SHRI.ROSHAN LAKRA vs THE STATE AND ANR
- Court
- Calcutta High Court
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR
Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction
(Appellate Side)
CRA/4/2024
(IA NO: CRAN/3/2026)
Shri Roshan Lakra
Vs.
The State and Another
with
CRA/5/2025
(IA NO: CRAN/3/2026)
Shri Roshan Lakra
Vs.
The State and Another
Before: The Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee
&
The Hon’ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray
For the Amicus Curiae : Mr. D. C. Kabir, Sr. Adv.
For the Appellant : Mr. Siddhartha Singha, Adv.
For the Respondent no.2 : Md. Sharukh, Adv.
For the State : Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar, Adv.
Judgment On : 08.05.2026
Arijit Banerjee, J.:
1. These two appeals and the connected applications were taken up for
hearing together as they involve similar facts and the same parties as well
as same points of law.
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2. CRA 4 of 2024 is an appeal against a judgment and order dated
January 2/3, 2020, whereby the appellant was convicted for commission of
offence punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (in short POCSO Act). The appellant was sentenced to
suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years, and was fined in the
sum of Rs. 5000/-, in default simple imprisonment for one month.
3. CRA 5 of 2025 is an appeal against a judgment and order dated April
25/30, 2025, whereby the appellant was again convicted for commission of
offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant was
sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and was fined in the
sum of Rs. 5000/-, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further rigorous
imprisonment for one month.
4. The facts of this case reveal a disturbing state of the law relating to
protection of children from sexual offences. The appellant (hereinafter
referred to as Roshan) is the younger brother of the survivor girl’s
(hereinafter referred to as Anjali) elder sister’s husband. Roshan and Anjali
fell in love with each other. That led to physical relationship between them.
Admittedly, Anjali was a minor at that time. Roshan had attained majority.
5. As a consequence of the physical relationship between Roshan and
Anjali, the latter became pregnant. She gave birth to a female child. When
she had first approached the concerned hospital to confirm whether or not
she had conceived, the hospital authorities, being duty bound in law,
reported to the police that a minor girl had visited the hospital and it was
found that she was pregnant. First Information Report was lodged by a Sub-
Inspector. There was no complaint from Anjali or any of her family members.
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6. A case was initiated against Roshan under Section 6 of the POCSO
Act being Special Case No. 18 of 2017 leading to Special Trial No. 60 of
2017. He was arrested. Charge Sheet was filed under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act. He pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Subsequently he
was granted bail and was on bail during the trial.
7. While Roshan was on bail, evidently he and Anjali again cohabited.
Consequently, Anjali became pregnant for a second time. Anjali had still not
attained majority. Again, having received information from the concerned
hospital, a First Information Report was lodged against Roshan. Special
(POCSO) Case No. 12 of 2019 was initiated against him. Charge sheet was
issued against him under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. He pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried. This resulted in Special (POCSO) ST No. 20 of 2019.
He had initially been arrested but was then granted bail.
8. The second case being Special (POCSO) Case No. 12 of 2019 was
decided first. By his judgement and order dated January 2/3,2020, learned
Special Judge (POCSO Act), North and Middle Andaman, Mayabunder, held
Roshan to be guilty of commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of
the POCSO Act. The punishment of 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment and
fine of Rs. 5000/-, was imposed on him. This resulted in CRA 4 of 2024.
9. The first case being Special Case No. 18 of 2017 was decided by the
Additional Sessions Judge–cum-Judge Special Court (POCSO Act), South
Andaman District, Port Blair, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, by his
judgement and order dated April 25/30, 2025. Again, Roshan was held to be
guilty for commission of offence punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO
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Act. Punishment of 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.
5000/-, was imposed on him. This resulted in CRA 5 of 2025.
10. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties in these two appeals
and the connected applications, at length.
11. The facts of the case are not in dispute. Evidently there was an
intense love affair between Roshan (who at the relevant point of time was
about 24 years old) and Anjali (who was then about 14 years old). Roshan
lived for about 4 years in Anjali’s paternal house. They indulged in physical
relationship resulting in Anjali’s pregnancy. Anjali’s father banished Roshan
from his house. Roshan went away to his paternal home in Srinagar. Anjali
became upset at this and left her paternal house. She went to reside with
her elder sister whose husband is Roshan’s elder brother. Soon thereafter,
Roshan went to reside with his said elder brother. There is evidence on
record that Roshan and Anjali are residing as husband and wife. They have
been married upon Anjali attaining majority. They have two children aged 9
and 7 years old. They live as a happy family.
12. Before proceeding further, I would like to advert to certain portions of
the depositions of some of the prosecution witnesses.
13. Anjali deposed as PW 1 in connection with the 2017 case and as PW 7
in connection with the 2019 case. In connection with the 2017 case, she
deposed as follows:
“ In the year, 2017, I was a student of class-VII of Karmatang.
School. I know Roshan Lakra. I was in love with him. We had
sexual intercourse and I conceived. I went to hospital for medical
check-up. I did not go to any other place from hospital. Later I
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delivered a female baby on 09.07.2017. Roshan is the father of my
baby.
Roshan knew that I was a student of class-VII. We were not
married at that time. Roshan is present in court today (identified).
(Statement under section 164 of Cr.P.C. is shown to the witness).
These are my three signatures appearing on the statement.
(signatures are marked as Ext. 1).
Cross examination by the defence:
I did not complain against Roshan. I want to marry Roshan after
attaining my majority. I do not want punishment of Roshan. I used
to stay at the house of Roshan. I want to live with him. Our
parents do not have any objection. Police officer never interrogated
me. I do not know the contents of the document recorded by the
Magistrate.
I wanted to be a mother of his baby .”
14. In connection with the 2019 case, Anjali deposed as follows:
“ 1. I read up to class VII at Government Senior Secondary School,
Karmatang. Roshan Lakra is my husband. Roshan Lakra married
me in the year 2017.
2. At the time of birth of second child police started this case.
Police recorded my statement and took my signature thereon. This
is my signature. Let the signature of PW7 on her statement
(fardbayan) be marked as Ext-4/1.
3. I was medically examined by doctor at PHC Kalighat. Doctor
took my signature on my medical examination report. This is my
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signature. Let the signature of PW7 on her medical examination
report be marked as Ext-2/1.
4. I gave statement before Ld. Magistrate in connection with this
case in presence of my mother. Ld. Magistrate after recording my
statement took my signatures thereon. These are my signatures.
Let the signatures of PW7 on her statement recorded u/s/164
Cr.P.C be marked as Ext-9/1 & Ext-9/2 respectively.
5. I had refused to give blood samples of myself and my new born
baby at Mayabunder hospital in presence of witnesses including
doctor because I had become pregnant on account of physical
relationship with Roshan Lakra and case was started against him
and he was in jail. I had signed on refusal letter. This is my
signature. Let the signature of PW7 on my refusal letter be marked
as Ext-7/1.
6. Roshan Lakra is present in court (identified).
Cross Examination
7. Roshan Lakra is my husband. I want to live with Roshan
Lakra. ”
15. Anjali’s sister, Malika Toppo, deposed as P.W. 2 in connection with the
2017 case and as P.W. 9 in connection with the 2019 case. In connection
with the earlier case, she recorded the following evidence:
“ Roshan Lakra is my brother in-law. Anjili is my sister. Anjili
delivered a baby less than a year ago. Anjili was a student. She
quit her study as she was pregnant. She was carrying the baby of
Roshan Lakra. Roshan knew that Anjili was a student.
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Roshan is present in court today (identified). Roshan and Anjili
were not married. I stated before the police officer that Anjili
conceived due to physical relation with Roshan.
Cross examination by the defence:
My sister used to stay in our house. Roshan also used to stay with
us. We wanted them to marry. They were not married as she was
minor. We fixed their marriage.
I never complained to the police officer.
It is not a fact that I deposed falsely. ”
16. In connection with the 2019 case, Malika deposed that Roshan is her
brother-in-law (Dewar). Anjali is her full blood sister. Anjali and Roshan are
married. Anajli has two children. Anjali was residing presently in her
paternal home. The elder child of Anjali is about two years old .
17. Anjali’s father, Niranjan Toppo, deposed as P.W. 3 in connection with
the 2017 case and as P.W. 4 in connection with the later case. In connection
with the earlier case, Niranjan deposed that Roshan stayed at his house for
3 to 4 years. Roshan used to catch hold of Anjali. Being annoyed, Niranjan
drove Roshan out of house. One or two months thereafter, Anjali left
Niranjan’s house to reside with her elder sister Malika. Thereafter, Niranjan
came to know that Anjali had been impregnated by Roshan. In cross
examination by the defence, Niranjan said that he never made any
complaint to the police regarding the misdeeds of Roshan. He never lodged
any complaint of any kind against Roshan. At the time when Anjali got
pregnant, she had attained majority. Anjali and Roshan are married and
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were residing in his house. In connection with the later case, Niranjan
deposed that Roshan is his son-in-law.
18. Anjali’s mother, Pushpa Lakra, deposed as P.W. 5 in connection with
the 2019 case. She said that Roshan is her son-in-law. She did not know
why the case had been started against Roshan. Anjali and Roshan have two
children one of whom was born about 3 years ago (date of deposition
September 23, 2019). At the time of birth of her second child, Anjali may
have completed 18 years of age. Pushpa did not depose in connection with
the 2017 case.
19. Roshan’s elder brother, Edmon Lakra, deposed in connection with the
2019 case as follows-
“ Examination in chief:-
1. Roshan Lakra is my brother. Anjali Toppo is the wife of my
brother Roshan Lakra. My in laws house is also situated at
Karmatang. My brother Roshan used to go to my in laws house at
Karmatang and at that time he became acquainted with Anjali
Toppo and after few days Roshan had physical relationship with
Anjali and she became pregnant. Since Roshan Lakra made Anjali
pregnant, a case was started against him which is pending in Port
Blair court. After being released on bail in the case at Port Blair,
Roshan came to house and had physical relationship with Anjali
again and she became pregnant for the second time and Anjali
gave birth to a male child.
2. It is true that Anjali is still a minor below the age of 18 years.
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3. My wife had accompanied Anjali to Kishore Nagar, PHC at the
time of her labour pain.
4. Hospital authority informed pregnancy of Anjali Toppo to police.
5. Roshan Lakra is present in court (identified).
Cross Examination
6. Anjali Toppo is my wife's sister. ”
20. In his examination under section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, Roshan admitted that Anjali was a minor when he had physical
relationship with her. He said that he had not done ‘any forceful act with
Victim Girl’. Anjali had solemnised marriage with him out of her free will
after she became major. In answer to Q. 25 he said: “I have been falsely
implicated in this case. I and VG were in love affair and we have solemnised
marriage out of our free will. I have two kids. At the time of my love affair
with Victim Girl, she was major and I am the sole bread earner of my
family’. In his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, in connection with the 2019 case Roshan, in answer to Q. 44
said: ‘I have two minor children. my wife Anjali is alone in house. I pray for
mercy’.
21. We therefore see, from the evidence on record that Roshan, a young
man in his early 20s, fell in love with Anjali, a young girl in her teens.
Anjali’s elder sister is married to Roshan’s elder brother. The physical
relationship that developed between Roshan and Anjali flowed from the love
that they felt for each other. Roshan did not enter into sexual relationship
with Anjali out of lust or to satisfy his carnal desire. No force was applied by
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Roshan on Anjali. They were attracted to each other. Their physical union
was as natural as a river flowing into the sea.
22. Anjali never made any complaint against Roshan, nor did any member
of Anjali’s family. Initially Anjali’s father Niranjan may have been somewhat
peeved with Roshan’s display of affection for Anjali by touching her
intimately. However, he never lodged any complaint. He subsequently
accepted the marriage of his daughter Anjali with Roshan. Anjali’s mother
has evidently, accepted Roshan as her son-in-law. Anjali’s elder sister
Malika has also approved her sister’s matrimony with Roshan. Roshan and
Anjali have two kids who are about 9 and 7 years old.
23. We therefore find a big happy family all members of which who could
live happily ever after. But that was not to be the case. The POCSO Act in
effect criminalises sex with a person below the age of 18 years. Therefore, in
the backdrop of the admitted fact that when both the 2017 and 2019 cases
were initiated, Anjali was below the age of 18 years, the learned Trial Judges
in both the cases had no choice but to convict Roshan under Section 6 of
the POCSO Act. Afterall, the actus reus of the crime was not disputed even
in the faintest manner by Roshan. The hands of the learned Trial Judges in
the two cases were firmly tied. Such is the impact and effect of the POCSO
Act.
24. The intensity of Anjali’s feelings for Roshan would be evident, inter
alia , from the statement made by Anjali from the witness box in open Court
to the effect that she wanted to be the mother of Roshan’s child. It was more
than mere physical relationship between the two. It was a meeting of minds.
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It was a longing to be together and walk the path of life holding each other’s
hands.
25. This is not a case where the survivor girl fell prey to the accused
person’s lust, libido or carnal desire. This is a case of loving consensual
physical relationship in which force or violence had no role to play.
26. Roshan is the sole earning member of the family. If these appeals fail,
Roshan, who is presently on bail, will have to go back to custody. The
probable and very likely result would be disintegration of a happy family
leading to destitution and ultimate destruction and ruination of Anjali and
the two children.
27. At this point we may note that Anjali has filed two applications in the
two appeals being CRA No. 4 of 2024 and CRA No. 05 of 2025 both of which
are marked as CRAN 3 of 2026, the prayer portions whereof read as follows:
“ It is therefore most humbly prayed that this Hon'ble Court may
be graciously pleased to consider the subsequent marriage
between me and the Appellant and the birth of our two children
and accept my submissions to quash the entire proceedings of this
case including the conviction and sentence passed on my husband
Roshan Lakra and to pass such other order(s) as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice. ”
28. It is important to note what Anjali has stated in those two petitions
which are identical:-
“ 2. That I am filing the instant application voluntarily, out of my
own free will, without any pressure, threat, coercion, or undue
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influence from the appellant or any other person being an adult
and of sound mind and clear conscience.
3. That at the time of the incident, I and the appellant were known
to each other and were in a relationship out of mutual affection
and consent, wherein I was fully aware of the consequences and
nature of our relationship, and I wanted to be married to and live
with the appellant and have children and a family with him. I have
repeatedly made these statements before the police and Magistrate
and court at different times over the years during the trial
proceedings faced by my husband Roshan Lakra.
4. That after the registration of the case and during the pendency
of the proceedings, our relationship has always continued and
with the consent and blessing of both our families, we have
solemnized our marriage according to Christian rites and customs.
5. That since the date of marriage, I and the appellant have been
living together as husband and wife peacefully and happily.
6. That out of the said wedlock, we have been blessed with two
children being a Baby Girl aged about 9 years and a Baby Boy
aged about 7 years.
The copies of their birth certificate of Baby Girl and Mother &
Child Protection Card of Baby Boy are enclosed with this
application and marked as “Annexure A/1”.
7. That I am residing with the Appellant along with our children
and we are leading a normal matrimonial and family life. The
Appellant is taking proper care of me and our children and is
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maintaining the family by earning livelihood being our sole
breadwinner and earner. That I have never had and still do not
have any grievance, complaint, or ill-will whatsoever against the
Appellant and I do not wish to pursue anything adverse against
him. I have made this clear over the years before both police and
judicial authorities, yet the case has been going on where my
husband has been punished for no fault of his.
8. That the incident which led to the present case arose out of our
relationship at that time and the same never existed as an offence
nor does anything of that case survive in view of our subsequent
marriage and family life. My conscious decision was to have a
family with the appellant and I was aware of the consequences of
my relationship with him, and I accepted the same, and he is
guilty of no offence.
9. That the continuation of this proceeding and the pronouncing of
a conviction and sentence against the Appellant is causing mental
agony and hardship to me and our children who are all dependent
on him and our happy family life is being further disrupted by the
forcible continuation of a case which I have never wanted or
supported.
10. That I respectfully state that Article 21 of the Constitution of
India guarantees me and my husband the right to life and
personal liberty, which includes the right to live with dignity, the
right to matrimonial life, and the right to family life. As the legally
wedded wife of the Appellant, I have a fundamental right to cohabit
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and lead a dignified matrimonial life with my husband and my
rights may be considered in this situation instead of merely going
by the letter of the law rather than the spirit of justice.
11. That my two minor children also have independent
fundamental rights under Article 21 to receive love, care,
protection, guidance, and upbringing from their father, which they
have done for so many years and still require at this stage of their
lives, where this legal proceeding is causing disruption and havoc
in their lives and our family.
12. That if the Appellant is required to undergo the sentence
without considering these situations and developments, the same
would directly affect my marital life and the welfare, education,
and future of our minor children. We would be reduced to a state
of destitution and more than anything, I would be deprived of my
husband and the children deprived of their father, merely to fulfil
the satisfaction of a law which I never wanted invoked in the first
place, and which I have repeated over the years before the
authorities in connection with this proceeding, being myself
responsible for the situation which I chose of my own free will and
volition being fully aware of the matters at the time.
13. That the welfare of children and preservation of the family unit
are humanitarian considerations flowing from Article 21 which
deserve kind consideration by this Hon'ble Court. These
subsequent developments are of such nature which were not in
existence at the time of trial and therefore deserve consideration at
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the appellate stage, which is fully permissible, and I pray for this
Hon'ble Court to invoke its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure to act ex debitio justitae and to do
complete justice to protect my rights under the Constitution which
overrules and overrides any statutory provisions or laws.
14. That I respectfully submit that these facts constitute
exceptional mitigating circumstances for consideration by this
Hon'ble Court while deciding the present Criminal Appeal, in
which it is my specific prayer that the offences were never existent,
constituted purely personal and private matters between me and
the appellant, and which have been subsequently compromised,
settled and closed. In such light, the entire conviction and
sentence of my husband may be quashed by this Hon'ble Court
being without merit or substance, in the interests of justice being
more important than merely blind adherence to the words of the
law which do not apply to this case at all.
15. That I am ready and willing to appear before this Hon'ble Court
and satisfy this Hon'ble Court as to my intentions in filing this
application. ”
29. The question that arises in the above factual matrix is whether or not
we affirm the learned Trial Court’s judgments and orders in these two
appeals and dismiss the appeals holding that there is technically no error in
the impugned judgments and orders? Will that serve the ends of justice?
Should our conscience permit that when we see that Roshan and Anjali
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crave to be with each other and share their lives as a happy family with their
two kids? The answer to each of these questions must be in the negative.
30. While the object of the POCSO Act is definitely laudable, its demerit is
its rigidity. In the present case, in our opinion, there is nothing criminal in
Roshan’s conduct but for the fact that the relevant provisions of the POCSO
Act make his physical relationship with Anjali, a crime. In this context we
may note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttar
Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr. (Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)
No. 10656 of 2025), reported at 2026 INSC 47 approved the High Court’s
view in Satish alias Chand vs State of U.P. (Crl. Misc. Bail Appl. No.
18596 of 2024) to the effect that 4 factors are crucial for the Courts to
consider in deciding a prosecution under the POCSO Act:-
“ A. Assess the Context: Each case should be evaluated on its
individual facts and circumstances. The nature of the relationship
and the intentions of both parties should be carefully examined.
B. Consider Victim's Statement: The statement of the alleged
victim should be given due consideration. If the relationship is
consensual and based on mutual affection, this should be factored
into decisions regarding bail and prosecution.
C. Avoid Perversity of Justice: Ignoring the consensual nature of a
relationship can lead to unjust outcomes, such as wrongful
imprisonment. The judicial system should aim to balance the
protection of minors with the recognition of their autonomy in
certain contexts. Here the age comes out to be an important factor.
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D. Judicial Discretion: Courts should use their discretion wisely,
ensuring that the application of POCSO does not inadvertently
harm the very individuals it is meant to protect. ”
31. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the concluding part of the judgment
has called upon the Secretary, Law, Government of India to consider
introduction of a Romeo-Juliet clause exempting genuine adolescent
relationships from the stronghold of the POCSO Act. However, no such
amendment has been made to the POCSO Act as yet.
32. The question then is, what should we do? Should we dismiss these
appeals knowing that same would almost certainly result in rapid
disintegration of Roshan’s family leading to the family’s annihilation? Or,
should we take a view within the four corners of law that would terminate
the prosecution once and for all enabling Roshan to be with his family and
nurture the family as its paterfamilias.
33. I have no doubt in my mind that we should adopt the second course
of action. Indeed, upholding the conviction in the facts of the present case,
would bring the justice delivery system into shame, odium and contempt.
34. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides that no person shall be
deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure
established by law. Article 21 has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in a vast number of cases, as encompassing a wide variety of rights. It
has been held that one such right is the right to marry or choose a life
partner. It was held in Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. and Ors. reported
at (2018) 16 SCC 368: AIR 2018 SC 1933 that right to marry a person of
one’s choice is an integral aspect of Article 21 i.e., protection of life and
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personal liberty. In Lata Singh v. State of U. P. & Anr., reported at
(2006) 5 SCC 475: AIR 2006 SC 2522 , Hon’ble Supreme Court recognised
the right to marry as a part of right to life under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The right to live a happy and healthy married life is
therefore a citizen’s fundamental right. Anjali has highlighted this right of
her in the petitions that she has filed in connection with these appeals.
Rohan also has the same right. It cannot be gainsaid that Article 21 would
override any other provision of law if there is a conflict between the two. For
example, it is now well established that notwithstanding the restriction in
Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
(NDPS Act), bail can be granted to an under-trial charged with an offence
under the NDPS Act, on the touch stone of Article 21, if he is detained in
custody for an inordinately long period of time without the trial coming to an
end. Similarly, Article 21 overrides the restriction on grant of bail in Section
43D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
35. In the present case, nobody seems to be having any grievance against
Roshan, excepting the prosecution. However, to be fair to the prosecution, it
has merely discharged its duties under the law of the land. We are of the
view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, prosecuting Roshan
has not advanced the cause of justice. It perhaps also amounts to an abuse
of the process of Court. The process of Court is meant to be used to secure
justice and a fair result. However, if setting in motion the process of Court in
a given set of facts leads to injustice, unfairness, inequity or unconscionable
results that would exemplify abuse of the process of court. Section 482 of
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the Code of Criminal Procedure reserves to the High Court inherent powers
to deal with such situations. Section 482 reads as follows:
“482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice. ”
36. A question may arise as to whether the High Court can exercise its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code while hearing a criminal
appeal. This question has been answered in the affirmative by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Popular Muthiah v. State Represented by
Inspector of Police reported in (2006) 7 SCC 296 .
37. Nobody can possibly dispute that the final cause of law is the welfare
of society as was observed by Benjamin N. Cardozo Former Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of United States. Law without justice is as vain as a
Ferrari without its engine and as useless as a refrigerator without its
compressor. Law is not an end in itself. It is a means to achieve a just end.
Law cannot be divorced from reality or humanity.
38. In Mahesh Mukund Patel v. State of U.P. & Ors., reported at
2025 SCC OnLine SC 614 , the charge was under the POCSO Act. In that
case, upon the survivor girl attaining majority, the accused person married
her. The girl filed an affidavit before Court stating that she was happily
married to the accused and they were residing together. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court treated the matter to be a fit case, where the High Court
20
should have exercised its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, by quashing the proceedings and recording a
conclusion that no purpose would be served by continuing the prosecution
since the same would cause undue harassment to the accused person, the
survivor girl being his wife and their children. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
accordingly set aside the order of the High Court and quashed the entire
proceedings.
In K. Kirubakaran vs State of Tamil Nadu reported at 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2307 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while quashing the conviction
and sentence imposed under the provisions of the POCSO Act in exercise of
power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, noted that a balance
needs to be struck between the competing interests of justice, deterrence
and rehabilitation. It was observed that in order to do complete justice in
proper cases, in the peculiar facts and circumstances, a balanced approach
combining practicality and empathy is necessary. The Hon’ble Court
specifically observed as follows:
“ 9. ……The appellant and the victim are not only legally married,
they are also in their family way. While considering the offence
committed by the appellant punishable under the POCSO Act, we
have discerned that the crime was not the result of lust but love.
The victim of crime herself has expressed her desire to live a
peaceful and stable family life with the appellant, upon whom she
is dependent, without the appellant carrying the indelible mark on
his forehead of being an offender. Continuation of the criminal
proceedings and the appellant’s incarceration would only disrupt
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this familial unit and cause irreparable harm to the victim, the
infant child, and the fabric of society itself. ”
39. Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an overriding section which saves the inherent
powers of the court to advance the cause of justice. Under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the inherent jurisdiction of the court can be exercised firstly, to give
effect to an order under CrPC.; secondly, to prevent the abuse of the process
of court; and thirdly, to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The powers of
the court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are wide and the court is vested with a
significant amount of discretion to decide whether or not to exercise such
powers. Every High Court has inherent powers to act ex debito justitiae to do
real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists,
or to prevent abuse of the process of court. Authority of the court exists for
the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is
brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be justified in
preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in the absence of specific
provisions in the statute books. [ Please see Inder Mohan Goswami and
Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. reported at 2007 (12) SCC 1 and
Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra and Anr. reported
at 2019 (9) SCC 608 ]
40. Another question pertains to the power of a High Court to quash
proceedings emanating from non-compoundable offences which have no
impact or depraving effect on the society at large, on the basis of a comprise
between the accused and the victim/complainant. As noted by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Ramgopal and Anr v. State of Madhya
Pradesh reported at (2022) 14 SCC 531, such question has been
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answered in the affirmative by a larger bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in the case of Gian Singh vs State of Punjab & Anr. reported at 2012 10
SCC 303 .
41. The power of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure is of the widest amplitude. The power is to be exercised to secure
the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of Court. In this
connection the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
paragraphs 11 to 13 of the judgment in Ramgopal and Anr Vs State of
Madhya Pradesh, (supra), should be noted:-
“ 11. True it is that offences which are “non-compoundable” cannot
be compounded by a criminal court in purported exercise of its
powers under Section 320 CrPC. Any such attempt by the court
would amount to alteration, addition and modification of Section
320 CrPC, which is the exclusive domain of legislature. There is no
patent or latent ambiguity in the language of Section 320 CrPC,
which may justify its wider interpretation and include such
offences in the docket of “compoundable” offences which have been
consciously kept out as non-compoundable. Nevertheless, the
limited jurisdiction to compound an offence within the framework
of Section 320 CrPC is not an embargo against invoking inherent
powers by the High Court vested in it under Section 482 CrPC. The
High Court, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances
of a case and for justifiable reasons can press Section 482 CrPC in
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aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court and/or to secure
the ends of justice.
12. The High Court, therefore, having regard to the nature of the
offence and the fact that parties have amicably settled their
dispute and the victim has willingly consented to the nullification
of criminal proceedings, can quash such proceedings in exercise of
its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, even if the offences
are non-compoundable. The High Court can indubitably evaluate
the consequential effects of the offence beyond the body of an
individual and thereafter adopt a pragmatic approach, to ensure
that the felony, even if goes unpunished, does not tinker with or
paralyse the very object of the administration of criminal justice
system.
13. It appears to us that criminal proceedings involving non-
heinous offences or where the offences are pre-dominantly of a
private nature, can be annulled irrespective of the fact that trial
has already been concluded or appeal stands dismissed against
conviction. Handing out punishment is not the sole form of
delivering justice. Societal method of applying laws evenly is
always subject to lawful exceptions. It goes without saying, that
the cases where compromise is struck post-conviction, the High
Court ought to exercise such discretion with rectitude, keeping in
view the circumstances surrounding the incident, the fashion in
which the compromise has been arrived at, and with due regard to
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the nature and seriousness of the offence, besides the conduct of
the accused, before and after the incidence. The touchstone for
exercising the extraordinary power under Section 482 CrPC would
be to secure the ends of justice. There can be no hard-and-fast line
constricting the power of the High Court to do substantial justice.
A restrictive construction of inherent powers under Section 482
CrPC may lead to rigid or specious justice, which in the given facts
and circumstances of a case, may rather lead to grave injustice.
On the other hand, in cases where heinous offences have been
proved against perpetrators, no such benefit ought to be extended,
as cautiously observed by this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of
Punjab. [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466,
para 29 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Laxmi Narayan [State of M.P.
v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, para 15 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
706] ”
42. The facts of the present case will reveal that although the offence that
Roshan is charged with, is non-compoundable in nature, there never was
any grievance against him on the part of Anjali or her family members. In
our opinion, quashing the instant proceedings will not have any adverse or
deprave effect on the society at large or any section of it.
43. As discussed above, the present case is not a run of the mill POCSO
case where a minor has been forcibly violated. The physical relationship
between Roshan and Anjali was admittedly consensual. It may be true that
consent of a minor is of no effect. However, the same has to be taken into
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account along with other factors indicated above, to decide whether or not
prosecuting Roshan is warranted in the present factual matrix. At the cost
of repetition we say that Anjali has pleaded before us to put an end to the
prosecution so that the family survives. Blindly prosecuting Roshan under
the provisions of the POCSO Act will be counterproductive. Such
prosecution will almost certainly destroy Roshan’s wife Anjali for the
protection of whom and the like, the POCSO Act was promulgated, not to
talk of the two children born to Roshan and Anjali.
44. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, to prevent abuse
of process of Court and to secure the ends of justice we quash the entire
proceedings in both the criminal cases being Special Case No. 18 of 2017
leading to Special Trial No. 60 of 2017 and Special (POCSO) Case No. 12 of
2019 leading to Special (POCSO) ST No. 20 of 2019 as also the conviction of
Roshan. The bail bonds shall stand discharged.
45. CRA No. 4 of 2024 and CRA No. 05 of 2025 along with the two
interlocutory applications filed in the two appeals, both numbered as IA NO:
CRAN/3/2026, are disposed of accordingly.
46. Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment and order, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.
I agree.
( Apurba Sinha Ray, J. ) ( Arijit Banerjee, J. )
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