M/S. Kalline Tea Estate vs On The Death Of Amol Tanti His Legal Heir Smti Anurupa Tanti
- Court
- Gauhati High Court
Page No.# 1/16
GAHC010133932017
2026:GAU-AS:16940
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/4053/2017
M/S. KALLINE TEA ESTATE
A UNIT OF JAYASHREE TEA and INDUSTRY LIMITED, REP. BY ITS
GENERAL MANAGER, PO-KALLAINE-788815, DIST. CACHAR, ASSAM
VERSUS
ON THE DEATH OF AMOL TANTI HIS LEGAL HEIR SMTI ANURUPA TANTI
W/O LATE SRI ANUP TANTI
R/O VILLAGE KALIBARI PECHACHARA CHA BAGAN
P.O KALAIN P.S. KALAIN
CACHAR ASSAM
PIN-788815
2:REKHA TANTI
S/O LATE SRI ANUP TANTI
R/O VILLAGE KALIBARI PECHACHARA CHA BAGAN
P.O. KALAIN P.S. KALAIN
CACHAR ASSAM
PIN-788815
3:SAMIR TANTI
S/O LATE SRI ANUP TANTI
R/O VILLAGE KALIBARI PECHACHARA CHA BAGAN
P.O. KALAIN P.S. KALAIN
CACHAR ASSAM
PIN-788815
4:THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY THE COMMISSIONER and SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF ASSAM
LABOUR DEPARTMENT
DISPUR
GUWAHATI-6
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5:THE ASSISTANT LABOUR COMMISSIONER
GOVT. OF ASSAM
CACHAR
ASSA
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. B. D. Das, Sr. Advocate
: Ms. R. Deka, Advocate
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. M. Dutta, Sr. Advocate
: Mr. K. Mira, Advocate
· Date on which Judgment was reserved : NA
· Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 10.11.2026
· Whether the pronouncement is of
the Operative Part of the Judgment : Yes
· Whether the full Judgment has been
Pronounced : NA
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. B. D. Das, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms.
R. Deka, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner
and Mr. M. Dutta, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. K.
Mira, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent
Nos.1, 2 and 3. I have also heard Ms. U. Das, the learned
Additional Senior Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the
Respondent Nos. 4 and 5.
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2. The present writ petition was filed by the Petitioner assailing
the Award dated 02.03.2016 passed by the learned Industrial
Tribunal, Cachar, Silchar in Reference Case No.02/2014.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
3. The original Respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to as the
‘Workman’) was offered appointment as the daily rated permanent
worker by the Management of the Petitioner on 28.07.1981.
Subsequent thereto, on 26.12.1983, the Workman was offered
appointment as Sardar w.e.f. 02.01.1984. On 25.03.1986, the
Workman was offered the post of a driver w.e.f. 01.04.1986.
4. At this stage, it is also of relevance to take note of that on
05.09.1985, the Nomination Form was filled up wherein, in the
column “date of birth”, it was inserted as 1950. On 20.08.2001, the
Workman was upgraded to the post of Artisan Grade-B w.e.f.
01.09.2001. On 02.06.2008, a communication was issued to the
Workman by the Senior Manager of the Petitioner Tea Estate
intimating him that his employment in the Tea Estate as monthly
staff would be terminated w.e.f. 30.06.2008 on superannuation.
The Workman was also asked to handover the vacant possession
of the quarter and the khet land before coming to collect the
amount of gratuity admissible to him. An amount of Rs.80,099.03p
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was sanctioned as the gratuity payable to the Workman upon he
being superannuated on 30.07.2008 at 4:30 PM. The Workman
thereupon was made an offer, post retirement on 28.06.2008 w.e.f.
01.07.2008 which would be renewed on six monthly basis. The
Workman duly accepted the said re-employment.
5. The records further reveal that on 05.10.2009, the Workman
was paid an amount of Rs.2,74,666/- as settlement towards his
provident fund dues. Further to that, on 31.03.2011, another
amount of Rs.1,08,150/- was paid to the Workman. Prior to
payment of the same, it is also relevant to observe that in the
Statement showing the Pensionary Benefits of the membership
before the age of retired members, the Workman put his signature
on 06.06.2011.
6. The records further reveal that on 05.12.2011, the Workman
raised the dispute by submitting a representation that he was
unjustly and arbitrarily terminated prior to he attaining the age of
superannuation inasmuch as it is the case of the Workman that his
date of birth was 31.10.1956 and therefore, ought to have retired
on 31.10.2014 but the management of the Petitioner Tea Estate
adopting that he was born in the year 1950 retired him on
30.06.2008. On the basis of the said representation submitted
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before the Labour Authorities, and the conciliation having been
failed, the appropriate Government vide a notification dated
12.02.2014 referred the dispute to the learned Industrial Tribunal,
Cachar. The dispute so referred were:
“ (a) Whether the management of M/S Kalline Tea is justified in
superannuation their workman Sri Amol Tanti w.e.f. 30.06.2008 on
the basis of the date of birth given/recorded in the A.T.P.P.F
nomination form in the face of a different date of birth as recorded
in his school certificate, LIC documents and the Muster Roll of
Employees maintained by the management?
(b) If not, what benefits the workman is entitled to?”
7. The Workman submitted his written statement. The
Management of the Petitioner Tea Estate also submitted its written
statement. In addition to that, the Management of the Petitioner
Tea Estate submitted an additional written statement.
8. On behalf of the management, one witness adduced evidence
i.e. the Senior Manager of the Petitioner Tea Estate and he was
cross-examined. On behalf of the Workman, he himself adduced
evidence and he was cross-examined. Various documents were
exhibited.
9. The learned Industrial Tribunal vide a Judgment and Award
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dated 02.03.2016 came to a categorical finding that the date of
birth of the Workman was 31.10.1956. The PF nomination form so
submitted could not be proved that the Workman had put his
signature. The learned Industrial Tribunal also opined that the date
of birth of the Workman was 31.10.1956 and therefore his date of
superannuation was on 31.10.2014. The learned Industrial Tribunal
vide the impugned Award dated 02.03.2016 held that though the
Workman is not entitled to get any compensation from the
management regarding his termination of service by the
management but the Workman would be entitled to the benefits as
an employee till the date of superannuation up to 31.10.2014.
10. Being aggrieved, the present writ petition was filed by the
Petitioner on 07.07.2017.
11. The learned Coordinate Bench of this Court vide an order
dated 12.07.2017 stayed the impugned Award dated 02.08.2016.
The interim order thereupon has been extended from time to time.
12. It is of relevance to take note of that during the pendency of
the present writ petition, the Workman expired and he was
substituted by his legal representatives i.e. his wife, son and
daughter vide an order dated 13.10.2023.
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13. The records reveal that the substituted Respondents filed an
affidavit-in-opposition on 21.12.2023 wherein they supported the
Award passed and also placed on record another document namely
the Staff Register Details wherein the Workman whose
employment code number was 90031 was reflected in the Staff
Register Details with his date of birth as 31.10.1956.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE LEARNED COUNSELS FOR THE
PARTIES:
14. Mr. B. D. Das, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the Petitioner submitted that the industrial dispute so raised
could not have been an industrial dispute, inasmuch as upon the
superannuation of the Workman w.e.f. 30.06.2008, there was no
employer-workman relationship. The learned Senior counsel further
submitted that prior to that, on 26.08.2008, the Workman was
given a post-retirement employment, which the Workman duly
accepted and continued till his services were dispensed with.
15. The learned Senior counsel for the Petitioner referring to the
records submitted that it would show that the Workman duly
accepted his date of birth as in the year 1950, as he never raised
any issue. The Workman duly accepted the gratuity and all other
pensionary benefits. It is only after the entire pensionary benefits
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were disbursed, then on 15.12.2011, a representation was
submitted raising a purported dispute as regards his date of
retirement. The learned Senior counsel, therefore, submitted that
after the superannuation of the Workman, he cannot raise such a
dispute as regards his date of birth and in that regard, referred to
the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The General
Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines Vs. The Vice President, United
Mines Mazdoor Union and Others , reported in (2024) 4 SCR 63 :
2024 INSC 264 , and placed reliance upon Paragraph Nos. 18, 19,
20, and 21 of the said judgment.
16. Per contra, Mr. M. Dutta, the learned Senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the substituted Respondents, submitted that from a
perusal of the Award, it would show that the PF Nomination Form
could not be proved. The management witness failed to show that
he had any knowledge when the PF Nomination Form was filled up.
The learned Senior counsel also submitted that the witnesses who
had signed in the PF Nomination Form were also not examined to
prove the PF Nomination Form. The learned Senior counsel,
therefore, submitted that sans the PF Nomination Form not being
proved, the learned Industrial Tribunal had rightly taken note of
the Driving License as well as the Insurance Policy, which
categorically showed that the date of birth of the Workman was on
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31.10.1956.
17. The learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
substituted Respondents also contended that it is a trite principle
of law that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution ought not to interfere with the Award passed by the
learned Labour Court, except in a case where there is a perversity
on the face of the records. In that regard, he has referred to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Management of
Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Vs. S. Viswanathan
reported in
(2005) 3 SCC 193 .
18. The learned Senior counsel also contended that the very
reference made to the learned Industrial Tribunal categorically
refers to the School Certificate, the Driving License, as well as the
Insurance Policy, which are documents which ought to have been
taken into consideration for fixing the date of birth, rather than a
nomination form which could not be proved. The learned Senior
counsel therefore submitted that there is no infirmity or perversity
in the impugned Award for this Court to exercise the certiorari
jurisdiction in the extant facts.
ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION:
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19. I have heard the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the
parties and perused the materials on record, including the records
of the learned Industrial Tribunal.
20. It is well settled that if a particular date of birth is entered in
the Service Register, a change sought for cannot be entertained at
the fag end of the service, after accepting the same to be correct
during the entire service career. In the instant case, the Workman
was duly intimated on 02.06.2008 that he would be retiring w.e.f.
30.06.2008. The Workman never challenged the said aspect then.
The Workman accepted the gratuity along with other pensionary
benefits. The provident fund dues were also accepted on
06.06.2011. This aspect is borne out of the records of the learned
Labour Court. The Workman not only accepted the gratuity, the
pensionary benefits as well as the pension, but also accepted an
order of re-employment, i.e. an appointment post-superannuation,
which would be reviewed on a six-monthly basis. This is also borne
out of the records. It was only after accepting the gratuity, the
pensionary benefits, as well as the provident fund, on 15.12.2011,
the Workman raised the dispute that he ought not to have been
superannuated on 30.06.2008; rather, he should have been in
service and his date of superannuation was on 31.10.2014. The
basis on which the Workman raised such dispute is his School
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Certificate, the Driving License, as well as the Life Insurance Policy,
wherein the date of birth of the Workman was shown as
31.10.1956.
21. This Court has minutely perused the evidence on affidavit of
the Workman as well as his cross-examination. In his cross-
examination, the Workman categorically stated that on the various
dates post the offer of his appointment dated 28.07.1981,
26.12.1983, 25.03.1986 and 20.08.2001, the Workman did not
submit any certificate concerning his date of birth.
22. This Court duly takes note of a document which was placed in
the present writ proceedings by way of an affidavit by the
substituted Respondents, wherein in the Staff Register Details, the
Workman's date of birth was recorded by the Petitioner Tea Estate
as 31.10.1956. However, the said document was not adduced as
evidence before the learned Industrial Tribunal.
23. In the backdrop of the above, let this Court refer to the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The General
Manager, M/S Barsua Iron Ore Mines (supra) wherein the issue
before the Supreme Court was as to whether a Workman who had
accepted the date of birth for a period of 10 years can be allowed
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to change the date of birth. The Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar as well as the learned
Division Bench of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack held that the
Workman in those proceedings could be permitted to raise the
issue pertaining to his date of birth, although he had accepted on
27.12.1972 that his date of birth was 27.12.1948 till 14.08.1982.
However, the Supreme Court in the said judgment interfered with
the Award passed by the learned Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar, as well as the Judgment
dated 04.02.2021 passed by the learned Division Bench of the High
Court of Orissa and held that the principle of estoppel would come
into play, inasmuch as the Workman, having stated on 27.12.1972
that his date of birth was 27.12.1948, cannot be permitted to raise
the claim of his date of birth being 12.03.1955, that too on
14.08.1982, i.e. almost after a decade. Paragraphs 18 to 21 of the
said judgment, being relevant, are reproduced hereinunder:
“ 18. Undoubtedly, a decision on the issue of date of birth is as important for
the employer as it is for the employee. Reference in this regard can be
made to Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v Shib Kumar Dushad, (2000)
8 SCC 696. As expressed in Union of India v C Rama Swamy,
(1997) 4 SCC 647 , “… the court also ought not to grant any relief
even if it is shown that the date of birth, as originally recorded, was
incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a different
date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with a view that
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that would be to his advantage. …”.
19. Moreover, the principles of estoppel would come into play in the
present case. The respondent no.3, having stated on 27.12.1972, that
his date of birth was 27.12.1948, cannot be permitted to raise the
claim of his date of birth being 12.03.1955, that too on 14.08.1982,
i.e., almost after a decade (counting from 27.12.1972 to 14.08.1982).
Even the STC was submitted after the appellant requested the
respondent no.3 for documentary proof on 24.11.1998.
20. Although, we have examined the matter from the lens of fraud as well,
in view of our discussions hereinabove, the said aspect does not merit
deeper probe. We leave it at that. For the present, it would suffice to
refer to a pronouncement of recent vintage by this Court in Karnataka
Rural Infrastructure Development Limited v T P Nataraja,
(2021) 12 SCC 27 , where earlier precedents in Home Department
v R Kirubakaran, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 155; State of Madhya
Pradesh v Premlal Shrivas, (2011) 9 SCC 664; Life Insurance
Corporation of India v R Basavaraju, (2016) 15 SCC 781 and
Bharat Coking Coal Limited v Shyam Kishore Singh, (2020) 3
SCC 411 were considered. Although this Court in T P Nataraja
(supra) was looking at the facts therein, in the context of the
Karnataka State Servants (Determination of Age) Act, 1974, the
principle of law laid down would equally apply insofar as change of
date of birth in service records is concerned, with which we concur:
“ 11 . Considering the aforesaid decisions of this Court the law
on change of date of birth can be summarised as under:
(i) application for change of date of birth can only be as
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per the relevant provisions/regulations applicable;
(ii) even if there is cogent evidence, the same cannot be
claimed as a matter of right;
(iii) application can be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches also more particularly when it is made at the fag-
end of service and/or when the employee is about to
retire on attaining the age of superannuation.”
21. In view of the aforesaid, this Court finds that the much-delayed
disclosure of the date of birth as 12.03.1955 by the respondent no.3,
coupled with his initial declaration and the admitted position that
based on such initial declaration, he had received employment, as
otherwise based on 12.03.1955, he could not have been legally
appointed due to being under-age, there is no manner of doubt that
the respondent no.3, irrespective of his real date of birth, for the
purpose of employment under the appellant, cannot be allowed the
purported rectification/correction of date of birth to 12.03.1955. He
would have to, necessarily, be content with his service and benefits
accounted taking his date of birth as 27.12.1948.”
24. Factually, the present case is similar inasmuch as the
Workman’s date of birth was recorded as 1950 in the PF
Nomination Form. On 02.06.2008, the Workman was duly informed
that he would superannuate on 30.06.2008. The Workman
accepted the said date and took the pensionary benefits, which
includes the gratuity and the provident fund. It is only upon receipt
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of all these benefits, the Workman raised the issue on 15.12.2011.
In addition to that, the Workman had also accepted his date of
superannuation to be 30.06.2008 by accepting the re-employment
order dated 28.06.2008, wherein the Workman was appointed
post-retirement as a driver on a six-monthly basis. In the opinion
of this Court, the learned Industrial Tribunal failed to take note of
these vital aspects of the matter, which touches on the principles of
estoppel. Under such circumstances, the findings so arrived at by
the learned Industrial Tribunal merely on the basis of not proving
the PF Nomination Paper and overlooking the conduct of the
Workman have led to perversity in the impugned Award dated
02.03.2016. Accordingly, the impugned Award cannot be sustained
in law.
CONCLUSION:
25. In that view of the matter, the instant writ petition stands
disposed of with the following observations and directions:
(i) The impugned Award dated 02.03.2016 passed by the learned
Industrial Tribunal, Cachar, in Reference Case No. 02/2014 is set
aside and quashed.
(ii) There shall be no order as to costs.
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(iii) Return the TCR.
Bijoy
Saha
Digitally signed
by Bijoy Saha
Date: 2026.11.18
10:33:09 +05'30'
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant