THE STATE OF KARNATAKA vs KARNATAKA RAJYA ANUDANITHA SHIKHANA SAMSTHEGALA OKKUTA
- Court
- Karnataka High Court
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WA No. 361 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
TH
DATED THIS THE 17 DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2026
®
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
WRIT APPEAL NO. 361 OF 2024 (S-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRINCIPAL SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
(PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION)
M.S BUILDING
BENGALURU-560001
2. THE COMMISSIONER
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTIONS
NRUPATUNGA ROAD, K.R CIRCLE
BENGALURU-560001
3. THE DIRECTOR
DEPARTMENT OF PRE-UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
18TH CROSS, MALLESHWARAM
SAMPIGE ROAD
BENGALURU-560012
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI M N SUDEV HEGDE, AGA)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
VASANTHA
KUMARY B
K
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA
1. KARNATAKA RAJYA ANUDANITHA
SHIKSHANA SAMSTHEGALA OKKUTA
(A SOCIETY REGISTERED UNDER
THE KARNATAKA SOCIETIES
REGISTRATIONS ACT, 1960)
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HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT:
RAVINDRA KANIKETANA, R.T. NAGAR
TUMKUR-572102
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY
SHRI DEVARAJIAH
S/O LATE SHRI CHIKKARAMIAH
AGED 70 YEARS
R/AT NISARGA NILAYA, 4TH CROSS
BASAVESHWARA EXTENSION
KYATASANDRA, TUMKUR-572104
…RESPONDENT
(BY PROF. RAVIVARMA KUMAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SMT. PRIYANKA YAVAGAL, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED U/S 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
08.12.2023 PASSED IN W.P.NO.11667/2022 BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE AND UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
OF ANNEXURE-I APPENDED TO RULE-3 OF THE KARNATAKA
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (RECRUITMENT AND TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF EMPLOYEES IN PRIVATE AIDED
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS)
RULES, 1999.
THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT ON 30.09.2026, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE
D K SINGH PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE D K SINGH)
I PREFACE:
The present appeal has been filed challenging the impugned
order dated 08.12.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in
W.P.No.11667/2022 (S-RES) wherein, the writ Court allowed
the writ petition filed by the Respondent-Society.
II BRIEF FACTS:
The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:
1. The Respondent is a Society registered under the
provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960.
The members of the Respondent-Society are primary and
secondary schools which have been admitted to grant-in-aid.
2. The Respondent-Society filed a writ petition bearing
W.P.No.11667/2022 praying to strike down Rule 3 in Annexure
I of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Recruitment and
Terms and Conditions of Services of Employees in Private Aided
primary and Secondary Educational Institutions) Rules, 1999
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1999 Rules’), along with a
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prayer to direct the Appellant-State to consider the
representations made by the Respondent-Society to fill up the
vacant posts in accordance with the provisions of the Grant in
Aid Code, Right to Education Act, 1983 and the 1999 Rules.
3. The learned Single Judge, vide impugned order dated
08.12.2023, allowed the writ petition and read down Clause 2
of Annexure I of the 1999 Rules, Rule 17 of the Karnataka Pre-
University Education (Academic, Registration, Administration
and Grant-in-aid etc.) Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the 2006 Rules), which required obtainment of prior permission
to fill up the vacancies, to mean that the educational
institutions are required to only inform the competent authority
that they are filling up the vacancies which have arisen due to
retirement, resignation, promotion or death, in respect of the
posts which have been admitted to Grant-in-Aid and the
competent authority is, thereafter, bound to grant permission
to fill up the vacant posts and the only power that the
competent authority possesses in this regard is to object to the
filling up of the posts if the reservation roster points are not
followed while filling up such vacant posts, and that if the
vacant posts are being filled up in accordance with the
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reservation roster points, the competent authority is bound to
accord permission without any delay.
4. The learned Single Judge has further held that the State
cannot contend that it does not have the necessary funds to
discharge its responsibility as per the statutory obligation laid
down in Section 46 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), and a holistic approach
was necessary which would not stultify or defeat the objective
of the State Law.
III SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT:
5. Learned Additional Government Advocate Sri Sudev
Hegde appearing for the Appellant-State Authorities would
submit that Section 49 of the Act vests a duty on the State to
set apart a sum of money annually for giving as Grant-in-Aid to
the local authority institutions and private institutions, which is
subject to the limits of economic capacity of the State. This
sum of money is a matter of policy which the State alone has to
decide looking into its financial capacity and other relevant
circumstances.
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5.1 It is further submitted that the State issued a Circular
dated 10.06.2020 by which it was made clear that Grant-in-Aid
benefit will not be given for any new Schools and it was also
made clear that no vacant posts of teachers would be filled in
Grant-in-Aid schools in view of the critical financial condition of
the State due to COVID-19. In view of the same and in
pursuance of the power vested under Section 52(2) of the Act,
the Appellant-State did not permit filling up of vacant posts in
aided high schools.
5.2 The learned Single Judge, after hearing both the parties
but without considering the objections raised by the Appellant-
State, passed the impugned order allowing the writ petition
filed by the Respondent-Society.
5.3 The learned Single Judge did not notice the cut-off date
of 31.12.2015 fixed by the State permitting the educational
institutions to fill up the posts. The choice of cut-off date
cannot be termed as arbitrary or discriminatory when it is
relatable to the economic measures adopted by the State. The
extension of Grant-in-Aid to any college or post is an essential
matter of policy of the State, and no management can claim
Grant-in-Aid as a matter of right.
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5.4 The learned Single Judge failed to notice that the words
‘within the limits of its economical capacity’ in Section 49 of the
Act have a clear nexus with the object of the Act, and the writ
Court had erred in allowing the writ petition when the
governing council has no power to appoint employees as per
Section 46 of the Act.
5.5 The learned Single Judge has erred in not differentiating
the two entities ‘Management Committee’ and the ‘Governing
Council’ which are specifically defined under the Act. Since the
Respondent-Society is a governing council, it has no locus
standi to seek permission to fill up the vacancies, nor to Grant-
in-Aid.
5.6 The impugned order is against the decisions laid down by
this Court in ADIVASI SHIKSHANA PRASARAKA MANDAL,
AURAD (B), DISTRICT BIDAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
(1998 SCC ONLINE KAR 586) and RAMANJANEYASWAMI
VIDHYA SAMSTHE v. STATE OF KARNATAKA (1999 SCC
. The direction of the learned Single Judge
ONLINE KAR 566)
to the State to pay the salary is against the dictum of this Court
in SHIVAJI HIGH SCHOOL v. PRABHAKAR JOTIBA
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BAMANE (1985 SCC ONLINE KAR 310) wherein this Court
observed that the primary liability to pay the salary is on the
Managing Committee of the Private Educational Institution and
not on the State, and the employees have no vested right to
seek salary or Grant-in-Aid from the State. In the present case,
there is no inaction on part of the Appellant-State, and it is the
duty of the private managements to comply with the policy
decisions taken by the Government. The primary liability of
providing basic infrastructure as well as teaching and non-
teaching faculty lies on the management only.
5.7 On the issue of maintainability of the Writ Petition, it has
been submitted that the Respondent-Society has no locus
standi to challenge the rules framed. The learned Single Judge,
in the impugned order, without considering the objection raised
by the Appellant-State, allowed the writ petition thereby
opening the floodgates for private institutions to conduct affairs
as they please. The Respondent-Society lacks the requisite
locus standi to file the writ petition inasmuch as under the
provisions of the Act, the Managing Committee of the Private
Aided Institution is the governing body for appointment of
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teachers in cases of posts falling vacant after obtaining
permission from the State Authorities.
5.8 The Respondent-Society has not placed on record any
resolution passed with the consent of its members to file the
writ petition on their behalf, nor has the Respondent-Society
furnished the list of member-institutions. On a reading of the
Byelaws of the Respondent-Society, it can be inferred that the
authorised representatives of the member-institutions can
become members of the Respondent-Society, thereby vitiating
the locus standi of the Respondent-Society to file the writ
petition on behalf of the member-institutions. Reliance is placed
on the decision of the Supreme Court in VINOY KUMAR v.
STATE OF U.P. [(2001) 4 SCC 734] wherein it has been held
that a person shall have no locus standi to file a writ petition if
he is not personally affected by the impugned order or his
fundamental rights have neither been directly or substantially
invaded nor is there any imminent danger of such rights being
invaded or his acquired interests have been violated ignoring
the applicable rules.
5.9 It is further submitted that though the prayer made in the
writ petition was for striking down of Rule 3 of the 1999 Rules,
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the learned Single Judge read down provisions and granted
reliefs which were not at all prayed for. Annexure I of Rule 3
provides for conditions to be fulfilled by the Aided Institutions
for seeking Grant-in-Aid. It is the responsibility of the Aided
Institutions to comply with the conditions prescribed under the
said Rules.
5.10 The learned Single Judge has failed to take note of the
decisions laid down by the Supreme Court in UNION OF
INDIA v. TEJRAM PARASHRAMJI BOMBHATE [(1991) 3
SCC 11] wherein it has been held that no court or tribunal can
compel the government to change its policy involving
expenditure and in STATE OF U.P. v. ABHAY NANDAN
INTER COLLEGE [(2021) 15 SCC 600] .
5.11 Reliance has been placed on the following cases for the
respective propositions of law:
i. UMESH CHAND VINOD KUMAR v. KRISHI
UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI (1983 SCC ONLINE
ALL 638) – An association of persons/registered
society does not have the locus to file a writ petition
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for enforcement of the rights of its members as
distinguished from enforcement of its own rights.
ii. SUBRAMANIAN SWAMY v. RAJU [(2014) 8 SCC
390] and K.P. VARGHESE v. ITO [(1981) 4 SCC
173] – Reading down of a provision is done only
when a portion of the provision is ultra vires and the
remaining portion can be saved if the provision is
interpreted in such a manner so as to enable it
harmoniously blended without striking down the
entire provision/section.
iii. T.M.A. PAI FOUNDATION v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA [(2002) 8 SCC 481] and STATE OF
U.P. v. ABHAY NANDAN INTER COLLEGE
[(2021) 15 SCC 600] – The issue of Grant-in-Aid
is a policy matter – administrative as well as fiscal –
depends on the economic capacity of the State. It is
not an absolute right.
iv. KOLAWANA GRAM VIKAS KENDRA V. STATE OF
GUJARAT [(2010) 1 SCC 133] and GOVT. OF
A.P. v. K. BRAHMANANDAM [(2008) 5 SCC
241] – Prior approval of the State is necessary.
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v. DHANAJAYA REDDY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA
[(2001) 4 SCC 9] – Where a statute requires a
particular act to be done in a particular manner, it
has to be done in that manner alone.
IV SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT:
6. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Prof. Raviverma Kumar, on
behalf of learned counsel Smt. Priyanka Yavagal appearing for
the Respondent-Society, has submitted that the cut-off date of
31.12.2015 is arbitrary and lacks a rational basis, thus violating
the principles of fairness and equity. Economic measures should
not undermine the fundamental rights of educational
institutions to maintain adequate staffing. The policy to restrict
the filling of posts to those vacant up to 31.12.2015 is arbitrary
and does not align with the broader statutory mandate to
support educational institutions comprehensively.
6.1 The Act’s objective to ensure the planned development of
educational institutions implies a duty to support them in
fulfilling their educational mandate. The denial of appointments
contradicts this objective and hinders the institutions from
achieving optimal educational standards. Reliance is placed on
the decision of the Supreme Court in STATE OF T.N. v. K.
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SHYAM SUNDER [(2011) 8 SCC 737] to contend that the
provisions of an Act should be construed to promote its
objectives.
6.2 The learned Counsel for the Appellant-State’s reliance on
the decisions in ADIVASI SHIKSHANA PRASARAKA
MANDAL (Supra) and RAMANJANEYASWAMI VIDHYA
SAMSTHE (Supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the
present case, as the said decisions emphasise on the issue of
claiming Grant-in-Aid as an inherent right. In the present case,
the Respondent-Society is seeking disbursement of sanctioned
Grant-in-Aid and appointment of teachers to positions that
have been previously approved for Grant-in-Aid. The impugned
order recognises the State’s obligation to fulfils its
commitments regarding the disbursement of sanctioned Grant-
in-Aid and the appointment of teaches to already-approved
posts.
6.3 Reliance on the decision in SHIVAJI HIGH SCHOOL
(Supra) is misplaced as the said judgement is not applicable to
the facts of the present case, as the said decision concerned
with private educational institutions that are unaided by the
Government, and that the primary responsibility for paying
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salaries lies with the Managing Committee of such institutions.
In the present case, the Respondent-State represents
institutions that are aided by the State, and the issue concerns
the State’s obligation to fulfil its commitment to the aided
institutions by (i) disbursing the sanctioned Grant-in-Aid and
(ii) ensuring that teachers in approved posts are paid their due
salaries.
6.4 On the issue of maintainability of the writ petition filed by
the Respondent-Society, the learned Senior Counsel would
submit that the Respondent-Society has a direct interest in the
matter as it represents institutions that are directly affected by
the actions and policies of the State. The institutions face
significant consequences due to the State’s failure to fulfil its
obligations regarding Grant-in-Aid and appointment of
teachers. The principle of locus standi has evolved to allow
representative bodies and associations to approach the court on
behalf of those who are directly affected but may not have the
means or capacity to do so, as held by the Supreme Court in
S.P. GUPTA v. UNION OF INDIA (1981 SUPP SCC 87) .
With the decision of the Supreme Court in JANATA DAL v.
H.S. CHOWDHARY [(1992) 4 SCC 305] , the concept of locus
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standi is relaxed in cases where the issues involved are of
public interest or where the petition is filed by a representative
body with a bona fide intention.
6.5 It is further submitted that the Respondent-Society’s
Byelaws and objectives empower it to represent the interests of
its members, including taking legal action when their rights
would be affected. The Supreme Court emphasised in DDA v.
SKIPPER CONSTRUCTION CO. (P) LTD. [(1996) 4 SCC
622] on the representative capacity of organisations in
protecting the rights of their members. Merely because the
representatives of aided institutions are members of the
society, it does not negate the society’s standing or locus
standi . The contention that the Society has not provided a list
of its members approved by the Registrar is a technicality that
does not undermine the substantive interests of the Society.
The principle of representative standing, as affirmed by the
Supreme Court in BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION OF
INDIA [(1984) 3 SCC 161] , promotes the Society’s role in
advocating on behalf of its members who are directly affected
by the State’s actions.
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6.6 It is contended that the while the State must operate
within its economic capacity, it would not permit it to neglect its
responsibilities towards educational institutions. The principle of
balancing budgetary constraints with statutory duties is
paramount and the State has an obligation to ensure that
financial measures do not impede the right to education, as
held in the case of UNNI KRISHNAN, J.P. v. STATE OF A.P.
[(1993) 1 SCC 645] . Reliance is placed on the decision of the
Supreme Court in MOHINI JAIN (MISS) v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA [(1992) 3 SCC 666] to contend that Right to
Education is a fundamental right and the State must take all
necessary measures to ensure that it is upheld. The State’s
financial constraints must be managed in a way that does not
compromise the fundamental right to education.
6.7 Rule 3 mandates prior approval for the appointment of
teachers, which the State had failed to grant since 2015, citing
financial constraints. This has severely hindered institutions’
ability to meet the required staffing standards, leading to a
situation where institutions are unable to function effectively.
The writ Court’s reading down of Rule 3 is justified to ensure
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that institutions are not penalised for the State’s failure to fulfil
its obligations.
6.8 The State’s financial constraints would not absolve it of its
statutory and constitutional duties. Placing reliance on the
decision of the Supreme Court in OLGA TELLIS v. BOMBAY
MUNICIPAL CORPN. [(1985) 3 SCC 545], it is contended
that the State’s selective application of economy measures
undermines the statutory framework designed to ensure the
proper functioning and quality of aided institutions. Sections 49
to 54 of the Act outline the obligations and powers of the State
concerning Grant-in-Aid to educational institutions. The Stat’s
failure to fulfil its Grant-in-Aid obligations, despite the statutory
requirements, justifies the reading down of Rule 3 to ensure
compliance with the constitutional and statutory framework.
6.9 The Respondent-Society challenged Rule 3 of the 1999
Rules in the writ petition. The grounds of the writ petition
clearly sought for the striking down of the rule, asserting its
inconsistency with statutory and constitutional principles, and
the Appellant-State’s claim that the relief was not prayed for is
incorrect.
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6.10 While Sections 87 and 88 of the Act prescribed the terms
and conditions of service for employees in private educational
institutions, these provisions do not negate the State’s
responsibilities and obligations under the Act. Sections 49 to 54
emphasise the State’s duty to support educational institutions
financially, subject to conditions that are reasonable and non-
discriminatory.
V POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:
7. In light of the brief facts and submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties, the points that arise for our
consideration are as follows:
i. Whether the Respondent-Society has the requisite
locus standi to maintain the writ petition seeking
enforcement of the rights and interests of the member-
institutions?
ii. Whether the Government's decision to restrict the
filling up of vacancies to those which had arisen on or
before 31.12.2015, having regard to the financial capacity
of the State, is arbitrary, discriminatory or contrary to the
provisions of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 and the
Rules framed thereunder?
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VI ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION:
8. Before we proceed to analyse the aforesaid issues at
hand, it is necessary to extract Rule 3 along with Clause 2 of
Annexure I of the 1999 Rules, and Rule 17 of the Karnataka
Pre-University Education (Academic, Registration,
Administration and Grant-in-aid etc.) Rules 2006. The same are
extracted as hereunder:
Rule 3 of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Recruitment
and Terms and Conditions of Service of Employees in Private
Aided Primary and Secondary Educational Institutions) Rules,
1999:
“ 3. Qualification and conditions of service of
employees.-
(1) Subject to the other provisions in these rules:
(a) The categories of posts, the staffing pattern
and the qualifications for recruitment to posts in
an Institution shall be as specified in Annexure
III, IV and V. In respect of employees other than
teachers, the prescribed qualifications for
recruitment, etc. in Institutions shall be the same
as those applicable for the corresponding category
of employees in Government Educational
Institutions. The procedure for selection of
candidates to posts identified for recruitment shall
be [as specified in Annexure-I and the procedure
for filling up of the post of Head Master and Head
Mistress in High schools shall be specified in
Annexure VI].
(b) Subject to the financial capacity of the State
Government the salary of employees in respect of
posts admitted into aid in recognised private
educational institutions receiving aid from the
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State Government shall generally be the same as
those applicable for the corresponding category of
employees in government educational institutions
as per orders issued by the State Government in
respect of this category of employees from time
to time.
Provided that no employees of an aided
Institution shall be entitled to the benefits
enumerated in Annexure – II.
(c) Subject to the financial capacity of the State
Government pensionary benefits is admissible to
aided employees of aided institution as per the
provisions of Triple Benefit Scheme Rules and
gratuity is admissible as per the orders issued by
the government from time to time.
Provided that in respect of employees appointed
prior to 1.1.86, pension and gratuity is admissible
if management contribution of 3% is paid upto
the period of 4.9.86.
(2) The State Government may vary the
qualification, method of recruitment and
conditions of service from time to time."
Clause 2 of Annexure I of the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Recruitment and Terms and Conditions of Service
of Employees in Private Aided Primary and Secondary
Educational Institutions) Rules, 1999:
" 2. Advertisement in the News Paper: - The
selecting authority of an educational institution
shall, subject to the economy orders banning
filling of vacancies, issued by Government from
time to time, firstly obtain prior permission of the
competent authority to fill up the vacancies
arising due to retirement, resignation, promotion
and death against posts which were admitted to
grant-in-aid excluding the vacancies caused on
account of sanction of additional
sections/subjects/combinations. Permission shall
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be granted to fill the vacant posts as per the
reservation roster points by the competent
authority. Thereafter it shall notify at least in one
State level daily newspaper having large
circulation in the State and in one leading district
level daily newspaper having large circulation in
the district, inviting applications from candidates
indicating therein the categories of posts, number
of vacancies, minimum qualification prescribed,
classification of vacancies as per the reservation
roster etc., Copy of the advertisement shall also
be sent to the concerned Deputy Director of Public
Instruction, Block Educational Officer and the
concerned employment exchange for displaying
on the notice board of their offices. The managing
committee of the institution shall also display the
advertisement on the notice board of its office."
Rule 17 of the Karnataka Pre-University Education (Academic,
Registration, Administration and Grant-in-aid etc.) Rules 2006:
" 17. Mode of notifying a vacancy for the
purpose of recruitment.-
(1) A managing committee of a private aided Pre-
University college may notify a vacancy which
arises in accordance with Rule 16 after obtaining
prior permission for doing so from the Director.
The notification shall be published on the notice
board of the office of the management; Pre-
University college concerned; the Deputy Director
of Pre-University Education of the concerned
district and further it shall be published in at least
one leading newspaper having largest circulation
in the district. The notification shall contain the
description of the vacant post, caste category
reservation if any, the number and date of
permission to advertise accorded by the Director,
the minimum qualification specified, the last date
fixed for submitting the application and marks and
caste certificates to be produced in support of the
academic qualification and caste category.
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(2) After the last date for submitting the
application is over, the management shall verify
the particulars of all the candidates whether
eligible or otherwise serially in the order of their
academic merit, placing the candidate with the
highest marks scored in the Post Graduation
degree in the first place. If the academic merit of
more than one candidate is same, the candidate
older in age shall be placed above the other. If
the highest total marks prescribed for the
qualifying examinations of different candidates
vary, then, the managing committee shall prepare
the list based on the percentage or a common
denominator.
(3) For each post, five applicants in the top of the
list prepared under sub-rule (2) shall be called for
interview, unless the total number of applicants is
less than 5, in which case all the applicants shall
be called for the interview. The management shall
consult the Deputy Director of the concerned
district to fix a date and time for the interview of
the candidates and shall conduct the interview in
the premises of the concerned Pre-University
College.
(4) The managing committee shall constitute a
recruitment committee comprising of four
members; two representing the managing
committee, the third being the Deputy Director of
the concerned district, unless the Director
nominates someone else by a specific order and
the fourth being a subject expert to be nominated
by the managing committee.
(5) The candidates called for interview shall
demonstrate their ability to teach the subject and
handle a class by actually delivering a lecture
before a class of students of concerned college for
at least twenty minutes in the presence of the
recruitment committee.
(6) Each member of the recruitment committee
may award a maximum of twenty-five marks and
the total interview marks that can be awarded to
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any candidate shall not exceed twelve percent of
the marks secured in the qualifying examination.
(7) The recruitment committee shall then prepare
a list of selected candidates showing the marks
scored in the Post Graduation examination and
the marks awarded by the recruitment committee
separately and also the total marks against the
name of each candidate.
(8) The recruitment committee shall prepare, in
the order of merit, a panel of three selected
candidates for appointment to the post on the
basis of the aggregate percentage of marks in the
qualifying examination and marks scored at the
interview. The managing committee shall send
the appointment order to the person in the order
of merit. Prior approval of the Director shall be
obtained before issuing the appointment order to
the selected candidate.”
Re: Point (i):
9. It is the contention of the learned Additional Government
Advocate that the objections filed by the Appellant-State before
the writ Court were not considered by the learned Single Judge
before passing the impugned order. However, the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Society has
vehemently contended that the learned Single Judge has
passed a well-reasoned order after considering the objections
of the State.
10. The learned Single Judge proceeded with the contentions
of the Respondent-Society, then with those of the Appellant-
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State, followed by the issues framed, analysis of the applicable
provisions, and the application of the law to the present case.
The learned Additional Government Advocate has contended
that the objections were not considered by the writ Court. The
Appellant-State has raised various objections, including the
maintainability of the writ petition. However, no whisper has
been made on the issue or objection of maintainability of the
writ petition. The learned Single Judge has proceeded directly
with an extensive analysis of the provisions involved and
applied the same to the facts of the case, without deciding
whether the writ petition filed by the Respondent-Society is
maintainable or not.
11. Since the issue of maintainability was not addressed by
the learned Single Judge, we find it justified to decide on the
same.
The Learned Single Judge failed to consider and determine the
preliminary objection regarding the locus standi of the
Respondent-Society before adjudicating upon the substantive
merits of the writ petition
12. It is a well-settled principle of law that a Court, while
adjudicating upon a lis between the parties, is required to
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WA No. 361 of 2024
consider the material pleadings, objections and submissions
advanced by the parties and render findings on the issues
which arise for its consideration. More particularly, where a
preliminary objection touching upon the maintainability of the
proceedings or the locus standi of a party to institute such
proceedings is raised, the same requires consideration before
the Court proceeds to adjudicate upon the substantive
controversy. The determination of such an objection cannot be
treated as an inconsequential procedural formality, since the
competence of a party to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court is
distinct from the merits of the relief sought. The Supreme Court
in SIEMENS ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING CO. OF
INDIA LTD. v. UNION OF INDIA [(1976) 2 SCC 981] has
emphasised that every judicial/quasi-judicial order must be
supported by reasons and that recording reasons is a basic
requirement of natural justice. Similarly, in
KRANTI
ASSOCIATES (P) LTD. v. MASOOD AHMED KHAN [(2010)
9 SCC 496] , the Supreme Court reiterated that recording
reasons was an essential component of judicial and quasi-
judicial decision-making, as reasons would demonstrate the
application of mind and ensure fairness in the decision-making
process. Thus, where an objection going to the root of the
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WA No. 361 of 2024
maintainability of the proceedings is raised, the Court is
required to examine and determine the same by recording
appropriate reasons, rather than proceeding directly to
adjudicate upon the substantive rights claimed by the
petitioner.
13. In the present case, a perusal of the impugned order
indicates that the learned Single Judge has extracted the
contentions advanced on behalf of the Appellant-State,
including the contention that private educational institutions do
not possess any legally enforceable right to claim Grant-in-Aid
from the State Government and that the managements are
required to bear the responsibility of paying salaries to their
employees. The learned Single Judge has thereafter proceeded
to examine the statutory provisions of the Act, the Rules
framed thereunder and the obligations of the State Government
in relation to grant-in-aid. However, the question as to whether
the Respondent-Society, which is a registered society
comprising several aided educational institutions as its
members, possesses an independent locus standi to institute
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking enforcement of the rights and interests of such
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WA No. 361 of 2024
member-institutions, has not been separately framed or
determined. The impugned order proceeds on the premise that
the Respondent-Society is competent to maintain the writ
petition and proceeds to examine the substantive reliefs sought
therein, without undertaking an independent examination of its
entitlement to espouse the cause of its member-institutions.
14. The question of locus standi of the Respondent-Society
assumes significance in the facts of the present case,
particularly having regard to the nature of the reliefs sought in
the writ petition. The Respondent-Society has approached this
Court seeking directions concerning the filling up of vacancies
in aided educational institutions represented by it, as well as
the interpretation and operation of the statutory provisions
governing such appointments. The rights and obligations
arising out of the recruitment process and the consequential
financial implications thereof are, in the first instance, referable
to the individual member-institutions and the competent
authorities concerned. Therefore, before examining the legality
of the Government's decision and the interpretation of the
relevant statutory provisions, it becomes necessary to
determine whether the Respondent-Society is entitled to
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WA No. 361 of 2024
maintain the proceedings in a representative capacity and seek
the reliefs claimed on behalf of its members. Since this aspect
has not been independently examined by the learned Single
Judge, we consider it appropriate to address the same in the
present appeal.
15. The Respondent is a Society registered under the
provisions of the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960,
and the members of the petitioner–Society are primary and
secondary schools which have been admitted to grant-in-aid.
The writ petition had been filed on behalf of the member-
institutions, aggrieved by the inaction of the Appellant-State
over the multiple representations made by the Respondent-
Society regarding filling up of vacancies in various teaching
posts.
16. It is well settled that an Association or Society, which
represents the common interests of its members, is competent
to maintain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India for redressal of grievances affecting such members
collectively. The fact that the rights sought to be enforced may,
in their immediate operation, pertain to the individual members
would not, by itself, constitute a bar to the maintainability of
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WA No. 361 of 2024
such proceedings. Where the cause espoused is common to the
members, the relief sought is intended to protect their
collective interests, and the Association or Society is duly
authorised to represent them, it would have the requisite
locus
standi to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The
maintainability of such a petition, however, would depend upon
the nature of the grievance raised, the relief sought and the
Association's competence to represent the interests of its
members.
17. A Society can sue and be sued in the name of the
President, Chairman, or Principal Secretary or trustees as shall
be determined by the rules and regulations of the society or in
the name of such person as shall be appointed by the
governing body for the occasion in default of such
determination (See ILLACHI DEVI v. JAIN SOCIETY
[(2003) 8 SCC 413] ). An Association or Society representing
a body of persons having a common grievance is entitled to
invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court for espousing and
ventilating the common cause of its members. The
maintainability of such proceedings cannot be negatived merely
on the ground that the rights sought to be enforced are those
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WA No. 361 of 2024
of the members represented by the Association and not the
Association in its individual capacity (See CONFEDERATION
OF EX-SERVICEMEN ASSNS. v. UNION OF INDIA [(2006)
8 SCC 399] and AKHIL BHARATIYA SOSHIT KARAMCHARI
SANGH (RAILWAY) V. UNION OF INDIA [(1981) 1 SCC
246] ) . However, the maintainability of a writ petition instituted
by an Association or Society on behalf of its members is subject
to certain recognised conditions, which were enumerated by the
Kerala High Court in JUSTITIA v. STATE OF KERALA (2020
SCC ONLINE KER 10628) as hereunder :
“There had been other decisions of the Apex
Court as well and principles which emerge from all
of them are as under:
(a) That the members of the said association
should have sufficient strength so as to come in
the category of a large sect of public.
(b) That the members should be identifiable.
(c) That the members must be of the category of
poor/illiterate/helpless or disabled.
(d) That the individual member must not be
capable of filing a writ petition.
(e) That the entire body of the members must
authorise the association to protect their legal
rights.
(f) That such an association must have its own
Constitution, and
(g) That there must be authority to file a writ
petition on behalf of all the members.”
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The aforesaid principles have been recognised in the
following decisions:
1. PEOPLE'S UNION FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS v.
UNION OF INDIA [(1982) 3 SCC 235];
2. UMESH CHAND VINOD KUMAR v. KRISHI
UTPADAN MANDI SAMITI (1983 SCC ONLINE ALL
638);
3. STATE BANK OF BIKANER AND JAIPUR v.
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (1991 SCC ONLINE
MAD 11);
4. TET PASSED CANDIDATES WELFARE
ASSOCIATION v. UNION OF INDIA (2023 SCC
ONLINE MAD 3643); and
5. TAMIL NADU SURVEY OFFICERS UNION
(CENTRAL) V. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU
(W.P. NO.10465 OF 2020, DECIDED BY THE
MADRAS HIGH COURT ON 28.04.2022).
The Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in UMESH
CHAND VINOD KUMAR (Supra) further held that, in the
absence of any of the aforesaid circumstances, an Association,
whether registered or unregistered, cannot maintain a petition
under Article 226 for enforcement or protection of the rights of
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WA No. 361 of 2024
its members, as distinguished from the enforcement of its own
rights.
18. Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts
of the present case.
19. In the present case, the Respondent-Society filed the writ
petition bearing W.P.No.11667/2022 being aggrieved by the
inaction of the Respondent-State Authorities in not considering
the representations made by the Society regarding the
vacancies in the member-institutions and praying for
consideration of the said representations made to fill up the
vacancies. The Respondent-Society relied on Rule 45 of the
Grant-in-Aid Code for Secondary Schools and Colleges and
Clause 2 of Annexure I of the 1999 Rules to contend that
sufficient measures as per law and representations were made
to the Respondent-Authorities seeking permission to fill up
vacant posts in the Schools and Colleges represented by the
Society therein. Rule 45 of the Grant-in-Aid Code is extracted
as hereunder:
“45. Appointment — Applications shall be
invited by advertisement by the
management in respect of vacancies of more
than six months’ duration. A copy of the
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WA No. 361 of 2024
advertisement shall be sent to the concerned Joint
Director of the Division.
20. The term ‘Management’ is defined in Rule 8(e) of the
Code as follows:
"(e) “Management” means and includes a Local
Body which maintains an Educational Institution
or Institutions or a registered association or a
registered body of persons which maintains a
recognised Educational Institution or institutions
or the Managing Committee or the Committees of
an Educational Institution or Institutions which
are registered and recognised as such by the
Department, as provided in para 12b."
It is to be noted that the term ’management’ includes a
registered association or a registered body of persons which
maintains a recognised Educational Institution or Institutions.
21. The Respondent-Society, though formed as an
association, was registered as a Society under the Karnataka
Societies Registration Act, 1960. Clause 4 of the Byelaws of the
Respondent-Society provides for the Objectives of the Society,
which are extracted as hereunder:
“ 04. Objectives :
1) Welfare and revival of institutions imparting
quality education, technical, medical and spiritual
education to promote nationalism, universal
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WA No. 361 of 2024
brotherhood among Indians and strengthening of
administrative systems.
2) Encouraging educational development and
social service activities undertaken by private
educational institutions within the framework of
the Constitution and providing effective protection
for the achievement of these objectives.
3) Urging the government to implement uniform
policy rules and follow remedial measures for
adequate management of already established
private aided schools and colleges without
discrimination of all facilities applicable to
government schools.
4) Efforts will be made to give permission to start
various skill development training courses in
private aided educational institutions and provide
grants.
5) Establishing library and reading rooms for
public.
6) Organizing seminars, workshops, special
lectures related to education and publishing
periodicals related to educational development.
7) To try to create a grant commission for lower
level educational institutions such as primary and
secondary institutions on the model of UGC at
central government level for the development of
higher educational institutions.
8) To impart qualitative education to Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Class children of the region
in the aided schools of the state in addition to
Kannada medium locally.
9) To draw the attention of the Government to
establish Primary and Secondary Education
Development Council at the State level.
10) For the development of primary and
secondary educational institutions, action should
be taken to provide supplementary grants for the
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WA No. 361 of 2024
construction of laboratory, library, teaching
materials. The government will provide an annual
grant to this institution to develop a program to
improve the quality of education by developing
primary and secondary education institutions in
the state.
11) Organizing programs to provide all kinds of
facilities available from the government to the
members of the association and making good use
of the government schemes by organizing
meetings, seminars and conferences to make
people aware.
12) Celebrating birthdays of national leaders
collectively and spreading national spirit by
celebrating national festivals.
13) Encouraging the nobles who work for public
welfare by giving honor, memorial, stipend,
rewards."
22. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule would indicate that the
term ‘Management’ expressly includes a registered association
or a registered body of persons only where such association or
body maintains a recognised educational institution or
institutions. Admittedly, the representations were made by the
Respondent-Society on behalf of its member-institutions,
seeking permission to fill up vacant posts in such institutions.
However, a perusal of the objectives of the Respondent-
Society, as extracted hereinabove, does not disclose that the
Society itself maintains any recognised educational institution
or institutions. Its stated objectives are primarily directed
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WA No. 361 of 2024
towards the welfare and development of private aided
educational institutions, securing governmental assistance and
facilities for such institutions, and promoting educational and
social activities. The mere fact that the Society is registered
under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960, and that
its members comprise private aided educational institutions,
would not, by itself, satisfy the requirement contemplated
under Rule 8(e) of the Grant-in-Aid Code. In the absence of
any material to establish that the Respondent-Society
maintains a recognised educational institution or institutions, it
cannot be construed as ‘Management’ within the meaning of
Rule 8(e) of the Grant-in-Aid Code. Consequently, the
Respondent-Society cannot claim the status of a Management
under the said Code for the purpose of invoking Rule 45
thereof.
23. Further, Clause 2 of Annexure I of the 1999 Rules
stipulates that the selecting authority of an educational
institution shall obtain prior permission of the competent
authority to fill up the vacancies. The expression ‘Selecting
Authority’ has to be understood with reference to the scheme of
the 1999 Rules and the nature of the appointment
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WA No. 361 of 2024
contemplated thereunder. It refers to the authority or body
competent to undertake the process of selection and
appointment of employees to the posts in a particular
educational institution, namely, the Management or the duly
constituted authority of such institution. The power to seek
prior permission to fill up vacancies is, therefore, incidental to
and flows from the responsibility of managing the concerned
educational institution and undertaking recruitment thereto.
The Respondent-Society, which merely represents its member-
institutions and does not itself maintain or administer any
recognised educational institution, cannot, merely by virtue of
such representation, be regarded as the Selecting Authority
within the meaning of Clause 2 of Annexure I of the 1999
Rules. The authority to seek permission for filling up vacancies
would vest in the respective Managements or competent
authorities of the member-institutions and cannot be exercised
by the Respondent-Society in its own capacity.
24. We are not in disagreement with the settled position of
law that a writ petition is maintainable by an Association or
Society on behalf of its members, subject to the fulfilment of
the recognised conditions governing representative
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WA No. 361 of 2024
proceedings. However, as observed by the Full Bench of the
Allahabad High Court in UMESH CHAND VINOD KUMAR
( Supra ), the right of an Association or Society to espouse the
cause of its members is not absolute and would depend upon
the nature of the rights sought to be enforced and its authority
to represent such members. Where the rights and interests of
the members are individually affected, the Society cannot,
merely by virtue of its representative character, assume the
role of the concerned member-institutions and espouse their
individual claims before the State Authorities, particularly when
the applicable statutory provisions contemplate that such
representations and requests for permission to fill up vacancies
are to be made by the respective institutions or their
Managements themselves.
Grant-in-Aid is not an absolute or indefeasible right, and the
Respondent-Society — neither being the Management/Selecting
Authority nor having specific authorisation from its member-
institutions — lacks the locus standi to maintain the writ
petition in a representative capacity
25. It is also relevant to observe that Grant-in-Aid is not an
absolute or unconditional right conferred upon an educational
institution. The entitlement to receive Grant-in-Aid is governed
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WA No. 361 of 2024
by the applicable statutory provisions, Rules and policy
decisions of the State Government and is subject to the
institution satisfying the prescribed eligibility conditions, as well
as the financial capacity and policy of the State. Even upon
fulfilment of the eligibility conditions prescribed under the
Grant-in-Aid Code or the relevant Rules, an institution cannot
claim Grant-in-Aid as an indefeasible right. In LAXMIDHAR
PATI v. STATE OF ORISSA (1995 SCC ONLINE ORI 289) ,
the Orissa High Court, while considering the entitlement of
educational institutions to receive Grant-in-Aid upon fulfilment
of the prescribed eligibility criteria, held as under:
“22. The ratio of the aforesaid decisions is not in
doubt or in dispute in any manner whatsoever. By
construing and interpreting the Government
resolutions and the Government circular as
indicated above, we shall have to consider
whether the scheme as framed by the State
Government entitles the recipients to receive
grant-in-aid from the date of their achieving the
eligibility criteria and/or from the date of
notification to indicate that such eligible schools
or their teaching and nonteaching staff are eligible
‘to receive grant-in-aid by approving their
eligibility, or whether the date of release of grant-
in-aid to eligible schools and/or their teaching and
non-teaching staff from the date of actual order of
release having no nexus to the date of approval of
the eligibility criteria. Looking at the scheme
and in particular the provision of law that
there is no absolute right to claim grant-in-
aid and the financial capacity, the economic
potentiality and other developmental work
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WA No. 361 of 2024
of Government have to be considered in
interpreting Article 41 of the Constitution of
India. We are of the considered view that the
Bench decision of this Court reported in 1993 (1)
O.L.R. 77 is correct. The view taken by the
subsequent Division Bench as to entitlement to
grant-in-aid from the date of approval and/or
from the date of achieving the eligibility criteria
does not appear to be good law. The reference is
answered accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid decision reiterates that the fulfilment of
eligibility criteria does not, by itself, confer an automatic
entitlement to receive Grant-in-Aid from the date of such
fulfilment or approval, and that the financial capacity and
developmental priorities of the Government are relevant
considerations in determining such entitlement.
26. In the present case, the grievance arising from the non-
consideration of the representations seeking permission to fill
up vacant posts pertains to the respective member-institutions
and their Managements, who are the authorities competent to
make such representations under the applicable provisions. The
Respondent-Society, not being the Management or Selecting
Authority of the member-institutions, cannot claim to be
directly aggrieved by the non-consideration of representations
which were required to be made by the respective institutions
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WA No. 361 of 2024
or their Managements. Further, the conditions stipulated in
JUSTITIA v. STATE OF KERALA ( Supra ), particularly that the
entire body of members must authorise the Association to
protect their legal rights and that specific authority must exist
to institute a writ petition on behalf of all the members, have
not been satisfied. Admittedly, no resolution of the governing
body or other competent body authorising the Respondent-
Society to institute the writ petition on behalf of its member-
institutions has been placed on record. In the absence of such
authorisation, and having regard to the nature of the statutory
provisions governing the representations and the reliefs sought,
we are of the considered view that the Respondent-Society has
failed to establish the requisite locus standi to maintain the writ
petition in a representative capacity. Accordingly, the second
issue framed by us is answered in favour of the Appellant-
State.
Re: Point (ii):
27. It is the contention of the learned Additional Government
Advocate that vide Notification dated 10.06.2020, the Grant-in-
Aid benefit was restricted for any new Schools and that no
vacant posts would be filled in Grant-in-Aid schools due to the
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WA No. 361 of 2024
financial condition of the State in lieu of COVID-19. Further,
vide letter dated 02.02.2023 bearing No. C8(1)PED High Court
Application No.11667/2022/59/22-23, the State Authority
stated that action was being taken to fill up the vacancies in
secondary education prior to 31.12.2015 and there is no
opportunity to fill up the posts after the said date. Per contra,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Society
has contended that the policy to restrict the filling of posts to
those vacant up to 31.12.2015 is arbitrary and does not align
with the broader statutory mandate to support educational
institutions comprehensively.
28. The Notification dated 10.06.2020 is reproduced as
hereunder:
“ NOTIFICATION
Subject: Regarding non-consideration of
proposals for salary subsidy for the year 2020-21.
A lot of proposals are being received for salary
subsidy and filling up of vacancies under various
government departments.
Currently in the background of covid-19 severe
economic hardship has been created in the state.
Therefore, many austerity measures have already
been taken and ordered in the government. In the
background explained above, the administrative
departments have been informed to take the
following action.
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WA No. 361 of 2024
1. In the year 2020-21, no new unaided
educational institutions can be subjected to salary
subsidy.
2. Vacancies due to retirement, death,
resignation or any other reasons in aided
institutions cannot be filled in the year 2020-
21. The said rule shall also apply to those
cases which have already been agreed to be
filled by the Finance Department.
3. No fresh consent can be given to fill up
the vacant posts in aided institutions.
4. All these rules shall be applicable to aided
educational institutions/hostels under all
Government Departments and to other aided
institutions including aided educational institutions
which have already received and are to be
received for grant of salary.”
Further, the letter dated 02.02.2023 is reproduced as follows:
“ GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA
Office of the Commissioner of Public Education
Department, Nrupathunga Road, Bangalore-01
No.C8(1)PED High Court Application No.
11667/2022/59/22-23
Date: 02-02-2023
General Secretary to the Government,
Department of School Education and Literacy,
Multi-storied Building, Bangalore.
Sir,
Subject: Writ Application No.11667/2022,
regarding the submission of vacancy information
for submission of affidavit in Daily order dated 05-
01-2023 of Writ Petition filed by Union of
Karnataka State Aided Educational Institutions,
Tumkur District.
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WA No. 361 of 2024
Reference: 1) Government Letter No.ED 106 SEW
2022, Dated 06-09-2022 and 31-01-2023.
2) Writ Petition No.11667/2022 Daily Enquiry
Order dated 05-01-2023.
3) E-mail information from the District Deputy
Director (Administration).
With reference to the above subject and as cited
in Ref. (1), the Government letter dated 31-01-
2023 Karnataka State Aided Educational
Institutions Union, Tumkur District on behalf of
the Writ Petitioner Management Boards against
the writ petition filed in the Hon'ble High Court
against the Government dated 05-01-2023 by the
Writ Petitioner and it is directed to submit
information regarding vacancies in the on-going
aided High schools.
Since the said case is about filling up of
vacancies in colleges of secondary education
and undergraduate department, action is
being taken to fill up the vacancies in
secondary education prior to 31-12-2015 as
per the rules and there is no opportunity to
fill up the posts after that. In this regard the
information as cited in Ref.(3) has been obtained
and codified and the information is enclosed with
this letter and submitted for further action."
The COVID-19 austerity Notification dated 10.06.2020 and the
internal letter dated 02.02.2023 operate in distinct contexts,
and the latter — lacking any disclosed statutory or policy basis
— cannot justify imposing 31.12.2015 as an arbitrary cut-off
date prohibiting the filling of vacancies in aided institutions
29. A perusal of the aforesaid Notification dated 10.06.2020
and the letter dated 02.02.2023 would indicate that the two
communications operate in different contexts and cannot be
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WA No. 361 of 2024
construed as laying down one continuous or uniform policy
prohibiting the filling up of vacancies in aided educational
institutions after a particular date. The Notification dated
10.06.2020 was issued in the backdrop of the economic
hardship faced by the State on account of the COVID-19
pandemic. Clause 2 thereof expressly provides that vacancies
arising on account of retirement, death, resignation or any
other reason in aided institutions cannot be filled during the
financial year 2020-21. However, Clause 3, which states that
no fresh consent can be given for filling up vacant posts in
aided institutions, does not specify the period for which such
restriction would operate. While Clause 2 expressly confines the
prohibition to the financial year 2020-21, Clause 3 does not
contain any corresponding temporal limitation. The scope and
duration of the restriction under Clause 3, therefore, remain
unclear, particularly when the Notification, read as a whole,
was issued in the context of the financial difficulties arising
during the COVID-19 pandemic. In any event, the Notification
does not prescribe 31.12.2015 as a cut-off date for filling up
vacancies, nor does it expressly impose a permanent
prohibition against recruitment in aided institutions.
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WA No. 361 of 2024
30. On the other hand, the letter dated 02.02.2023, issued
during the pendency of the writ proceedings, states that action
was being taken to fill up vacancies in secondary education
which had arisen prior to 31.12.2015 and that there was no
opportunity to fill up posts arising thereafter. However, the
letter does not disclose the statutory provision, Government
Order or policy decision under which 31.12.2015 was adopted
as the cut-off date, nor does it explain the rationale for
selecting the said date. The letter also does not clarify whether
the restriction is founded upon Clause 3 of the Notification
dated 10.06.2020 or upon any subsequent decision of the
Government. Further, it is a communication issued by the
Commissioner of Public Instruction to the Government in
response to the proceedings before this Court and does not, by
itself, constitute an independent Government Order or
Notification prescribing a general policy governing recruitment
in aided institutions. Thus, while the Notification dated
10.06.2020 imposes a restriction in the context of the financial
year 2020-21, the letter dated 02.02.2023 proceeds on the
premise that vacancies arising after 31.12.2015 cannot be
filled, without disclosing the source or legal basis for such
restriction. The distinction between these two communications
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WA No. 361 of 2024
is material, and the latter cannot, in the absence of an
underlying Government decision or policy, be treated as
sufficient justification for imposing a continuing prohibition on
filling up vacancies arising after 31.12.2015.
Executive instructions cannot operate in a field occupied by
legislation, and the Notification dated 10.06.2020 — issued
under the guise of regulating Grant-in-Aid under Section 52(2)
of the 1983 Act — cannot override the statutory framework or
impose a continuing prohibition on recruitment under the 1999
Rules
31. It is submitted by the learned Additional Government
Advocate that the Notification dated 10.06.2020 was issued in
exercise of the power granted under Section 52(2) of the 1983
Act. Section 52 reads as follows:
“ 52. Application for sanction of grant and the
conditions to be fulfilled on such sanction.-
(1) Every application for the sanction of grant
shall be made to the State Government, in such
form as may be prescribed and shall contain a
declaration signed by the Governing Council of the
44 Education recognised institution to the effect
that the conditions of recognition and of grant are
being and shall continue to be fully observed, that
all facilities for inspection of that institution, its
accounts, registers and other records relating to
the grant shall be afforded to the inspecting staff
deputed for the purpose and that all the returns
and reports prescribed in this behalf shall be
submitted to the competent authority within the
time specified by it.
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WA No. 361 of 2024
(2) The State Government may sanction
such grant or for good and sufficient reasons
refuse to sanction such grant.
(3) Subject to the other provisions of this
Act, any order passed by the State
Government refusing to sanction the grant
shall be final and shall not be questioned in
any court of law. ”
32. Section 52(2) of the 1983 Act empowers the State
Government to sanction Grant-in-Aid or, for good and sufficient
reasons, refuse to sanction such grant. The provision, however,
does not expressly confer upon the State Government any
independent power to impose a general prohibition on the filling
up of vacancies in aided educational institutions. It essentially
contemplates the consideration of applications seeking sanction
of Grant-in-Aid and empowers the Government to take an
appropriate decision thereon in accordance with the statutory
requirements. No doubt, in exercise of its executive power
under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, the State
Government is competent to formulate policies and issue
executive instructions regulating the sanction and disbursement
of grant-in-aid, having regard to its financial resources and
other relevant considerations. Such executive power, however,
must be exercised consistently with the provisions of the
Constitution and the statutory framework governing the
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WA No. 361 of 2024
subject. The power to sanction or refuse Grant-in-Aid cannot,
by itself, be construed as conferring an independent authority
to prohibit recruitment or filling up of vacancies in aided
educational institutions, particularly where the subject of
recruitment and conditions of service is governed by statutory
provisions and Rules.
33. The limits of executive power under Article 162 of the
Constitution of India have been explained by the Supreme
Court in BISHAMBER DAYAL CHANDRA MOHAN v. STATE
OF U.P. [(1982) 1 SCC 39] , wherein it was held that the
executive power of the State is co-extensive with its legislative
power, but cannot be exercised in contravention of the
provisions of the Constitution or any law made by the
Legislature. The executive Government may issue orders and
instructions in matters falling within its domain, particularly
where the field is not occupied by legislation. However, such
executive instructions cannot take the place of legislation or
override the statutory provisions governing the subject. The
executive power is intended to supplement the law and
facilitate its implementation and cannot be invoked to introduce
restrictions or conditions inconsistent with the legislative
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scheme. Thus, where the Legislature has enacted provisions
governing a particular field, the State Government cannot, by
issuing administrative orders, circulars, instructions or
notifications, amend, modify or supplant those provisions or
alter the rights and obligations flowing therefrom. The
executive action must, therefore, remain within the limits of the
authority conferred by law and cannot be employed to achieve
indirectly what the Government is not empowered to do under
the governing statute. Consequently, while the State
Government may regulate matters relating to the sanction and
disbursement of Grant-in-Aid through appropriate executive
instructions, such instructions cannot override or dilute the
statutory provisions governing recruitment and the conditions
of service of employees in aided educational institutions.
34. The Supreme Court, in STATE OF SIKKIM v. DORJEE
TSHERING BHUTIA [(1991) 4 SCC 243] , has reiterated the
aforesaid principle and held that the executive power of the
State cannot be exercised in a field which is already occupied
by laws made by the Legislature and that any order,
instruction, direction or notification issued in exercise of such
executive power, if contrary to the statutory provisions, would
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be without jurisdiction and a nullity. The underlying principle is
that the source of executive authority cannot be invoked to
defeat the very law within whose framework the executive is
required to function. Consequently, the validity of an executive
instruction or notification cannot be determined merely by
reference to the authority of the Government to formulate
policy or to regulate expenditure. It must also be examined
whether the subject matter is governed by statutory provisions
and whether the executive measure is consistent with those
provisions. The existence of a general executive power does not
confer upon the Government an independent authority to
disregard the statutory restrictions, procedures or obligations
prescribed by the Legislature. Where the statute has conferred
powers upon specified authorities and has prescribed the
manner in which those powers are to be exercised, the
executive cannot, by an administrative decision, substitute a
different procedure or impose additional restrictions which have
no sanction under the statute.
35. In the present case, the Notification dated 10.06.2020 is
sought to be justified by the learned Additional Government
Advocate on the basis of Section 52(2) of the 1983 Act and the
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financial constraints faced by the State Government during the
COVID-19 pandemic. As noticed hereinabove, Section 52(2)
empowers the State Government to sanction or refuse to
sanction Grant-in-Aid for good and sufficient reasons. Such
power enables the Government to take appropriate decisions in
relation to the sanction of grant-in-aid, having regard to the
statutory requirements and the financial capacity of the State.
However, the said provision cannot be construed as conferring
an unrestricted power to regulate or prohibit recruitment in
aided educational institutions, particularly where the
recruitment process is governed by separate statutory
provisions and Rules. The distinction between the power to
sanction or refuse financial assistance and the power to
regulate the filling up of vacancies must be borne in mind.
Merely because the State Government is competent to regulate
the disbursement of grant-in-aid, it does not follow that it can,
by an executive notification, dispense with or override the
procedure prescribed under the recruitment Rules. The financial
implications arising from appointments may constitute a
relevant consideration while deciding the question of sanction
of Grant-in-aid. Nevertheless, such consideration cannot, by
itself, confer a power which the statute does not contemplate.
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36. Therefore, the Notification dated 10.06.2020, being an
executive instrument, cannot be construed as having the effect
of amending or overriding the provisions of the 1999 Rules or
the other statutory provisions governing recruitment in aided
educational institutions. If the Notification is intended merely to
regulate the sanction and disbursement of Grant-in-Aid in view
of the financial exigencies prevailing during the financial year
2020-21, its operation must be understood in that context and
within the limits of the authority available to the State
Government. However, if it is sought to be relied upon as a
source of power to impose a general or continuing prohibition
on the filling up of vacancies, independent of the statutory
recruitment framework, such an interpretation would amount to
permitting the executive to occupy a field already regulated by
legislation. The State Government cannot, under the guise of
regulating Grant-in-Aid or exercising its financial powers,
introduce a restriction which has the effect of nullifying the
statutory provisions governing recruitment.
37. Further, we find no discernible or rational basis for
prescribing 31.12.2015 as the cut-off date for permitting the
filling up of vacancies in aided educational institutions. It is no
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doubt true that the financial capacity of the State and the
economic constraints faced by it are relevant considerations
while formulating a policy governing the sanction and
disbursement of grant-in-aid. The State Government is entitled
to regulate its financial commitments and cannot be compelled
to incur expenditure without having regard to its available
resources and budgetary priorities. However, the existence of
financial constraints, by itself, does not explain the rationale for
selecting a particular date as the cut-off for permitting
recruitment. In the present case, the Notification dated
10.06.2020 was issued in the backdrop of the financial
difficulties arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic and, under
Clause 2 thereof, the restriction on filling up vacancies was
expressly confined to the financial year 2020-21. Though
Clause 3 provides that no fresh consent shall be given for filling
up vacant posts, it does not specify the period for which such
restriction is intended to operate.
38. More importantly, neither the said Notification nor the
letter dated 02.02.2023 discloses the basis on which
31.12.2015 came to be adopted as the cut-off date. The letter
dated 02.02.2023 merely states that vacancies arising prior to
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the said date were being considered for filling up and that there
was no opportunity to fill up vacancies arising thereafter. It
does not identify any Government Order, Cabinet decision or
other policy determination which prescribed the said date, nor
does it set out the reasons or material which weighed with the
Government in selecting that date. Further, the restriction
contemplated under the Notification dated 10.06.2020, which
was issued in the context of the financial exigencies prevailing
during the year 2020-21, cannot, without any further material
or decision of the Government, be treated as the basis for
imposing a continuing prohibition in respect of vacancies arising
after 31.12.2015. The two communications, therefore, operate
in different contexts and do not establish any rational nexus
between the financial constraints relied upon by the State and
the particular cut-off date adopted. We are, therefore, of the
considered view that, in the absence of any disclosed material
or discernible rationale justifying the selection of 31.12.2015 as
the cut-off date, the restriction is arbitrary and cannot be
sustained merely on the general ground of financial constraints.
While the Courts do not ordinarily sit in appeal over executive
policy decisions or economic choices, judicial review remains
available to examine whether an administrative action or policy
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is tainted by illegality, arbitrariness, irrationality, or
contravenes statutory provisions.
39. We are conscious of the settled position of law that the
Courts, while exercising the power of judicial review, do not
ordinarily sit in appeal over the policy decisions of the
Government or examine the wisdom, expediency or desirability
of a particular policy. The formulation of policy, particularly in
matters involving financial resources, economic considerations
and allocation of public funds, primarily falls within the domain
of the executive. The Court cannot substitute its own view for
that of the Government merely because another policy may
appear to be fairer, more beneficial or more appropriate.
Nevertheless, the power of judicial review is not altogether
excluded in respect of policy decisions or executive actions. The
Court is entitled to examine whether the decision has been
taken by the competent authority, whether it is founded upon
relevant considerations, whether the procedure adopted is fair
and whether the decision is arbitrary, irrational, discriminatory
or mala fide. Unless the decision is shown to be arbitrary, mala
fide or wholly unrelated to the stated public purpose, this Court
cannot substitute its own assessment for that of the competent
authority. (See UNION OF INDIA, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,
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ESTATE MANAGEMENT UNIT (DRDO) v. STATE OF
KARNATAKA & OTHERS ( W.A. No. 2121 of 2015 &
CONNECTED MATTERS, DECIDED ON 21.09.2026 BY THE
. A policy decision which is
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT) )
contrary to statutory provisions, or which fails to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of non-arbitrariness under Article 14
of the Constitution of India would certainly be amenable to
judicial review.
40. The Supreme Court in BALCO EMPLOYEES' UNION v.
UNION OF INDIA [(2002) 2 SCC 333] has held that the
wisdom or advisability of an economic policy is ordinarily not a
matter for judicial scrutiny and that the Court may interfere
where the policy decision is palpably arbitrary, discriminatory or
mala fide. The relevant paragraphs are as follows:
“34. Applying the analogy, just as the court
does not sit over the policy of Parliament in
enacting the law, similarly, it is not for this
Court to examine whether the policy of this
disinvestment is desirable or not. Dealing with
the powers of the Court while considering the
validity of the decision taken in the sale of certain
plants and equipment of the Sindri Fertilizer
Factory, which was owned by a public sector
undertaking, to the highest tenderer, this Court in
Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union
of India [(1981) 1 SCC 568] SCC 568 at p. 584,
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while upholding the decision to sell, observed as
follows: (SCC para 35)
“We certainly agree that judicial interference
with the administration cannot be meticulous
in our Montesquien system of separation of
powers. The Court cannot usurp or abdicate,
and the parameters of judicial review must
be clearly defined and never exceeded. If the
directorate of a government company has
acted fairly, even if it has faltered in its
wisdom, the court cannot, as a superauditor,
take the board of directors to task. This
function is limited to testing whether the
administrative action has been fair and free
from the taint of unreasonableness and has
substantially complied with the norms of
procedure set for it by rules of public
administration.”
36. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4
SCC 566] the change of the policy decision taken
by the State of Madhya Pradesh to grant licence
for construction of distilleries for manufacture and
supply of country liquor to existing contractors
was challenged. Dealing with the power of the
Court in considering the validity of policy decision
relating to economic matters, it was observed at
pp. 605-06 as follows: (SCC para 34)
“34. But, while considering the applicability
of Article 14 in such a case, we must bear in
mind that, having regard to the nature of the
trade or business, the Court would be slow to
interfere with the policy laid down by the
State Government for grant of licences for
manufacture and sale of liquor. The Court
would, in view of the inherently pernicious
nature of the commodity allow a large
measure of latitude to the State Government
in determining its policy of regulating,
manufacture and trade in liquor. Moreover,
the grant of licences for manufacture and
sale of liquor would essentially be a matter of
economic policy where the Court would
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hesitate to intervene and strike down what
the State Government has done, unless it
appears to be plainly arbitrary, irrational or
mala fide. We had occasion to consider
the scope of interference by the Court
under Article 14 while dealing with laws
relating to economic activities in R.K.
Garg v. Union of India [(1981) 4 SCC
675 : 1982 SCC (Tax) 30] . We pointed
out in that case that laws relating to
economic activities should be viewed
with greater latitude than laws touching
civil rights such as freedom of speech,
religion, etc. We observed that the
legislature should be allowed some play
in the joints because it has to deal with
complex problems which do not admit of
solution through any doctrinaire or
strait-jacket formula and this is
particularly true in case of legislation
dealing with economic matters, where,
having regard to the nature of the
problems required to be dealt with,
greater play in the joints has to be
allowed to the legislature. We quoted with
approval the following admonition given by
Frankfurter, J. in Morey v. Doud [354 US 457
: 1 L Ed 2d 1485 (1957)] :
‘In the utilities, tax and economic
regulation cases, there are good
reasons for judicial self-restraint if
not judicial deference to legislative
judgment. The legislature after all
has the affirmative responsibility.
The courts have only the power to
destroy, not to reconstruct. When
these are added to the complexity of
economic regulation, the
uncertainty, the liability to error, the
bewildering conflict of the experts,
and the number of times the Judges
have been overruled by events —
self-limitation can be seen to be the
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path to judicial wisdom and
institutional prestige and stability.’
What we said in that case in regard to
legislation relating to economic matters
must apply equally in regard to
executive action in the field of economic
activities, though the executive decision
may not be placed on as high a pedestal
as legislative judgment insofar as
judicial deference is concerned. We
must not forget that in complex
economic matters every decision is
necessarily empiric and it is based on
experimentation or what one may call
‘trial and error method’ and, therefore,
its validity cannot be tested on any rigid
‘a priori’ considerations or on the
application of any strait-jacket formula.
The Court must while adjudging the
constitutional validity of an executive
decision relating to economic matters
grant a certain measure of freedom or
‘play in the joints’ to the executive. ‘The
problem of Government’ as pointed out
by the Supreme Court of the United
States in Metropolis Theater Co. v. State
of Chicago [57 L Ed 730 : 228 US 61
(1912)] ‘are practical ones and may
justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations, illogical, it may be,
and unscientific. But even such criticism
should not be hastily expressed. What is
best is not discernible, the wisdom of
any choice may be disputed or
condemned. Mere errors of Government
are not subject to our judicial review. It
is only its palpably arbitrary exercises
which can be declared void’.
The Government, as was said in Permian
Basin Area Rate cases [20 L Ed 2d 312 : 390
US 747 (1968)] , is entitled to make
pragmatic adjustments which may be called
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for by particular circumstances. The Court
cannot strike down a policy decision taken by
the State Government merely because it
feels that another policy decision would have
been fairer or wiser or more scientific or
logical. The Court can interfere only if the
policy decision is patently arbitrary,
discriminatory or mala fide. It is against
the background of these observations and
keeping them in mind that we must now
proceed to deal with the contention of the
petitioners based on Article 14 of the
Constitution.”
42. While considering the validity of the industrial
policy of the State of Madhya Pradesh relating to
the agreements entered into for supply of sal
seeds for extracting oil in M.P. Oil Extraction v.
State of M.P. [(1997) 7 SCC 592] the Court at p.
610-11 held as follows: (SCC para 41)
“41. After giving our careful consideration to
the facts and circumstances of the case and
to the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties, it appears to us that
the Industrial Policy of 1979 which was
subsequently revised from time to time
cannot be held to be arbitrary and based on
no reason whatsoever but founded on mere
ipse dixit of the State Government of M.P.
The executive authority of the State
must be held to be within its
competence to frame a policy for the
administration of the State. Unless the
policy framed is absolutely capricious
and, not being informed by any reason
whatsoever, can be clearly held to be
arbitrary and founded on mere ipse dixit
of the executive functionaries thereby
offending Article 14 of the Constitution
or such policy offends other
constitutional provisions or comes into
conflict with any statutory provision, the
Court cannot and should not outstep its
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limit and tinker with the policy decision
of the executive functionary of the
State. This Court, in no uncertain terms,
has sounded a note of caution by
indicating that policy decision is in the
domain of the executive authority of the
State and the Court should not embark
on the unchartered ocean of public
policy and should not question the
efficacy or otherwise of such policy so
long the same does not offend any
provision of the statute or the
Constitution of India. The supremacy of
each of the three organs of the State i.e.
legislature, executive and judiciary in
their respective fields of operation
needs to be emphasised. The power of
judicial review of the executive and
legislative action must be kept within
the bounds of constitutional scheme so
that there may not be any occasion to
entertain misgivings about the role of
judiciary in outstepping its limit by
unwarranted judicial activism being
very often talked of in these days. The
democratic set-up to which the polity is
so deeply committed cannot function
properly unless each of the three organs
appreciate the need for mutual respect
and supremacy in their respective
fields. ”
(emphasis added)
47. Process of disinvestment is a policy decision
involving complex economic factors. The courts
have consistently refrained from interfering
with economic decisions as it has been
recognised that economic expediencies lack
adjudicative disposition and unless the
economic decision, based on economic
expediencies, is demonstrated to be so
violative of constitutional or legal limits on
power or so abhorrent to reason, that the
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courts would decline to interfere. In matters
relating to economic issues, the Government
has, while taking a decision, right to “trial
and error” as long as both trial and error are
bona fide and within limits of authority.
There is no case made out by the petitioner that
the decision to disinvest in BALCO is in any way
capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed…
93. Wisdom and advisability of economic
policies are ordinarily not amenable to
judicial review unless it can be
demonstrated that the policy is contrary to
any statutory provision or the Constitution.
In other words, it is not for the courts to
consider relative merits of different
economic policies and consider whether a
wiser or better one can be evolved. For
testing the correctness of a policy, the
appropriate forum is Parliament and not the
courts. Here the policy was tested and the
motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1-3-2001.
98. In the case of a policy decision on
economic matters, the courts should be very
circumspect in conducting any enquiry or
investigation and must be most reluctant to
impugn the judgment of the experts who
may have arrived at a conclusion unless the
court is satisfied that there is illegality in the
decision itself. ”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Similarly, in TATA CELLULAR v. UNION OF INDIA
[(1994) 6 SCC 651] , the Supreme Court, while delineating
the scope and limitations of judicial review in matters involving
administrative discretion and policy decisions, has held that the
Court is primarily concerned with examining the legality and
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fairness of the decision-making process and not with
substituting its own opinion on the merits or wisdom of the
decision. The Court further observed that judicial review is
intended to ensure that the administrative authority exercises
its powers within the limits prescribed by law and does not act
arbitrarily, irrationally or for an improper purpose. The relevant
observations of the Supreme Court are extracted hereinbelow:
“70. It cannot be denied that the principles of
judicial review would apply to the exercise of
contractual powers by Government bodies in
order to prevent arbitrariness or favouritism.
However, it must be clearly stated that there are
inherent limitations in exercise of that power of
judicial review. Government is the guardian of the
finances of the State. It is expected to protect the
financial interest of the State. The right to refuse
the lowest or any other tender is always available
to the Government. But, the principles laid down
in Article 14 of the Constitution have to be kept in
view while accepting or refusing a tender. There
can be no question of infringement of Article 14 if
the Government tries to get the best person or
the best quotation. The right to choose cannot
be considered to be an arbitrary power. Of
course, if the said power is exercised for any
collateral purpose the exercise of that power
will be struck down.
71. Judicial quest in administrative matters
has been to find the right balance between
the administrative discretion to decide
matters whether contractual or political in
nature or issues of social policy; thus they
are not essentially justiciable and the need
to remedy any unfairness. Such an
unfairness is set right by judicial review.
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74. Judicial review is concerned with
reviewing not the merits of the decision in
support of which the application for judicial
review is made, but the decision-making
process itself.
75. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police
v. Evans [(1982) 3 All ER 141, 154] Lord
Brightman said:
“Judicial review, as the words imply, is
not an appeal from a decision, but a
review of the manner in which the
decision was made.
*
Judicial review is concerned, not with
the decision, but with the decision-
making process. Unless that restriction
on the power of the court is observed,
the court will in my view, under the
guise of preventing the abuse of power,
be itself guilty of usurping power.”
77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the
question of legality. Its concern should be:
1. Whether a decision-making authority
exceeded its powers?
2. Committed an error of law,
3. committed a breach of the rules of
natural justice,
4. reached a decision which no reasonable
tribunal would have reached or,
5. abused its powers.
Therefore, it is not for the court to determine
whether a particular policy or particular
decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy
is fair. It is only concerned with the manner
in which those decisions have been taken.
The extent of the duty to act fairly will vary
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from case to case. Shortly put, the grounds
upon which an administrative action is
subject to control by judicial review can be
classified as under:
(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker
must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and
must give effect to it.
(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury
unreasonableness.
(iii) Procedural impropriety."
(emphasis supplied)
The aforesaid principles make it clear that while the Court
cannot undertake an assessment of the relative merits of
competing policies, it can certainly examine whether the policy
adopted by the Government has a rational and discernible basis
and whether the resultant action conforms to the constitutional
mandate of fairness and non-arbitrariness. A `State' is entitled
to fix a cut-off date. Such a decision can be struck down only
when it is arbitrary. Its invalidation may also depend upon the
question as to whether it has a rational nexus with the object
sought to be achieved (See COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC &
INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH & OTHERS v. RAMESH CHANDRA
AGARWAL & ANOTHER [(2009) 3 SCC 35] ) .
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While the financial capacity and economic constraints of the
State are relevant considerations in determining the sanction of
Grant-in-Aid, the State cannot rely upon general difficulties to
impose an arbitrary cut-off date without a lawful and rational
basis
42. At the same time, it is equally well settled that the
financial capacity of the State is a relevant consideration in
determining the extent and manner in which Grant-in-Aid may
be sanctioned to educational institutions. In STATE OF
ODISHA v. ANUP KUMAR SENAPATI [(2019) 19 SCC
626] , the Supreme Court considered the question of
entitlement to grant-in-aid under the provisions of the Orissa
Education Act, 1969 and the Grant-in-Aid Orders framed
thereunder. The issue before the Court was whether the
employees of non-government educational institutions could
claim Grant-in-Aid under the earlier Grant-in-Aid Order, 1994,
notwithstanding its subsequent repeal and the introduction of a
revised scheme under the Grant-in-Aid Order, 2004. While
considering the said issue, the Supreme Court held that Grant-
in-Aid could not be claimed as a matter of absolute right merely
upon fulfilment of the prescribed eligibility conditions or
completion of the qualifying period. The sanction and release of
Grant-in-Aid are governed by the applicable statutory
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provisions and the scheme framed by the Government and are
also dependent upon the financial capacity and economic
resources of the State. The Court further recognised that
financial constraints constitute a relevant consideration for the
Government in formulating or modifying its grant-in-aid policy
and that the State cannot be compelled to extend financial
assistance beyond its economic capacity. The Court, therefore,
recognised the discretion of the State Government in
determining the manner and extent of financial assistance to be
extended to educational institutions, subject to the governing
statutory framework.
43. The aforesaid decision is relevant to the present case, as
Section 7-C of the Orissa Education Act, 1969, considered by
the Supreme Court, and Section 52 of the Karnataka Education
Act, 1983, operate on a similar statutory premise insofar as
they recognise the discretion of the State Government in the
matter of sanction of Grant-in-Aid. Consequently, the
Respondent-Society or its member-institutions cannot claim
sanction of Grant-in-Aid as an indefeasible right merely on the
ground that they satisfy the prescribed eligibility conditions. At
the same time, the principle laid down in the said decision does
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WA No. 361 of 2024
not dispense with the requirement that any restriction imposed
by the State Government must have a lawful basis and must
conform to the applicable statutory provisions and the
constitutional requirement of non-arbitrariness. The principle
that the financial capacity of the State is a relevant
consideration in determining the entitlement to Grant-in-Aid
has also been recognised in LAXMIDHAR PATI (Supra) .
44. Thus, we do not dispute the authority of the State
Government to take into consideration its financial resources
and economic constraints while deciding whether and to what
extent Grant-in-Aid should be sanctioned. However, the
recognition of financial constraints as a relevant consideration
does not dispense with the requirement that the policy adopted
by the State must have a rational basis and be supported by
relevant material. We are aware of the settled position of law
that fixing of cut-off dates keeping in view the economic
conditions, financial constraints and other circumstances is
within the domain of the executive authority and the Court
should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by
the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the
face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary (See GOVT. OF
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A.P. v. N. SUBBARAYUDU [(2008) 14 SCC 702] ) . However,
the State cannot rely upon the general existence of financial
difficulties to justify the selection of an arbitrary cut-off date,
particularly when neither the Notification dated 10.06.2020 nor
the letter dated 02.02.2023 discloses the basis for fixing
31.12.2015 as the relevant date. We are, therefore, of the
considered view that while the financial constraints of the State
may constitute a valid consideration in regulating the sanction
and disbursement of grant-in-aid, the restriction on filling up
vacancies arising after 31.12.2015, in the absence of any
disclosed policy decision or rational basis for adopting the said
date, cannot be sustained.
The competent authority must decide recruitment permission
applications through an institution-specific, reasoned
assessment balancing financial constraints against statutory
staffing norms — without mechanically invoking the Notification
dated 10.06.2020 or the 31.12.2015 cut-off date in the letter
dated 02.02.2023 — upon individual applications submitted
directly by the concerned aided educational institutions'
Managements
45. There is yet another aspect which requires consideration.
The refusal to permit the filling up of vacancies in aided
educational institutions may have consequences beyond the
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immediate financial implications for the State. The statutory
framework governing such institutions contemplates
maintenance of the prescribed staffing pattern and the requisite
number of teachers, having regard to the nature of the
institution and the strength of students. Where a vacancy
arises on account of retirement, resignation, promotion or
death, and the applicable Rules require the prior permission of
the competent authority before the vacancy can be notified and
filled up, refusal to grant such permission may result in the
institution being unable to maintain the prescribed teaching
strength. Consequently, the institution may be placed in a
position where, despite being required to comply with the
staffing norms prescribed under the applicable Rules, it is
prevented from undertaking the recruitment necessary to
maintain such norms.
46. In this regard, it is necessary to harmonise the
obligations of the management of an aided educational
institution with the powers vested in the State Government and
the competent authorities under the Act and the Rules. No
doubt, the primary responsibility of providingthe requisite
infrastructure and teaching and non-teaching staff rests with
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the management of the private educational institution. The
management cannot, merely on the ground that the State has
declined to extend Grant-in-Aid, claim that it is absolved of its
obligations under the applicable statutory provisions. Equally,
however, where the statutory framework requires prior
permission of the competent authority before a vacancy can be
filled up, the authority cannot exercise such power in an
arbitrary or mechanical manner, without having regard to the
actual staffing position of the institution and the consequences
of leaving the vacancy unfilled.
47. The competent authority, while considering a request for
permission to fill up a vacancy, is therefore required to take
into consideration not merely the financial implications of the
proposed appointment, but also the sanctioned strength of the
institution, the number of teachers presently working, the
student strength, the applicable staffing pattern and the extent
to which the continued non-filling of the vacancy would affect
the institution's ability to comply with the prescribed norms and
impart education effectively. The nature of the vacancy, the
circumstances in which it arose, the applicable reservation
roster and the other requirements prescribed under the
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relevant Rules would also be relevant considerations. A decision
refusing permission, without considering these aspects and
merely by reference to a general prohibition or an unexplained
cut-off date, would not constitute a proper exercise of the
discretion vested in the competent authority.
48. At the same time, it must be made clear that the
aforesaid considerations do not confer upon an aided
educational institution an indefeasible right to fill up every
vacancy or to claim Grant-in-Aid towards the salary of every
person appointed against such vacancy. The State Government
is entitled to take into account its financial capacity, budgetary
commitments and other relevant considerations while
determining the extent and manner of Grant-in-Aid. The
management is also required to comply with the statutory
requirements governing recruitment and cannot proceed to fill
up a vacancy without obtaining the prior permission
contemplated under the applicable Rules. The requirement of
prior permission cannot, therefore, be reduced to a mere
formality or treated as an obligation on the competent authority
to grant permission in every case.
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49. The requirement, however, is that the power to grant or
refuse such permission must be exercised in accordance with
the Act, the applicable Rules and the constitutional requirement
of non-arbitrariness. The competent authority must undertake
an institution-specific assessment and balance the financial
implications for the State against the statutory staffing
requirements and the actual needs of the institution. If
permission is refused, the reasons for such refusal must be
disclosed, particularly where the consequence would be that
the institution continues to function with a teaching strength
below the prescribed requirement. The mere existence of
financial constraints, without an assessment of the relevant
circumstances and without identifying the legal or policy basis
for the refusal, would not be sufficient to sustain a blanket
denial of permission.
50. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the
considered view that the Notification dated 10.06.2020 cannot
be construed as imposing a perpetual prohibition on filling up
vacancies in aided educational institutions. Clause 2 thereof
expressly contemplated a restriction during the financial year
2020-21, in the backdrop of the economic exigencies prevailing
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on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. Clause 3, when read in
the context of the Notification as a whole, cannot be construed
as introducing an indefinite prohibition, independent of the
statutory framework governing recruitment. We are also of the
view that the letter dated 02.02.2023, by itself, does not
constitute an independent Government policy or statutory
instrument capable of imposing a general prohibition on filling
up vacancies arising after 31.12.2015. In the absence of any
disclosed Government decision or material indicating a rational
basis for adopting the said cut-off date, the restriction cannot
be sustained merely on the ground of the financial constraints
of the State.
51. It is, however, necessary to clarify that the aforesaid
conclusion does not mean that every vacancy arising after
31.12.2015 is liable to be filled up or that the State
Government is bound to sanction Grant-in-Aid in respect of
every such vacancy. The question whether permission should
be granted to fill up a particular vacancy must be examined by
the competent authority in the light of the applicable statutory
provisions, Rules, the sanctioned strength, staffing pattern,
student strength, reservation requirements and the financial
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implications involved. The State Government shall also remain
at liberty to formulate an appropriate policy governing the
sanction and disbursement of Grant-in-Aid, having regard to its
financial capacity, provided such policy is consistent with the
Act, the Rules and the Constitution.
52. Coming to the issue of locus standi , we have held that the
Respondent-Society has failed to establish the requisite
authorisation to institute the writ petition on behalf of its
member-institutions and that the representations seeking
permission to fill up vacancies were required to be made by the
respective institutions or their Managements under the
applicable Rules. The Society, therefore, cannot seek a
direction in its own name compelling the competent authority
to grant permission to fill up vacancies in the individual
member-institutions. Nevertheless, the legal position
concerning the scope and operation of the Notification dated
10.06.2020 and the letter dated 02.02.2023, as discussed
hereinabove, shall govern the consideration of applications
made by individual aided educational institutions in accordance
with law.
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53. Accordingly, while the Respondent-Society cannot claim
permission to fill up vacancies on behalf of its member-
institutions, it would be open to each concerned aided
educational institution, through its Management or the
competent authority recognised under the applicable Rules, to
submit an individual representation/application before the
competent authority seeking permission to fill up the vacancy
or vacancies in question. Such application shall contain the
relevant particulars concerning the sanctioned posts, the nature
and date of occurrence of the vacancy, the existing teaching
strength, the student strength, the applicable staffing pattern,
the reservation roster and such other particulars as may be
required under the relevant Rules.
54. Upon receipt of such an application, the competent
authority shall consider the same independently, in accordance
with the applicable statutory provisions and Rules, and shall
take into account the observations made in this judgment. In
particular, the application shall not be rejected solely on the
ground that the vacancy arose after 31.12.2015 or by
mechanically relying upon the letter dated 02.02.2023. The
authority shall also examine whether the continued non-filling
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of the vacancy would result in the institution falling below the
prescribed staffing requirements and the likely impact thereof
on the functioning of the institution. Any decision refusing
permission shall be supported by reasons and communicated to
the concerned institution.
55. We reiterate that the above directions do not dispense
with the requirement of obtaining prior permission under the
applicable Rules, nor do they confer any automatic right upon
the management to fill up the vacancy or upon the appointee to
receive salary or other benefits under the Grant-in-Aid scheme.
The management shall be at liberty to proceed with recruitment
only upon obtaining the requisite permission and thereafter
complying with the prescribed recruitment procedure. The State
Government shall, in turn, be entitled to examine the eligibility
of the post for Grant-in-Aid and the financial implications in
accordance with law in a time-bound manner i.e., within two
months from the date of the receipt of the application.
56. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the issues framed
for consideration are answered accordingly. The writ appeal is
liable to be disposed of in the above terms.
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ORDER
i. The writ appeal is allowed in part .
ii. The order dated 08.12.2023 passed by the
learned Single Judge in W.P. No.11667/2022 is set
aside to the extent it directs the competent
authority to treat the requirement of prior
permission under Clause 2 of Annexure-I to the
Karnataka Educational Institutions (Recruitment and
Terms and Conditions of Services of Employees in
Private Aided Primary and Secondary Educational
Institutions) Rules, 1999 and the applicable
provisions of the Karnataka Pre-University Education
(Academic, Registration, Administration and Grant-
in-Aid etc.) Rules, 2006, as a mere requirement of
intimation and confines the power of the competent
authority to examining compliance with the
reservation roster.
iii. It is declared that the requirement of
obtaining prior permission of the competent
authority, as prescribed under the applicable Rules,
continues to operate and the competent authority is
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entitled to examine all relevant statutory
requirements before granting or refusing such
permission.
iv. The Notification dated 10.06.2020 shall not be
construed as imposing a perpetual or continuing
prohibition on filling up vacancies in aided
educational institutions. The restriction under Clause
2 thereof was expressly confined to the financial
year 2020-21 and Clause 3 thereof shall be
understood in the context of the said Notification
and the financial exigencies for which it was issued.
v. The letter dated 02.02.2023 shall not, by
itself, be treated as an independent Government
policy or statutory instrument imposing a blanket
prohibition on filling up vacancies arising after
31.12.2015. The said cut-off date cannot be
mechanically applied in the absence of an
identifiable Government decision supported by
relevant material and a rational basis.
vi. The Respondent-Society, not being the
Management or Selecting Authority of the individual
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member-institutions, cannot seek permission to fill
up vacancies on their behalf. It shall, however, be
open to each concerned aided educational
institution, through its Management or competent
authority, to submit an individual application
seeking permission to fill up the vacancy or
vacancies in accordance with the applicable Rules.
vii. In the event such applications are submitted,
the competent authority shall consider each
application independently, having regard to the
sanctioned strength, nature and date of occurrence
of the vacancy, existing teaching strength, student
strength, applicable staffing pattern, reservation
roster and other relevant statutory requirements.
viii. While considering such applications, the
competent authority shall also examine whether the
continued non-filling of the vacancy would result in
the institution falling below the prescribed staffing
requirements or adversely affect its ability to impart
education in accordance with the applicable norms.
The financial capacity of the State and the financial
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implications arising from the proposed appointment
shall also be relevant considerations. Such
consideration and decision on the application should
be given and taken within two months from the date
of the receipt of the application.
ix. No application shall be rejected solely on the
ground that the vacancy arose after 31.12.2015 or
by mechanical reliance upon the letter dated
02.02.2023. Any decision refusing permission shall
be supported by justified reasons and
communicated to the concerned institution.
x. It is clarified that the above directions do not
confer upon any institution an automatic right to fill
up a vacancy or to claim Grant-in-Aid in respect of
an appointment made against such vacancy. The
requirement of prior permission and compliance with
the prescribed recruitment procedure shall continue
to apply. The State Government shall be at liberty
to formulate an appropriate policy governing Grant-
in-Aid, having regard to its financial capacity,
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subject to such policy being consistent with the Act,
the Rules and the Constitution.
xi. The findings recorded herein shall not be
construed as directing the State Government to
sanction Grant-in-Aid in respect of any particular
post or appointment. The entitlement of each
institution and the eligibility of the post for Grant-in-
Aid shall be considered in accordance with the
applicable statutory provisions and policy.
xii. In view of the above, all pending interlocutory
applications, if any, stand disposed of.
Sd/-
(D K SINGH)
JUDGE
Sd/-
(H.SHANTHI BHUSHAN)
JUDGE
BKV
CT:SN