL
Present: Mr. Namit Khurana, Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. Surender Singh Pannu, Additional A.G. Haryana.

PARMOD GOYAL , J.
Present regular second appeal has been preferred by unsuccessful
appellant/plaintiff being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 08.12.1992,
passed by learned Additional District Judge, Karnal vide which first appeal
preferred by respondents/defendants was allowed, suit for permanent
injunction was dismissed, by setting aside judgment and decree dated
21.08.1990, passed by learned Sub Judge, Third Class, Karnal vide which suit
of appellant/plaintiff was decreed.
2. Appellant/plaintiff in his suit for permanent injunction claimed
that he is resident of poultry area, Nilokheri and residing there since 1954.
That a plot measuring 87 feet east west, 20 feet north to south exists opposite
to his house divided by pucca road. It was claimed that vacant land is being
used by appellant/plaintiff since 1954 for tethering his cattle, preparing cow
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.11.13 15:39
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RSA-594-1993 -2-
dung cakes, putting batoras, putting his agriculture implements and for other
allied purposes i.e. for parking his tractor etc. Municipal Committee, Nilokheri
has challaned him for putting rubbish and cow dung on the land in question.
Thereafter, on 08.04.1986, he was served with a notice under Section 181 of
Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 for having encroached upon the Municipal land.
Appellant/plaintiff, however, claimed that he is owner of land since 1954 being
in its possession peacefully and continuous and since Municipal Committee is
interfering in his possession and threatening to dispossess him, he has
preferred suit for permanent injunction.
3. Respondents/defendants had contested the suit and claimed suit
land to be owned and possessed by Municipal Committee and claim of
appellant/plaintiff over the suit land was denied and accordingly, dismissal of
suit was prayed for.
4. Following issues were framed from the pleadings of parties :-
(i) Whether the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the
land in suit? OPP
(ii) Whether the site in dispute vests in Municipality Nilokheri
and falls in the definition of street? OPD
(iii) Whether the plaintiff has illegally encroached upon the
Municipality land? OPD
(iv) Relief.
5. Learned Court of first instance had decided issues No.1 and 2 in
favour of appellant/plaintiff and against respondents/defendants and
appellant/plaintiff was held to be owner by way of adverse possession.
Accordingly, suit of appellant/plaintiff was decreed by learned Court of first
instance. On appeal by Municipal Committee, findings of learned Court of first
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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RSA-594-1993 -3-
instance on issues No.1 to 3 were set aside and it was held that
appellant/plaintiff is not owner of suit property and was held to be trespasser
and, therefore, is not entitled to relief of permanent injunction.
6. Learned counsel for appellant/plaintiff has argued that learned
Appellate Court has erred in deciding issues No.1 and 2 specially ownership of
appellant/plaintiff over the suit property. Learned counsel for
appellant/plaintiff has argued that learned First Appellate Court has erred in
setting aside well reasoned judgment passed by learned Court of first instance
wherein on appreciation of evidence, Court had duly found appellant/plaintiff
to be in possession since 1954 and has therefore, rightly concluded ownership
by way of adverse possession in favour of appellant/plaintiff and had rightly
decreed the suit.
7. Learned State counsel, however, has relied upon reasoning given
by learned First Appellate Court.
8. On consideration, I find findings of fact as recorded by learned
First Appellate Court to be correct findings on the basis of pleadings and
evidence led by both the parties. Admittedly, in the present case,
appellant/plaintiff had not sought any declaration that he has become owner of
suit property by way of adverse possession though had claimed ownership by
adverse possession. His case in the plaint was that he had been using suit
property since 1954 for tethering his cattle, storing his agricultural implements
and parking his tractor etc. He had claimed that he is owner of suit land since
1954 and his possession on the said land has been continuous, uninterrupted
and hostile to the knowledge of all including Municipal Committee, Nilokheri
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.11.13 15:39
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RSA-594-1993 -4-
and has become owner of suit land on the basis of adverse possession since
1954. Appellant/plaintiff also claimed that wall over the suit property
constructed by him existed since long.
9. Perusal of pleadings further goes to show that appellant/plaintiff
had duly admitted in the plaint itself that Municipality Committee had
challaned him for putting rubbish and cow dung on the land and was fined
Rs.25/- by the Court of Mr. Manjeet Singh who had dealt the challan on behalf
of learned CJM, Karnal. These facts so stated by appellant/plaintiff in his
plaint were duly taken in consideration by learned First Appellate Court
whereas learned Court of first instance had failed to take the same in
consideration.
10. Mere long possession is not sufficient to establish adverse
possession. Possession of a person has to be open and hostile to the knowledge
of true owner, whereas in the present case, except for oral assertions, no
substantive, cogent or reliable evidence had been produced by
appellant/plaintiff to show his possession to be open and hostile to the
knowledge of Municipal Committee. In fact, appellant/plaintiff is denying
even the ownership of Municipal Committee.
11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in judgment titled Bhag Singh (D)
Through Mahant Kashmir Singh Vs. Basant Kaur (D) Through LRs &
Ors. , 2026 AIR Supreme Court 4303, has held as under :-
“28. In T. Anjanappa and Others vs. Somalingappa and Another
(6), this Court reiterated that adverse possession contemplates
possession which is hostile to the title of the true owner. A person
asserting such a plea must establish by clear and unequivocal evidence
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RSA-594-1993 -5-
that his possession was actual, open, continuous and hostile, so as to
amount to a denial of the true owner's title. Mere long possession,
however uninterrupted, is insufficient unless accompanied by the
requisite hostile animus. Where possession can be referred to a lawful
or permissive origin, it cannot be regarded as adverse merely by lapse
of time.
29. Tested on the aforesaid principles, we find ourselves unable to
sustain the conclusions recorded by the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court. The entire case of the appellants proceeds on the
premise that Attar Singh entered into possession of the suit property as
Mahant of Dera Bhai Mastan Singh for Dharam-Arth purposes and
that, upon his demise, possession continued through the succeeding
Mahants. If that be the appellants own case, the origin of possession
was never asserted to be hostile to the recorded proprietors. On the
contrary, the appellants themselves sought to explain such possession
as flowing from an earlier dedication of the property in favour of the
Dera. Possession founded upon such an assertion cannot, without
more, simultaneously be characterised as hostile possession so as to
attract the doctrine of adverse possession.
30. It is equally significant that neither the pleadings nor the
evidence disclose the point of time at which the appellants' possession
allegedly became hostile to the true owners. There is no pleading
identifying the date from which the title of the recorded proprietors was
openly repudiated, nor is there evidence demonstrating any overt act by
which such hostility was asserted to the knowledge of the true owners.
The absence of these foundational pleadings is not a mere technical
defect. They constitute the very basis upon which a plea of adverse
possession rests. Unless the commencement of hostile possession is
pleaded and proved, the statutory period prescribed under the
Limitation Act, 1963 cannot even begin to run.
31. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court appear to have
equated long and uninterrupted possession with adverse possession.
Such an approach, with respect, overlooks the settled distinction
between the two concepts. Long possession may furnish evidence of
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physical occupation, however it does not, by itself, establish that such
possession was adverse in law. The doctrine of adverse possession does
not reward longevity of occupation alone. It protects only such
possession as is accompanied by a conscious and hostile assertion of
ownership in denial of the rights of the true owner. Unless the element
of hostility is affirmatively established, the plea must necessarily fail.
32. We also find that the revenue entries relied upon by the
appellants do not advance their case beyond proving possession. The
description "gair marusi bila lagan bawaja Dharam Arth" may
legitimately indicate that the possession was associated with religious
or charitable purposes. However, such an entry neither records an
assertion of hostile title nor evidences the extinguishment of the
ownership of the recorded proprietors. The evidentiary value of a
revenue entry cannot be stretched beyond the purpose for which it is
maintained. In the absence of independent evidence establishing hostile
possession, the said entries cannot, by themselves, sustain a decree
founded upon adverse possession.”
12. Moreover, own case of appellant/plaintiff is that he was challaned
by Municipal Committee for which he was fined Rs.25/- by the Court. The fact
that appellant/plaintiff was fined and has not contested the assertion of
ownership by Municipal Committee in 1983 prior to passing of 30 years as per
his own case, (as appellant/plaintiff had nowhere stated to be in use of suit
property prior to 1954). In fact appellant/plaintiff had come and started living
in the said area where the suit property is situated only in 1954 and his claim is
only that he was using the suit land since 1954. The fact that Municipal
Committee had challaned appellant/plaintiff for putting rubbish and cow dung
on its land clearly shows that Municipal Committee had always been asserting
its right over the suit property. The fact of payment of Rs.25/- as fine in
pursuance of said challan in fact goes to show that appellant/plaintiff had duly
accepted the ownership of Municipal Committee and trespass by him. Payment
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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of challan by appellant/plaintiff goes to show that his claim of ownership open
and hostile to Municipal Committee was subsequent to acceptance of
ownership and payment of challan in the Court. Learned First Appellate had
rightly concluded that appellant/plaintiff has failed to prove his open and
hostile possession for more than 30 years, rather from the fact stated by
appellant/plaintiff in his plaint itself goes to show that till 1983
appellant/plaintiff had been accepting Municipal Committee to be its true
owner and in fact had duly paid the amount of fine which was imposed by
Municipal Committee. In fact challan in 1983 and subsequent notice by
Municipal Committee dated 08.04.1986 to vacate the encroachment goes to
show that appellant/plaintiff had allegedly constructed boundary wall and
encroached upon the suit land after 1983 and immediately Municipal
Committee had issued notice for vacation of same in 1986.
13. From the pleadings of appellant/plaintiff itself, it is clearly made
out that appellant/plaintiff was not in open and hostile possession of suit
property for more than 30 years. His possession was recent. Mere oral
assertions that boundary wall was constructed in 1954 again is without any
basis and is disproved by the fact that no such assertion/claim of possession as
owner was made by appellant/plaintiff in 1983 when he was challaned and
fined by Court for putting rubbish and cow dung over the land of Municipal
Committee. It appears that subsequently, appellant/plaintiff had tried to
encroach upon the land of Municipal Committee by falsely claiming his
possession since 1954.
14. In fact, perusal of plaint goes to show that appellant/plaintiff had
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described suit land as a vacant land measuring 87 feet east west, 20 feet from
north to south bounded by north: Nala and then walls bounded on south by
pucca road, east: land owned by Mola, west: nala and then khokas. The
possession of vacant land goes with the ownership. Appellant/plaintiff has
claimed ownership only by way of adverse possession and he is not the true
owner and true owner is Municipal Committee, therefore, the use of vacant
land by appellant/plaintiff would not given any right of easement or any right
of possession over the same. Possession always remained with Municipal
Committee and even its use by appellant/plaintiff had been objected by
Municipal Committee as it had duly fined appellant/plaintiff for putting
rubbish and cow dung over the suit property.
15. Therefore, in the present case, appellant/plaintiff has failed to
prove long legal possession or ownership by any means including adverse
possession. The appreciation of pleadings and evidence as made by learned
First Appellate Court, therefore, cannot be faulted with. Same is based upon
correct appreciation of pleadings and evidence. In fact, learned Court of first
instance had erred in ignoring the pleadings made by appellant/plaintiff and by
concluding adverse possession without there being any legal basis and
evidence. In fact, learned Court of first instance had granted declaration in a
suit for injunction which was beyond its jurisdiction.
16. No question of law arises in the present case. Findings of learned
Appellate Court is based upon pleadings and evidence, therefore, no
interference with the same is warranted. The appeal was rightly partly allowed
by learned Appellate Court. Judgment and decree of learned Appellate Court is
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
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upheld. Respondents/defendants shall be free to seek possession of suit
property by following due process of law. Appeal is without any merit, hence
is dismissed .
17. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s)
disposed of accordingly.
13.11.2026 (PARMOD GOYAL)
Chiranjeev
JUDGE
Whether speaking/reasoned Yes
Whether reportable Yes/No
CHIRANJEEV SINGH
2026.11.13 15:39
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